

Between Merit and Politics

The selection of Federal Judges in Argentina

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ABSTRACT. In 1998, Argentina established a Judicial Council to select lower federal Courts Judges. The Judicial Council administers examinations to applicants to determine their ranking based upon professional merit. A short list of the top three candidates is sent to the President who then nominates one candidate and asks for the consent of the Senate for his appointment to the bench. The establishment of the Judicial Council resulted from reforms promoted by International Development agencies, such as the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and USAID. It was meant to depoliticize judicial nominations, according to a meritocratic model used mainly by European countries. However, Argentina did not adopt a purely meritocratic system: the membership of the Judicial Council includes politicians (Senators and Representatives), the process permits the modification of merit-based rankings, and the ultimate selection of judges relies upon political decisions by the President and the Senate. In this study, I examine empirically the decisions of the Judicial Council over the last ten years, including all the short-lists and nominations for lower federal Court Judges, to analyze to what extent merit was a determinative factor in the process. Among other findings, the results show that around 70% of the candidates were included in the short-list because of merit, but in the remaining 30% of cases, politics also played a role. At the same time, 70% of the short-lists included at least one candidate chosen because of political factors. These results give an accurate description of how the system works, and illustrate that politics are an important factor in selecting judges in Argentina. Consequently, I argue, the institutional design of the process should be modified to permit an open and public discussion of ideology or moral values of the candidates.

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1. Introduction

Selection of judges has been a highly controversial topic during the last twenty years in Argentina. Judges' lack of independence, political manipulation in their designation, and deficient selection procedures have been a main concern in judicial discussions since the 1990's. Moreover, in the last few years, Judges' associations¹, bar associations², and non-governmental organizations³ have commented on the existence of problems in the selection process of judges.

There is no agreement about what are the real problems in the selection of judges or the possible solutions. This is the case, in part, because it is not clear how the system should work. The 1994 amendment to the Constitution of Argentina created a new institution, the Judicial Council (*Consejo de la Magistratura*), to depolitize and democratize the selection of judges process, and to select them on the basis of merit. But the extent of the depolitization, or the role that merit should play in the process was never clearly established.

This lack of clarity of how the system is supposed to work led to differences between what is done and what justification is used. On the one hand, for some of the Judicial Council's members, the most relevant factor in the selection process is the "merit" of the candidates: proficiency in law and legal experience. For others, ideology and partisanship play a determinative role, but even for them, it is inconvenient discuss them openly. At the same time, the participation of the President and the Senate is part of the process, and these political actors are influenced by their ideology when they conduct their roles. However, discussions about the ideology of the candidates, their moral values or their views on constitutional interpretation are rarely openly present in the selection of judges' debates.

¹See the conclusions of the Second National Judges Conference, Salta 2007, and of the Third National Judges Conference, Santa Fe 2008, available at <http://www.cij.csjn.gov.ar> (last acceded March 2009).

²See Federación Argentina de Colegios de Abogados [Federation of Bar Associations], 03/22/06, Declaration of Tandil, available at http://www.faca.org.ar/noticia.php?noticia_id=208 (last acceded March 2009).

³See, among others, CELS, Annual Report 2007 and 2008, available at <http://www.cels.org.ar> (last acceded March 2009). From a different ideological position, FORES, "La designación de jueces en Argentina", August 2004, at <http://www.foresjusticia.org.ar>.

This prevents civil society from discussing the candidates moral values, and contributes to the poor quality of debates surrounding judicial nominees.

This study empirically analyzes the importance of “merit” in the selection of judges *vis a vis* political considerations, such as ideology, moral values or partisanship. The main purpose of this paper is to describe how the system has worked *in action*, and to which extent merit was a determinative factor in the approval or rejection of judicial nominations.

Knowledge about the actual importance of merit and the real weight of other considerations may promote a robust discussion about the selection of the judiciary, including not only the candidates’ professional qualifications but also their ideology or moral values. Having an accurate description of how the Judicial Council has selected federal Judges may improve the discussion about the appointment of future judicial candidates.

This is an excellent time for this study; ten years after the creation of the Judicial Council, there exists a large quantity of data (not yet compiled) that makes possible empirical analysis of the criteria used in the selection of judges. At the same time, in this 10-year period, two controversial legal reforms modified the process, and the impact of these legal reforms was not analyzed yet.

Comparatively, western democracies adopted two major models of judicial selection . The first assumes that selecting a judge is mainly a bureaucratic decision where the candidate’s professional qualifications are the most important factor. The second model assumes that selecting a judge is basically a political issue where the main concerns are political. In Argentina, after the establishment of the Judicial Council, selection of judges is supposed to be an apolitical matter. The goal of this study is to analyze which model is predominant in Argentina.

The research questions that guide the study are:

- (1) To what extent has the Judicial Council acted according to a meritocratic model, or, alternatively, according to a political model; and so, to what extent was “merit” an important factor in the appointment of judges?

- (2) What was the impact of the two legal reforms that modified the process?
- (3) To what extent civil society could participate in the process?

There are important limitations for this study. First, empirical research is unusual in Argentina; thus, it is difficult to obtain different sources of data that permit cross-analysis among the Judicial Council, the Executive and the Senate. The executive branch publishes almost no data about the selection process, civil society participation, or the criteria used in the selection of the nominees. The Senate has no statistical information about judicial nominations. Even more problematic is that there are no studies about the ideology of Senators, Judges or Judicial Council members,⁴ or ratings about qualifications of the candidates or judges⁵ other than the process at the Judicial Council.

The second limitation is that it was impossible to evaluate independently every factor that influenced the selection of judges, such as ideology, partisanship or moral values. Then, it was not possible to construct a regression model evaluating the weight of each independent variable in the selection of a judge. More research is necessary on this point in order to construct a statistical model evaluating these factors independently. However, the descriptive statistics used therein are still a good starting point to empirically analyze the Judicial Council.

I define “merit” as an objective measure of professional qualifications. The Judicial Council administers one written examination to the candidates, and evaluates their resumes. Those scores decide an initial ranking among the candidates. Operatively, I will use these evaluations as a measure of “merit”, assuming that the evaluation of merit is an objective determination (while acknowledging that complete objectivity is impossible). At the same time, I will englobe all other factors that can influence the selection of a judge —moral values, partisanship, ideology, commitment with democracy, etc—, and call them “political

⁴In Argentina there is nothing like the data compiled by Keith, Pole, DW-NOMINATE Scores, at, <http://voteview.com/dwnomin.htm> (last acceded on March 2009).

⁵Also, nothing like the American Bar Association (ABA) rating of judicial nominees, at <http://www.abanet.org/scfedjud/ratings.html> (last acceded on March 2009).

factors”. They are subjective measures, and difficult to evaluate, but I will try to do it, acknowledging the limitations.

This paper contains six sections. Section 2 presents a theoretical framework that reviews different models of selecting judges, background information about how Judicial Councils arrived to Latin America countries, and, finally, the debate about the establishment of the Judicial Council in Argentina. Section 3 describes the selection process in Argentina, *in the books*. That section provides a necessary background for readers not already familiar with the Argentina judiciary. Section 4 retells the methodology for this research, data collection and includes a description of the population of cases. Section 5 presents the main findings of the study, according to the research questions. And finally Section 6 presents a discussion of the findings, policy recommendations and suggestions for future research.

2. Background

This section provides the historical background on the establishment of the Judicial Council in Argentina. This institutional reform did not occur in a vacuum; on the contrary, the 1990s witnessed the creation of similar councils throughout Latin America. This wave of Judicial Councils was a consequence to multilateral development and cooperation agencies that promoted them as a response to the excessive politicization and lack of independence of most the judicial branches in Latin America. The proposed solution tried to combine the benefits of two different models of selecting judges —meritocratic and political.

This section will recount this history, explain the different models, the problems in Latin America's judiciary, the proposed reforms, and the Argentina's solution.

2.1. Two different selection models. Democracies around the world have different methods for the selection of judges. Judges may be selected based on their judicial career, by popular vote (in partisan or non-partisan elections), political appointment, or in other hybrids methods⁶. Vesting the authority to designate judges in the executive branch, the legislature, the people, other judges, or some combination thereof, has direct implications on the way judicial power will be exercised.⁷ Judges are key players in the political process of allocating values for society, and their role will be determined by the political culture of that society.⁸ The common law system recognizes judges as policy-makers, together with the other branches. In civil law countries, on the contrary, law-making process related responsibilities are assigned exclusively to the legislative power.⁹

The interaction among the method of selecting judges, the judicial function, civil or common law tradition, judicial review and political culture (i.e. presidentialism or parliamentarism) defines the model. In analyzing the institutional design of a given country, it

⁶Kate Malleson, Introduction, in MALLESON AND RUSSELL, *APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER* (UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS, 2006), at 4.

⁷VOLCANSEK, MARY AND LUCIENNE LAFON, JACQUELINE, *JUDICIAL SELECTION, THE CROSS-EVOLUTION OF FRENCH AND AMERICAN PRACTICES* (GREENWOOD PRESS, 1988), at 1.

⁸*Ibidem*, at 2.

⁹MERRYMAN, JOHN AND PÉREZ PERDOMO, ROGELIO, *THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION*, (3rd. edition, 2006), at 36.

is necessary to take into consideration additional factors beyond the written law. However, there are some common features that can be found in different countries and that can be classified according to two models, a meritocratic one and a political one.

2.1.1. *The meritocratic model: examinations and judicial career.* In France, a civil law country, the prevailing view is that the government must be able to act without being second-guessed by courts.¹⁰ When judges supported the *Ancien Régime*, the leaders of the 1789 Revolution paid special attention controlling the judicial function, and took every possible measure to avoid a strong judiciary.¹¹ Consequently, the French judiciary is independent of the legislative and executive branches, but only insofar as to resolve disputes impartially and fairly: judicial courts are subordinated to the political branches. A direct consequence of this subordination is that Courts interpret the law as it comes from the Legislative, without undertaking constitutional review. There is a special body to exercise the constitutional review of laws.¹² In this model, judges' role is considerably less prominent than in other models such as that of the United States'.¹³

The *Ecole Nationale de la Magistrature*(ENM) is in charge of the recruitment of judges, under the assumption that the judicial function is a technical and deductive activity, with no creative or subjective component. The examination for law graduates to be accepted to the ENM is very competitive. Those who pass are appointed as judicial observers, who take a 31 month-long course, taught mainly by judges. At the end of the course, there is another test, and judicial appointments are made according to the score on this test.

The Judiciary is administrated by the *Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature*(CSM), which makes decisions on the placement of new judges and their promotions. To promote judges the CSM conducts oral interviews and receives recommendations from other judges.

¹⁰Provine, Doris Marie and Garapon, Antoine, *The selection of judges in France: searching for a new legitimacy*, in MALLESON AND RUSSELL, op. cit in note 6, at 176.

¹¹Volcansek and Lafon, op. cit., at 62.

¹²Provine and Garapon, at 176. I will follow them in the explication of the recruitment and selection of judges.

¹³MERRIMAN AND PÉREZ PERDOMO, op. cit., at 35.

In this model, the judicial function is unrelated to politics. Independence is necessary to guarantee impartiality in adjudicatory processes, but judges do not have jurisdiction to evaluate governmental policies, or to undertake constitutional review. The highest tribunal is the *Cour de Cassation*. Its decisions are short, made on the narrowest basis possible, and use a formulaic system of decisions, without dissent. In France, “judges are merely the mouth of the law.”

However, there is also a body that undertakes constitutional review: the *Constitutional Council*. This review is made *in abstract* before the promulgation of law. Members of the Constitutional Council are elected by political parties. The President of the Republic, the President of the National Assembly and the President of the Senate each choose three of the nine members, for nine-year terms. Those selected included former Presidents and other prominent individuals with political backgrounds.

In conclusion, in this model it is possible to identify that judges without judicial review powers are selected exclusively by merit in a very apolitical process, and that their promotion is made through a similar process. The judges’ unique function is limited to plainly applying the law. But, at the same time, members of the Constitutional Council—who do have constitutional review powers—are elected in an extremely political process.

Other countries have similar systems, but with certain differences. In Italy—the first country to introduce a Judicial Council, in 1948—for example, there exists the same separation between an ordinary justice system (without powers of judicial review) and a distinct Constitutional Court in charge of constitutional review. The Italian Judicial Council has 30 members, 20 judges and 10 law professors or lawyers with a minimum of fifteen years of professional experience, elected by the Legislative. There is no judicial school, and the only requirement to become a judge is passing one examination. Promotion is by seniority.¹⁴

2.1.2. *The political model: advice and consent.* In other countries, there is a different system to select judges, where political bodies are directly in charge of the decision. This is

¹⁴See Volcansek, Mary, *Judicial selection in Italy: a civil service model with partisan results*, in MALLESON AND RUSSELL, op. cit, at 159.

the case in the appointment of federal judges in the United States. The President nominates one candidate, and the appointment is made “by and with the advice and consent of the Senate”. Substantial literature exist on this topic that is impossible to summarize here. The U.S. system is quite simple: the President chooses a candidate and asks for the Senate’s consent. The Senate may confirm or reject the candidate by simple majority vote.

In the United States there are other informal rules, such as Senatorial courtesy, “blue slip”, and the possibility of filibustering, which make the system more complex in practice. Senatorial courtesy is an informal rule for the selection of district judges where the Senate defers to the criteria of the Senators of presidents’ party who represent the home state of the Court in question.¹⁵ If they find a candidate acceptable, it is likely that the Senate will confirm him or her. On the contrary, if the Senator(s) find the candidate unacceptable, the Senate will usually fail to confirm him or her. The election of the district court nominee is the product of a bargaining process between the President and the Senators of the home state of the Court, that gives to certain Senators the power to recruit candidates and propose their names to the President.¹⁶

The “blue slip” rule is perhaps the institutionalization of the Senatorial Courtesy,¹⁷ with regards to blocking a candidate. When the nomination reaches the Senate, the Counsel for the Judiciary Committee sends out “blue slips” to the two Senators from the nominee’s home state. If the “blue slip” is returned marked “objection” (or is not returned), by any Senator, regardless of the party, the custom is that no hearing will be scheduled. On the contrary, if the “blue slip” is returned marked “no objection”, the Committee schedules confirmation

¹⁵See Johnson, Susan and Songer, Donald, *The influence of Presidential versus home state senatorial preferences on the policy output of judges on the United States district Courts*, 36 LAW & SOC’Y REV 657 (2002), at 659.

¹⁶See ROWLAND AND CARP, *POLITICS AND JUDGMENT IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS*, (UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS PRESS, 1996), at 94.

¹⁷Denning, Bramon, *The Blue Slip: Enforcing the norms of the judicial confirmation process*, 10 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 75, 92 (2001).

hearings.¹⁸ This rule effectively gives a veto to the Senators, even those belonging to a party different from that of the President's.¹⁹

The committee will schedule confirmation hearings to hear testimony from different witnesses, and the candidate himself.²⁰ Interest groups can raise their concerns and gain public attention for their agendas. The political character of the judicial selection process is evident at the hearings,²¹ where questions posed to candidates are related to constitutional interpretation and moral opinions.²² After the hearings, the Committee sends a recommendation to confirm or not to confirm the candidate to the full Senate.

At the floor of the Senate, the third informal rule may appear. Filibuster is another tool—similar to the quorum—that a minority in the Senate can use to block a vote. Senate rules impose a supermajority of 60 votes to end debate and bring a matter to a vote. When one party take the floor with the intention to speak for hours or days, the only way that the opposing party may end the debate is with a majority of 60 votes. For this reason, it is commonly said that sixty percent rather than simple majority of 51, are necessary to pass legislation or appointments.²³ According to Fisk and Chemerinsky, the filibuster of judicial nominations makes it necessary to achieve greater consensus on the candidate, and is an appropriate check on the president's nominating powers.²⁴

¹⁸See GOLDMAN, SHELDON, *PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES* (YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1997), at 12.

¹⁹In its origin in 1913, the blue slip was used only to get advise of the home Senators, rather a veto mechanism. The veto evolution looks like an unintended consequence. See Binder, Sara, *Where do institutions come from? Exploring the origins of the Senate blue slip*, 21 *STUDIES IN AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT*, 1-15 (Spring 2007). However, this rule was changing over the time, and there were periods where an objection was not the end of the nomination. See SCHERER, NANCY, *SCORING POINTS, POLITICIANS, ACTIVISTS AND THE LOWER FEDERAL COURT APPOINTMENT PROCESS* (STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2005), at 141.

²⁰See EPSTEIN AND SEGAL, *ADVICE AND CONSENT* (OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2005), at 92.

²¹Law, David, *Appointing federal judges: the president, the senate, and the prisoner's dilemma*, 26 *CARDOZO LAW REVIEW* 495, 492 (2005), Symposium on Jurocracy and Distrust: reconsidering the federal judicial appointments process.

²²See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, *Questioning Justice: Law and Politics in Judicial Confirmation Hearings*, *YALE L.J.* (THE POCKET PART), Jan. 2006.

²³See Fisk, Catherine and Chemerinsky, Erwin, *The filibuster*, 49 *STANFORD LAW REVIEW* 181, 182 (1997).

²⁴Fisk, Catherine & Chemerinsky, Erwin, *In defense of filibustering judicial nominations*, 26 *CARDOZO LAW REVIEW* 331, 351 (2005), Symposium on Jurocracy and Distrust: reconsidering the federal judicial appointments process.

In this system, both the president and the Senate play crucial roles in the process, and both incorporate politics into their decisions.²⁵ For example, from 1977 to 2004, the Senate has not approved about 20% (69) of the 350 nominees to Federal Circuit Courts, and over 10% (131) of the 1248 nominees to Federal District Courts.²⁶

However, the process is not purely political. Judicial qualifications, ideology and partisanship all play a role in the process. An empirical study about nominations to the Supreme Court showed that when a nominee is perceived as highly unqualified, the likelihood of a negative vote is 25%, and that that probability decreases to 0.2% when the nominee is highly qualified (other things being equal).²⁷ In addition, according to the American Bar Association rating for District judges, among the 1078 appointments made between 1953 and 1989, 5.66% (61) were “exceptionally well qualified”, 45.64% (492) were “well qualified”, 45.83% (494) were “qualified”, and 2% (21) were “not qualified” (with 1% (10) of unrated).²⁸ These numbers show that more than 95% of the judges designated in the period were qualified or well qualified.

In conclusion, the United States’ uses political concerns as as the main criteria to select judges. Its process entails more than just political discretion.²⁹ Nevertheless, the complexity of the U.S. system is rarely found in other countries sharing the same system. Some countries in Latin America, such as Argentina, Mexico, Panama and Nicaragua use a very similar system, at least for the appointment of Supreme Court Justices, but have experienced very different outcomes than in the U.S.

²⁵See EPSTEIN AND SEGAL, op. cit., at 20.

²⁶Ibidem, at 21.

²⁷See Lee Epstein, Jeffrey Segal, Nancy Staudt and Rene Lindstadt, *The role of qualifications in the Confirmation of nominees to the U.S. Supreme Court*, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1145 (2004 – 2005). The dependent variable was “Senator vote (yea or nay)” and the explanatory or independent variables were “lack of qualifications”, “ideological distance”, “lack of qualifications times ideological distance”, “strong president” and “same party”. The data includes all the Supreme Court nominees from 1953 to 1994.

²⁸Data from SHELDON GOLDMAN, *PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES* (YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1997), at 349.

²⁹Of course, there are critics on how the system works in the U.S. Some scholars proposed to modify the system to elect judges by their merits. See Choi, Stephen and Gulati, Mitu, *A tournament of judges*, 92 CAL. L. REV. 299 (2004), and also their critics at Marshall, Williams, *Be careful what you wish for: the problems with using empirical rankings to select Supreme Court justices*, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 119 (2004).

2.2. Judicial reform in Latin America. During the 1990s, most Latin American judicial systems were dependent upon the executive branch,³⁰ weak, and politically conservative. Judges have had little social relevance, and acted both bureaucratically and inefficiently. Codes of judicial procedure —the heritage of the colonial tradition— established a hierarchical and inquisitorial process that placed the administration of justice faraway from the people.³¹ Legal formalism, a non-politization discourse and an exacerbated sense of the separation of powers were the perfect excuses for Judges to maintain judicial status without confronting the political branches.³² The idea of the “science of law”, understood as a rational, non-political, and technical discourse, permitted numerous abuses by powerful actors.³³

In recent years, many Latin American countries decided to amend their constitutions because they were concerned, among other things, by the lack of independence and congenital weakness of the judiciary.³⁴ As a consequence, many countries established (or reformed) a Judicial Council in the 1990s: Argentina (in 1994), Bolivia (1994), Colombia (1981, modified in 1991), Costa Rica (1989), Dominican Republic (1994), Ecuador (1992), El Salvador (1983), Mexico (1995), Panamá (1987) and Paraguay (1992).³⁵ Chile, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua decided not to establish it after the debate.³⁶ This wave of new-created Judicial Councils was not due merely to chance; some common factors —the transition to democracy

³⁰Thome, Joseph, *Heading South but looking north: Globalization and law reform in Latin America*, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 691 (2000), at 702.

³¹For a description of this model, see MIRJAN DAMASKA, *THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO LEGAL PROCESS* (YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1986).

³²See Abramovich, Víctor, *Todos los jueces son crustáceos* [“All Judges Are Like Crabs”]. 8 NO HAY DERECHO 3 (1992).

³³In one extreme, for example, the Supreme Court of Argentina found a legal justification for a military coup d’état. See CSJN, Acordada de 1930.

³⁴See Gargarella, Roberto, *Recientes Reformas constitucionales en America Latina: una primera aproximación*, [Recent constitutional reforms in Latin America: a first approach], 36 DESARROLLO ECONOMICO 144 (1997).

³⁵See MARK UNGER, *ELUSIVE REFORM: DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW IN LATIN AMERICA*, (LYNNE RIENNES PUBLISHER, COLORADO, 2002), at 170.

³⁶See Hammergren, *Do Judicial Councils Further Judicial Reform?*, Carnegie Endowment, Working Paper 28, June 2002. Guatemala rejected the proposal in a popular referendum in 1999 together with another block of reforms. Venezuela (in 1988) and Uruguay (in 1981, as part of the democratic transition) abolished their councils.

of most of the Latin American countries during the 1980s, lack of independent and generally weak judiciaries (probably, in part, because of the military regimes), and reforms towards a market economy— promoted judicial reforms throughout the region.³⁷

Agencies like the World Bank, the Inter American Development Bank and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), shared a common agenda of institutional reforms, after realizing the initial flaws of the Washington Consensus.³⁸ The idea was to pursue institutional reforms to complement the economic reforms. This set of institutional reforms opened the door for a second wave of the law and development movement³⁹ with a new agenda heavily focused on judicial reforms, to promote the rule of law and market economies.

For the World Bank, for example, weak Latin American judiciaries had become an impediment to trade, financing and investment, because of their inefficiency, lengthy case delays, limited access to justice, lack of transparency and predictability, and poor public confidence in the system.⁴⁰ Proposed reforms included, among other measures, the depolitization of judicial appointments. According to a World Bank’s judicial specialist

[A] system based on the highest professional standards and personal integrity will promote quality personnel and quality justice. Judicial appointments that are based on standards to ensure political loyalty only perpetuate the dependence of

³⁷See TEDESCHI ET AL, *CONSEJOS DE LA MAGISTRATURA, LOS CONSEJOS DE LA MAGISTRATURA DE ARGENTINA, BOLIVIA, EL SALVADOR, PARAGUAY Y PERÚ* (PENA Y ESTADO, 2003), chapter 6 Comparative Report.

³⁸The Washington Consensus was a set of ten economic recommendations that the multilateral credit agencies (World Bank, International Monetary Fund) and the United States imposed as condition to give credits to developing countries, including, for instance, privatizations, deregulations, fiscal policy discipline, and trade liberation. This was later known as the basic of *neoliberalism*. See WILLIAMSON, JOHN, *LATIN AMERICAN ADJUSTMENT: HOW MUCH HAS HAPPENED?* (INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, 1990), Ch. 2 *What Washington means by policy reform*.

³⁹Cesar Rodríguez, *Globalización, reforma judicial y Estado de derecho en Colombia y América Latina: el regreso de los programas de derecho y desarrollo* [Globalization, judicial reform and rule of law in Colombia and Latin America: the return of law and development programs], in UPRIMNY, RODRÍGUEZ GARAVITO AND GARCIA VILLEGAS, *JUSTICIA PARA TODOS? SISTEMA JUDICIAL, DERECHOS SOCIALES Y DEMOCRACIA EN COLOMBIA*, (NORMA, 2006) AT 421.

⁴⁰Thome, Joseph, *Heading South but looking north: Globalization and law reform in Latin America*, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 691 (2000), at 697.

the judiciary. It is essential, therefore, that only those individuals truly qualified be considered for judicial positions.⁴¹

and

[I]deally, the appointment process should be reviewed for all levels of the judiciary, since one of the main goals of the reform is to assure that professionals administer justice.⁴²

It is clear that the World Bank prefers highly depoliticized judicial selections and law applied by technicians. This seems to promote an efficient and non-political administration of justice, necessary for the development of a free market. The idea of a politically neutral application of law has a long tradition in the modern legal thought. Langdell first, the American Legal Institute and the Restatements later, and more recently, the Law and Economics movement, have advocated for a politically neutral adjudication of the law.

According to this view, politically neutral judges who administered justice in a non-partisan manner better protect property rights, which, in turn, reduces market transaction costs. Judicial activism and social constitutionalism decrease the efficiency of the market. Judicial reforms played an essential role in trying to reduce transaction costs,⁴³ and establishing clear rules for market players. If property rights are not clearly defined or if the judicial branch has difficulties enforcing contracts or property laws, transaction costs would increase because economic actors would lack certainty about the future of their business.⁴⁴

⁴¹DAKOLIAS, MARIA, THE JUDICIAL SECTOR IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, ELEMENTS TO REFORM, (World Bank technical paper Number 319, 1996), at 13. In another edited version, the author clearly stated that “[T]o ensure integrity and legitimacy of the system, judicial appointments must be made on the basis of the qualifications of candidates, rather than on political considerations”. See Dakolias, Maria, *A strategy for judicial reform: the experience in Latin America*, 36 VA. J. INT’L L. 167, at 178.

⁴²Ibidem, at 20.

⁴³See Mauricio García Villegas, *Justicia, mercado y democracia: un examen crítico de las teorías económicas sobre el (in)cumplimiento del derecho y su relación con el desarrollo, la justicia y la democracia*, [Justice, market and democracy: a critical approach to economic theories on law (dis)obedience and its relationship to development, justice and democracy] in UPRIMNY, RODRÍGUEZ GARAVITO AND GARCÍA VILLEGAS (2006), op. cit, at 70 and 75.

⁴⁴See César Rodríguez and Rodrigo Uprimny, *Justicia para todos o seguridad para el mercado?* [Justice for all or security for the market?], in UPRIMNY, RODRÍGUEZ GARAVITO AND GARCÍA VILLEGAS,(2006), op. cit, at 124.

This was the main idea behind the promotion of judicial reforms by multilateral development agencies. As the World Bank's General Counsel stated in 1994,

[I]n Latin America and the Caribbean, as in other regions, experience has clearly demonstrated the quintessential role of law in development and, especially, the need for the rule of law and for well-functioning judicial institutions. This is particularly evident in the private sector, where the rule of law is a precondition for sectorial development. It creates certainty and predictability; it leads to lower transaction costs, greater access to capital and the establishment of level playing fields. In fact, worldwide experience confirms the importance to rapid and sustainable development of the clarification and protection of property rights, the enforcement of contractual obligations, and the enactment and application of rigorous regulatory regimes.⁴⁵

At the same time, human rights NGO's, governmental agencies, and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), pursued judicial reforms focused on access to justice, public interest law, promotion of social rights, public defense services and due process of law. Some of these actors supported the creation of Judicial Councils. They did so not to ensure that judges apply the law in a politically neutral way, but rather as a method to democratize, pluralize and diversify the administration of justice.⁴⁶

For some of these actors, judicial reforms should be part of the transition to democracy, and the selection of judges should be mindful of the recent history of military dictatorships. Judicial independence was seen not only as depolitization of the judiciary, but as a way to promote human rights, to reform the judiciary (where judges appointed by the previous regime are still working) and to protect the weakest groups in society.⁴⁷ The selection

⁴⁵Ibrahim Shihata, *Legal framework for development: the World Bank's role in Legal and Judicial Reform*, in World Bank Technical Paper Number 280, JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (WORLD BANK, 1994).

⁴⁶In Argentina, see a six NGO's document, *Una Corte para la Democracia* [a Court for Democracy], with a democratization agenda for judicial reform.

⁴⁷See CELS, ANNUAL REPORT 2008, (SIGLO XXI, BUENOS AIRES, 2008), *Independencia para una justicia democratica* [Independency for a democratic justice].

process should seek out the candidates most likely to promote equality and protection for disadvantaged groups. Activist judges who pursue social and economic reforms are favored.⁴⁸

Then, Judicial Councils had joint goals: augmenting judicial independence and improving judicial performance and administrative management.⁴⁹ There were different expectations for this new institution: on the one hand, efficiency of the judicial branch to improve the market economy; and on the other, depolitization of the judicial designations to improve democracy, access to justice, plurality. These two motivations —democracy and the market— for the same institution were somewhat contradictory in the context of Latin America.⁵⁰

2.3. The creation of the Judicial Council in Argentina. The first Argentine Constitution of 1853 adopted the *political* model to select federal judges. Following the United States' system, the President nominated one candidate, and the Senate consented his appointment. However, in Argentina, there were no informal or customary rules like those that exist in the U.S. Senate. As such, executive control of the process was exacerbated,⁵¹ and Senators voted along partisan strict lines, generally, under the President leadership.⁵² This led to an unbalanced system.

⁴⁸See Rodrigo Uprimny, *Legitimidad y conveniencia del control constitucional de la economía* [Legitimacy and appropriateness of judicial review of economy], in UPRIMNY, RODRÍGUEZ GARAVITO AND GARCÍA VILLEGAS (2006).

⁴⁹Hammergren, *op. cit* in note 32.

⁵⁰For the a critical approach to the two goals, see Thome, Joseph, *Heading South but looking north: Globalization and law reform in Latin America*, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 691 (2000).

⁵¹Presidentialism in Argentina is stronger than in U.S. Carlos Nino mentioned the following differences: constitutional provisions in Argentina do not require the president to seek the advice and consent of the Senate in selecting his Cabinet, a typical parliamentary mechanism incorporated into the U.S. Constitution. Unlike the U.S. Constitution, the Argentine Constitution gives the president various powers in the event of a state of siege. Similarly, the Argentine Constitution gives the president powers regarding federal intervention where the U.S. Constitution does not. Hyper-presidentialism also results from the practices of successive executives who enlarged their powers at the expense of a resigned Congress, and with the blessing of the Supreme Court. See, Nino, Carlos Santiago, *The devate over constitutional reform in Latin America*, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 635, 640 (1993).

⁵²See Mustapic, Ana María, *Oficialistas y diputados: las relaciones Ejecutivo-Legislativo en la Argentina*, 39 DESARROLLO ECONÓMICO 571 (2000).

At the same time, recurrent interruptions to constitutional governments by successive *coup d'ete* changed constantly the composition of the judiciary, leading to frequent and significant changes in the composition of the Supreme Court.⁵³

After the return of democracy in 1983, the judicial branch played an active role in Argentine politics. The then Supreme Court —appointed completely by President Alfonsín after the military-appointed Court resigned *en masse*— made very important decisions to reinstate individual rights.⁵⁴ Lower courts had an important responsibility to conduct trials against the perpetrators of human rights violations of the last regime.⁵⁵ The reorganization of the judiciary was a central challenge in Alfonsín's administration.

The political model during Alfonsín's administration was unique in that the Senate's Nominations Committee was controlled by the opposition, the Peronist party. Even when the Chairman was radical, the majority of the committee was Peronist, and the real powerbroker was Senator Vicente Leónidas Saadi.⁵⁶ Most nominations required his personal consent that led to constant “give and take” bargaining. A Judge's qualifications or the suitability to the job were not always the most important factor because personal interests took on an influential role.⁵⁷

⁵³There were full or majority renovations in 1947, 1955, 1958, 1966, 1973, 1976, 1983 and 1990. The average of the term of the Justices between 1947 and 2002 was 7,22 years. See Sabsay, Daniel, *El juicio político a la Corte Suprema de la República Argentina* [Impeachment to the Argentina Republic Supreme Court], 8 ANUARIO IBEROAMERICANO DE JUSTICIA CONSTITUCIONAL 493, 497 (2004).

⁵⁴For example, they decided the unconstitutionality of the prohibition to remarry after a divorce (*Sejean v. Sejean*), antidiscriminatory decisions regarding nationality (*Repetto*) or physical attributes (*Arenzon*), how to deal with *de facto* laws (*Dufurq and Aramayo*), the unconstitutionality of the criminalization of consumption of drugs (*Bazterrica*), etc. See Böhmer, Martín, “La Corte de los 80 y los 90 un diálogo sobre el rule of law en Argentina”, in SELA 2000: ESTADO DE DERECHO Y DEMOCRACIA. UN DEBATE ACERCA DEL RULE OF LAW, (EDITORES DEL PUERTO, BUENOS AIRES, 2001).

⁵⁵The trials were stopped in 1987, after the approval of “due obedience” and “full stop” laws. These laws were found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 2005, and trials and prosecutions could continue then, after 25 years. See CELS, ANNUAL REPORT 2007, (SIGLO XXI, BUENOS AIRES, 2007), CHAPTER 1, “JUSTICIA POR LOS CRIMENES DE LA DICTADURA”.

⁵⁶Peronist party had 5 members at the committee and Radical party only 4. The majority necessary to pass a recommendation was 5 votes. See Llanos and Schibber, *Prestando acuerdo*, GIGA WP 54/2007 (2007), at 19.

⁵⁷See La Nación newspaper, *Enfoques* supplement, 10/26/2003, “1983-2003: 20 años de democracia”.

It was during the next administration that of President Menem when the judiciary lost most of its legitimacy.⁵⁸ Delay, inefficiency and corruption were frequently associated with the federal courts. In 1990, Menem packed the Supreme Court, increasing its size from 5 to 9, and he appointed 6 new Justices, most of them without the basic legal qualifications for the position.⁵⁹ This Court was known as “the automatic majority” because decided almost all of its cases in favor of the government during Menem’s administration. The judiciary was an important ally of the economic reforms that Menem introduced, and insured impunity against allegations of corruption of the government officers . The construction of a judiciary dependent on the executive was a deliberate governmental strategy during 1990s.⁶⁰

When Menem began negotiation of a constitutional reform to allow him to serve a second term as president —then forbidden by the Constitution— the Radical Party (under the leadership of Alfonsín) agreed on the condition that other reforms also be included, to increase the checks on the executive. In those negotiations, known as the “Pacto de Olivos”, the idea of changing the process for selection of judges first appeared. The solution for the lack of independence, inefficiency and corruption of the judicial branch was the creation of the Judicial Council.

In Argentina, neither the Radical nor the Peronist parties had really studied the Judicial Council before.⁶¹ But, some provinces had adopted their own Judicial Councils (with

⁵⁸In 1984, the confidence in the judiciary was around 57%, but later, during nineties fell to 26%, and in 1998 was of 19.21%. See official statistics at <http://www.justiciaargentina.gov.ar/estadisticas/imag-jus.htm>, and see also the data compiled by the Inter-American Development Bank, at <http://www.iadb.org/datagob/>.

⁵⁹The appointees were: Julio Nazareno (former chief of police of La Rioja, original Province of Menem, and former partner of Menem Law firm), Santiago Moline O’Connor (former Vice-president of the Argentina Tennis Association), Mariano Cavagna Martinez (close friend of Menem’s brother, Eduardo), Rodolfo Barra (former Secretary of Justice of Menem), Julio Oyhanarte, and Ricardo Levene. See VERBITSKY, HORACIO, HACER LA CORTE (PLANETA, 1993).

⁶⁰VERBITSKY HORACIO, HACER LA CORTE, op. cit. in the previous note.

⁶¹A preliminary report by the *Consejo para la Consolidacion de la Democracia* —an institute of legal studies created by president Alfonsín, to analyze constitutional reforms to promote democracy and led by Professor Carlos Nino— contemplated trial by jury as the appropriate judicial reform, instead of something like Spain’s Judicial Council. See CONSEJO PARA LA CONSOLIDACION DE LA DEMOCRACIA, REFORMA CONSTITUCIONAL: DICTAMEN PRELIMINAR (EUDEBA, 1986), at 119. [Constitutional Reform: Preliminary Report]. This was the most important technical paper for the Radical party at 1994’s Constitutional reform.

different responsibilities)⁶² and, most important, other countries in the region were creating them at the insistence of the multilateral development institutions.

In this context, a Constitutional amendment established the Judicial Council to select federal judges.⁶³ The selection of Supreme Court Justices was modified hardly at all by the 1994 Constitutional amendments. The only changes were that the session at the Senate should be public,⁶⁴ and a two-thirds majority was required. But the process continued to follow the political model: the President chose one —any— candidate, and asked for the consent of the Senate.

Historically, there was almost no discussion about the candidates at the Senate, and this was seen as one of the causes of the poor qualifications of nominees and lack of independence of the Justices.⁶⁵ In 2003, President Kirchner introduced a reform to the process: the President, before requesting Senatorial consent, would publish the name and the resume of the prospective Justice in the newspapers, and any person or civil society organization could submit an opinion or observation about the prospective Justice. Only after this public consultation, the President would ask for the Senate's consent.⁶⁶ The Senate also reformed its rules and incorporated a public hearing with the candidate, which was absent from the previous procedure.

⁶²Provinces of Chaco, Chubut, Formosa, Rio Negro, San Juan, San Luis, Santiago del Estero, and Tierra del Fuego had adopted different versions of Judicial Councils.

⁶³Article 114 of the new Constitution.

⁶⁴Former article 86, section 4 of the Constitution had no reference to the publicity or secrecy of the session at the Senate. However, a procedure senatorial rule incorporated in 1924, established that the consent to any executive nomination would be given in a secret session. In the reforms of 1939 and 1948 the clause was maintained. See PITT VILLEGAS, JULIO CÉSAR, REGLAMENTO DE LA CÁMARA DE SENADORES Y ANTECEDENTES HISTÓRICOS, (H. SENADO DE LA NACIÓN ARGENTINA, 2008). There was a very important scandal in 1990, when the Senate give the consent to four new Justices, in a tree minutes secret session, without the presence of the opposite parties. For this scandal, see VERBITSKY, HORACIO, HACER LA CORTE(PLANETA 1993), ch. 1. After this event, the necessity of a public session was introduced in the Constitution.

⁶⁵This was a conclusion arrived by six NGO's, CELS, ADC, INECIP, FARN, Poder Ciudadano, and Usuarios and Consumidores, in *Una Corte para la Democracia* report [a Court for Democracy], op. cit at note 46

⁶⁶After the huge economic and social crisis of 2001, there were demonstrations against the Justices of the Supreme Court, asking for their resignation. The elected President had to reconstruct the legitimacy of the Supreme Court, and this decree 222/03 (and the impeachment processes that Congress conducted) was the main measure for that. See CELS, DERECHOS HUMANOS EN ARGENTINA, INFORME 2004, (SIGLO XXI ED, 2004), at 78. At the same time, this reform gave more power to the President in the bargaining with the Senate, and increased the cost for the Senate to reject a nominee with “popular support”.

The Judicial Council had different functions. It had a role in the selection of lower court judges (as I will describe it in the following section), but it also was responsible for the administration of the judicial power, the discipline of those judges, and their impeachment. For the selection of lower court judges, the Constitution establishes that the Judicial Council have to select a short-list of three names of candidates and the President must nominate one of them, asking the consent to the Senate. The process to appoint federal judges has, then, three stages: the first one at the Judicial Council, the second one at the Executive level, and the last one at the Senate.

The idea of a Judicial Council and an examination to nominate judges comes from the meritocratic model. But judges in Argentina have the power of judicial review, and for this reason, the simple “meritocratic model” did not fit very well.⁶⁷ Consequently, the composition of the Judicial Council is not merely academic nor “technical”, but included several political members. The process is not comprised of a single examination: there are other stages that permit the introduction of changes to merit-based rankings.

The new Constitution of 1994 established that the Judicial Council had to be created within one year; but in fact was not established until 1998, when Congress passed law 24,937 and 24,939 the same day. This delay was due to political reasons. In 1995 President Menem still had 4 years in office left, and the creation of the Judicial Council would have restricted his powers considerably. In 1998, he was in his last year as President, and it was likely that the opposition party would win the upcoming elections (which it did). As such, it was a good occasion to restrict presidential powers.⁶⁸

Law 24,937 established a Council with 20 members, comprised of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (the Chairman of the Council); 4 lower court judges (2 from appeals courts and 2 from courts of first instance); 4 lawyers elected by the Bar Association; 4 members of the lower House of Congress (2 from the majority party, 1 from the largest minority and

⁶⁷It is not possible to conclude that as judges do not have judicial review powers, then their selection is apolitical. But this is an important difference with those countries where exist Judicial Councils.

⁶⁸FINKEL, JODI, *JUDICIAL REFORM AS POLITICAL INSURANCE: ARGENTINA, PERU AND MEXICO IN THE 1990'S* (UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME PRESS, 2008).

1 from the second largest minority); 4 Senators (2 from the majority, and 1 each from the largest and second largest minority parties); 2 University professors; and 1 executive branch representative.

In 2006, after an important debate about the possible effect on judicial independence manipulation, Congress passed law 26,080, reducing the number of members from 20 to 13, and changing its composition to: 3 judges, 2 lawyers elected by the Bar Association; 3 members of the lower House of Congress (2 from the majority party, 1 from the largest minority); 3 Senators (2 from the majority, and 1 from the largest minority party); 1 University Professor; and 1 executive branch representative. The following table clarifies these changes.

	Law	
	24,937	26,080
Justices	1	-
Judges	4	3
Lawyers	4	2
House Rep.	4	3
Senators	4	3
Professors	2	1
Executive	1	1
Total	20	13

The opposition and the civil society were mainly against the reform, and the Government failed to explain clearly the goal of the reform, besides the political control of the Council. Following this reform, the Judicial Council lost some of its credibility.

In conclusion, the system for selecting lower court federal judges in Argentina includes examination of professional proficiency —as the model were meritocratic—, but the composition of the Council, the different stages at the process, as well as the participation of the President and the Senate, introduce into the process a strong political aspect.

3. The selection process in Argentina, the hybrid model

This section presents a brief description of the current selection process in Argentina. It occurs, consecutively, in three different institutions: the Judicial Council, the Executive branch and the Senate. The most relevant phase is the first one at the Judicial Council that determines the three possible candidates to fulfill a judicial vacancy. Later, the president chooses one of those three candidates to nominate and requests senatorial consent. The Senate conducts a public hearing, and subsequently consents (or rejects) the candidate's nomination.


3.1. The Judicial Council phase. The Judicial Council must follow a very detailed procedure to arrive at its short list of three names. Each of these processes is called *concurso*. The process has five steps, and is performed almost completely by the Selection Committee of the Judicial Council.⁶⁹ First, there is an anonymous test graded by law professors and judges; second, the qualifications of the prospective judges are evaluated; third, the candidates may request a further review of their exam results and qualification; fourth, the top ranked candidates are interviewed; and finally, a public hearing is held with the three candidates on the short list. The following page contains a flow chart depicting this procedure.

3.1.1. *Written exam.* When a vacancy opens on a federal court, the Judicial Council calls for applications, and selects an *ad-hoc* jury to prepare, administer and grade the written exam. This “*ad-hoc* jury” is made up of two law professors and two judges.⁷⁰ The law professors are selected randomly from a list prepared by the national Universities; and the judges are also randomly selected from a list prepared by the National Judges Association.

The exam consists of the resolution of a real or hypothetical case in the jurisdiction of the court with the vacancy. Applicants are provided with the complete file for the case and

⁶⁹The Committee is made of 8 members: 3 judges, 3 House representatives, 1 University Professor and 1 Executive branch representative. There are no lawyers at the Committee. Art. 12 Law 24,937 (modified by 26,080).

⁷⁰Law 24,937, Article 13(C), according to Law 26,080. Before that reform that reduced the size of the Council, the ad hoc jury was made up of one law professor, one judge and one lawyer from the National Bar Association, with alternates elected in the same way.



must write the final decision of the Court as if they were the presiding judge. Candidates have a maximum of eight hours to handwrite the decision. The written exam’s goal is to evaluate the theoretical and practical skills of the candidates.⁷¹ The *ad-hoc* jury will grade the exams on an 100-points scale evaluating the reasonableness of the solution given, its legal appropriateness and the ability of the candidate to write logically.⁷²

The exam is graded blindly. The applicants must write a code number on the exam, that is only matched to his or her name after the jury decides the grades. The blind basis grading

⁷¹Law 24,937, Art. 13 (a)(3).

⁷²Selection Rules, Art. 33.

system makes it difficult for the jury to know whose test they are evaluating, and it tends to guarantee objective scores.⁷³

3.1.2. *Evaluation of qualifications.* As part of the application, each candidate must file—in the format specified by the Council—his or her *curriculum vitae*, listing qualifications for the position, and attaching all of their certificates and diplomas.

A reform introduced in 2002 by Law 25.669, established that one member of the selection committee is randomly assigned in each *concurso* to evaluate the qualifications of the applicants on a 100-points basis. Previous to that legal reform the *ad-hoc* jury conducted this evaluation.

Up to 70 points are given for professional qualifications, up to 30 points of which according to the length of experience in the judicial branch or in private practice in general, and up to 40 points for specialization in the court's area of expertise. Also, up to 30 points are given for academics' qualifications: 10 points for publications, 10 for courses taught, and 10 for Ph.D., or master degrees.⁷⁴

An evaluation of qualifications of this kind is always subjective. It is very hard to compare the quality of two different publications, other than extrinsic characteristics, such as length, quantity of footnotes, etc. It is also difficult to compare the professional performance of different lawyers. The Council neither doesn't attempt to do this: it just gives points according to seniority. So, the more years (of experience), the more points you receive.

When a random member of the Judicial Council grades the qualifications of a candidate, she is not aware of the candidate's performance in the written exam. So, it is difficult to him or her to manipulate the rankings decisively. It is possible to give the candidate she prefers a better score than he or she deserves, but is unknown how many extra points are needed.

⁷³However, the tests are not uniforms, such as multiple choices, and for this reason the jurors could identify the author of the test by the content of the solution, or at least they can identify his or her political ideology. The randomness of the selection of the *ad hoc* jury is a protection against the consequences of this problem, but the problem is still there. Objectivity is hardly realizable, even in a blind evaluation.

⁷⁴Selection Rules, Art. 34.

With both scores (qualifications and written exam), the Selection Committee publishes the “initial ranking” of the applicants, and after this, the candidates can file an appeals petitions to review his or her scores.

3.1.3. *The appeals phase.* The possibility of review is given only in cases of “factual mistake” in the grading, a “procedural error”, or “clear arbitrariness” from the *ad-hoc* jury or from the member of the committee.⁷⁵

Two different members of the committee, also selected randomly⁷⁶ —called “the subcommittee”— reexamine the exam and qualifications grades. In this step, the review is made with the knowledge of all the results, and it is possible for the subcommittee to change the ranking by modifying certain scores.

The subcommittee can modify all of the scores, not only of those candidates that have filed a review petition but also of those who haven’t. It also can change the criteria used by the first member of the Committee, which may affect the overall results. Usually, the subcommittee does not change the grades of the written exam,⁷⁷ but it does often change the scores based on a candidate’s qualifications.

After the subcommittee proposes the new ranking (I call it the “appeals ranking”), the Selection Committee approves it, and calls in the candidates with the top six scores for a personal interview.

3.1.4. *Interview with the subcommittee.* The same subcommittee (the two members of the Committee that decided the appeals petitions) conducts individual interviews with the top ranked candidates. The goal of the interview is to evaluate the applicants’ personal motivations for seeking the position, their work plan for the court, basic notions of law, judiciary rules, constitutional interpretation, Supreme Court recent cases, and general law principles. Also, the interview is used to evaluate the managerial skills of the candidates,

⁷⁵Art. 37 and 38, Selection Rules.

⁷⁶Each of the four subcommittees are randomly assigned to the *concurso*s but they remain with the same committee members during one year.

⁷⁷The subcommittee can also designate a second *ad-hoc* jury to advise them on the correctness of the grades of the previous jury.

their efficiency, their ethical values, commitment to democracy and human rights, and any other relevant factors.⁷⁸

The goals of the interview are flexible enough to allow for discretionary changes on the ranking. Here, the subcommittee generally uses two formulas: “*there is no basis for a ranking variation*” and “*the outstanding performance of x candidate compels us to change the order*”.

The interviews are open to the public, but not to the rest of candidates.⁷⁹ While other members of the committee have participated in the interviews, in almost all cases, no member of the public did so. Even when the rules permit it, the Committee keeps no records of the interviews; neither a transcript, nor audio or video recording. It is be very difficult to know what was asked and what were the responses of the candidates if one was not present at the interview. It is difficult to attend the hearings because of the date and place of the interview is available only on the webpage of the Judicial Council.⁸⁰

After the interviews, the Committee proposes to the plenary of the Judicial Council the short list of three names, creating a “final ranking.”

3.1.5. *Hearing at the Judicial Council.* In these hearings, the full Judicial Council evaluates the suitability of the candidates to the job, their abilities and commitment to democracy.⁸¹ Only in rare cases, have they made modifications to the Committee’s final ranking, and, in such cases, some members of the Committee dissented. The Judicial Council has to approve the list with a two-thirds majority of its members.

The hearings are open to the public and the media, and in some cases, an large number of people attended. The public, the civil society organizations and professional associations are not allowed to pose questions to the participants. Most of the questions asked by the Judicial Council are related to the candidates’ resume, requesting relevant updates (the

⁷⁸Art. 40, Selection Rules.

⁷⁹Art. 39, Selection rules.

⁸⁰And also here it is difficult to find it: it is only published for a short period of time, in the “news” tab.

⁸¹Art. 13(c), law 24,937.

process takes an average of 16 months),⁸² or their personal opinions on recent Supreme Court cases. Finally, the Council approves the short list and sends it to the President.

The short-list is supposed to have only three names. However, there are two different complementary lists. If there is more than one vacant seat at the same Court, the Judicial Council must add another candidate to the list for each vacancy (e.i. to fill 2 seats, 4 names in the short-list). At the same time, if any of the short-listed candidates is already listed on a different *concurso*, a new name has to be added, but the President may choose it only in case that the repeated candidate was nominated for the previous court. The idea is that under all circumstance, the President always has three names from which to choose.

3.2. The process at the Executive level. After receiving the short list from the Judicial Council, the President—in a similar way to the nomination of Supreme Court Justices⁸³— publishes the resume of the candidates in the newspaper, in case any person or civil society organization wishes to submit any observations, objections or support for the candidates within 15 days.

After the consultation, the President analyses the observations, and decides which candidate to nominate. The president may follow whatever criteria he or she prefer in making the decision. However, the same decree that orders the consultation described above, establishes that the final goal of the selection process is “the correct valuation of the moral aptitudes, the technical suitability, the importance of the career and the commitment with the human rights and the democratic values of the candidates.”⁸⁴ This was understood as a transitional democracy clause, vetting those candidates with ties or attachment to the last dictatorship.⁸⁵

Once the President nominees one of the names on the short list, he or she then requests the consent to the Senate.

⁸²Data from Poder Ciudadano, *Observatorio de los concursos de la Comisión de Selección del Consejo de la Magistratura de la Nación*, 2004. The report is from 1999 to 2004. More data is necessary to support this length, because one of the goals of the 2006’s reform was to reduce the duration of the processes.

⁸³See supra, note 66.

⁸⁴Art. 2, decree 222/2003.

⁸⁵See Maxit, Margarita, *El caso Patti y el desafío de asumirnos como una sociedad democrática transicional* [The Patti case and the challenge of assuming us as a transitional democracy], 7 REVISTA JURÍDICA DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE PALERMO 159, 182 (2006).

3.3. The last phase: the Senate. When the Senate receives the President's judicial nominee, the Appointments Committee calls for a public hearing with the candidate. Here, civil society organizations, professional associations, or any person can pose questions to the candidate (through the Committee Chairman). After the Committee approves the nomination, the Senate needs a simple majority vote to confirm him or her.

This process involves certain aspects of a meritocratic model, such as the exams, and the grading of qualifications, but also some aspects from the political model, such as the composition of the Judicial Council, the existence of an appeals phase and interviews, and the participation of the President and the Senate. It is fair to say that it is an hybrid model.

4. Methodology

To conduct this study, both quantitative and qualitative data were compiled. The quantitative data is more reliable than the qualitative, as I will explain below. Such data is drawn from the records of the Judicial Council, available online. The qualitative data comes from newspapers, Senate discussions, and NGO reports.

4.1. Quantitative analysis. The methodology of this research relies almost entirely in a quantitative analysis of the data obtained from the Judicial Council website.⁸⁶ I compiled the available data from 119 *concurros*, to fill 157 judicial vacancies during a period of 10 years ranging from 1998 to 2008. This data has been available but not previously organized in a fashion that permits it to be analyzed. This study is doing that for the first time.

The Selection Committee of the Judicial Council prepares a summary of each *concurso*, including the applicants' names, test score, qualifications score, appeals, the results of the interviews and the final ranking. I compiled that information in a (large) table. One column was added to indicate who was ultimately nominated and by which president.⁸⁷

In general, it is very difficult to conduct empirical research in Argentina, mainly because of limited access to information. Data is not regularly compiled, and if it is, is not publicly available. But for this research, the availability of all the recommendations of the Selection Committee on the Council's website was a tremendous source of information. For this reason, the mere compilation of the records into a single table provided me, and can provide other researchers also, a strong foundation for empirical analysis.

The table will be made also available on a website to allow other researchers to replicate or continue this investigation.⁸⁸

⁸⁶The website is <http://www.jus.gov.ar> (last accessed on March 2009).

⁸⁷The table is included as Appendix A of this paper.

⁸⁸Also, the coding used to analyze the data and create the graphics is available in Appendix B. I used a statistical analysis software called "R", that is open-source and free. R Development Core Team (2008). R: A language and environment for statistical computing. Vienna, Austria. URL <http://www.R-project.org> (last accessed on March 2009).

I assumed that the exams grades (given by the *ad-hoc* jury) and the first evaluation of the qualifications (made without information about the results of the exams) represent an “objective” score, and consequently constitutes the meritocratic part of the selection process. The written exam is graded blind by a random jury made up of two law professors and two judges. It is difficult for them to be partial because they do not know whose exams are grading.⁸⁹ At the same time, qualifications are evaluated without knowing each candidate’s exams grade; making it difficult for the evaluator to favor certain candidate substantively. It is true that the evaluator knows whose resume is grading, and he or she can give preference to one candidate over another, but manipulating the outcome is difficult because the evaluator does not know the other half of the score. When both parts of the score get combined, an initial ranking is created. In this study, I will assume that these scores constitutes an objective measure of the merit of each of the candidates.

After the appeals review, the initial ranking is modified, and it is replaced by the appeals ranking. And after the interviews, new modifications occur, and the final ranking is created. This final ranking determines the candidates on the short list. I also assume that political factors led to modifications in the appeals phase and during the interviews.

One variable called “variation” expresses the difference between the position in the initial ranking and the final ranking. This “variation” variable will show how many positions the candidate improved or dropped during the appeals process or the interview phase, and will give me a measure of the political factors involved. For example, if one applicant reached the 12th position after the exam and the initial qualifications (initial ranking), but rose to the 6th position after the appeals process (appeals ranking), and finally ended in 3rd position after the interviews (final ranking), her variation was “9”. In this case, it is possible to assume that his or her merit was not the only factor that the Committee took into account when formulating the short list and that political factors were determinative of his or her inclusion in the final ranking. On the other hand, a variation of 0 suggests that the merit (position in the initial ranking) was the relevant factor for the candidate’s inclusion in the final ranking.

⁸⁹But it is possible to detect the author or his or her ideology by the content of the exam. See note 73.

To calculate if the candidate made a significative improvement after the merit phase, and was included in the short-list not only by his or her merit, it is necessary to compare the initial ranking with the final ranking, in each *concurso*. For example, if one candidate was ranked 4th in the initial ranking, and after the appeals phase and the interview was ranked 3rd (and consequently, included in the short list) his or her merit was not the only factor for the inclusion in the short list. Even when the variation was just “1”, that improvement was the difference necessary to cross the line between the short-listed and the no-short-listed candidates. However, as different *concursos* had different quantity of members depending on how many seats are vacant,⁹⁰ the evaluation has to be done for each *concurso* separately. For example, to fill 3 seats in one *concurso*, the short list will have 5 candidates, and in that case, if a candidate rose from the 6th to the 5th position, he crossed the line to be short-listed.

4.2. Qualitative analysis. The qualitative analysis was focused on those candidates determined to be outliers. Using the quantitative data, it was possible to identify some extreme cases, and focus qualitative analysis on them.

In these cases, I researched other information about the judicial nominations by reviewing the online edition of the three most important newspapers in Argentina: Clarín, Página/12 and La Nación. Also, I reviewed local newspapers (El Liberal and Nuevo Diario, from Santiago del Estero) to get other data about the candidates, as well NGO reports.

The transcripts of the hearings before the Senate’s Appointment Committee, available online,⁹¹ were also reviewed, as was the list of executive nominations, to identify the nominees that were not confirmed.

However, this qualitative analysis has weaknesses. I could not conduct interviews that might have added important evidence. This was mainly because the research was conducted from outside the Argentina in a short period of time, as part of my master’s thesis at

⁹⁰See *supra* section 3.1.5. I will consider the increment of the short list only by the accumulation of other vacant seat, and not for cases where the short-listed are already listed on a different *concurso*, because the President cannot chose them directly.

⁹¹<http://www.senado.gov.ar>.

Stanford Law School. For this reason, I only focused on the readily available information, mainly online. As such, my qualitative findings are tentative.

4.3. Data population. The Judicial Council decides short-lists on candidates both for Federal Courts and for Buenos Aires' local Courts.⁹² However this study focuses only on Federal Courts (and it is not about the complete activity of the Judicial Council) because they are distributed in all Provinces, and because they have a distinctive jurisdiction. Also, probably, this jurisdiction uses to have an special attractiveness for political actors.

To this study, I compiled data from all the *concurros*, and no sampling methodology was used. References to the population are referred to the entirely population of federal courts selection processes. The utilization of the complete population data reduced the necessity for statistical tests.

The population of the research includes federal *concurros* since the creation of the Judicial Council in 1998 through December 1st, 2008. This ten-year period was divided in three parts according to the two legal reforms. The first period covers the time between the creation of the Judicial Council by Law 24,937 (1998) and the reform introduced by Law 25,669 in 2002. This modification transferred the power to evaluate candidate qualifications from the *ad-hoc* jury to the Selection Committee. Period 2 spans from the passage of Law 25,669 (2002) to the enactment of Law 26,080 (2006) that changed the composition of the Judicial Council. This reform reduced the size of the Judicial Council from 20 to 13, increasing the relative weight of the representatives of the governing party. And period 3 goes from Law 26,080 (2006) to December 1st of 2008, the cut-off date of this research.

The data set includes 119 *concurros* to fill 157 vacancies. From them, 10 decisions (for 13 seats) were still pending at the Executive level, and then, the data set includes just 144 nominees. Table 1 shows the distribution of these 119 *concurros* according to the year that

⁹²Before the creation of Buenos Aires Autonomous City in 1994, the city was a federal territory, and for that reason the National Senate and the National President selected their judges. After the reform, that power had to be transferred to the local authorities (according to article 129, National Constitution), but until that moment, the Judicial Council will continue selecting and removing the Buenos Aires's state judges (transitory clause 15, National Constitution).

the short-list was approved. On average, the Judicial Council approved 13 short-lists each year, with a maximum of 19 during 2001, and a minimum of 9 in 2000 and 2006.

TABLE 1. Number of *concurso*s by year

Year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
<i>concurso</i> s	9	19	11	17	12	16	9	14	12

Figure 1 shows the quantity of applicants by *concurso*. The median was 12 candidates, but there were two cases with 42 candidates each, one to fill 6 vacancies in Criminal Tax Courts and the other to fill four vacancies in the Criminal Courts of First Instance both in Buenos Aires City. On the other extreme, there was 1 *concurso* with only 3 applicants—for the Federal Court of first instance of Chubut—where all the candidates were included in the short list. However, in the majority of the *concurso*s there were between 10 and 19 applicants.




FIGURE 1. Applicants by *concurso*

Some of the 1815 participants in the 119 *concurso*s were “frequent players.”⁹³ In fact, there were only 1160 different applicants in total. Seventy five percent of the candidates

⁹³This is not exactly the same as “repeated players”, in Galanter’s terms, (see Galanter, *Why the ‘Haves’ come out ahead: speculations on the limits of legal change*, 9 LAW AND SOCIETY REVIEW 95 (1974)), because these “frequent players” cannot try to change the rules, but, *concurso* after *concurso*, they can improve their performance learning what the members of the Council are looking at.

participated only in one *concurso*, while 25% participated in more than one. Domingo Montanaro applied in 35 cases (and was short-listed in 12 of them), and after him Carlos Santacroce participated in the second largest number of selection processes: 20 (and was never short-listed).

5. Findings

The previous section presented a quick overview of the raw data collected. In this section, the analysis will focus on the most important findings of the study. The first is that the appeals stage is not used just to review the grades but as a political instance to change the ranking. The second finding is that the judicial exam and the evaluation of qualification are the most important factors to be short-listed in 73% of the *concursons*, but in the rest 27%, political considerations are decisive. But, at the same time, 68% of the *concursons*' short-lists included at least one candidate for political factors, who is nominated 32% of the times by the President. The third finding is that the system permits, from time to time, the appearance of outliers, or scores' modification out of the common pattern. In such cases, the relevance of political factors is clear. Fourth, the impact of legal reforms (transferring the power to grade applicants' qualifications from the ad-hoc jury to the Selection Committee, and reducing of the size of the Judicial Council) had relatives effects. Fifth and finally, the Senate acted, in a few occasions, as the public forum to civil society organizations to discuss the nominations, but this participation comes too late in the process. I will explain each of these findings in turn.

5.1. Finding 1: Appeals as a political instance. This finding —confirming a methodological intuition⁹⁴— shows that the appeals are not just used to correct “*factual mistakes, procedural errors or clear arbitrariness.*”⁹⁵ Looking at the number of reviews granted, it is possible to identify that only in two *concursons* out of 119, the committee rejected the appeals petitions.⁹⁶ The maximum score modification in one *concurso* was 57.5 points in favor of one candidate, and the biggest drop was 37 points for another (in a general score's average for all the applicants of 118 points). Not every appellant had his or her score

⁹⁴I excluded the appeals phase from the objective part of the process because of this intuition. See Section 4.1.

⁹⁵As Selection rules art. 37 and 38 state, see note 74.

⁹⁶*Concurso* number 2 and 3, year 2000. Also, in *concurso* number 165, to fill the first stage Federal Court of Chubut, with only 3 candidates, there were no appeal filed.

modified, but changes occurred in almost every *concurso*, and in order to modify the ranking is not necessary to change every score.

Figure 2 shows the range of scores' modification at the appeals phase by each *concurso*. This graphically illustrates that in all *concursons* except numbers 2, 3 and 165 (interruptions in the horizontal line) there was some change in the scores after the appeals process. For example in *concurso* number 1, the subcommittee changed the scores of two applicants, reducing one by two points and the other by six points. All other applicants' scores remained unchanged (difference = 0). So, the vertical line goes from 0 (one extreme, no modification) to -6 (the other extreme).




FIGURE 2. Score's range modification in the appeals phase by *concurso*

I will return to this graphic later, to analyze why the broader range of scores' variation (higher vertical lines) occurred in earlier *concursons*,⁹⁷ but here the focus is that in almost every one there were important modifications to scores during the appeals phase. The mean of range score's variation by contest was 18.42 points. Then, it is very hard to affirm that the appeals were used just to correct *factual mistakes* or *clear arbitrariness*. On the contrary, this stage appears to be the first opportunity of the Selection Committee to change scores taking into account not only the candidate's merit but political concerns. If this step were

⁹⁷See finding 4.1.

used only to correct factual mistakes or clear arbitrariness of the first member of the Selection Committee, it would be very difficult to find a rate of 99.97% of *concursons*' modifications.

5.2. Finding 2: The merit is a determinative factor in about seventy percent of the cases, but in about seventy percent of the short-list there is at least one candidate for political reasons.

5.2.1. *Variation at the Judicial Council.* Comparing the position in the initial ranking and in the final ranking, it is possible to find that 222 candidates (44.22%) out of 505 short-listed candidates⁹⁸ rose ranking positions during the appeals phase and the interviews. For them, the final ranking position was not only due to the meritocratic part of the process. The remaining 292 candidates (55.78%) maintained or dropped positions after the appeals phase and the interviews.

However, this calculation may include candidates disregarding the “short-list line”. For example, if one candidate was initially ranked in the third position and ended at the first or second position at the final ranking, it is possible to realize that the final position at the rank was not only because of her merit, but anyways, she would have been included in the short-list by her merit. To exclude those cases from the calculation of the previous paragraph, it is necessary to analyze the changes in each process.

In the 119 *concursons* there were 1815 participants, of which 395 were the pool of nominees for the Executive.⁹⁹ In 80 of these 119 processes (67.23%) at least one candidate in the short list improved positions during the appeals phase or the interviews (the political part of the process), and crossed the short-list line. In the remaining 39, the initial ranking was constitutive of the final ranking and short list. At the same time, 56 *concursons*' short-lists (47%) included one candidate that improved positions, and 24 *concursons*' short-list (20.16%) included two or three candidates that crossed the short-list line.

⁹⁸Including the short-listed and the two complementary lists: those with more than one vacant seat, and those already included in other short-list.

⁹⁹I am not taking into account the complementary list for members already included in another short list. Counting them there were 505 candidates referred in the previous footnote. But of them, the President can only pick nominees from 395 options

Looking to the 395 short-listed candidates, it is possible to identify 290 cases where merit was sufficient to get them included in the short list—in the top three positions, or more, depending on the *concurso*—, and 105 cases where merit alone was not sufficient to get them included in the short list, and they had to improve positions during the appeals and the interviews.

Table 2 summarizes the changes in the ranking of the short listed candidates from the initial ranking to the final ranking for the 395 short-listed candidates. For 73.41% of the candidates (290) their position in the initial ranking was determinative of their inclusion in the short-list. They were ranked initially in the three (or more, depending on the number of vacant seats) top positions in the initial rank, and they ended in the three (or more) top positions in the short-list. For the remaining 26.58% of the candidates (105), their scores at the meritocratic part of the process were not the only determinative factor for their inclusion in the short list. At the same time that this second group improved positions, other similar group dropped them.¹⁰⁰

TABLE 2. Changes in the short-list from Initial Ranking to Final Ranking

	Appeals		Final	
	<i>N</i>	%	<i>N</i>	%
Unchanged	344	87.08	290	73.42
Improved	67	16.96	105	26.58

This variation did not occur in one movement. The first column of Table 2 shows the variation on the top positions of the ranking after the appeals phase only, and the second column shows the total changes after the appeals and interview phases. The half of the changes occurs after the appeal phase ($395 - 344 = 51$ cases, 13%) and the remaining half ($344 - 290 = 54$ cases, 14%) after the interviews. Both instances are equally important to modify the initial ranking, and to introduce political considerations.

The variation during the process at the Judicial Council showed that 73.41% short-listed candidates were at the top positions in the initial ranking. For those candidates, the process

¹⁰⁰During the appeals, some candidates were tie ranked in the same position, and for that reason the sum of “Unchanged” and “Improved” is greater than 395.

was similar to the meritocratic model described in Section 2, and they were included in the short list because they performed well in the exams and in the initial evaluation of their qualifications. On the other hand, for the remaining 26.58% applicants in the short list, the system was not the meritocratic model described; rather they were included in the short list because of political considerations, such as their ideology, moral values or partisan preferences.

5.2.2. *Variation at the Executive level.* However, the final ranking is not the end of the process. Once the Judicial Council approves the short list, the president chooses one candidate to nominate and request for the consent of the Senate. During the period of time of the study, four presidents nominated candidates: Fernando de la Rúa,¹⁰¹ Eduardo Duhalde, Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner.

According to the institutional design, the President can choose the candidate that he or she prefers from the short list, without any additional restriction other than a verification of the candidate's commitment to democracy.¹⁰² But, even in a political model, qualifications still have an important role. When the president chooses the top candidate on the short list, supposedly, he or she is taking qualifications into account.

Figure 3 shows the nominee's position in the final ranking by President. There were 144 nominations in the 10-year period of the study. De la Rúa made 20 nominations during his term, and most of the time he chose the candidate ranked first on the short list. The same can be said for Néstor Kirchner, who nominated 76 candidates. Duhalde (29 nominations) chose the first and third ranked candidates most of the time. Finally Fernández de Kirchner chose an equal proportion of first, second and third ranked candidates in her 19 nominations.

¹⁰¹Between the resignation of de la Rúa on December 21st 2001, and the assumption of Eduardo Duhalde in January 1st 2002, three other presidents took office —Ramón Puerta, Adolfo Rodríguez Saa and Eduardo Camaño— but none of them nominated judges.

¹⁰²See supra, note 85.




FIGURE 3. Nominees’ position in the final ranking by President

Methodologically, this study assumed that the initial ranking reflects a meritocratic model, and later, political considerations influenced the rankings. So, it is relevant to analyze the initial ranking of those nominees. Figure 4 shows the nominees’ initial rank by each President.

The results are similar to Figure 3, given that Presidents chose the candidate at the top of the initial ranking most of the time. The first candidate at the initial ranking was nominated in 39 cases out of 144 (27%), and the second in 25 cases (17.63%). De la Rúa nominated candidates at the top of the initial ranking 30% of the time, Duhalde, also nominated the top ranked candidate 31% of the time; Kirchner did it 25% of the time, and Fernández in 26.33% of the time (she chose the fourth ranked most of the times: 31.6%).

Graphics in Figure 4 show a longer right-tail than those in Figure 3, meaning that candidates far away from the top positions were nominated. At the same time, these graphics show that there were important variations, and candidates ranked in the 9th, 11th, and even in the 12th position in the initial ranking were ultimately nominated to the courts.




FIGURE 4. Nominees' position in the initial ranking by President

Table 3 shows the relationship between the nominees' changes in the short-list from the initial ranking to the final ranking, according to the nominating President.

TABLE 3. Changes in the short list from Initial Ranking to Final Ranking by nominating President

	Judicial Council		De la Rúa		Duhalde		Kirchner		Fernandez		Total Pres.	
	<i>N</i>	%	<i>N</i>	%	<i>N</i>	%	<i>N</i>	%	<i>N</i>	%	<i>N</i>	%
Unchanged	290	73.41	15	75	20	68.96	52	68.42	11	57.9	98	68.06
Improved	105	26.58	5	25	9	31.04	24	31.58	8	42.1	46	31.94
Total	395		20		29		76		19		144	

The table shows, as already mentioned, that at the Judicial Council 290 candidates were included in the short-list because of their merit, and 105 by political considerations. Presidents nominated 32% of the time those candidates that crossed the short-list line, and improved the ranking after the merit phase, even when they represent the 26.6% of the short-listed candidates. This means that Presidents have a preference for those candidates. It is possible to infer a coordination between the Judicial Council and the Executive branch:

if the Judicial Council decides to include a candidate in the short-list not only by his or her merit, it is likely that the President will prefer him or her.

It is not clear if the preference for candidates that improved in the ranking constitutes a deference from the President to the Judicial Council, or if it is that the Council included that candidate in the short list because the President prefer him or her. Qualitative research is necessary to clarify this point. However, the data shows that the coordination may exist.

At the same time, the table shows that De la Rúa preferred 75% of the time candidates that had not changed after the merit phase, and this percentage decreased up to Fernández de Kirchner, who only preferred those candidates 58% of the time, and nominated candidates that were not initially ranked in the top positions 42% of the time. It is possible to affirm, then, than for president Fernández de Kirchner, merits are a relevant factor to be nominated 58% of the times, but are not the only relevant factor 42% of the time.

5.3. Finding 3. The process allows exceptions: the outliers. Continuing with the difference between the position in the initial ranking and the final ranking, it is possible to identify that the nominees, in the majority of the cases, had a variation around 0. Figure 5 presents a scatter plot with the variation for each nominee. Each point represents a nominee. On the x axis is the number of the *concurso* (it is possible to find more than one nominee for each *concurso*) and on the y axis is the variation between the initial ranking and the final ranking for that nominee.

It is possible to observe that the majority of the nominees had a variation equal to 0. In fact, 61.75% of the nominees had no variation, or just increased 1 point. The dotted lines in Figure 5 mark 1.5 times the inter-quartile range, and the dashed ones mark 3 times the inter-quartile range over the quartiles.¹⁰³ I will use the greater difference lines (3 times the inter-quartile range) to identify the outliers.¹⁰⁴ They are the upper dots (Antelo, Lijo,

¹⁰³The inter-quartile range is the difference between the first and third quartile, and a value is often considered an outlier, if it is 1.5 times the interquartile range above the third quartile or below the first one. See CRAWLEY, MICHEL, THE R BOOK (JOHN WILEY & SONS, 2007), p. 283.

¹⁰⁴It is impossible to have outliers down because I am only looking to the nominees, included in the short list. It is not possible to find a candidate included in the short list with a variation of more than around 3 positions.

Najurieta, Rodriguez, Sotelo and Molinari). However, I will focus only in the three extreme cases: Molinari, Sotelo and Antelo.




FIGURE 5. Nominees who were outliers

5.3.1. *Guillermo Molinari*. President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner nominated Guillermo Molinari in 2008. He was initial ranked 12th but ended up ranked 3rd in the final ranking, a variation of 9 positions.¹⁰⁵ His case constitutes, perhaps, the clearest evidence of how the system can be subverted.

Molinari scored 62 on the exam, scoring 13th out of 14 participants, and ranked 12th in the initial ranking. After the appeals process, he climbed to the 6th position. A closer view to the criteria used by the subcommittee gives us an idea of the broad discretion that it has. Molinari was neither a law professor, nor a teaching assistant (TA) or an academic. But he gave two public speeches at the University, and for that reason he received 5 points in the teaching category. At the same time, Reynaga, another participant in the same *concurso*, taught a criminal law course at Catamarca National University for six years, and was a TA in another course for five years, but received only 2.25 points in the teaching category.

¹⁰⁵He was 4.65 SD away from the mean ($z.score = 4.65$, $p.value \simeq 0$): this variation hardly was due to chance.

After having reached the sixth position after the appeals process, Molinari was called to the personal interview, where —according to the subcommittee— “*Molinari demonstrated a clear knowledge about the situation of the vacant Court.*” For that reason, the committee moved up to the third position, including him in the short list.

Molinari was, at the time of this process, the provisional judge at the vacant Court. He was appointed temporally when former judge Toledo resigned (facing an impeachment process). Molinari was once a representative in the provincial legislature and shared the same political alliance as Governor Zamora. Zamora self-identifies as a “*Radical-K*”, which means, a Radical party member (opposition) but with some connections to the governing party of President Fernández de Kirchner. This change in loyalty (Kirchner instead of a Radical) made the leaders of the Radical party see the Governor as a deserter. Molinari had strong bonds to Zamora, and no conflict with the national government. For this reason, probably he was included in the short list and the President nominated him.

Nevertheless, he had a tough time in the Senate. In the Appointments Committee, Radical Party chief, Senator Morales, called the attention about his rise in the rankings during the *concurso*, his close relation to governor Zamora, and his possible lack of independence. Other small parties, like the Civic Coalition and the Socialist Party, joined the Radical Party in rejecting his nomination. However, the governing party controlled the majority of the committee and finally recommended confirmation of the nomination, and it was approved by majority.¹⁰⁶

5.3.2. *Mirta Sotelo*. The second extreme case is the nomination of Mirta Sotelo de Andreau in *concurso* 126 (variation = 8).¹⁰⁷ President Kirchner nominated her in 2006. Sotelo’s situation is different from Molinari’s. Her 100-page resume shows extensive study of administrative law, including a Master Degree from Spain. In the initial ranking of *concurso* 126

¹⁰⁶Report 1415/08, approved at the committee on 12/11/08, and by the Senate on April 15th, 2009, by 32 votes to 11.

¹⁰⁷*z.score* = 4.09, *p.value* \simeq 0.001.

(to select two judges for the Corrientes Court of Appeals), she ranked 12th out of 28 candidates. After an appeal, she rose to the 5th position. As there were two vacancies to fill, four candidates were included on the short list. At the same time, the third ranked applicant, Paso de los Libres' Judge Juan Oliva, was criminally indicted for charges related to violation of custom laws,¹⁰⁸ and was excluded from the short list. So, Sotelo rose the 4th position.

At the same time, Sotelo also participated in *concurso* 130, to select two judges for Resistencia Appeals Court. In that *concurso*, she was ranked 6th in the initial and appeals rankings, but after the interview, she climbed to the 3rd position. However, the first ranked participant, Gustavo Fresneda, was excluded because he was criminally charged with fraud offenses. So, she reached the second position. There were two vacancies to fill also in this *concurso*, and four candidates were included to the short list. But at the same time, as Sotelo and Marta Altabe (ranked 4th) were in the short list of *concurso* 126, the list increased to six names.

The same day, President Néstor Kirchner selected the four nominees for the two *concur-sos*: Ramon Gonzalez (third ranked) and Mirta Sotelo (fourth ranked) for Corrientes; and Jose Aguilar (third ranked) and Maria Denogens (fifth ranked) for Resistencia. The Senate consented all of them.

It is very difficult to talk here about “politics” in the same sense as the Molinari case, but it is likely that the fact that the two processes shared short-listed candidates was an important factor for the Executive before making the decision. It is very difficult to know the ultimate reason; yet, in order to nominate Denogens in Resistencia, Sotelo (or Altabe) had to be nominated in Corrientes.

5.3.3. *Guillermo Antelo and María Najurieta.* President Duhalde, in 2002, nominated María Najurieta and Guillermo Antelo to fill two vacancies at the Federal Civil and Commercial Court of Buenos Aires City in the same *concurso*. Najurieta was ranked 1st in the

¹⁰⁸Paso de los Libres is one of the most important cities at the borders with Brasil. The judge was implicated in some criminal offenses related to customs. He finally resigned in February 2009, after “loosing” 18 kg. of marihuana from his court.

final ranking, after being ranked 7th initially (variation = 6),¹⁰⁹ and Antelo reached the 3rd position on the short list, after being ranked 11th in the initial ranking (variation = 8).¹¹⁰

The appeals in this *concurso* changed the majority of the initial ranking. Figure 6 shows the modifications graphically. It was very controversial, and the Committee wrote the recommendations with four different minority votes. Nevertheless, Najurieta, clerk of Supreme Court Justice Augusto Belluscio (Alfonsín’s appointee in 1983), was included in all of them, and recommended first on the short-list.




FIGURE 6. Rankings for *concurso* 33

Yet, there was no agreement about Antelo. Peronist Senator Miguel Piccheto ranked him 2nd (and Najurieta 4th), but other members of the Committee disagreed and even excluded him from the proposed short-list.

It is not clear why president Duhalde nominated both of them. Antelo was clerk of the Supreme Court Chief Justice, Julio Nazareno, and, in 2002, Duhalde was trying to impeach Nazareno and the rest of the Supreme Court Justices, including Belluscio. Nevertheless, he selected Antelo and Najurieta, and asked for their confirmation to the Senate.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁹ $z.score = 2.95, p.value \simeq 0.003$.

¹¹⁰ $z.score = 4.09, p.value \simeq 0.001$.

¹¹¹Several factors could led to this result. Duhalde did not have many options in the short list: Antelo, Najurieta and Herrera were law clerks for Supreme Court Justices Nazareno, Belluscio and Vázquez. Also, at that moment, the Impeachment Committee worked without consulting every step to the President, and probably, there were some political bargaining going on with the Supreme Court Justices.

In the Senate, a peculiar event happened: former president Alfonsín, then a Senator, was photographed during a session (unrelated with the nomination) reading a small piece of paper, he just received, that said “Judge to freeze: Antelo”. Alfonsín did not know who was Antelo, and passed the piece of paper to another Radical Senator, consulting him about Antelo. The piece of paper went back and forth several times, and, the following morning was the lead story in every newspaper.¹¹² Because of the publicity, Alfonsín said that he was not against the designation of Antelo, and asked for a speedy confirmation of his nomination. The following day, Radical Party chief Senator Carlos Maestro met Antelo and publicly supported him.¹¹³ His nomination was passed without opposition.

These three cases show that the system can work in a highly political way. In these cases, considerations other than judicial qualifications were the main factors. Perhaps, Molinari’s case is the clearest. The case of Sotelo showed how two different processes can be inter-related, and how one *concurso* decision can be influenced by another *concurso*. Finally, the Antelo case illustrates how discussions about political support of a candidate is still *taboo* in Argentine society because the process is still supposed to be apolitical.

5.4. Finding 4. Relative impact of legal reforms. During the ten-year period of the study, there were two legislative reforms that modified the selection process. The first was law 25,669 which transferred the power to review the qualifications of applicants from the *ad-hoc* jury to the Selection Committee. The second was law 26,080, which modified the composition of the Judicial Council and the Selection Committee. The first reform had a lower profile than the second, when the majority of the civil society reacted because its goal was seen as political manipulation of judicial designations. I will analyze each in turn.

5.4.1. *The power to grade qualifications of candidates.* In 2002, the first modification to the selection process took place, and transferred the power to grade the qualifications of the

¹¹²See Clarín, 05/17/02, “Alfonsín: entre un papel indiscreto y el ascenso de un camarista”. (Alfonsín: between an indiscrete paper and the nomination of an Appeals Court judge).

¹¹³Newspaper La Nación, 05/17/02, “Maestro se reunió con Antelo y lo respaldó” [Maestro met Antelo and supported him].

candidates from the ad-hoc jury to the Selection Committee. The chairman of the Justice Committee of the lower House in Congress justified the reform because the selection process took a lot of time, in part because *ad-hoc* jurors did not grade the qualifications of applicants on time, and also, because the same candidate could obtain different grades from different *ad-hoc* juries in different *concurros*, when his or her qualifications were the same.

The data set does not measure the length of the process, and for that reason it is impossible to evaluate if the first goal was achieved. However, Figure 7 clearly shows that the second goal was not successful. It is true that before the legal modification (that is, in period 1) the same participant obtained different qualification scores in different *concurros*, but this was not resolved with the modification. In period 2 and 3 (after the reform), the same participant still obtained different scores in different *concurros*. Figure 7 analyzes the different scores that Domingo Montanaro obtained in the 35 *concurros* in which he participated.




FIGURE 7. Montanaro’s Initial qualifications by *concurso*

He received different grades for his qualifications in every *concurso*, before and after this reform. The change of the power to evaluate the qualifications to the Committee did not resulted in a equalization of the evaluations of the same candidate.¹¹⁴

¹¹⁴It is possible to identify an ascendent trend in Montanaro’s legal qualifications, and that is expected because he gained more years of experience though different *concurros*, and he learned after his repeated play. But here the point is that he was evaluated differently at every *concurso*, and that was what the reform pretended to avoid.

However, the reform had other serious implications, not stated during the discussion of the law. Getting back to Figure 2 (that showed the vertical lines with the range variation by *concurso*), it is possible to realize the wider range modification between the initial score and the appeal score happened in Period 1. Perhaps this was the most important consequence of this reform. Table 4 analyzes the mean of the difference between appeals scores and initial scores in period 1 (before the reform) and period 2 + 3 (after the reform).

TABLE 4. Mean variation after the appeals phase by period

	Min.	Mean	Max.	SD.
Period 1	-35.00	5.54	57.50	9.86
Period 2 + 3	-37.00	1.08	41.00	6.72

It is possible to observe that the mean of the difference between appeals scores and initial scores in period 1 is statistical significantly greater than period 2 and 3; and also period 1 had a broader spread.¹¹⁵

The data shows that one consequence of giving the power to evaluate the qualifications to the Committee instead of the *ad-hoc* jury was a reduction in the differences between the initial scores and the appeals ones.

Since the ad-hoc jury is comprised of judges and law professors, randomly selected for each process, it is possible to infer that this shift diminished the objectivity or meritocracy of the selection process. The fewer differences between the appellate scores and the initial ones, after the reform shows that the criteria of the initial evaluators is similar to the reviewers, after the reform, both from the Selection Committee. After this legal reform it is possible to affirm that the evaluation of the candidates qualifications was truly modified, and it is less objective.

5.4.2. *The reduction of the size of the Council.* As described in Section 2, the main consequence of Law 26,080 was the reduction of the size of the Judicial Council from 20 members to 13, and increasing, at the same time, the representation of the governing party.

¹¹⁵To test if the difference between period 1 and period 2 and 3, I run two-samples Student tests, setting a null hypothesis that both means were equal. The results was: $t.score = 10.9596$, $p.value < 2.2e^{-16}$.

To analyze if the Judicial Council acted in a higher merit-based way before the reform, it is necessary to compare the mean of the variation in ranking positions between the initial ranking and final ranking for period 2 (before this reform) and period 3 (after the reform). Period 1 is excluded of the comparison because the other reform impacted in the variation. Table 5 shows the mean variation of ranking positions for the two periods, between the initial and final rankings.

TABLE 5. Mean variation for period 2 and 3

	Min.	Mean	Max.	SD.
Period 2	-2.00	0.66	8.00	1.44
Period 3	-3.00	0.76	9.00	1.60

t.score = 0.5357, *p.value* = 0.5928

It is impossible to affirm that a statistically significant difference exists between the means of the variation in the two period, before and after the reform.¹¹⁶ So, law 26,080 did not created greater variation between the initial ranking and the final ranking, what might show a higher politicization of the process.

However, such calculation of the mean can hide a higher frequency of outliers. Figure 8 shows the variation of period 2 and 3 graphically. White dots are for period 2 and solid dots for period 3.

It is possible to identify that the extreme dots were for period 3, and probably this is consequence of law 26,080: most cases have no difference with the previous period, but it is easier for the Council to subvert the system with extreme cases. However, more cases are necessary to determine if this is a pattern or not.

In conclusion, it is possible to infer that, on the one hand, the first normative reform of law 25,669 had an important impact in reducing the difference between the initial scores and the appealed ones. This was achieved by transferring the power to initially evaluate the qualifications of the candidates from the random jury, to the same Committee that also conduct the review of those evaluations.

¹¹⁶Even running a two-sample test, but stating the alternative as the mean in period 3 is greater that period 2, it is not possible to reject the null: *p - value* = 0.2964.




FIGURE 8. Variation between initial ranking and appeal ranking in periods 2 and 3

On the other hand, the impact of law 26,080 in the selection process can not yet be clearly identified. It is possible to detect that the most extreme variation between the initial ranking and the final ranking occurred in this period, and maybe this was the most important consequence of the reform. However, more data is necessary to evaluate these findings.

5.5. Finding 5. The Senate as an imperfect public forum. The Senate constituted the public forum for discuss about the candidates, but just in counted occasions, and even in those, the outcome was insatisfactory. Since the creation of the Judicial Council, the Senate never expressly rejected a candidate,¹¹⁷ but it did fail to approve four federal nominees¹¹⁸ and the President had to withdraw their names.¹¹⁹ Taking in count that there was 144 nominations, the Senate fail to approve only a 2.8% of them. Such a small proportion show that the Senate did not have a very relevant role at the selection process.

Table 6 summarizes the qualification of the nominees, the rankings at the Judicial Council, and who was opposed to the nomination. The qualifications of the candidate and the

¹¹⁷See, Llanos and Schibber, *Prestando acuerdo: El Senado frente a los nombramientos del Poder Judicial en la Argentina democrática (1983-2006)* [Giving consent: the Senate and the nominations for the Judicial branch in democratic Argentina (1983-2006)], GIGA WP 54/2007, July 2007.

¹¹⁸Not including non-federal judges, or other nominees like public defenders or prosecutors.

¹¹⁹There were two other cases, Graciela Vilas and Graciela Montesi, where the candidates resigned the nomination before the hearings.

variation between the initial ranking and the final ranking do not show any significant characteristic.

TABLE 6. Rankings at the Judicial Council of non-consented nominees

	Qualif.	Initial	Appeal	Final	Variation	Opposition
Assaf, Amalina	162	2	2	1	1	Senator
Monti, Victor	162	1	1	2	-1	NGOs
Compaired, Carlos	133	3	3	3	0	NGOs
Aguilar, Horacio	163.5	4	4	3	1	Bar Association Senator

The first case was Amalina Assaf, for the federal Court of Catamarca, whose nomination was opposed by Catamarca three Senators. The Committee treated the opposition of the State Senators as some kind of “blue slip” rule, and no hearing was scheduled for her nomination. Finally, she resigned and the President nominated the second candidate from the short list, Victor Monti Herrera, who had the political support of Catamarca’s Senators. However, two human rights organizations —representing victims of the last dictatorship and their relatives¹²⁰— formally expressed concern over his nomination because Monti supported the dictatorship. The President dropped also this nomination, and asked the Judicial Council to start the process again. The court seat has remained vacant since 2001.¹²¹

Compaired followed a similar fate to Monti. He was nominated to the Federal Appeals Court of La Plata when two human rights organizations opposed his nomination¹²² because of his lack of commitment to democratic values, and because the Disciplinary Committee of the Judicial Council had received a complaint alleging corruption of his part. Before the hearings, the President dropped his nomination. However, some months later, she reconsidered that decision, and presented his nomination again. In this second time, Compaired testified at

¹²⁰The observations were presented by Asociacion Madres de Plaza de Mayo, Linea Fundadora (Mothers of Plaza de Mayo, one of the most important victim associations), HIJOS (Association of sons and daughters of the disappeared), and HERMANOS (association of siblings of disappeared); and for Foundation “Luis y Olga Aredes”, from Tucuman. Luis and Olga Aredes were victims of the state terrorism. According to the observations, Victor Monti was judge during the dictatorship, and in democracy, during an Undersecretary of Human Rights’s talk, Monti expressly supported that regime.

¹²¹Two provisional judges were at the Court since 2001, Pedro Navarro and Ricardo Moreno.

¹²²Center for Legal and Social Studies (CELS) and Comision Provincial por la Memoria [provincial committee for Memory].

the Committee, giving a sort of explanation about the corruption claim, and his nomination was approved by majority vote.¹²³

The President also had to drop another nomination because of the opposition of State Senators in the case of Horacio Aguilar, nominated for the Federal Appeals Court of Salta. In this case, the Bar Association of Jujuy, and Jujuy Senators Gerardo Morales (the opposition leader) and Guillermo Jenefes (governmental party Senator) opposed his nomination (the Federal Appeals Court of Salta also have jurisdiction over Jujuy). According to Salta Senator Sonia Escudero, they objected because there was a political agreement that the vacancy would be filled by a candidate from Jujuy.¹²⁴ The existence of this kind of agreement is common in a political model for selecting judges, however, it makes no sense in a meritocratic model.

In conclusion, even when the Judicial Council conducts a “public hearing,” or the Executive branch follows a participatory process, the plurality and the publicity of the discussions, makes of the Senate the most receptive body for political discussions about the candidates. However, this broad discussion about the nominees happened in only few cases, and in most of the cases, the public hearing was no more than a formal requirement. For this reason, it can be said that it was the public forum, but it was imperfect.

5.6. Other findings: gender disparity is still present. The data set also confirms a pattern of the self-exclusion of women that Bergallo detected,¹²⁵ and verifies that the problem has continued over time. Bergallo found, for Buenos Aires federal courts, that in the pool of applicants 83.5% were male and 16.5% female; that 84.85% of the short-listed were male and 15.15% female; and that 84.61% of the executive nominees were male and 15.38% female. Five years later, with more data available, it is possible to affirm that the pattern of self-exclusion is still present, and the process continues the gender discrimination.

¹²³The Civil Coalition Senator Cabanchik presented a minority report summarizing all the objections that the candidate received. See recommendation 1414/08 of the Appointments Committee.

¹²⁴See Senator Escudero press release 12/16/08, available at

http://www.soniaescudero.com.ar/joomla/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=275.

¹²⁵See Bergallo, Paola, *A judicial glass ceiling? The selection of Buenos Aires federal and state judges*, SPILS dissertation, Stanford Law School, 2004, p. 60.

There is a consistent difference between the quantity of women and men in the pool of applicants, on the short-lists,¹²⁶ and executive nominees. Table 7 shows that the differences are constant, and that the system lacks an affirmative policy to remedy this disparity.

TABLE 7. Applicants, Short-listed candidates and Nominees by gender

	Participants		Short-listed		Nominees	
	<i>N</i>	%	<i>N</i>	%	<i>N</i>	%
Male	1473	81.15	414	82.47	110	76.39
Female	342	18.85	88	17.53	34	23.61
	1815		502		144	

The Judicial Council has not taken any affirmative action to remedy this pattern of self-exclusion, and the data set confirmed the continued existence of the gender divide.

To conclude, there was important findings. The first is that appeals are not used just to make corrections or revision of factual mistakes or clear arbitrariness. The second one is that around seventy percent of the candidates was included in the short-list because of their performance in the meritocratic part of the process, and that the other thirty percent was included based on political considerations. Also, around seventy percent of the *concurso*'s short-lists, included, at least, one candidate that increased ranking positions for political considerations. Third, it is possible to identify outliers in the data, meaning that in some nominations, political considerations were clearly the most important factor disregarding the meritocratic part of the process. Fourth, the legal reforms to the selection process had different impacts: while Law 25,669 increased the politicization of the evaluation of applicants' qualifications, Law 26,080 did not have a significant impact on politicization of the process, but it did, however, permit more extreme results or outliers. The fifth finding is that the Senate is not playing a relevant role, but under certain circumstances, it can be a public forum for civil society organizations to discuss candidates' ideology. And lastly, the research verifies that the Judicial Council has done little to address continued gender imbalance in the selection process.

¹²⁶Taking into account the two complementary lists: those for more than one seat, and those for a candidate already short-listed in another *concurso*.

6. Conclusions

This paper analyzed the relationship between merit and political factors in the selection of federal judges in Argentina. Two different models to select judges were described: a meritocratic model —with a Judicial Council— mostly present in civil law countries where judges lack judicial review powers; and a political model —by advice and consent of political bodies— most common in common law countries where judges do have powers of judicial review. I also described how the Judicial Council was established in Argentina. This could be understood as part of a judicial reform wave in Latin America, promoted by multilateral development agencies such as the World Bank, or USAID, to depolitize the judiciary, improve the rule of law and bring certainty to the market. The idea was to remove the power to appoint judges from politicians and vest it in a meritocratic selection process.

However, Argentina has not adopted a pure meritocratic model. The Judicial Council is made up of different members, including judges and lawyers, but also political representatives and Senators. The process includes an exam blindly graded by a jury chosen at random, but also it has an appeals phase that it used to change the scores, as well as interviews where political considerations are taken into account. After the Judicial Council plays its role, the Executive and the Senate make the final decisions also by political reasons. It is an hybrid model.

Empirically, it has been demonstrated that this institutional design is reflected in practice: for 73% of the short-listed candidates, their performance in the meritocratic part of the process (exam and initial evaluation of qualifications) was the determinative factor in their inclusion on the short list. But, for the 27% of the candidates, political factors were heavily influential in their inclusion at the short list. 70% of the *concurso*s' short-list included at least one of those candidates, and they were nominated by the Executive in 32% of the cases. In the following paragraphs I will discuss these findings, draw out a few policy recommendations, and finally, close the paper with suggestions for future research.

6.1. Discussion of the findings. As described in the previous section, findings 1, 2 and 3 showed that the Judicial Council worked neither as a meritocratic body nor a political one, and the process can accurately be described as an hybrid of the two models. At the same time, finding 4 shows that normative reforms had different impacts on the process: while Law 25,669 (that transferred the power to grade the candidate's qualifications to the Judicial Council) had increased the politicization of the process, the same cannot be preliminary said for Law 26,080 (that reduced the size of the Council). But one effect of the latter reform might be the increment of outliers. Finally, finding 5 demonstrates that the Senate was the only forum for civil society organizations to discuss the candidates, but it was it only in counted occasions.

6.1.1. *A hybrid of the two models.* Research question number 1 was related to the extent that the system worked as a merit-based model or as a political one. Finding 2 showed that for 73.41% of the candidates on the short lists, their performance in the meritocratic part of the process was determinative of their inclusion on the list. And taking into account the nominations of the Presidents, it is possible to say that 68.06% of the nominees ranked in the top positions in the initial ranking. For the remaining candidates, other considerations such as political ideology, moral values and partisanship were relevant to their inclusion on the short list (26.58%) or to receive a nomination by the executive (31.94%).

At the same time, 67.22% of the *concurros*' short-lists included at least one candidate that increased positions by political factors in order to cross the short-list line, and be included in it. Only 31.88% of the *concurros*' short-list did not include a candidate that increased positions in the appeals phase or during the interviews.

In conclusion, it is possible to affirm that the meritocratic part of the process is the most relevant factor to be included in the short list in seventy percent of the cases, but a candidate that did not perform well in the meritocratic part can also be included. Almost seventy percent of the *concurros* included some candidate for other factors than merit. And those were nominated by the President in one third of the vacant seats.

This is the direct consequence of the institutional design of the process. There is a meritocratic part, with exams and the initial evaluation of the applicants' qualifications, but later, the process is open to political considerations. Finding 1 showed that the appeals phase does not work just as a review, and that scores were modified in 99.97% of the *concurros*. Half of the modifications to the initial ranking occurred during the appeals phase. The other half was made during the interviews.

As a consequence of this design, the existence of some outliers showed that the system could be subverted and transformed to an almost exclusively political model in certain occasions. The case of Molinari is probably the clearest, but there were other cases where political considerations were the most important factor to nominate a candidate.

6.1.2. *The impact of the legal reforms.* Research question number 2 was referred to the impact of the legal reforms that modified the process at the Judicial Council. The goals of Law 25,669 (that transferred the power to evaluate the applicants' qualifications to the Selection Committee) were to reduce the delay in the selection process and bring uniformity to the evaluation of the applicants qualifications. The real consequence was different: increased the politicization of the evaluation of judicial qualifications. This reform pushed the system away from the meritocratic model.

In 2006, when Law 26,080 (that reduced the size of the Council) was discussed there was a extended debate about the manipulation of the judicial nominations. As discussed in Section 2, many civil society organizations, the media, and opposition parties believed that this law would pushed the system away from the meritocratic model. However, the available data does not support this conclusion.

6.1.3. *The Senate as a public forum.* Research question number 3 was related to the public participation at the process. Finding 5 shows that in certain and rare occasions, the Senate acts as a forum for civil society organizations, and even for Senators to voice political opinions about nominees. The problem was that in those cases, there was almost no possibility to change the nominee. The Senate usually does not expressly reject the

nominations, and let it there indefinitely until the candidate resigns or the President drops the name. The process should re-start from the beginning, and this could take a long time. The Appeals Court of Catamarca, for instance, with objections to two nominees, has remained vacant for more than seven years.

6.2. Policy recommendations. This study was not designed to evaluate which model—political or meritocratic—is better. The main concern was to determinate how the system works in Argentina, and the conclusion is that it is a hybrid between the two models.

This conclusion should make us think about the consequences of having a mix between the two models. First, political considerations are important in the selection of judges, and the institutional design should appropriately reflect this. Judicial Council members should refrain from assuming that their function as evaluating only merits, and openly incorporate discussions of candidates' ideology. The use of the appeals phase to introduce political preferences, then, should be reduced because they do not reflect openly such political discussions.

Also, to avoid the political abuse of the appeals process, the qualifications scores might be repeated from one *concurso* to another. Applicants might be evaluated, for example, once a year, and their score remain valid for all processes in that period. This may avoid a candidate with different evaluations of his or her qualifications according to the process (see figure 8, for instance).

At the same time, the interview should be used mainly to identify the moral values or the ideology of the candidates. It should be used to clarify the political values of the candidates, and to promote a real discussion about the judge wanted for a Court. For this, the Selection Committee should improve the transparency of that step and its openness to the public. The Committee should give more public attention to the interviews, and to invite to bar associations and civil society organizations to participate and pose questions to the candidates. The interview should not be conducted only by two members but for the

complete Committee, and transcripts should be available to the public before the hearings and the approval of the short list.

The public hearing with the short-listed candidates should be a real public hearing, where different actors and organizations should be present, discussing the performance of the candidate, but also probing their ideological or moral values.

Also, the Judicial Council should take seriously its responsibility to promote diversity in the judiciary. If the Judicial Council discusses political considerations, diversity should be a topic to consider before approving a short list. Gender diversity is perhaps the most prominent (see Section 5.6), but race, religion, sexual orientation and socioeconomic background, at least, should also be contemplated in the selection of the judiciary.

The executive branch also needs to improve the transparency of its decisions. The observations and support given to the candidates should be available online, and the President should be able to justify why he or she chooses one candidate over another, according to the promotion to a certain judicial policy of the administration. Clear criteria about this selection process could bring legitimacy to the nominations.

And, finally, Senators should take their role politically, but being aware that the system is not only a political model. Agreements such as that regarding the Appeals Court of Salta (see note 118) are not possible in the hybrid model.

6.3. Recommendations for future research. Evaluating institutions with empirical data permits us to have paint an accurate picture of how they work. This study tried to do that with respect to the mix between a meritocratic and a political model for selecting judges. However, there were some limitations on this study, and further research can complement this initial effort.

Future studies can expand the analysis using additional variables. It would be interesting to use a measure of ideology and partisanship in the nomination process. Probably, future researchers will be able to measure this. At the same time, the analysis could be improved with other variables about the candidates. In this research, the only data collected on

the candidates was gender. Race, religion, sexual orientation, socioeconomic background, university attended, professional experience, etc., were not available online, but it can be added to this data set in the future.

At the same time, this data set should be updated periodically, and also it would be interesting to include Buenos Aires local (non-federal) court judges that the Judicial Council decided. This may permit comparing these two kinds of courts appointees.

The compilation of more and more data will permit more and more complex and accurate evaluations. Both qualitative and quantitative analysis is necessary to improve the selection of judges, public participation in the decision-making process, and the democratization of the judicial branch of government.

number	contest	year	court	provir	date	name	gender	exam_score	exam_rank	total_part	initial_qualif	qualif_id	initial_sum	initial_rank	appeal_qualif	sum_appeal	sum_appeal_rank	appeal_ic	final_rank	rank_variation	executive	exec_id
1	1	2000	1	8	1	Aranguren, Beatriz	2	78	7	20	50	NA	128	6	NA	128	6	102	NA	NA	0	0
1	1	2000	1	8	1	Baldi, Alberto	1	51	15	20	50	NA	101	14	NA	101	14	102	NA	NA	0	0
1	1	2000	1	8	1	Baba, Martin	1	66	8	20	57	NA	123	7	NA	123	7	102	NA	NA	0	0
1	1	2000	1	8	1	Beron, Ezequiel	1	29	20	20	53	NA	82	19	NA	82	19	102	NA	NA	0	0
1	1	2000	1	8	1	Calvete, Federico	1	90	2	20	56	NA	146	4	NA	146	4	102	NA	2	2	0
1	1	2000	1	8	1	Compareid, Carlos	1	91	1	20	65	NA	156	1	NA	156	1	102	NA	1	0	0
1	1	2000	1	8	1	Culotta, Juan	1	65	9	20	50	NA	115	10	NA	115	10	102	NA	NA	0	0
1	1	2000	1	8	1	Dapuetto, Miguel	1	80	6	20	67	NA	147	3	NA	147	3	102	NA	NA	0	0
1	1	2000	1	8	1	Goldberg, David	1	81	5	20	20	NA	101	15	NA	101	14	102	NA	NA	0	0
1	1	2000	1	8	1	Maiztegui, Eduardo	1	83	4	20	56	NA	139	5	NA	137	5	102	NA	3	2	0
1	1	2000	1	8	1	Mantaras, Miguel	1	30	19	20	55	NA	85	18	NA	85	18	102	NA	NA	0	0
1	1	2000	1	8	1	Montanaro, Domingo	1	63	11	20	54	NA	117	9	NA	117	9	102	NA	NA	0	0
1	1	2000	1	8	1	Monzo, Carlos	1	52	14	20	50	NA	102	13	NA	102	13	102	NA	NA	0	0
1	1	2000	1	8	1	Palmisano, Patricia	2	45	16	20	22	NA	67	20	NA	67	20	102	NA	NA	0	0
1	1	2000	1	8	1	Quadrini, Guillermo	1	64	10	20	55	NA	119	8	NA	119	8	102	NA	4	4	3
1	1	2000	1	8	1	Rodriguez, Reinaldo	1	55	12	20	50	NA	105	12	NA	105	12	102	NA	NA	0	0
1	1	2000	1	8	1	Rojas, Mariela	2	38	18	20	61	NA	99	16	NA	99	16	102	NA	NA	0	0
1	1	2000	1	8	1	Selser, Julio	1	54	13	20	55	NA	109	11	NA	109	11	102	NA	NA	0	0
1	1	2000	1	8	1	Sero, Alberto	1	88	3	20	65	NA	153	2	NA	147	2	102	NA	NA	0	0
1	1	2000	1	8	1	Viaut, Luis	1	40	17	20	54	NA	94	17	NA	94	17	102	NA	NA	0	0
2	2	2000	1	7	1	Kazakevich, Fernando	1	75	1	12	82	NA	157	1	NA	NA	1	103	NA	NA	0	0
2	2	2000	1	7	1	Compareid, Carlos	1	70	2	12	77	NA	147	2	NA	NA	2	103	NA	1	1	0
2	2	2000	1	7	1	Parcio, Eva	2	68	3	12	75	NA	143	3	NA	NA	3	103	NA	2	1	1
2	2	2000	1	7	1	Selser, Julio	1	60	4	12	75	NA	135	4	NA	NA	4	103	NA	NA	0	0
2	2	2000	1	7	1	Gomez, Antonio	1	40	7	12	83	NA	123	5	NA	NA	5	103	NA	3	2	0
2	2	2000	1	7	1	Suarez, Aldo	1	42	5	12	75	NA	117	6	NA	NA	6	103	NA	NA	0	0
2	2	2000	1	7	1	Sanchez, Mariano	1	37	8	12	78	NA	115	7	NA	NA	7	103	NA	NA	0	0
2	2	2000	1	7	1	Baffigi, Gabriel	1	41	6	12	72	NA	113	8	NA	NA	8	103	NA	NA	0	0
2	2	2000	1	7	1	Sassot, Cristian	1	35	9	12	72	NA	107	9	NA	NA	9	103	NA	NA	0	0
2	2	2000	1	7	1	Deluca, Luis	1	22	11	12	71	NA	93	10	NA	NA	10	103	NA	NA	0	0
2	2	2000	1	7	1	Baldi, Alberto	1	20	12	12	42	NA	62	11	NA	NA	11	103	NA	NA	0	0
2	2	2000	1	7	1	Goldberg, David	1	30	10	12	16	NA	46	12	NA	NA	12	103	NA	NA	0	0
3	3	2000	1	23	1	De Antueno, Franciscc	1	85	4	19	79	NA	164	1	NA	NA	1	104	NA	NA	0	0
3	3	2000	1	23	1	Gomez, Antonio	1	80	5	19	65	NA	145	2	NA	NA	2	104	NA	1	1	0
3	3	2000	1	23	1	Calvete, Federico	1	95	1	19	50	NA	145	2	NA	NA	2	104	NA	2	0	1
3	3	2000	1	23	1	Massimi, Guillermo	1	87	3	19	57	NA	144	4	NA	NA	4	104	NA	NA	0	0
3	3	2000	1	23	1	Baffigi, Gabriel	1	95	2	19	42	NA	137	5	NA	NA	5	104	NA	3	2	0
3	3	2000	1	23	1	Compareid, Carlos	1	45	11	19	67	NA	112	6	NA	NA	6	104	NA	NA	0	0
3	3	2000	1	23	1	Sagastume, Carlos	1	45	12	19	58	NA	103	7	NA	NA	7	104	NA	NA	0	0
3	3	2000	1	23	1	Maiztegui, Eduardo	1	50	7	19	53	NA	103	7	NA	NA	7	104	NA	NA	0	0
3	3	2000	1	23	1	Reyes, Eduardo	1	60	6	19	41	NA	101	9	NA	NA	9	104	NA	NA	0	0
3	3	2000	1	23	1	Sassot, Cristian	1	45	13	19	55	NA	100	10	NA	NA	10	104	NA	NA	0	0
3	3	2000	1	23	1	Zenere, Gisela	2	47	10	19	53	NA	100	10	NA	NA	10	104	NA	NA	0	0
3	3	2000	1	23	1	Ildarraz, Marta	2	40	14	19	59	NA	99	12	NA	NA	12	104	NA	NA	0	0
3	3	2000	1	23	1	Maino, Fernando	1	48	9	19	50	NA	98	13	NA	NA	13	104	NA	NA	0	0
3	3	2000	1	23	1	Culotta, Juan	1	40	15	19	50	NA	90	14	NA	NA	14	104	NA	NA	0	0
3	3	2000	1	23	1	Baldi, Alberto	1	40	16	19	44	NA	84	15	NA	NA	15	104	NA	NA	0	0
3	3	2000	1	23	1	Deluca, Luis	1	25	19	19	52	NA	77	16	NA	NA	16	104	NA	NA	0	0
3	3	2000	1	23	1	Goldberg, David	1	50	8	19	24	NA	74	17	NA	NA	17	104	NA	NA	0	0

Appendix A

number	contest_year	count	provir	date	name	gender	exam_score	exam_rank	total_part	initial_qualif	id	initial_sum	initial_rank	appeal_qualif	sum_appeal	appeal_rank	18	19	104	final_rank	variation	executive	exec_id
3	3	2000	1	23	1	Selser, Julio	1	30	18	19	34	NA	64	18	NA	18	104	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
3	3	2000	1	23	1	Sellares, Patricia	2	35	17	19	26	NA	61	19	NA	19	104	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
4	4	2000	9	23	1	Venegas, Jorge	1	90	3	25	63	NA	153	1	NA	1	102	1	0	0	0	0	0
4	4	2000	9	23	1	D'Alessio, Ana	2	100	1	25	51	NA	151	2	NA	2	102	2	0	1	1	1	1
4	4	2000	9	23	1	Pena, Hector	1	90	3	25	58	NA	148	3	NA	3	102	3	0	1	2	2	2
4	4	2000	9	23	1	Camutti, Ricardo	1	90	3	25	52	NA	142	4	NA	4	102	4	0	0	0	0	0
4	4	2000	9	23	1	Maino, Fernando	1	90	3	25	36	NA	126	5	NA	5	102	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
4	4	2000	9	23	1	Sassot, Cristian	1	90	3	25	24	NA	114	6	NA	6	102	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
4	4	2000	9	23	1	Culotta, Juan	1	100	1	25	13	NA	113	7	NA	6	102	5	2	0	0	0	0
4	4	2000	9	23	1	Calot, Enrique	1	60	9	25	51	NA	111	8	NA	102	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0	0
4	4	2000	9	23	1	Gomez, Antonio	1	60	9	25	50	NA	110	9	NA	9	102	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
4	4	2000	9	23	1	Pitcovsky, Leonardo	1	60	9	25	50	NA	110	10	NA	10	102	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
4	4	2000	9	23	1	Calvete, Federico	1	90	3	25	20	NA	110	10	NA	8	102	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
4	4	2000	9	23	1	Deluca, Luis	1	60	9	25	34	NA	94	12	NA	12	102	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
4	4	2000	9	23	1	Machado, Jorge	1	60	9	25	31	NA	91	13	NA	11	102	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
4	4	2000	9	23	1	Vital, Ernesto	1	20	15	25	69	NA	89	14	NA	89	NA	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
4	4	2000	9	23	1	Caviglia, Miguel	1	60	9	25	18	NA	78	15	NA	13	102	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
4	4	2000	9	23	1	Magraner, Roberto	1	20	15	25	57	NA	77	16	NA	14	102	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
4	4	2000	9	23	1	Totaro, Ana	2	10	23	25	61	NA	71	17	NA	16	102	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
4	4	2000	9	23	1	Cevasco, Omar	1	20	15	25	51	NA	71	17	NA	15	102	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
4	4	2000	9	23	1	Arguiano, Dario	1	20	15	25	38	NA	58	17	NA	17	102	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
4	4	2000	9	23	1	Sonia, Juan	1	20	15	25	38	NA	58	18	NA	18	102	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
4	4	2000	9	23	1	Selser, Julio	1	20	15	25	36	NA	56	19	NA	19	102	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
4	4	2000	9	23	1	Reyes, Eduardo	1	20	15	25	31	NA	51	20	NA	20	102	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
4	4	2000	9	23	1	Piccardo, Alfredo	1	10	23	25	39	NA	49	21	NA	21	102	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
4	4	2000	9	23	1	Barrionuevo, Maria	2	20	15	25	20	NA	40	22	NA	22	102	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
4	4	2000	9	23	1	Cuenca, Francisco	1	10	23	25	22	NA	32	23	NA	23	102	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
5	5	2000	1	1	1	Compareid, Carlos	1	71	2	22	71	NA	142	1	NA	1	105	1	0	1	1	1	1
5	5	2000	1	1	1	Gomez, Antonio	1	59	8	22	80	NA	139	2	NA	2	105	2	0	0	0	0	0
5	5	2000	1	1	1	Barreiro, Ricardo	1	67	3	22	58	NA	125	3	NA	4	105	3	0	0	0	0	0
5	5	2000	1	1	1	Reyes, Eduardo	1	54	14	22	68	NA	122	4	NA	3	105	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
5	5	2000	1	1	1	Mc Intosh, Maria	2	58	9	22	62	NA	120	5	NA	5	105	5	0	0	0	0	0
5	5	2000	1	1	1	Quadrini, Guillermo	1	64	6	22	54	NA	118	6	NA	6	105	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
5	5	2000	1	1	1	Sellares, Patricia	2	67	3	22	51	NA	118	6	NA	6	105	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
5	5	2000	1	1	1	Bazzani, Juan	1	60	7	22	50	NA	110	8	NA	9	105	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
5	5	2000	1	1	1	Martinez, Martin	1	54	14	22	54	NA	108	9	NA	11	105	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
5	5	2000	1	1	1	Montanaro, Domingo	1	85	1	22	22	NA	107	10	NA	6	105	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
5	5	2000	1	1	1	Baba, Martin	1	55	12	22	50	NA	105	11	NA	12	105	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
5	5	2000	1	1	1	Lameiza, Osvaldo	1	49	17	22	52	NA	101	12	NA	13	105	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
5	5	2000	1	1	1	Plou, Hector	1	65	5	22	30	NA	95	13	NA	9	105	4	9	0	0	0	
5	5	2000	1	1	1	Cubelli, Jorge	1	41	21	22	52	NA	93	14	NA	15	105	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
5	5	2000	1	1	1	Selser, Julio	1	57	11	22	35	NA	92	15	NA	16	105	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
5	5	2000	1	1	1	Petrel, Juan	1	46	19	22	34	NA	80	16	NA	17	105	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
5	5	2000	1	1	1	Cognigni, Eduardo	1	55	12	22	23	NA	78	17	NA	14	105	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
5	5	2000	1	1	1	Zaratogui, Bertoldo	1	43	20	22	34	NA	77	18	NA	19	105	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
5	5	2000	1	1	1	Goldberg, David	1	51	16	22	20	NA	71	19	NA	20	105	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
5	5	2000	1	1	1	Bayle, Jose	1	38	22	22	27	NA	65	20	NA	20	105	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
5	5	2000	1	1	1	Lopez Orbea, Jorge	1	46	18	22	15	NA	61	21	NA	17	105	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
5	5	2000	1	1	1	Palmisano, Patricia	2	58	9	22	2	NA	60	22	NA	22	105	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0

number	contest	year	court	provir	date	name	gender	exam_score	exam_rank	total_part	initial_qualif	qualif_id	initial_sum	initial_rank	appeal_qualif	appeal_sum	appeal_rank	appeal_ic	final_rank	rank_variation	executive	exec_id
6	6	2000	1	21	1	Montanaro, Domingo	1	75	1	25	52 NA	127	1 NA	1	105 NA	1	105 NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
6	6	2000	1	21	1	Venegas, Jorge	1	45	3	25	68 NA	113	2 NA	2	105	2	105	1	1	1	0	0
6	6	2000	1	21	1	Mino, Francisco	1	50	2	25	63 NA	113	2 NA	2	105	3	105	3	-1	1	2	2
6	6	2000	1	21	1	Compareid, Carlos	1	45	3	25	63 NA	108	4 NA	4	105	4	105	2	2	0	0	0
6	6	2000	1	21	1	Barreiro, Ricardo	1	36	7	25	62 NA	98	5 NA	9	105 NA	5	105 NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
6	6	2000	1	21	1	Robinson, Ricardo	1	8	19	25	83 NA	91	6 NA	6	105 NA	6	105 NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
6	6	2000	1	21	1	Lincoln, Horacio	1	45	3	25	88	88	7 NA	12	105 NA	12	105 NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
6	6	2000	1	21	1	Viaut, Luis	1	13	11	25	71 NA	84	8 NA	8	105 NA	8	105 NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
6	6	2000	1	21	1	De la Torre, Diego	1	10	15	25	66 NA	76	10 NA	15	105 NA	15	105 NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
6	6	2000	1	21	1	Reyes, Eduardo	1	7	23	25	67 NA	74	11 NA	16	105 NA	16	105 NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
6	6	2000	1	21	1	Gonzalez, Laudelino	1	5	24	25	67 NA	72	12 NA	17	105 NA	17	105 NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
6	6	2000	1	21	1	Arrieta, Roberto	1	13	11	25	56 NA	69	13 NA	18	105 NA	18	105 NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
6	6	2000	1	21	1	Miitello, Sergio	1	10	15	25	59 NA	69	13 NA	11	105 NA	11	105 NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
6	6	2000	1	21	1	Monzo, Carlos	1	8	19	25	60 NA	68	15 NA	10	105 NA	10	105 NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
6	6	2000	1	21	1	Seligmann, Luis	1	35	8	25	32 NA	67	16 NA	7	105 NA	7	105 NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
6	6	2000	1	21	1	Beron, Ezequiel	1	13	11	25	52 NA	65	17 NA	18	105 NA	18	105 NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
6	6	2000	1	21	1	Zarategui, Bertoldo	1	8	19	25	57 NA	65	17 NA	20	105 NA	20	105 NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
6	6	2000	1	21	1	Del Huerto, Felicia	2	5	24	25	50 NA	55	19 NA	14	105 NA	14	105 NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
6	6	2000	1	21	1	Andres, Jorge	1	37	6	25	13 NA	50	20 NA	21	105 NA	21	105 NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
6	6	2000	1	21	1	Sanchez, Adela	2	10	15	25	37 NA	47	21 NA	22	105 NA	22	105 NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
6	6	2000	1	21	1	Abasolo, Miguel	1	35	8	25	9 NA	44	22 NA	7	105 NA	7	105 NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
6	6	2000	1	21	1	Goldberg, David	1	10	15	25	31 NA	41	23 NA	23	105 NA	23	105 NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
6	6	2000	1	21	1	Perez Leiva, Juan	1	8	19	25	32 NA	40	24 NA	24	105 NA	24	105 NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
6	6	2000	1	21	1	Palmisano, Patricia	2	20	10	25	5 NA	25	25 NA	25	105 NA	25	105 NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
6	6	2000	1	21	1	Garcia Porta, Jose	1	12	14	25	71 NA	83	9 NA	13	105 NA	13	105 NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
7	7	2000	9	1	1	Rozanski, Carlos	1	100	1	36	65 NA	165	1 NA	1	104	1	104	1	0	1	2	2
7	7	2000	9	1	1	Jarazo, Nelson	1	90	7	36	68 NA	158	2 NA	2	104	2	104	2	0	1	1	1
7	7	2000	9	1	1	Isaurralde, Horacio	1	95	5	36	60 NA	155	3 NA	3	104	3	104	3	0	1	1	1
7	7	2000	9	1	1	Calvete, Federico	1	100	1	36	53 NA	153	4 NA	4	104	4	104	4	0	0	0	0
7	7	2000	9	1	1	Rafecas, Daniel	1	100	1	36	51 NA	151	5 NA	5	104	5	104	5	0	0	0	0
7	7	2000	9	1	1	Ochoa, Fernando	1	85	11	36	65 NA	150	6 NA	6	104 NA	6	104 NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
7	7	2000	9	1	1	Ferraro, Alfonso	1	95	5	36	50 NA	145	7 NA	7	104 NA	7	104 NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
7	7	2000	9	1	1	Alegre, Francisco	1	90	7	36	52 NA	142	8 NA	9	104 NA	9	104 NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
7	7	2000	9	1	1	Franco, Sergio	1	90	7	36	50 NA	140	9 NA	9	104	7	104	6	3	0	0	0
7	7	2000	9	1	1	Montanaro, Domingo	1	100	1	36	37 NA	137	10 NA	9	104 NA	9	104 NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
7	7	2000	9	1	1	Martinez, Roberto	1	90	7	36	45 NA	135	11 NA	11	104 NA	11	104 NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
7	7	2000	9	1	1	Vital, Ernesto	1	60	14	36	70 NA	130	12 NA	12	104 NA	12	104 NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
7	7	2000	9	1	1	Biasotti, Ana	2	85	11	36	39 NA	124	13 NA	13	104 NA	13	104 NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
7	7	2000	9	1	1	Della Malva, Claudia	2	70	13	36	50 NA	120	14 NA	14	104 NA	14	104 NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
7	7	2000	9	1	1	Selser, Julio	1	50	18	36	67 NA	117	15 NA	15	104 NA	15	104 NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
7	7	2000	9	1	1	Alvero, Marcelo	1	60	14	36	55 NA	115	16 NA	16	104 NA	16	104 NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
7	7	2000	9	1	1	Venegas, Jorge	1	50	18	36	64 NA	114	17 NA	17	104 NA	17	104 NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
7	7	2000	9	1	1	Deglaue, Jose	1	60	14	36	51 NA	111	18 NA	18	104 NA	18	104 NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
7	7	2000	9	1	1	Martinez Vega, Maria	2	60	14	36	50 NA	110	19 NA	19	104 NA	19	104 NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
7	7	2000	9	1	1	Cozzi, Jorge	1	50	18	36	55 NA	105	20 NA	20	104 NA	20	104 NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
7	7	2000	9	1	1	Canero, Herminio	1	50	18	36	53 NA	103	21 NA	21	104 NA	21	104 NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
7	7	2000	9	1	1	Quadrini, Guillermo	1	50	18	36	50 NA	100	22 NA	22	104 NA	22	104 NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
7	7	2000	9	1	1	Rey Ordóñez, Julio	1	30	25	36	66 NA	96	23 NA	23	104 NA	23	104 NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
7	7	2000	9	1	1	Dapueto, Miguel	1	30	25	36	65 NA	95	24 NA	24	104 NA	24	104 NA	NA	NA	0	0	0

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number	contest	year	court	provinc	date	name	gender	exam_score	exam_rank	total	part	initial_qualif	qualif_id	initial_sum	initial_rank	appeal_qualif	qualif_appeal	sum_appeal	sum_appeal_rank	ic	final_rank	variation	executive	exec_id
7	7	2000	9	1	1	Rivera, Lia	2	40	24	36	36	54	NA	94	25	25	NA	94	25	104	NA	NA	0	0
7	7	2000	9	1	1	Sarlo, Ruben	1	30	25	36	36	61	NA	91	26	26	NA	91	26	104	NA	NA	0	0
7	7	2000	9	1	1	Cevasco, Omar	1	20	36	36	36	71	NA	91	26	26	NA	91	26	104	NA	NA	0	0
7	7	2000	9	1	1	Piccardo, Alfredo	1	30	25	36	36	59	NA	89	28	28	NA	89	28	104	NA	NA	0	0
7	7	2000	9	1	1	Parcio, Eva	2	25	34	36	36	56	NA	86	29	29	NA	86	29	104	NA	NA	0	0
7	7	2000	9	1	1	Guerello, Carlos	1	25	34	36	36	60	NA	85	30	30	NA	85	30	104	NA	NA	0	0
7	7	2000	9	1	1	Tenembaum, Mariela	2	50	18	36	36	35	NA	85	30	30	NA	85	30	104	NA	NA	0	0
7	7	2000	9	1	1	Rojt, Julio	1	30	25	36	36	55	NA	85	30	30	NA	85	30	104	NA	NA	0	0
7	7	2000	9	1	1	Romano, Jaime	1	25	34	36	36	55	NA	80	33	33	NA	80	33	104	NA	NA	0	0
7	7	2000	9	1	1	Culotta, Juan	1	30	25	36	36	50	NA	80	33	33	NA	80	33	104	NA	NA	0	0
7	7	2000	9	1	1	Heredia, Alberto	1	30	25	36	36	36	NA	66	35	35	NA	66	35	104	NA	NA	0	0
7	7	2000	9	1	1	Compareid, Carlos	1	30	25	36	36	35	NA	65	36	36	NA	65	36	104	NA	NA	0	0
8	10	2001	2	24	1	Wayar, Ernesto	1	71	5	30	30	80	NA	151	1	1	NA	146	1	106	1	0	1	1
8	10	2001	2	24	1	Cossio, Marina	2	82	2	30	30	50	NA	132	2	2	NA	125	3	106	3	-1	1	1
8	10	2001	2	24	1	Rouges, Julio	1	94	1	30	30	35	NA	129	3	3	NA	145	2	106	2	1	0	0
8	10	2001	2	24	1	Lopez, Luis	1	60	8	30	30	57	NA	117	4	4	NA	117	5	106	NA	NA	0	0
8	10	2001	2	24	1	Ibanez, Carlos	1	59	9	30	30	55	NA	114	5	5	NA	114	6	106	NA	NA	0	0
8	10	2001	2	24	1	Noli, Maria	2	80	3	30	30	32	NA	112	6	6	NA	122	4	106	4	2	0	0
8	10	2001	2	24	1	Fontan, Carmen	2	72	4	30	30	34	NA	106	7	7	NA	108	7	106	NA	NA	0	0
8	10	2001	2	24	1	Bravo, Lilian	2	54	12	30	30	48	NA	102	8	8	NA	102	9	106	NA	NA	0	0
8	10	2001	2	24	1	Luna, Leopoldo	1	42	18	30	30	59	NA	101	9	9	NA	101	11	106	NA	NA	0	0
8	10	2001	2	24	1	Vallejo, Erica	2	55	11	30	30	40	NA	95	10	10	NA	95	16	106	NA	NA	0	0
8	10	2001	2	24	1	Abalovich, Silvia	2	50	13	30	30	45	NA	95	10	10	NA	97	15	106	NA	NA	0	0
8	10	2001	2	24	1	Malmierca, Jorge	1	67	7	30	30	28	NA	95	10	10	NA	105	8	106	NA	NA	0	0
8	10	2001	2	24	1	Weyrauch, Erika	2	50	13	30	30	42	NA	92	13	13	NA	94	17	106	NA	NA	0	0
8	10	2001	2	24	1	Lobo, Rafael	1	37	26	30	30	52	NA	89	14	14	NA	89	18	106	NA	NA	0	0
8	10	2001	2	24	1	Repetto, Agustin	1	38	25	30	30	51	NA	89	14	14	NA	100	13	106	NA	NA	0	0
8	10	2001	2	24	1	Rodriguez Campos, Jc	1	68	6	30	30	21	NA	89	14	14	NA	102	10	106	NA	NA	0	0
8	10	2001	2	24	1	Viojubenno, Pascual	1	43	16	30	30	44	NA	87	17	17	NA	100	14	106	NA	NA	0	0
8	10	2001	2	24	1	Freidenberg, Alicia	2	41	19	30	30	44	NA	85	18	18	NA	100	12	106	NA	NA	0	0
8	10	2001	2	24	1	Piccardo, Alfredo	1	56	10	30	30	28	NA	84	19	19	NA	87	19	106	NA	NA	0	0
8	10	2001	2	24	1	Garzia, Jose	1	43	16	30	30	38	NA	81	20	20	NA	81	21	106	NA	NA	0	0
8	10	2001	2	24	1	De Blasias, Alicia	2	45	15	30	30	35	NA	80	21	21	NA	80	22	106	NA	NA	0	0
8	10	2001	2	24	1	Jozami, Viviana	2	40	20	30	30	34	NA	74	22	22	NA	74	24	106	NA	NA	0	0
8	10	2001	2	24	1	Astorga, Fernando	1	35	28	30	30	38	NA	73	23	23	NA	73	25	106	NA	NA	0	0
8	10	2001	2	24	1	Tejerizo, Roberto	1	39	23	30	30	33	NA	72	24	24	NA	77	23	106	NA	NA	0	0
8	10	2001	2	24	1	Giffoniello, Estela	2	36	27	30	30	34	NA	70	25	25	NA	72	26	106	NA	NA	0	0
8	10	2001	2	24	1	Bugeau, Horacio	1	40	20	30	30	23	NA	67	26	26	NA	67	27	106	NA	NA	0	0
8	10	2001	2	24	1	Moreno, Margarita	2	40	20	30	30	23	NA	63	27	27	NA	63	29	106	NA	NA	0	0
8	10	2001	2	24	1	Padilla, Pedro	1	31	29	30	30	25	NA	56	29	29	NA	56	28	106	NA	NA	0	0
8	10	2001	2	24	1	Burroni, Luis	1	25	30	30	30	25	NA	50	30	30	NA	50	30	106	NA	NA	0	0
9	12	2001	1	1	1	Seiser, Julio	1	73	1	23	23	60	NA	133	1	1	NA	133	1	107	NA	NA	0	0
9	12	2001	1	1	1	Calvete, Federico	1	68	3	23	23	57	NA	125	2	2	NA	125	2	107	1	1	0	0
9	12	2001	1	1	1	Cayuela, Luis	1	57.3	6	23	23	63	NA	120.33	4	4	NA	120.33	4	107	NA	NA	0	0
9	12	2001	1	1	1	Erbeta, Guillermo	1	53	11	23	23	65	NA	118	7	7	NA	118	7	107	NA	NA	0	0
9	12	2001	1	1	1	Romualdi, Emilio	1	34	17	23	23	80	NA	114	8	8	NA	114	8	107	NA	NA	0	0
9	12	2001	1	1	1	Faggionato, Federico	1	66	4	23	23	48	NA	114	8	8	NA	124	3	107	2	4	3	1
9	12	2001	1	1	1	Montanaro, Domingo	1	69	2	23	23	43	NA	112	6	6	NA	119	6	107	4	3	0	0

number	contest	year	court	provinc	date	name	gender	exam_score	exam_rank	total_part	initial_qualif	qualif_id	initial_sum	initial_rank	appeal_qualif	appeal_sum	appeal_rank	final_rank	rank_variation	executive	exec_id
9	12	2001	1	1	1	Salas, Luis	1	56.5	8	23	55 NA	111.5	111.5	10	107 NA	107 NA	NA	NA	0	0	
9	12	2001	1	1	1	Montero, Martin	1	58.3	5	23	51 NA	109.3	109.3	11	107 NA	107 NA	NA	NA	0	0	
9	12	2001	1	1	1	Lugones, Alberto	1	57	7	23	52 NA	109	119	5	107	107	3	7	0	0	
9	12	2001	1	1	1	Michelin, Jorge	1	50	12	23	57 NA	107	114	9	107 NA	107 NA	NA	NA	0	0	
9	12	2001	1	1	1	Righero, Victor	1	56	10	23	50 NA	106	106	12	107 NA	107 NA	NA	NA	0	0	
9	12	2001	1	1	1	Baba, Martin	1	56.5	8	23	49 NA	105.5	105.5	13	107 NA	107 NA	NA	NA	0	0	
9	12	2001	1	1	1	Delgado, Sergio	1	45	13	23	59 NA	104	104	14	107 NA	107 NA	NA	NA	0	0	
9	12	2001	1	1	1	Reyes, Eduardo	1	32	19	23	62 NA	94	94	15	107 NA	107 NA	NA	NA	0	0	
9	12	2001	1	1	1	Ferrari, Carlos	1	37	14	23	51 NA	88	88	16	107 NA	107 NA	NA	NA	0	0	
9	12	2001	1	1	1	Militello, Sergio	1	34	17	23	51 NA	85	85	17	107 NA	107 NA	NA	NA	0	0	
9	12	2001	1	1	1	Goldberg, Marcelo	1	36	15	23	44 NA	80	80	18	107 NA	107 NA	NA	NA	0	0	
9	12	2001	1	1	1	Maddalena, Daniel	1	28.5	20	23	50 NA	78.5	78.5	19	107 NA	107 NA	NA	NA	0	0	
9	12	2001	1	1	1	Cubelli, Jorge	1	35.5	16	23	42 NA	77.5	77.5	20	107 NA	107 NA	NA	NA	0	0	
9	12	2001	1	1	1	Mattos, Carlos	1	21	21	23	45 NA	66	66	21	107 NA	107 NA	NA	NA	0	0	
9	12	2001	1	1	1	Aguirre, Oscar	1	18	22	23	46 NA	64	64	22	107 NA	107 NA	NA	NA	0	0	
9	12	2001	1	1	1	Almendras, Oscar	1	15	23	23	35 NA	50	50	23	107 NA	107 NA	NA	NA	0	0	
10	14	2001	1	1	1	Compareid, Carlos	1	65	2	9	64 NA	129	129	1	106	106	1	0	0	0	
10	14	2001	1	1	1	Perez Lance, Adrian	1	80	1	9	46 NA	126	126	2	106	106	2	0	0	0	
10	14	2001	1	1	1	Selser, Julio	1	60	4	9	54 NA	114	114	3	106 NA	106 NA	NA	NA	0	0	
10	14	2001	1	1	1	Cavallini, Raul	1	52	5	9	48 NA	100	100	4	106 NA	106 NA	3	1	3	2	
10	14	2001	1	1	1	Baba, Martin	1	63	3	9	37 NA	100	100	5	106 NA	106 NA	NA	NA	0	0	
10	14	2001	1	1	1	Arbonies, Eugenio	1	15	9	9	58 NA	73	73	6	106 NA	106 NA	NA	NA	0	0	
10	14	2001	1	1	1	Montanaro, Domingo	1	34	6	9	37 NA	71	71	7	106 NA	106 NA	NA	NA	0	0	
10	14	2001	1	1	1	Rajol, Norberto	1	18	7	9	39 NA	67	67	8	106 NA	106 NA	NA	NA	0	0	
10	14	2001	1	1	1	Ochoa, Jose	1	17	8	9	36 NA	53	53	9	106 NA	106 NA	NA	NA	0	0	
11	15	2001	5	3	1	Jantus, Pablo	1	90	1	40	50 NA	140	140	2	108	108	2	-1	0	0	
11	15	2001	5	3	1	Peralta, Omar	1	80	2	40	56 NA	136	136	4	108	108	4	-2	0	0	
11	15	2001	5	3	1	Perez Lance, Adrian	1	67	4	40	58.5 NA	125.5	125.5	9	108 NA	108 NA	NA	NA	0	0	
11	15	2001	5	3	1	Litvack, Alejandro	1	69	3	40	50 NA	119	119	13	108 NA	108 NA	NA	NA	0	0	
11	15	2001	5	3	1	Spangenberg, Ernestc	1	60	5	40	57 NA	117	130	7	108 NA	108 NA	NA	NA	0	0	
11	15	2001	5	3	1	Torres, Sergio	1	28	26	40	85 NA	113	145	1	108	108	1	5	3	1	
11	15	2001	5	3	1	Laguinge, Marin	1	50	10	40	63 NA	113	133	5	108 NA	108 NA	NA	NA	0	0	
11	15	2001	5	3	1	Morin, Daniel	1	46	14	40	64 NA	110	137	3	108	108	3	5	0	0	
11	15	2001	5	3	1	Montenegro, Guillerma	1	55	8	40	54 NA	109	121	12	108 NA	108 NA	NA	NA	0	0	
11	15	2001	5	3	1	Michelin, Jorge	1	60	5	40	48 NA	108	118	14	108 NA	108 NA	NA	NA	0	0	
11	15	2001	5	3	1	Della Malva, Claudia	2	58	7	40	46 NA	104	128	8	108 NA	108 NA	NA	NA	0	0	
11	15	2001	5	3	1	Michero, Horacio	1	50	10	40	52 NA	102	122	10	108 NA	108 NA	NA	NA	0	0	
11	15	2001	5	3	1	Elicabe, Ariel	1	40	16	40	61 NA	101	106	16	108 NA	108 NA	NA	NA	0	0	
11	15	2001	5	3	1	Rodriguez Jordan, Mai	1	35	19	40	65 NA	100	65	18	108 NA	108 NA	NA	NA	0	0	
11	15	2001	5	3	1	Lambruschini, Gustav	1	53	9	40	45 NA	98	113	15	108 NA	108 NA	NA	NA	0	0	
11	15	2001	5	3	1	Casal, Roberto	1	28	26	40	67 NA	95	95	21	108 NA	108 NA	NA	NA	0	0	
11	15	2001	5	3	1	Cubelli, Jorge	1	48	12	40	47 NA	95	95	22	108 NA	108 NA	NA	NA	0	0	
11	15	2001	5	3	1	Ramos Padilla, Juan	1	20	38	40	72.5 NA	92.5	131	6	108 NA	108 NA	NA	NA	0	0	
11	15	2001	5	3	1	Ledesma, Mario	1	48	12	40	43 NA	91	91	23	108 NA	108 NA	NA	NA	0	0	
11	15	2001	5	3	1	Rodriguez, Sergio	1	40	16	40	47.5 NA	87.5	87.5	25	108 NA	108 NA	NA	NA	0	0	
11	15	2001	5	3	1	Vazquez, Marcelo	1	36	18	40	51 NA	87	122	11	108 NA	108 NA	NA	NA	0	0	
11	15	2001	5	3	1	Rivolo, Carlos	1	25	33	40	61 NA	86	96	20	108 NA	108 NA	NA	NA	0	0	
11	15	2001	5	3	1	Ercolini, Julian	1	30	21	40	54.5 NA	84.5	89.5	24	108 NA	108 NA	NA	NA	0	0	
11	15	2001	5	3	1	Martinez, Guillermina	2	28	26	40	56 NA	84	84	26	108 NA	108 NA	NA	NA	0	0	

number	contest	year	court	provir	date	name	gender	exam_score	exam_rank	total_part	initial_qualif	qualif_id	initial_sum	initial_rank	appeal_qualif	appeal_sum	appeal_rank	appeal_ic	final_rank	variation	executive	exec_id
11	15	2001	5	3	1	Delgado, Sergio	1	28	26	40	55 NA	83	25 NA	17	108 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
11	15	2001	5	3	1	Heredia, Alberto	1	30	21	40	52.5 NA	82.5	26 NA	28	108 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
11	15	2001	5	3	1	Dapuetto, Miguel	1	20	38	40	62 NA	82	27 NA	29	108 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
11	15	2001	5	3	1	Dure, Juan	1	43	15	40	38 NA	81	28 NA	30	108 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
11	15	2001	5	3	1	Radrizzani, Miguel	1	17	40	40	62 NA	79	29 NA	32	108 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
11	15	2001	5	3	1	Schwab, Martin	1	30	21	40	48 NA	78	30 NA	27	108 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
11	15	2001	5	3	1	Colombo, Marcelo	1	35	19	40	41.5 NA	76.5	31 NA	33	108 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
11	15	2001	5	3	1	Cearras, Carlos	1	22	35	40	50 NA	72	32 NA	19	108 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
11	15	2001	5	3	1	Montero, Martin	1	25	33	40	45 NA	70	33 NA	31	108 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
11	15	2001	5	3	1	Gimenez, Abelardo	1	30	21	40	39 NA	69	34 NA	35	108 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
11	15	2001	5	3	1	Beron, Ezequiel	1	28	26	40	37 NA	65	35 NA	34	108 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
11	15	2001	5	3	1	Baba, Martin	1	28	26	40	36 NA	64	36 NA	36	108 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
11	15	2001	5	3	1	Cardenas, Miguel	1	22	35	40	42 NA	64	37 NA	37	108 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
11	15	2001	5	3	1	Decaria, Hugo	1	27	32	40	33 NA	60	38 NA	38	108 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
11	15	2001	5	3	1	Potocar, Jose	1	30	21	40	27.5 NA	57.5	39 NA	39	108 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
11	15	2001	5	3	1	Verrier, Cesar	1	22	35	40	16 NA	38	40 NA	40	108 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
12	20	2001	8	3	1	Poclava Lafuente, Jua	1	78	1	11	73 NA	151	1 NA	1	103	1	0	1	1	0	0	
12	20	2001	8	3	1	Kogan, Hilda	2	41	6	11	71 NA	112	2 NA	2	103	2	0	0	0	0	0	
12	20	2001	8	3	1	Braghini, Alicia	2	78	1	11	31 NA	109	3 NA	3	103 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
12	20	2001	8	3	1	Blajeau, Miguel	1	52	5	11	55 NA	107	4 NA	3	103 NA	3	1	0	0	0	0	
12	20	2001	8	3	1	Giamichelli, Jose	1	38	7	11	40 NA	78	5 NA	6	103 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
12	20	2001	8	3	1	Prota, Carlos	1	28	11	11	46 NA	74	6 NA	6	103 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
12	20	2001	8	3	1	Apa, Yolanda	2	37	8	11	36 NA	73	7 NA	9	103 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
12	20	2001	8	3	1	Borrego, Stella	2	58	3	11	13 NA	71	8 NA	10	103 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
12	20	2001	8	3	1	Santana, Gabriel	1	54	4	11	11 NA	65	9 NA	8	103 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
12	20	2001	8	3	1	Cipolletta, Graciela	2	36	9	11	26 NA	62	10 NA	5	103 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
12	20	2001	8	3	1	Lettieri, Mirta	2	27	10	11	4 NA	31	11 NA	11	103 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
13	22	2000	2	6	1	Fernandez, Maria	2	78	1	9	57 NA	135	1	67	145	1	107	1	0	1	2	
13	22	2000	2	6	1	Serrano, Juan	1	65	3	9	59 NA	124	2	59	124	2	107	2	0	0	0	
13	22	2000	2	6	1	Lopez, Oscar Ramon	1	73	2	9	48 NA	121	3	48	121	3	107	3	0	0	0	
13	22	2000	2	6	1	Kees, Amanda	2	35	6	9	79 NA	114	4	70	105	4	107 NA	NA	0	0	0	
13	22	2000	2	6	1	Avalos, Edmundo	1	40	5	9	50 NA	90	5	50	90	5	107 NA	NA	0	0	0	
13	22	2000	2	6	1	Ledesma, Aldo	1	53	4	9	35 NA	88	6	35	88	6	107 NA	NA	0	0	0	
13	22	2000	2	6	1	Lindor, Jose	1	31	7	9	47 NA	78	7	54	85	7	107 NA	NA	0	0	0	
13	22	2000	2	6	1	Garrido, Miguel	1	27	8	9	37 NA	64	8	37	64	8	107 NA	NA	0	0	0	
13	22	2000	2	6	1	Mattos, Carlos	1	19	9	9	23 NA	42	9	23	42	9	107 NA	NA	0	0	0	
14	23	2001	2	7	1	Carranza, Gustavo	1	92	1	7	65 NA	157	1 NA	2	154	2	109 NA	NA	0	0	0	
14	23	2001	2	7	1	Gomez, Antonio	1	78	2	7	65 NA	143	2 NA	3	143	3	109 NA	2	0	0	0	
14	23	2001	2	7	1	Leal de Ibarra, Javier	1	78	2	7	64 NA	142	3 NA	1	156	1	109	1	2	2	1	
14	23	2001	2	7	1	Trillo, Abel	1	65	5	7	58 NA	123	4 NA	5	123	5	109	4	0	0	0	
14	23	2001	2	7	1	Sassot, Cristian	1	65	5	7	55 NA	120	5 NA	6	120	6	109 NA	NA	0	0	0	
14	23	2001	2	7	1	Juri, Hilda	2	60	7	7	55 NA	115	6 NA	7	115	7	109 NA	NA	0	0	0	
14	23	2001	2	7	1	Gutierrez, Jorge	1	68	4	7	42 NA	110	7 NA	4	128	4	109	3	4	0	0	
15	24	2001	2	1	1	Arrolla, Graciela	2	72	1	7	91 NA	163	1 NA	1	163	1	110	1	0	1	2	
15	24	2001	2	1	1	Gomez, Antonio	1	57	2	7	69 NA	126	2 NA	2	126	2	110	2	0	0	0	
15	24	2001	2	1	1	Corbacho, Fernando	2	55	3	7	63 NA	118	3 NA	3	118	3	110	4	-1	0	0	
15	24	2001	2	1	1	Jimenez, Eduardo	1	55	3	7	55 NA	118	4 NA	3	118	3	110	3	1	0	0	
15	24	2001	2	1	1	Robbio, Mario	1	37	6	7	68 NA	105	5 NA	5	115	5	110 NA	NA	0	0	0	
15	24	2001	2	1	1	Romano, Carlos	1	45	5	7	54 NA	99	6 NA	6	109	6	110 NA	NA	0	0	0	

Appendix A

number	contest	year	court	provinc	date	name	gender	exam_score	exam_rank	total_part	initial_qualif	qualif_id	initial_sum	initial_rank	sum_appeal	sum_appeal_rank	qualif_appeal	7 NA	7 NA	89	89	54 NA	54 NA	7 NA	7 NA	7 NA	7 NA	110 NA	110 NA	110 NA	110 NA	rank	variation	executive	exec_id
15	24	2001	2	1	1	Selser, Julio	1	35	7	7	7	54 NA	89	149	167	2	103	2	1	149	167	74	74	1	1	110 NA	110 NA	2	1	0	0	0	0		
16	25	2000	2	8	1	Jenaro Pita, Enrique	1	93	1	7	7	56 NA	149	149	167	2	103	2	1	149	167	74	74	1	1	110 NA	110 NA	2	1	0	0	0	0		
16	25	2000	2	8	1	Enderle, Guillermo	1	70	3	7	7	76 NA	146	146	167	1	103	1	2	146	167	97	97	2	2	110 NA	110 NA	1	1	1	1	3	1		
16	25	2000	2	8	1	Arribillaga, Liliana	2	80	2	7	7	40 NA	120	120	147	3	103	3	3	120	147	67	67	3	3	103 NA	103 NA	3	0	0	0	0	0		
16	25	2000	2	8	1	Piccardo, Alfredo	1	40	5	7	7	35 NA	75	75	100	4	103 NA	4	4	75	100	60	60	4	4	103 NA	103 NA	4	0	0	0	0	0		
16	25	2000	2	8	1	Rodriguez, Reinaldo	1	50	4	7	7	18 NA	68	68	88	5	103 NA	5	5	68	88	38	38	5	5	103 NA	103 NA	5	0	0	0	0	0		
16	25	2000	2	8	1	Viaut, Luis	1	33	6	7	7	32 NA	65	65	85	6	103 NA	6	6	65	85	52	52	6	6	103 NA	103 NA	6	0	0	0	0	0		
16	25	2000	2	8	1	Isaurralde, Horacio	1	12	7	7	7	25 NA	37	37	65	7	103 NA	7	7	37	65	53	53	7	7	103 NA	103 NA	7	0	0	0	0	0		
17	26	2002	1	1	1	Ercolini, Julian	1	95	1	35	35	66 NA	161	161	168	1	110	1	1	161	168	74	74	1	1	110 NA	110 NA	1	0	0	0	0	0		
17	26	2002	1	1	1	Culotta, Juan	1	85	5	35	35	68 NA	153	153	147	4	110	2	2	153	147	97	97	2	2	110 NA	110 NA	2	0	0	0	0	0		
17	26	2002	1	1	1	Baffigi, Gabriel	1	90	3	35	35	59 NA	149	149	147	2	110 NA	3	3	149	147	76 NA	76 NA	3	3	110 NA	110 NA	3	0	0	0	0	0		
17	26	2002	1	1	1	Peralta, Omar	1	70	9	35	35	76 NA	146	146	146	6	110 NA	4	4	146	146	76 NA	76 NA	4	4	110 NA	110 NA	4	0	0	0	0	0		
17	26	2002	1	1	1	Castelli, German	1	85	5	35	35	61 NA	146	146	148	3	110	3	5	146	148	61 NA	61 NA	5	5	110 NA	110 NA	3	2	3	2	3	2		
17	26	2002	1	1	1	Gonzalez Charvay, Ad	1	90	3	35	35	53 NA	143	143	143	7	110 NA	6	6	143	143	53 NA	53 NA	6	6	110 NA	110 NA	7	0	0	0	0	0		
17	26	2002	1	1	1	Passero, Marcelo	1	61	12	35	35	80 NA	141	141	141	8	110 NA	7	7	141	141	80 NA	80 NA	7	7	110 NA	110 NA	8	0	0	0	0	0		
17	26	2002	1	1	1	Michero, Horacio	1	80	8	35	35	57 NA	137	137	137	9	110 NA	8	8	137	137	57 NA	57 NA	8	8	110 NA	110 NA	9	0	0	0	0	0		
17	26	2002	1	1	1	Beron, Ezequiel	1	85	5	35	35	50 NA	135	135	137	9	110 NA	9	9	135	137	50 NA	50 NA	9	9	110 NA	110 NA	9	0	0	0	0	0		
17	26	2002	1	1	1	Camutti, Ricardo	1	60	13	35	35	74 NA	134	134	134	11	110 NA	10	10	134	134	74 NA	74 NA	10	10	110 NA	110 NA	11	0	0	0	0	0		
17	26	2002	1	1	1	Bruzoni, Ernesto	1	70	9	35	35	61 NA	131	131	132	12	110 NA	11	11	131	132	61 NA	61 NA	11	11	110 NA	110 NA	12	0	0	0	0	0		
17	26	2002	1	1	1	Delgado, Sergio	1	55	17	35	35	69 NA	124	124	124	13	110 NA	12	12	124	124	69 NA	69 NA	12	12	110 NA	110 NA	13	0	0	0	0	0		
17	26	2002	1	1	1	Salas, Juan	1	95	1	35	35	26 NA	121	121	147	4	110 NA	13	13	121	147	26 NA	26 NA	13	13	110 NA	110 NA	4	0	0	0	0	0		
17	26	2002	1	1	1	Garcia Vila, Alejandra	2	60	13	35	35	59 NA	119	119	120	14	110 NA	14	14	119	120	59 NA	59 NA	14	14	110 NA	110 NA	14	0	0	0	0	0		
17	26	2002	1	1	1	Montanaro, Domingo	1	65	11	35	35	54 NA	119	119	119	15	110 NA	15	15	119	119	54 NA	54 NA	15	15	110 NA	110 NA	15	0	0	0	0	0		
17	26	2002	1	1	1	Moramarc, Alejandro	1	60	13	35	35	54 NA	114	114	114	17	110 NA	16	16	114	114	54 NA	54 NA	16	16	110 NA	110 NA	17	0	0	0	0	0		
17	26	2002	1	1	1	Canero, Herminio	1	55	17	35	35	58 NA	113	113	113	18	110 NA	17	17	113	113	58 NA	58 NA	17	17	110 NA	110 NA	18	0	0	0	0	0		
17	26	2002	1	1	1	Lafourcade, Raquel	2	40	26	35	35	71 NA	111	111	111	20	110 NA	18	18	111	111	71 NA	71 NA	18	18	110 NA	110 NA	19	0	0	0	0	0		
17	26	2002	1	1	1	Righero, Victor	1	50	19	35	35	60 NA	110	110	115	16	110 NA	19	19	110	115	60 NA	60 NA	19	19	110 NA	110 NA	20	0	0	0	0	0		
17	26	2002	1	1	1	Rafanuello, Guillermo	1	50	19	35	35	60 NA	110	110	110	22	110 NA	20	20	110	110	60 NA	60 NA	20	20	110 NA	110 NA	21	0	0	0	0	0		
17	26	2002	1	1	1	Ramos Padilla, Juan	1	35	29	35	35	73 NA	108	108	111	20	110 NA	21	21	108	111	73 NA	73 NA	21	21	110 NA	110 NA	22	0	0	0	0	0		
17	26	2002	1	1	1	Ferraro, Alfonso	1	40	26	35	35	67 NA	107	107	107	23	110 NA	22	22	107	107	67 NA	67 NA	22	22	110 NA	110 NA	23	0	0	0	0	0		
17	26	2002	1	1	1	Falcucci, Julian	1	50	19	35	35	56 NA	106	106	106	24	110 NA	23	23	106	106	56 NA	56 NA	23	23	110 NA	110 NA	24	0	0	0	0	0		
17	26	2002	1	1	1	Dilarlo, Elena	2	50	19	35	35	55 NA	105	105	105	25	110 NA	24	24	105	105	55 NA	55 NA	24	24	110 NA	110 NA	25	0	0	0	0	0		
17	26	2002	1	1	1	Fernandez, Eduardo	1	50	19	35	35	55 NA	105	105	112	19	110 NA	25	25	105	112	55 NA	55 NA	25	25	110 NA	110 NA	26	0	0	0	0	0		
17	26	2002	1	1	1	Montecchiari, Claudio	1	50	19	35	35	53 NA	103	103	104	26	110 NA	26	26	103	104	53 NA	53 NA	26	26	110 NA	110 NA	27	0	0	0	0	0		
17	26	2002	1	1	1	Ambrosio, Miguel	1	50	19	35	35	51 NA	101	101	101	27	110 NA	27	27	101	101	51 NA	51 NA	27	27	110 NA	110 NA	28	0	0	0	0	0		
17	26	2002	1	1	1	Echegaray, Sergio	1	40	26	35	35	53 NA	93	93	93	28	110 NA	28	28	93	93	53 NA	53 NA	28	28	110 NA	110 NA	29	0	0	0	0	0		
17	26	2002	1	1	1	Portocarrero, Elpidio	1	60	13	35	35	33 NA	93	93	93	29	110 NA	29	29	93	93	33 NA	33 NA	29	29	110 NA	110 NA	30	0	0	0	0	0		
17	26	2002	1	1	1	Vattimo, Alejandro	1	30	30	35	35	61 NA	91	91	91	30	110 NA	30	30	91	91	61 NA	61 NA	30	30	110 NA	110 NA	31	0	0	0	0	0		
17	26	2002	1	1	1	Cubelli, Jorge	1	30	30	35	35	57 NA	87	87	87	31	110 NA	31	31	87	87	57 NA	57 NA	31	31	110 NA	110 NA	32	0	0	0	0	0		
17	26	2002	1	1	1	Litvack, Alejandro	1	30	30	35	35	54 NA	84	84	84	32	110 NA	32	32	84	84	54 NA	54 NA	32	32	110 NA	110 NA	33	0	0	0	0	0		
17	26	2002	1	1	1	Santacroce, Carlos	1	0	35	35	35	71 NA	71	71	71	33	110 NA	33	33	71	71	71 NA	71 NA	33	33	110 NA	110 NA	34	0	0	0	0	0		
17	26	2002	1	1	1	Arganaraz, Bernardo	1	10	33	35	35	34 NA	44	44	44	34	110 NA	34	34	44	44	34 NA	34 NA	34	34	110 NA	110 NA	35	0	0	0	0	0		
17	26	2002	1	1	1	Marilluis, Delia	2	10	33	35	35	15 NA	25	25	25	35	110 NA	35	35	25	25	15 NA	15 NA	35	35	110 NA	110 NA	36	0	0	0	0	0		
18	28	2001	2	8	1	Carrillo, Carlos	1	74	1	13	13	77 NA	151	151	151	1	110	1	1	151	151	77 NA	77 NA	1	1	110 NA	110 NA	1	0	0	0	1	1		
18	28	2001	2	8	1	Figueroa, Ana Maria	2	51	8	13	13	91 NA	142	142	151	2	110	2	2	142	151	91 NA	91 NA	2	2	110 NA	110 NA	2	0	0	0	0	0		
18	28	2001	2	8	1	Caballero, Beatriz	2	62	3	13	13	75 NA	137	137	137	4	110	4	4	137	137	75 NA	75 NA	4	4	110 NA	110 NA	3	-1	0	0	0	0		
18	28	2001	2	8	1	Arribillaga, Liliana	2	58	4	13	13	72 NA	130	130	141	3	110	3	3	130	141	72 NA	72 NA	3	3	110 NA	110 NA	4	1	2	1	2	1		
18	28	2001	2	8	1	Vazquez Rossi, Jorge	1	33	13	13	13	96 NA	129	129	129	6	110 NA	5	5	129	129	96 NA	96 NA	6	6	110 NA	110 NA	7	0	0	0	0	0		
18	28	2001	2	8	1	Bailaque, Marcelo	1	63	2	13	13	59 NA	122	122																					

number	contest_year	court	provir	date	name	gender	exam_score	exam_rank	total_part	initial_qualif	qualif_id	initial_sum	initial_rank	appeal_qualif	appeal_sum	appeal_rank	appeal_ic	final_rank	variation	executive	exec_id
18	28	2001	2	8	1 Venegas, Jorge	1	55	5	13	64 NA	119	124	7	110 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
18	28	2001	2	8	1 Rodriguez, Miguel	1	50	9	13	55 NA	105	112	10	110 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
18	28	2001	2	8	1 Toledo, Jose	1	55	5	13	46 NA	101	118	9	110 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
18	28	2001	2	8	1 Gardiol, Ariel	1	44	11	13	56 NA	100	132	5	110 NA	5	5	0	0	0	0	
18	28	2001	2	8	1 Ceconi, Hector	1	52	7	13	38 NA	90	105	11	110 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
18	28	2001	2	8	1 Piccardo, Alfredo	1	46	1	13	37 NA	83	83	12	110 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
18	28	2001	2	8	1 Feijoo, Martha	2	39	12	13	41 NA	80	80	13	110 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
19	31	2001	6	3	1 Magarinos, Hector	1	80	2	14	85 NA	165	171	1	107	1	0	0	0	0	0	
19	31	2001	6	3	1 Garrido, Carlos	1	90	1	14	72 NA	162	156	4	107	3	-1	0	0	0	0	
19	31	2001	6	3	1 Rimondi, Jorge	1	80	2	14	81 NA	161	162	3	107 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
19	31	2001	6	3	1 Cavallo, Gabriel	1	70	4	14	88 NA	158	157	3	107	2	2	3	1	0	0	
19	31	2001	6	3	1 Huarte, Alberto	1	70	4	14	87 NA	157	155	5	107 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
19	31	2001	6	3	1 Sterchele, Graciela	2	55	6	14	76 NA	131	129	6	107 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
19	31	2001	6	3	1 Obligado, Daniel	1	45	12	14	78 NA	123	117	10	107 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
19	31	2001	6	3	1 Hergott, Oscar	1	50	7	14	72 NA	122	126	7	107 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
19	31	2001	6	3	1 Deigado, Sergio	1	50	7	14	70 NA	120	120	9	107 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
19	31	2001	6	3	1 Duran, Roberto	1	50	7	14	63 NA	113	116	11	107 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
19	31	2001	6	3	1 Thomas, Ricardo	1	45	12	14	59 NA	104	107	12	107 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
19	31	2001	6	3	1 Montanaro, Domingo	1	50	7	14	48 NA	98	103	13	107 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
19	31	2001	6	3	1 Spangenberg, Ernestc	1	50	7	14	33 NA	83	123	8	107 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
19	31	2001	6	3	1 Verrier, Cesar	1	45	12	14	18 NA	63	63	14	107 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
20	32	2001	1	1	1 Jimenez, Eduardo	1	90	1	19	72 NA	162	164	2	106	1	0	1	1	0	0	
20	32	2001	1	1	1 Rodriguez, Miguel	1	88	2	19	70 NA	158	169	1	106	2	0	0	0	0	0	
20	32	2001	1	1	1 Bazzani, Juan	1	82	6	19	62 NA	144	144	4	106	6	-3	0	0	0	0	
20	32	2001	1	1	1 Uberrazzi, Laura	2	83	4	19	61 NA	144	144	4	106 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
20	32	2001	1	1	1 Auge, Juan Pablo	1	81	7	19	61 NA	142	144	4	106	4	1	0	0	0	0	
20	32	2001	1	1	1 Lopez, Alfredo	1	86	3	19	55 NA	141	151	3	106	3	3	3	2	0	0	
20	32	2001	1	1	1 Games, Hebe	2	80	8	19	61 NA	141	141	7	106 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
20	32	2001	1	1	1 Gilligan, Miguel	1	62	12	19	72 NA	134	134	9	106 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
20	32	2001	1	1	1 Apesteguia, Carlos	1	76	9	19	58 NA	134	134	9	106 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
20	32	2001	1	1	1 Suarez, Aldo	1	70	10	19	63 NA	133	133	11	106 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
20	32	2001	1	1	1 Faggi, Carlos	1	60	13	19	64 NA	124	124	12	106 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
20	32	2001	1	1	1 Dadda, Rafael	1	83	4	19	41 NA	124	144	4	106	5	7	0	0	0	0	
20	32	2001	1	1	1 Zarategui, Bertoldo	1	65	11	19	53 NA	118	118	13	106 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
20	32	2001	1	1	1 Esparza, Maria	2	46	14	19	60 NA	106	106	14	106 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
20	32	2001	1	1	1 del Blanco, Gustavo	1	35	17	19	65 NA	100	100	15	106 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
20	32	2001	1	1	1 Bayle, Jose	1	43	15	19	45 NA	88	88	17	106 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
20	32	2001	1	1	1 Kemper, Jorge	1	38	16	19	33 NA	71	91	16	106 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
20	32	2001	1	1	1 Martin, Sergio	1	27	18	19	22 NA	49	49	18	106 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
20	32	2001	1	1	1 Santacroce, Carlos	1	25	19	19	17 NA	42	42	19	106 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
21	33	2001	11	3	1 Carbone, Edmundo	1	89	6	16	76 NA	165	161	4	110 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
21	33	2001	11	3	1 Marco, Hernan	1	91	3	16	72 NA	163	166	1	110	2	0	0	0	0	0	
21	33	2001	11	3	1 Recondo, Ricardo	1	75	12	16	88 NA	163	163	3	110	4	-1	1	2	0	0	
21	33	2001	11	3	1 Torti, Roberto	1	86	7	16	74 NA	160	160	7	110 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
21	33	2001	11	3	1 Tresguerras, Jose	1	75	12	16	76 NA	151	153	8	110 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
21	33	2001	11	3	1 Soto, Francisco	1	76	10	16	75 NA	151	152	11	110 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
21	33	2001	11	3	1 Najurieta, Maria	2	91	3	16	57 NA	148	165	2	110	1	6	2	2	0	0	
21	33	2001	11	3	1 Tettamanti, Raul	1	71	15	16	76 NA	147	148	12	110 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	
21	33	2001	11	3	1 Sanchez, Diego	1	80	8	16	64 NA	144	153	8	110 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	

Appendix A

number	contest	year	court	provir	date	name	gender	exam_score	exam_rank	total	part	initial_qualif	qualif_id	initial_sum	initial_rank	appeal_qualif	appeal_rank	sum_appeal	rank_appeal	ic_final	rank_variation	executive	exec_id
21	33	2001	11	3	1	Diaz Solimine, Omar	1	76	10	16	16	61 NA	137	10 NA	153	8	110 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	
21	33	2001	11	3	1	Antelo, Guillermo	1	94	1	16	16	42 NA	136	11 NA	161	4	110 NA	3	8	3	2	2	
21	33	2001	11	3	1	Saint Genez, Alejandr	1	92	2	16	16	41 NA	133	12 NA	142	14	110 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	
21	33	2001	11	3	1	Heredia, Pablo	1	91	3	16	16	41 NA	132	13 NA	161	4	110 NA	5	8	0	0	0	
21	33	2001	11	3	1	Zumarraga, Javier	1	72	14	16	16	53 NA	125	14 NA	131	15	110 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	
21	33	2001	11	3	1	Rabbi-Baldi, Luis	1	66	16	16	16	46 NA	112	15 NA	143	13	110 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	
21	33	2001	11	3	1	Verrier, Cesar	1	78	9	16	16	11 NA	89	16 NA	89	16	110 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	
22	34	2001	1	10	1	Aguilar, Horacio	1	80	1	12	12	56 NA	136	1 NA	148	1	109	1	0	1	2	2	
22	34	2001	1	10	1	Aragone, Alberto	1	55	2	12	12	71 NA	126	2 NA	126	2	109	2	0	0	0	0	
22	34	2001	1	10	1	Savio, Hugo	1	47	3	12	12	57 NA	104	3 NA	104	4	109 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	
22	34	2001	1	10	1	Batule, Domingo	1	45	4	12	12	58 NA	103	4 NA	110	3	109	3	1	0	0	0	
22	34	2001	1	10	1	Cataldi, Maria	2	30	7	12	12	64 NA	94	5 NA	102	5	109	4	1	0	0	0	
22	34	2001	1	10	1	Olivera Pastor, Carlos	1	29	8	12	12	60 NA	89	6 NA	102	6	109	5	1	0	0	0	
22	34	2001	1	10	1	Contreras, Mario	1	32	5	12	12	55 NA	87	7 NA	87	8	109 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	
22	34	2001	1	10	1	Perez Wiaggio, Carlos	1	27	9	12	12	56 NA	83	8 NA	94	7	109 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	
22	34	2001	1	10	1	Dilascio, Mario	1	32	5	12	12	50 NA	82	9 NA	82	10	109 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	
22	34	2001	1	10	1	Arias, Josefina	2	12	11	12	12	64 NA	76	10 NA	76	11	109 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	
22	34	2001	1	10	1	Ase, Efrain	1	17	10	12	12	46 NA	63	11 NA	85	9	109 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	
22	34	2001	1	10	1	Diaz Vicedo, Norma	2	11	12	12	12	18 NA	29	12 NA	29	12	109 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	
23	36	2001	10	3	1	Simari, Virginia	2	82	2	12	12	52 NA	134	1 NA	141	2	106	3	-2	0	0	0	
23	36	2001	10	3	1	Saint Genez, Alejandr	1	74	3	12	12	66.5 NA	140.5	2	66.5	140.5	3	106	2	0	1	2	
23	36	2001	10	3	1	Uriarte, Fernando	1	85	1	12	12	55 NA	140	3	65	150	1	106	1	2	0	0	
23	36	2001	10	3	1	Garese, Rita	2	70	5	12	12	59 NA	129	4	55	126	4	106 NA	NA	0	0	0	
23	36	2001	10	3	1	Raffo, Eugenio	1	71	4	12	12	55 NA	126	5	55	126	5	106 NA	NA	0	0	0	
23	36	2001	10	3	1	Lopez, Alfredo	1	59	6	12	12	64 NA	123	6	64	123	6	106 NA	NA	0	0	0	
23	36	2001	10	3	1	Gilligan, Miguel	1	58	7	12	12	64 NA	122	7	64	122	7	106 NA	NA	0	0	0	
23	36	2001	10	3	1	Valle, Pedro	1	57	8	12	12	61 NA	118	8	61	118	8	106 NA	NA	0	0	0	
23	36	2001	10	3	1	Muzio, Eduardo	1	56	9	12	12	54 NA	110	9	54	110	9	106 NA	NA	0	0	0	
23	36	2001	10	3	1	Bulygin, Eugenio	1	53	10	12	12	48 NA	107	10	54	107	10	106 NA	NA	0	0	0	
23	36	2001	10	3	1	Mazzi, Patricia	2	47	11	12	12	48 NA	95	11	48	95	11	106 NA	NA	0	0	0	
23	36	2001	10	3	1	Cimino, Humberto	1	45	12	12	12	46 NA	91	12	46	91	12	106 NA	NA	0	0	0	
24	37	2001	9	22	1	Lopez, Luis	1	77	4	23	23	81 NA	158	1	81	158	1	107	1	0	1	2	
24	37	2001	9	22	1	Lindow, Isabel	2	75	5	23	23	59 NA	134	2	59	134	2	107 NA	NA	0	0	0	
24	37	2001	9	22	1	Zurita, Marquesa	2	70	7	23	23	62 NA	132	3	62	132	3	107 NA	NA	0	0	0	
24	37	2001	9	22	1	Luna Roldan, Angel	1	85	1	23	23	46 NA	131	4	46	131	6	107 NA	NA	0	0	0	
24	37	2001	9	22	1	Hernandez, Lorna	2	80	3	23	23	50 NA	130	5	52	132	4	107	2	3	0	0	
24	37	2001	9	22	1	Diaz, Federico	1	85	1	23	23	45 NA	130	6	47	132	5	107 NA	NA	0	0	0	
24	37	2001	9	22	1	Granda, Carlos	1	70	7	23	23	48 NA	118	7	53	123	7	107 NA	NA	0	0	0	
24	37	2001	9	22	1	Maud, Ana Maria	2	75	5	23	23	37 NA	112	8	37	123	9	107 NA	NA	0	0	0	
24	37	2001	9	22	1	Lugones, Luis	1	60	10	23	23	51 NA	111	9	60	120	8	107	3	6	0	0	
24	37	2001	9	22	1	Cipolatti, Omar	1	50	12	23	23	57 NA	107	10	59	109	10	107 NA	NA	0	0	0	
24	37	2001	9	22	1	Sirena, Guillermo	1	65	9	23	23	39 NA	104	11	39	104	11	107 NA	NA	0	0	0	
24	37	2001	9	22	1	Turk, Cesar	1	35	16	23	23	57 NA	92	12	62	97	13	107 NA	NA	0	0	0	
24	37	2001	9	22	1	Bravo, Jose Humberto	1	45	14	23	23	44 NA	89	13	54	99	12	107 NA	NA	0	0	0	
24	37	2001	9	22	1	Palмира, Carmen	2	55	11	23	23	33 NA	88	14	33	88	14	107 NA	NA	0	0	0	
24	37	2001	9	22	1	Vital, Ernesto	1	20	19	23	23	67 NA	67	15	67	87	15	107 NA	NA	0	0	0	
24	37	2001	9	22	1	Valev, Eva	2	40	15	23	23	44 NA	84	16	46	86	16	107 NA	NA	0	0	0	
24	37	2001	9	22	1	del Valle, Nilida	2	50	12	23	23	30 NA	80	17	30	80	17	107 NA	NA	0	0	0	
24	37	2001	9	22	1	Piccardo, Alfredo	1	20	19	23	23	55 NA	75	18	55	75	18	107 NA	NA	0	0	0	

number	contest	year	court	provir	date	name	gender	exam_score	exam_rank	total	part	initial_qualif	qualif_id	initial_sum	initial_rank	appeal_qualif	appeal_sum	appeal_rank	appeal_ic	final_rank	variation	executive	exec_id
24	37	2001	9	22	1	Viana, Graciela	2	30	17	23	23	37	NA	67	19	37	67	19	107	NA	NA	0	0
24	37	2001	9	22	1	Miguel, Nestor	1	20	19	23	23	46	NA	66	20	46	66	20	107	NA	NA	0	0
24	37	2001	9	22	1	Meneghini, Bibiana	2	30	17	23	23	33	NA	63	21	33	63	21	107	NA	NA	0	0
24	37	2001	9	22	1	Bravo, Maria del Carr	2	20	19	23	23	35	NA	55	22	40	60	22	107	NA	NA	0	0
24	37	2001	9	22	1	Barrionuevo, Aristobu	1	10	23	23	23	34	NA	44	23	34	44	23	107	NA	NA	0	0
25	38	2002	9	3	1	Yanzon, Roberto	1	90	3	21	21	75	NA	165	1	70	160	5	109	NA	NA	0	0
25	38	2002	9	3	1	Huarte, Alberto	1	90	3	21	21	75	NA	165	2	85	175	1	109	2	0	0	0
25	38	2002	9	3	1	Valotta, Agustin	1	100	1	21	21	59	NA	159	3	68	168	3	109	NA	NA	0	0
25	38	2002	9	3	1	Delgado, Sergio	1	85	5	21	21	69	NA	154	4	72	157	7	109	NA	NA	0	0
25	38	2002	9	3	1	Gettas, Jorge	1	85	5	21	21	67	NA	152	5	85	170	2	109	1	4	3	2
25	38	2002	9	3	1	Ramos Padilla, Juan	1	80	9	21	21	70	NA	150	6	80	160	5	109	3	0	0	0
25	38	2002	9	3	1	Hergott, Oscar	1	80	9	21	21	64	NA	144	7	74	154	8	109	NA	NA	0	0
25	38	2002	9	3	1	Jantus, Pablo	1	100	1	21	21	43	NA	143	8	63	163	4	109	NA	NA	0	0
25	38	2002	9	3	1	Fernandez, Eduardo	1	85	5	21	21	56	NA	141	9	68	153	9	109	NA	NA	0	0
25	38	2002	9	3	1	Thomas, Ricardo	1	85	5	21	21	55	NA	140	10	55	140	11	109	NA	NA	0	0
25	38	2002	9	3	1	Piccardo, Alfredo	1	75	12	21	21	52	NA	127	11	62	137	12	109	NA	NA	0	0
25	38	2002	9	3	1	Rojt, Julio	1	70	13	21	21	55	NA	125	12	55	125	13	109	NA	NA	0	0
25	38	2002	9	3	1	Spangenberg, Ernestc	1	60	17	21	21	64	NA	124	13	64	124	14	109	NA	NA	0	0
25	38	2002	9	3	1	Bacigalupo, Pablo	1	60	17	21	21	64	NA	124	14	64	124	14	109	NA	NA	0	0
25	38	2002	9	3	1	Calvete, Federico	1	65	15	21	21	55	NA	120	15	58	123	16	109	NA	NA	0	0
25	38	2002	9	3	1	Romano, Jaime	1	70	13	21	21	49	NA	119	16	74	144	10	109	NA	NA	0	0
25	38	2002	9	3	1	Garcia Elorrio, Juan	1	80	9	21	21	35	NA	115	17	5	85	20	109	NA	NA	0	0
25	38	2002	9	3	1	Esmoris, Alejandro	1	65	15	21	21	48	NA	113	18	48	113	17	109	NA	NA	0	0
25	38	2002	9	3	1	Senes, Concepcion	2	55	21	21	21	54	NA	109	19	54	109	18	109	NA	NA	0	0
25	38	2002	9	3	1	Montanaro, Domingo	1	60	17	21	21	49	NA	109	20	49	109	19	109	NA	NA	0	0
25	38	2002	9	3	1	Verrier, Cesar	1	60	17	21	21	22	NA	82	21	22	82	21	109	NA	NA	0	0
26	39	2005	4	3	1	Gusman, Alfredo	1	95	1	12	12	44	NA	139	1	NA	139	3	106	3	-2	0	0
26	39	2005	4	3	1	Chiban, Nora	2	47	9	12	12	84	NA	131	2	NA	134	7	106	NA	NA	0	0
26	39	2005	4	3	1	Marinelli, Ernesto	1	80	2	12	12	50	NA	130	3	NA	140	2	106	1	2	0	0
26	39	2005	4	3	1	Silva Garretton, Martin	1	72	4	12	12	56	NA	128	4	NA	139	5	106	NA	NA	0	0
26	39	2005	4	3	1	Guglielmino, Osvaldo	1	55	7	12	12	69	NA	124	5	NA	139	3	106	2	3	0	0
26	39	2005	4	3	1	Bonzon, Juan	1	58	6	12	12	65	NA	123	6	NA	123	9	106	NA	NA	0	0
26	39	2005	4	3	1	Fernandez, Sergio	1	68	5	12	12	54	NA	122	7	NA	132	8	106	NA	NA	0	0
26	39	2005	4	3	1	Alemany, Jorge	1	75	3	12	12	32	NA	107	8	NA	140	1	106	4	3	3	3
26	39	2005	4	3	1	Tosi, Jorge	1	30	12	12	12	73	NA	103	9	NA	103	11	106	NA	NA	0	0
26	39	2005	4	3	1	Rodriguez, Claudia	2	50	8	12	12	51.5	NA	101.5	10	NA	113.5	10	106	NA	NA	0	0
26	39	2005	4	3	1	Moran, Jorge	1	48	10	12	12	52	NA	100	11	NA	135	6	106	NA	NA	0	0
26	39	2005	4	3	1	Cardenas, Juan	1	35	11	12	12	41	NA	76	12	NA	91	12	106	NA	NA	0	0
27	40	2002	9	21	1	Bruera, Matiide	2	70	2	15	15	67	NA	137	1	NA	146	1	109	1	0	0	0
27	40	2002	9	21	1	Acosta, Daniel	1	70	2	15	15	45	NA	115	2	NA	124	3	109	6	-4	0	0
27	40	2002	9	21	1	Digeronimo, Omar	1	75	1	15	15	36	NA	111	3	NA	136	2	109	3	0	1	2
27	40	2002	9	21	1	Caballero, Beatriz	2	55	7	15	15	48	NA	103	4	NA	122	4	109	2	2	2	2
27	40	2002	9	21	1	Figueroa, Ana Maria	2	35	12	15	15	66	NA	101	5	NA	116	7	109	NA	NA	0	0
27	40	2002	9	21	1	Venegas, Jorge	1	45	9	15	15	55	NA	100	6	NA	118	5	109	4	2	2	2
27	40	2002	9	21	1	Vidal, Elida	2	65	4	15	15	30	NA	95	7	NA	118	5	109	5	2	0	0
27	40	2002	9	21	1	Ballaque, Marcelo	1	60	6	15	15	32	NA	92	8	NA	107	9	109	NA	NA	0	0
27	40	2002	9	21	1	Aragone, Alberto	1	35	12	15	15	56	NA	91	9	NA	91	14	109	NA	NA	0	0
27	40	2002	9	21	1	Toledo, Jose	1	45	9	15	15	38	NA	83	10	NA	103	10	109	NA	NA	0	0
27	40	2002	9	21	1	Gardioli, Ariel	1	30	15	15	15	52	NA	82	11	NA	109	8	109	NA	NA	0	0

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number	contest	year	court	provir	date	name	gender	exam_score	exam_rank	total	part	initial_qualif	qualif_id	initial_sum	initial_rank	appeal_qualif	appeal_sum	appeal_rank	appeal_ic	final_rank	variation	executive	exec_id
27	40	2002	9	21	1	Coconi, Hector	1	35	12	15	15	46 NA	81	12 NA	15	109 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	0
27	40	2002	9	21	1	Sutter, German	1	50	8	15	15	28 NA	78	13 NA	10	109 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	0
27	40	2002	9	21	1	Linconli, Horacio	1	65	4	15	15	13 NA	78	14 NA	13	109 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	0
27	40	2002	9	21	1	Piccardo, Alfredo	1	45	9	15	15	31 NA	76	15 NA	12	109 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	0
28	41	2001	1	17	1	Aragone, Alberto	1	64	2	9	9	75 NA	139	1 NA	1	109	2	-1	0	0	0	0	0
28	41	2001	1	17	1	Blanco, Oscar	1	61	3	9	9	68 NA	129	2 NA	3	109 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	0
28	41	2001	1	17	1	Bruno, Jose	1	49	6	9	9	72 NA	121	3 NA	4	109 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	0
28	41	2001	1	17	1	Aguilar, Horacio	1	65	1	9	9	55 NA	120	4 NA	2	109	1	3	0	0	0	0	0
28	41	2001	1	17	1	Linares, Carlos	1	50	4	9	9	66 NA	116	5 NA	5	109 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	0
28	41	2001	1	17	1	Reynoso, Raul	1	45	8	9	9	69 NA	114	6 NA	5	109	3	3	2	0	0	0	0
28	41	2001	1	17	1	Varela, Alberto	1	48	7	9	9	58 NA	106	7 NA	7	109 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	0
28	41	2001	1	17	1	Zarategui, Bertoldo	1	50	4	9	9	46 NA	96	8 NA	8	109 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	0
28	41	2001	1	17	1	Senes, Concepcion	1	30	9	9	9	54 NA	84	9 NA	9	109 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	0
29	42	2001	1	21	1	Viaut, Luis	1	75	1	11	11	75 NA	150	1 NA	1	110 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	0
29	42	2001	1	21	1	Montanaro, Domingo	1	75	1	11	11	67 NA	142	2 NA	2	110	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
29	42	2001	1	21	1	Faluccci, Julian	1	75	1	11	11	60 NA	135	3 NA	3	110	2	1	0	0	0	0	0
29	42	2001	1	21	1	Lopez de Gainza, Este	2	65	4	11	11	65 NA	130	4 NA	4	110 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	0
29	42	2001	1	21	1	Mino, Francisco	1	45	5	11	11	68 NA	113	5 NA	5	110 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	0
29	42	2001	1	21	1	Zapata, Felicia	2	0	10	11	11	76 NA	76	6 NA	8	110 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	0
29	42	2001	1	21	1	Abasolo, Miguel	1	5	9	11	11	70 NA	75	7 NA	7	110 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	0
29	42	2001	1	21	1	Sellares, Patricia	2	15	8	11	11	57 NA	72	8 NA	10	110 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	0
29	42	2001	1	21	1	Rodriguez, Reinaldo	1	40	6	11	11	24 NA	64	9 NA	6	110	3	6	3	1	0	0	0
29	42	2001	1	21	1	Perticara, Angel	1	25	7	11	11	15 NA	40	10 NA	88	9	110 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0
29	42	2001	1	21	1	Perez Leiva, Juan	1	0	10	11	11	15 NA	15	11 NA	30	12	110 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0
30	43	2001	1	1	1	Ziulu, Adolfo	1	84	5	11	11	91 NA	175	1	1	109	1	0	1	1	0	0	0
30	43	2001	1	1	1	Aristizabal, Maria	2	91	1	11	11	63 NA	154	2	2	109	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
30	43	2001	1	1	1	Salas, Luis	1	86	4	11	11	66 NA	152	3	3	109 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	0
30	43	2001	1	1	1	Faggi, Carlos	1	88	2	11	11	63 NA	151	4	4	109 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	0
30	43	2001	1	1	1	Auge, Juan	1	87	3	11	11	60 NA	147	5	5	109 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	0
30	43	2001	1	1	1	Lugones, Alberto	1	71	7	11	11	69 NA	140	6 NA	NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
30	43	2001	1	1	1	Deglaue, Jose	1	75	6	11	11	60 NA	135	7	6	109 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	0
30	43	2001	1	1	1	Alvarez, Mirta	2	56	9	11	11	75 NA	131	8	7	109 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	0
30	43	2001	1	1	1	Di Pierro, Jorge	1	64	8	11	11	55 NA	119	9	8	109 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	0
30	43	2001	1	1	1	Del Blanco, Gustavo	1	47	10	11	11	63 NA	110	10	9	109 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	0
30	43	2001	1	1	1	Almendras, Oscar	1	26	11	11	11	35 NA	61	11	10	109 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	0
31	45	2001	12	3	1	Folco, Carlos	1	75	15	42	42	85 NA	160	1	1	107	1	0	1	2	0	0	0
31	45	2001	12	3	1	Tapia, Elias	1	87	4	42	42	69 NA	156	2	2	107	4	-2	1	3	0	0	0
31	45	2001	12	3	1	Faggi, Carlos	1	85	7	42	42	68.5 NA	153.5	3	3	107	2	1	1	2	0	0	0
31	45	2001	12	3	1	Galli, Guillermo	1	91	1	42	42	61.7 NA	152.7	4	4	107	6	-2	1	3	0	0	0
31	45	2001	12	3	1	Sanz de Urquiza, Fern	1	70	20	42	42	81.5 NA	151.5	5	5	107	3	2	1	3	0	0	0
31	45	2001	12	3	1	Panelo, Amalia	2	90	2	42	42	60 NA	150	6	6	107	8	-2	0	0	0	0	0
31	45	2001	12	3	1	Garese, Rita	2	86	5	42	42	63.7 NA	149.7	7	7	107	5	2	1	2	0	0	0
31	45	2001	12	3	1	Pineiro, Viviana	2	86	5	42	42	63 NA	149	8	8	107 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	0
31	45	2001	12	3	1	Civit, Francisco	1	90	2	42	42	57 NA	147	9	9	107 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	0
31	45	2001	12	3	1	Vidal Claypole, Aixa	2	78	10	42	42	62.5 NA	140.5	10	10	107 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	0
31	45	2001	12	3	1	Gilligan, Miguel	1	72	19	42	42	68.1 NA	140.1	11	11	107 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	0
31	45	2001	12	3	1	Zapata, Felicia	2	70	20	42	42	69.8 NA	139.8	12	12	107 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	0
31	45	2001	12	3	1	Traiman, Raquel	2	81	8	42	42	57.3 NA	138.3	13	13	107 NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	0
31	45	2001	12	3	1	Lopez Mendoza, Jose	1	75	15	42	42	63 NA	138	14	14	107	7	7	0	0	0	0	0

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number	contest	year	court	provir	date	name	gender	exam_score	exam_rank	total_part	initial_qualif	qualif_id	initial_sum	initial_rank	appeal_qualif	appeal_sum	appeal_rank	appeal_ic	final_rank	variation	executive	exec_id
31	45	2001	12	3	1	Gracia, Guillermo	1	75	15	42	62.5 NA	137.5	15	15	64.5	139.5	15	107 NA	NA	0	0	
31	45	2001	12	3	1	Carosino, Pablo	1	75	15	42	58.5 NA	133.5	16	16	61.5	136.5	18	107 NA	NA	0	0	
31	45	2001	12	3	1	Espinola, Rafael	1	78	10	42	55 NA	133	17	17	65.5	143.5	13	107 NA	NA	0	0	
31	45	2001	12	3	1	Tosi, Jorge	1	60	32	42	72.6 NA	132.6	18	18	72.6	132.6	20	107 NA	NA	0	0	
31	45	2001	12	3	1	Geroldi, Viviana	2	70	20	42	60 NA	130	19	19	56	126	27	107 NA	NA	0	0	
31	45	2001	12	3	1	Alvarez, Mirta	2	62	30	42	66.5 NA	128.5	20	20	75	137	17	107 NA	NA	0	0	
31	45	2001	12	3	1	Gentile, Claudio	1	76	13	42	52.1 NA	128.1	21	21	55.1	131.1	21	107 NA	NA	0	0	
31	45	2001	12	3	1	Rojas, Ana Maria	2	65	25	42	62.5 NA	127.5	22	22	59.5	124.5	29	107 NA	NA	0	0	
31	45	2001	12	3	1	Aleman, Alberto	1	79	9	42	48.3 NA	127.3	23	23	51.3	130.3	23	107 NA	NA	0	0	
31	45	2001	12	3	1	Perez Wiaggio, Carlos	1	78	10	42	49.1 NA	127.1	24	24	65.6	143.6	12	107 NA	NA	0	0	
31	45	2001	12	3	1	Garbarino, Pablo	2	68	24	42	59 NA	127	25	25	61	129	24	107 NA	NA	0	0	
31	45	2001	12	3	1	de Gregorio, Cristina	2	62	30	42	64.7 NA	126.7	26	26	66	128	25	107 NA	NA	0	0	
31	45	2001	12	3	1	Gilardi, Maria	2	65	25	42	60 NA	125	27	27	66	131	22	107 NA	NA	0	0	
31	45	2001	12	3	1	Muzio, Federico	1	65	25	42	60 NA	125	28	28	56	121	30	107 NA	NA	0	0	
31	45	2001	12	3	1	Zanniello, Priscila	2	70	20	42	55 NA	125	29	29	51	121	30	107 NA	NA	0	0	
31	45	2001	12	3	1	Abal, Arturo	1	60	32	42	65 NA	125	30	30	65	125	28	107 NA	NA	0	0	
31	45	2001	12	3	1	Blastre, Marcelo	1	78	10	42	45 NA	123	31	31	48.5	126.5	26	107 NA	NA	0	0	
31	45	2001	12	3	1	Pedriani, Sandra	2	55	36	42	64 NA	119	32	32	57	112	36	107 NA	NA	0	0	
31	45	2001	12	3	1	Gonzalez Bulnes, Ferr	1	60	32	42	55 NA	115	33	33	57	117	33	107 NA	NA	0	0	
31	45	2001	12	3	1	Militello, Sergio	1	63	29	42	51 NA	114	34	34	51	114	35	107 NA	NA	0	0	
31	45	2001	12	3	1	Vitale, Hector	1	65	25	42	46.3 NA	111.3	35	35	49.3	114.3	34	107 NA	NA	0	0	
31	45	2001	12	3	1	de Marco, Domingo	2	53	37	42	58 NA	111	36	36	66	119	32	107 NA	NA	0	0	
31	45	2001	12	3	1	Armagno, Nestor	1	50	39	42	60.5 NA	110.5	37	37	55.5	105.5	38	107 NA	NA	0	0	
31	45	2001	12	3	1	Segato, Laura	2	40	41	42	66 NA	106	38	38	66	106	37	107 NA	NA	0	0	
31	45	2001	12	3	1	Jalabert, Noemi	2	40	41	42	60.5 NA	100.5	39	39	65	105	39	107 NA	NA	0	0	
31	45	2001	12	3	1	Senes, Concepcion	2	50	39	42	47 NA	97	40	40	47	97	40	107 NA	NA	0	0	
31	45	2001	12	3	1	Salles, Maria Alejandr	2	52	38	42	37 NA	89	41	41	27	79	42	107 NA	NA	0	0	
31	45	2001	12	3	1	Verrier, Cesar	1	60	32	42	20 NA	80	42	42	80	80	41	107 NA	NA	0	0	
32	46	2001	1	7	1	Pfleger, Jorge	1	77	1	7	76 NA	153	1	1	76	153	1	110 NA	1	0	1	2
32	46	2001	1	7	1	Gelvez, Fernando	1	75	2	7	72 NA	147	2	2	75	150	2	110	2	0	0	0
32	46	2001	1	7	1	Miquelarena, Jorge	1	66	3	7	61 NA	127	3	3	66	132	3	110	3	0	0	0
32	46	2001	1	7	1	Reyes, Eduardo	1	50	5	7	67 NA	117	4	4	67	117	4	110 NA	NA	0	0	0
32	46	2001	1	7	1	Simonet, Norma	2	48	6	7	52 NA	100	5	5	52	100	5	110 NA	NA	0	0	0
32	46	2001	1	7	1	Allende Rubino, Horac	1	59	5	7	24 NA	83	6	6	33	92	6	110 NA	NA	0	0	0
32	46	2001	1	7	1	Ferrari, Carlos	1	24	7	7	52 NA	76	7	7	52	76	7	110 NA	NA	0	0	0
33	51	2002	2	1	1	Montensanti, Nestor	1	70	3	9	90 NA	160	1	1	93	163	1	106	1	0	1	2
33	51	2002	2	1	1	Montanaro, Domingo	1	90	1	9	56 NA	146	2	2	56	146	3	106	2	0	0	0
33	51	2002	2	1	1	Alvarez Canale, Alcind	1	60	5	9	80 NA	140	3	3	81	141	4	106	3	0	0	0
33	51	2002	2	1	1	de la Cruz, Nicolas	1	80	2	9	59 NA	139	4	4	68	148	2	106 NA	NA	0	0	0
33	51	2002	2	1	1	Tortorola, Beatriz	2	65	4	9	54 NA	119	5	5	56	121	5	106 NA	NA	0	0	0
33	51	2002	2	1	1	Dardanelli, Luis	1	40	7	9	74 NA	114	6	6	74	114	6	106 NA	NA	0	0	0
33	51	2002	2	1	1	Labastia, Daniel	1	55	6	9	50 NA	105	7	7	55	110	7	106 NA	NA	0	0	0
33	51	2002	2	1	1	Piccardo, Alfredo	1	40	7	9	45 NA	85	8	8	53	93	8	106 NA	NA	0	0	0
33	51	2002	2	1	1	Paronetto, Guillermo	1	20	9	9	37 NA	57	9	9	37	57	9	106 NA	NA	0	0	0
34	52	2002	2	4	1	Costamanga, Olivio	1	60	5	8	80.75 NA	140.75	1	1	70.75	130.75	5	116 NA	NA	0	0	0
34	52	2002	2	4	1	Velez Funes, Ignacio	1	80	2	8	59 NA	139	2	2	79	159	2	116	2	0	1	2
34	52	2002	2	4	1	Sanchez Torres, Julio	1	80	2	8	51.5 NA	131.5	3	3	76	156	3	116	3	0	0	0
34	52	2002	2	4	1	Palacio de Caero, Silv	2	90	1	8	41.5 NA	131.5	4	4	71.5	161.5	1	116	1	3	0	0
34	52	2002	2	4	1	Martinez, Luis	1	60	5	8	68.5 NA	128.5	5	5	73	133	4	116 NA	NA	0	0	0

number	contest_year	court	provir	date	name	gender	exam_score	exam_rank	total_part	initial_qualif	qualif_id	initial_sum	initial_rank	appeal_qualif	appeal_sum	appeal_rank	final_rank	rank_variation	executive_exec_id
34	52	2002	2	4	1 Tagle, Jorge	1	60	5	8	51 NA	6	111	6	61	121	7	116 NA	NA	0
34	52	2002	2	4	1 Achaval, Andres	1	60	5	8	40.5 NA	7	100.5	7	60.5	120.5	8	116 NA	NA	0
34	52	2002	2	4	1 Martinez, Hector	1	75	4	8	25 NA	8	100	8	75	150	6	116 NA	NA	0
35	53	2003	2	21	1 Vazquez Ferrerira, Rol	1	75	1	6	59 NA	1	134	1	78.5	153.5	1	118	1	0
35	53	2003	2	21	1 Toledo, Jose	1	68	2	6	44 NA	2	112	2	69	137	2	118	2	0
35	53	2003	2	21	1 Calvi, Patricia	2	60	3	6	40 NA	3	100	3	66	126	3	118 NA	NA	0
35	53	2003	2	21	1 Abasolo, Miguel	1	52	4	6	40 NA	4	92	4	64	116	5	118	3	1
35	53	2003	2	21	1 Gardiol, Ariel	1	42	5	6	46.5 NA	5	88.5	5	82	124	4	118 NA	NA	0
35	53	2003	2	21	1 Soraluze, Fernando	1	30	6	6	19 NA	6	49	6	19	49	6	118 NA	NA	0
36	54	2002	2	24	1 Rouges, Julio	1	80	2	16	47 NA	1	127	1	81	161	1	117	1	0
36	54	2002	2	24	1 Repetto Villafane, Agl	1	70	4	16	54 NA	2	124	2	78	148	2	117 NA	NA	0
36	54	2002	2	24	1 del Valle Fuentes, Mar	1	70	4	16	49 NA	3	119	3	70	140	5	117 NA	NA	0
36	54	2002	2	24	1 Fernandez Vecino, Gr	2	65	1	16	49 NA	4	114	4	75.5	140.5	3	117	2	2
36	54	2002	2	24	1 Leone, Maria	2	85	1	16	27 NA	5	112	5	55	140	5	117 NA	NA	0
36	54	2002	2	24	1 Lugones, Alberto	1	75	3	16	32 NA	6	107	6	65.5	140.5	3	117	3	0
36	54	2002	2	24	1 Garzon, Benito	1	50	8	16	52 NA	7	102	7	86	136	7	117 NA	NA	0
36	54	2002	2	24	1 Viejobueno, Pascual	1	50	8	16	50 NA	8	100	8	76	126	8	117 NA	NA	0
36	54	2002	2	24	1 Rodriguez Campos, Jc	1	65	6	16	32 NA	9	97	9	58.5	123.5	9	117 NA	NA	0
36	54	2002	2	24	1 Novillo, Rodolfo	1	40	11	16	55 NA	9	95	10	78	118	10	117 NA	NA	0
36	54	2002	2	24	1 Madozzo, Luis	1	40	11	16	53 NA	11	93	11	73	113	12	117 NA	NA	0
36	54	2002	2	24	1 Bravo, Lilian	2	40	11	16	50 NA	12	90	12	70	110	14	117 NA	NA	0
36	54	2002	2	24	1 Garzia, Jose	1	45	10	16	45 NA	13	90	13	70	115	11	117 NA	NA	0
36	54	2002	2	24	1 Fontan, Carmen	2	55	7	16	33 NA	14	88	14	58	113	13	117 NA	NA	0
36	54	2002	2	24	1 Moeremans, Daniel	1	40	11	16	46 NA	15	86	15	63	103	15	117 NA	NA	0
36	54	2002	2	24	1 Moersovich, Rodolfo	1	40	11	16	30 NA	16	70	16	60	100	16	117 NA	NA	0
37	55	2003	9	12	1 Ramos Padilla, Juan	1	76	1	11	73 NA	1	149	1	73	149	1	115	2	-1
37	55	2003	9	12	1 Aragone, Alberto	1	68	4	11	73 NA	2	141	2	76	144	2	115	1	1
37	55	2003	9	12	1 Sanchez Torres, Abel	1	70	2	11	60 NA	3	130	3	71	141	3	115	3	0
37	55	2003	9	12	1 Cornet, Ramon	1	69	3	11	55 NA	4	124	4	55	124	4	115 NA	NA	0
37	55	2003	9	12	1 Drocchi, Alfredo	1	44	6	11	70 NA	5	114	5	71	115	6	115 NA	NA	0
37	55	2003	9	12	1 Arrieta, Marcelo	1	43	7	11	69 NA	6	112	6	76	119	5	115	4	2
37	55	2003	9	12	1 Piccardo, Alfredo	1	48	5	11	57 NA	7	105	7	57	105	7	115 NA	NA	0
37	55	2003	9	12	1 Arce, Alejandro	1	24	8	11	57 NA	8	81	8	57	81	10	115 NA	NA	0
37	55	2003	9	12	1 Ana, Claudio	1	21	9	11	57 NA	9	78	9	57	78	11	115 NA	NA	0
37	55	2003	9	12	1 Chumbita, Enrique	1	21	9	11	53 NA	10	74	10	65	86	9	115 NA	NA	0
37	55	2003	9	12	1 Nieto Ortiz, Manuel	1	20	11	11	40 NA	11	60	11	69	89	8	115 NA	NA	0
38	56	2003	9	13	1 Sanchez Torres, Abel	1	80	1	17	67 NA	1	147	1	NA	147	1	119	1	0
38	56	2003	9	13	1 Cortes, Hector	1	65	3	17	67 NA	2	132	2	NA	132	2	119	2	0
38	56	2003	9	13	1 Bento, Walter	1	70	2	17	58 NA	3	128	3	NA	129	3	119	3	0
38	56	2003	9	13	1 Culotta, Juan	1	60	4	17	60 NA	4	120	4	6 NA	125	4	119	4	0
38	56	2003	9	13	1 Yanzon, Roberto	1	58	9	17	65 NA	5	123	5	4 NA	123	5	119 NA	NA	0
38	56	2003	9	13	1 Blanco, Maria Estela	2	60	4	17	54 NA	6	114	6	7 NA	121	6	119 NA	NA	0
38	56	2003	9	13	1 Pasqua, Francisco	1	60	4	17	62.5 NA	7	122.5	7	NA	120.5	7	119 NA	NA	0
38	56	2003	9	13	1 Tacca, Carlos	1	58	9	17	56 NA	8	114	8	7 NA	116	8	119 NA	NA	0
38	56	2003	9	13	1 Montanaro, Domingo	1	60	4	17	54 NA	9	114	9	7 NA	114	9	119 NA	NA	0
38	56	2003	9	13	1 Alegre, Francisco	1	60	4	17	51 NA	10	111	10	NA	111	10	119 NA	NA	0
38	56	2003	9	13	1 Garay, Guillermo	1	50	11	17	61 NA	10	111	10	NA	111	10	119 NA	NA	0
38	56	2003	9	13	1 Manaresi, Susana	2	40	13	17	70 NA	11	110	11	NA	111	10	119 NA	NA	0
38	56	2003	9	13	1 Villar, Mario	1	30	15	17	72 NA	13	102	13	NA	102	13	119 NA	NA	0

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38	56	2003	9	13	1	Aragone, Alberto	1	40	13	17	60	NA	100	14	14	119	NA	NA	0	0
38	56	2003	9	13	1	Valotta, Agustin	1	30	15	17	68	NA	98	15	15	119	NA	NA	0	0
38	56	2003	9	13	1	Pina Satur, Jose	1	50	11	17	42	NA	92	16	16	119	NA	NA	0	0
38	56	2003	9	13	1	Santacroce, Carlos	1	30	15	17	40	NA	70	17	17	119	NA	NA	0	0
39	57	2003	9	1	1	Duran, Roberto	1	82	3	11	60	NA	142	1	1	116	2	-1	0	0
39	57	2003	9	1	1	Huarte Petite, Alberto	1	83	2	11	58	NA	141	2	2	116	1	1	0	0
39	57	2003	9	1	1	Esmoris, Alejandro	1	85	1	11	50	NA	135	3	3	116	3	0	1	3
39	57	2003	9	1	1	Dias, Horacio	1	75	5	11	57	NA	132	4	4	116	4	0	0	0
39	57	2003	9	1	1	Rey Ordonez, Julio	1	60	6	11	60	NA	120	5	5	116	NA	NA	0	0
39	57	2003	9	1	1	Silvestroni, Mariano	1	80	4	11	32.5	NA	112.5	6	6	116	NA	NA	0	0
39	57	2003	9	1	1	Cevasco, Omar	1	50	9	11	50	NA	100	7	7	116	NA	NA	0	0
39	57	2003	9	1	1	Montanaro, Domingo	1	55	7	11	40	NA	95	8	8	116	NA	NA	0	0
39	57	2003	9	1	1	Dedominichi, Hector	1	55	7	11	32	NA	87	9	9	116	NA	NA	0	0
39	57	2003	9	1	1	Laguinge, Martin	1	41	11	11	45	NA	86	10	10	116	NA	NA	0	0
39	57	2003	9	1	1	Costabel, Nestor	1	45	10	11	33	NA	78	11	11	116	NA	NA	0	0
40	58	2002	9	21	1	Bruera, Matilde	2	62	5	8	83	NA	145	1	1	106	1	0	0	0
40	58	2002	9	21	1	Baffigi, Gabriel	1	83	1	8	48	NA	131	2	2	106	2	0	0	0
40	58	2002	9	21	1	Faluccci, Julian	1	80	2	8	29	NA	109	3	3	106	4	-1	0	0
40	58	2002	9	21	1	Viaut, Luis	1	50	6	8	56	NA	106	4	4	106	NA	NA	0	0
40	58	2002	9	21	1	Vella, Maria	2	69	3	8	35	NA	104	5	5	106	3	2	3	2
40	58	2002	9	21	1	Piccardo, Alfredo	1	40	8	8	53	NA	93	6	6	106	NA	NA	0	0
40	58	2002	9	21	1	Abasolo, Miguel	1	66	4	8	21	NA	87	7	7	106	NA	NA	0	0
40	58	2002	9	21	1	Yebra, Maria	2	45	7	8	29	NA	74	8	8	106	NA	NA	0	0
41	59	2004	5	3	1	Vazquez, Marcelo	1	93	2	42	72.25	NA	165.25	1	1	112	8	-7	0	0
41	59	2004	5	3	1	Freiler, Eduardo	1	78	15	42	87	NA	165	2	2	112	1	1	0	0
41	59	2004	5	3	1	Barbaccia, Jose	1	89	6	42	75.25	NA	164.25	3	3	112	2	1	0	0
41	59	2004	5	3	1	Salas, Luis	1	86	8	42	73.75	NA	159.75	4	4	112	3	1	0	0
41	59	2004	5	3	1	Rafecas, Daniel	1	90	3	42	68.75	NA	158.75	5	5	112	4	1	1	3
41	59	2004	5	3	1	Culotta, Juan	1	90	3	42	66.75	NA	156.75	6	6	112	10	-4	0	0
41	59	2004	5	3	1	Montenegro, Guillermo	1	82	10	42	74	NA	156	7	7	112	6	1	1	3
41	59	2004	5	3	1	Roma, Marcelo	1	81	12	42	71	NA	152	8	8	112	NA	NA	0	0
41	59	2004	5	3	1	Ercolini, Julian	1	90	3	42	61.25	NA	151.25	9	9	112	7	2	2	3
41	59	2004	5	3	1	Sica, Jorge	1	80	13	42	69.75	NA	149.75	10	10	112	9	1	0	0
41	59	2004	5	3	1	Barroetavena, Diego	1	74	19	42	73.25	NA	147.25	11	11	112	NA	NA	0	0
41	59	2004	5	3	1	Lijo, Ariel	1	94	1	42	53.25	NA	147.25	12	12	112	NA	NA	0	0
41	59	2004	5	3	1	Rodriguez Jordan, Mai	1	88	7	42	59	NA	147	13	13	112	5	7	3	3
41	59	2004	5	3	1	De Langhe, Marcela	2	72	21	42	70.75	NA	142.75	14	14	112	11	2	0	0
41	59	2004	5	3	1	Apolo, Jorge	1	68	24	42	71	NA	139	15	15	112	NA	NA	0	0
41	59	2004	5	3	1	Cristofani, Gustavo	1	86	8	42	52.25	NA	138.25	16	16	112	NA	NA	0	0
41	59	2004	5	3	1	Taiano, Eduardo	1	65	27	42	72.75	NA	137.75	17	17	112	NA	NA	0	0
41	59	2004	5	3	1	Garcia de la Torre, Pal	1	82	10	42	55.25	NA	137.25	18	18	112	NA	NA	0	0
41	59	2004	5	3	1	Echevarria, Susana	2	75	18	42	61.5	NA	136.5	19	19	112	NA	NA	0	0
41	59	2004	5	3	1	Basso, Sebastian	1	79	14	42	54.25	NA	133.25	20	20	112	NA	NA	0	0
41	59	2004	5	3	1	Rey Ordonez, Julio	1	55	32	42	72	NA	127	21	21	112	NA	NA	0	0
41	59	2004	5	3	1	Costabel, Nestor	1	73	20	42	54	NA	127	22	22	112	NA	NA	0	0
41	59	2004	5	3	1	Bertuzzi, Pablo	1	76	16	42	48.5	NA	124.5	23	23	112	NA	NA	0	0
41	59	2004	5	3	1	Ambrosio, Miguel	1	76	16	42	47	NA	123	24	24	112	NA	NA	0	0
41	59	2004	5	3	1	Montanaro, Domingo	1	68	24	42	53.25	NA	121.25	25	25	112	NA	NA	0	0
41	59	2004	5	3	1	Cubelli, Jorge	1	69	23	42	52.25	NA	121.25	26	26	112	NA	NA	0	0

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41	59	2004	5	3	1	Tortorola, Beatriz	2	62	30	42	57	NA	119	27	NA	128	24	112	NA	NA	0
41	59	2004	5	3	1	Cearras, Carlos	1	51	35	42	66.25	NA	117.25	28	NA	121.75	29	112	NA	NA	0
41	59	2004	5	3	1	Martinez Frugoni, Carl	1	63	29	42	54	NA	117	29	NA	120	32	112	NA	NA	0
41	59	2004	5	3	1	Ojeda, Alberto	1	68	24	42	48.25	NA	116.25	30	NA	120.25	31	112	NA	NA	0
41	59	2004	5	3	1	Ramos Padilla, Juan	1	45	37	42	70.25	NA	115.25	31	NA	116.25	33	112	NA	NA	0
41	59	2004	5	3	1	Helou, Javier	1	64	28	42	51	NA	115	32	NA	120.5	30	112	NA	NA	0
41	59	2004	5	3	1	Echegaray, Sergio	1	53	34	42	60	NA	113	33	NA	111.5	35	112	NA	NA	0
41	59	2004	5	3	1	Fondato, Maria	2	55	32	42	50	NA	105	34	NA	110	36	112	NA	NA	0
41	59	2004	5	3	1	Fernandez Pertini, Jav	1	49	35	42	55	NA	104	35	NA	107	37	112	NA	NA	0
41	59	2004	5	3	1	Francia, Gabriela	2	62	30	42	41	NA	103	36	NA	113	34	112	NA	NA	0
41	59	2004	5	3	1	Dilario, Elena	2	45	36	42	51	NA	96	37	NA	99	38	112	NA	NA	0
41	59	2004	5	3	1	Heredia, Alberto	1	25	39	42	50.25	NA	75.25	38	NA	92.25	39	112	NA	NA	0
41	59	2004	5	3	1	Gonzalez Charvay, Ad	1	20	40	42	54	NA	74	39	NA	80.5	41	112	NA	NA	0
41	59	2004	5	3	1	Beron, Ezequiel	1	70	22	42	0	NA	70	40	NA	127.5	26	112	NA	NA	0
41	59	2004	5	3	1	Apestequia, Carlos	1	20	40	42	44	NA	64	41	NA	86	40	112	NA	NA	0
41	59	2004	5	3	1	Mariluis, Delia	2	20	40	42	36.5	NA	56.5	42	NA	78.5	42	112	NA	NA	0
42	65	2003	2	16	1	Douglas Price, Jorge	1	87	2	10	70	NA	157	1	69	156	1	115	1	0	0
42	65	2003	2	16	1	Barreiro, Ricardo	1	92	1	10	49	NA	141	2	63	155	2	115	2	0	1
42	65	2003	2	16	1	Coscia, Orlando	1	85	3	10	55	NA	140	3	66	151	3	115	3	0	0
42	65	2003	2	16	1	Dedominichi, Hector	1	82	4	10	48.5	NA	130.5	4	48.5	130.5	4	115	NA	NA	0
42	65	2003	2	16	1	Gianella, Horacio	1	67	6	10	62	NA	129	5	62	129	6	115	NA	NA	0
42	65	2003	2	16	1	Baffigi, Gabriel	1	76	5	10	45.5	NA	121.5	6	53.5	129.5	5	115	NA	NA	0
42	65	2003	2	16	1	Ferrando, Alicia	2	45	8	10	60.5	NA	105.5	7	60.5	105.5	8	115	NA	NA	0
42	65	2003	2	16	1	Hertzriken, Marcelo	1	58	7	10	44	NA	102	8	44	102	9	115	NA	NA	0
42	65	2003	2	16	1	Sanchez Freitas, Fern.	1	45	8	10	56	NA	101	9	70	115	7	115	NA	NA	0
42	65	2003	2	16	1	Lopez Meyer, Cesar	1	40	10	10	54.5	NA	94.5	10	54.5	94.5	10	115	NA	NA	0
43	66	2003	9	15	1	Coscia, Orlando	1	64	2	14	74.17	NA	138.17	1	74.97	138.97	1	114	1	0	0
43	66	2003	9	15	1	Garcia Osella, Jorge	1	57	5	14	76.83	NA	133.83	2	76.83	133.83	2	114	2	0	0
43	66	2003	9	15	1	Marquez, Armando	1	49	7	14	77.37	NA	126.37	3	73.37	122.37	6	114	NA	NA	0
43	66	2003	9	15	1	Sanchez Freitas, Fern.	1	52	6	14	73.67	NA	125.67	4	73.92	125.92	5	114	NA	NA	0
43	66	2003	9	15	1	De la Rosa, Rafael	1	47	9	14	77.21	NA	124.21	5	71.21	118.21	7	114	NA	NA	0
43	66	2003	9	15	1	Dedominichi, Hector	1	58	4	14	58.14	NA	116.14	6	60.14	118.14	8	114	NA	NA	0
43	66	2003	9	15	1	Baffigi, Gabriel	1	80	1	14	35.39	NA	115.39	7	52.79	132.79	3	114	3	4	0
43	66	2003	9	15	1	Tortorola, Beatriz	2	60	3	14	44.85	NA	104.85	8	66.85	126.85	4	114	4	4	0
43	66	2003	9	15	1	Lopez Meyer, Cesar	1	31	12	14	73.17	NA	104.17	9	67.17	98.17	11	114	NA	NA	0
43	66	2003	9	15	1	Lardit, Carlos	1	44	10	14	58.11	NA	102.11	10	60.11	104.11	10	114	NA	NA	0
43	66	2003	9	15	1	Saman, Maria Julieta	2	48	8	14	46.94	NA	94.94	11	66.24	114.24	9	114	NA	NA	0
43	66	2003	9	15	1	Pitovsky, Leonardo	1	33	11	14	50.6	NA	83.6	12	53.3	86.3	12	114	NA	NA	0
43	66	2003	9	15	1	Hertzriken, Marcelo	1	29	13	14	48.37	NA	77.37	13	55.28	84.28	13	114	NA	NA	0
43	66	2003	9	15	1	Garcia Elorrio, Juan	1	22	14	14	24.36	NA	46.36	14	29.36	51.36	14	114	NA	NA	0
44	67	2003	11	3	1	Lezana, Mario	1	90	2	14	79	NA	169	1	NA	173	2	114	2	-1	1
44	67	2003	11	3	1	Medina, Graciela	2	80	8	14	84	NA	164	2	NA	173	3	114	1	1	3
44	67	2003	11	3	1	Guarmoni, Ricardo	1	95	1	14	68	NA	163	3	NA	169	3	114	NA	NA	0
44	67	2003	11	3	1	Tresguerras, Jose	1	90	2	14	69	NA	159	4	NA	169	3	114	4	0	0
44	67	2003	11	3	1	Diaz Solimine, Omar	1	85	6	14	74	NA	159	5	NA	169	3	114	3	2	0
44	67	2003	11	3	1	Sanchez, Diego	1	80	8	14	76	NA	156	6	NA	160	8	114	NA	NA	0
44	67	2003	11	3	1	Zumaraga, Javier	1	90	2	14	59	NA	149	7	NA	163	7	114	NA	NA	0
44	67	2003	11	3	1	Rabbi-Baldi, Luis	1	85	6	14	61	NA	146	8	NA	168	6	114	NA	NA	0
44	67	2003	11	3	1	Heredia, Pablo	1	90	2	14	53	NA	143	9	NA	160	8	114	NA	NA	0

Appendix A

Appendix A

number	contest	year	court	provir	date	name	gender	exam_score	exam_rank	total	part	initial_qualif	qualif_id	initial_sum	initial_rank	sum_appeal	sum_appeal_rank	final_rank	rank_variation	executive	exec_id
44	67	2003	11	3	1	Ayala Flore, Maria	2	40	11	14	14	81 NA	10 NA	121	10	131	10	114 NA	NA	0	0
44	67	2003	11	3	1	Ferro, Jorge	1	40	11	14	14	77 NA	11 NA	117	11	118	11	114 NA	NA	0	0
44	67	2003	11	3	1	Seligmann, Luis	1	80	8	14	14	23 NA	12 NA	103	12	118	11	114 NA	NA	0	0
44	67	2003	11	3	1	Soto, Francisco	1	30	14	14	14	66 NA	13 NA	96	13	105	13	114 NA	NA	0	0
44	67	2003	11	3	1	Verrier, Cesar	1	40	11	14	14	16 NA	14 NA	56	14	114	14	114 NA	NA	0	0
45	70	2002	2	1	1	Ayala Flores, Maria	2	90	1	9	9	66 NA	1	156	1	169	1	113	1	0	0
45	70	2002	2	1	1	Compareid, Carlos	1	90	1	9	9	50 NA	2	140	2	155	3	113	3	-1	0
45	70	2002	2	1	1	Vallefin, Carlos	1	85	3	9	9	51 NA	3	136	3	168	2	113	2	1	3
45	70	2002	2	1	1	Silva Garretton, Martin	1	65	5	9	9	68 NA	4	133	4	143	5	113 NA	NA	0	0
45	70	2002	2	1	1	Caltri, Olga	2	80	4	9	9	50 NA	5	130	5	149	4	113 NA	NA	0	0
45	70	2002	2	1	1	Soto, Francisco	1	40	6	9	9	56 NA	6	96	6	110	8	113 NA	NA	0	0
45	70	2002	2	1	1	Isaurralde, Horacio	1	40	6	9	9	52 NA	7	92	7	114	7	113 NA	NA	0	0
45	70	2002	2	1	1	Carol, Guillermo	1	40	6	9	9	45 NA	8	85	8	119	6	113 NA	NA	0	0
45	70	2002	2	1	1	Lezana, Mario	1	20	9	9	9	51 NA	9	77	9	97	9	113 NA	NA	0	0
46	72	2003	1	21	1	Venegas, Jorge	1	90	1	17	17	57.5 NA	1	147.5	1	154.5	1	106	1	0	0
46	72	2003	1	21	1	Sutter, German	1	80	5	17	17	63 NA	2	143	2	140.5	4	106	4	-2	0
46	72	2003	1	21	1	Pinto, Ricardo	1	85	2	17	17	57 NA	3	142	3	139	5	106 NA	NA	0	0
46	72	2003	1	21	1	Bailaque, Marcelo	1	74	7	17	17	66 NA	4	140	4	141	3	106	3	1	0
46	72	2003	1	21	1	Vera Barros, Carlos	1	82	3	17	17	52.25 NA	5	134.25	5	142.5	2	106	2	3	3
46	72	2003	1	21	1	Gambacorta, Mario	1	81	4	17	17	48 NA	6	129	6	130	6	106 NA	NA	0	0
46	72	2003	1	21	1	Bertuzzi, Pablo	1	76	6	17	17	51.5 NA	7	127.5	7	126.5	8	106 NA	NA	0	0
46	72	2003	1	21	1	Martinez, Eugenio	1	72	9	17	17	52 NA	8	124	8	112	13	106 NA	NA	0	0
46	72	2003	1	21	1	Baffigi, Gabriel	1	73	8	17	17	50 NA	9	123	9	123	9	106 NA	NA	0	0
46	72	2003	1	21	1	Toledo, Jose	1	64	13	17	17	58.5 NA	10	122.5	10	129	7	106 NA	NA	0	0
46	72	2003	1	21	1	Abasolo, Miguel	1	68	10	17	17	53 NA	11	121	11	121	10	106 NA	NA	0	0
46	72	2003	1	21	1	Belforte, Eduardo	1	68	10	17	17	52 NA	12	120	12	119	12	106 NA	NA	0	0
46	72	2003	1	21	1	Salas, Juan	1	66	12	17	17	53.75 NA	13	119.75	13	119.75	11	106 NA	NA	0	0
46	72	2003	1	21	1	Angelini, Roberto	1	59	14	17	17	55 NA	14	114	14	109	14	106 NA	NA	0	0
46	72	2003	1	21	1	Facciano, Osvaldo	1	56	16	17	17	53 NA	15	109	15	108	15	106 NA	NA	0	0
46	72	2003	1	21	1	Boglioli, Alfredo	1	57	15	17	17	50 NA	16	107	16	106	16	106 NA	NA	0	0
46	72	2003	1	21	1	Araoz de Lamadrid, O	1	50	17	17	17	50 NA	17	100	17	105	17	106 NA	NA	0	0
47	73	2003	9	8	1	Montanaro, Domingo	1	90	1	11	11	58 NA	1	148	1	148	1	112	1	0	0
47	73	2003	9	8	1	Gemignani, Juan	1	70	3	11	11	73 NA	2	143	2	141	2	112	2	0	0
47	73	2003	9	8	1	Cadenas, Roberto	1	73	2	11	11	65 NA	3	138	3	123	5	112 NA	NA	0	0
47	73	2003	9	8	1	Lopez Arango, Manuel	1	50	6	11	11	82 NA	4	132	4	132	3	112	3	1	3
47	73	2003	9	8	1	Caunedo, Fernando	1	65	4	11	11	57 NA	5	122	5	125	4	112 NA	NA	0	0
47	73	2003	9	8	1	Celli, Felipe	1	30	11	11	11	82 NA	6	112	6	109	7	112 NA	NA	0	0
47	73	2003	9	8	1	Abasolo, Miguel	1	55	5	11	11	50 NA	7	105	7	110	6	112 NA	NA	0	0
47	73	2003	9	8	1	Franchi, Mario	1	40	8	11	11	60 NA	8	100	8	97	8	112 NA	NA	0	0
47	73	2003	9	8	1	Baffigi, Gabriel	1	42	7	11	11	54 NA	9	96	9	96	9	112 NA	NA	0	0
47	73	2003	9	8	1	Berzano, ireneo	1	38	9	11	11	46 NA	10	84	10	46	10	112 NA	NA	0	0
47	73	2003	9	8	1	Faluccci, Julian	1	35	10	11	11	44 NA	11	79	11	44	79	112 NA	NA	0	0
48	74	2003	1	2	1	Monti, Victor	1	73	5	11	11	89 NA	1	162	1	163	1	111	2	-1	0
48	74	2003	1	2	1	Assaf, Amalina	2	100	1	11	11	62 NA	2	162	2	163	2	111	1	1	2
48	74	2003	1	2	1	Reynaga, Juan	1	62	7	11	11	78 NA	3	140	3	140	4	111	4	-1	0
48	74	2003	1	2	1	Padros, Ramiro	1	93	2	11	11	47 NA	4	140	4	153	3	111	3	1	0
48	74	2003	1	2	1	Contreras, Miguel	1	76	3	11	11	62 NA	5	138	5	139	5	111 NA	NA	0	0
48	74	2003	1	2	1	Bertuzzi, Pablo	1	128	4	11	11	54 NA	6	128	6	128	6	111	5	1	0
48	74	2003	1	2	1	Moreno, Manuel	1	65	6	11	11	56 NA	7	121	7	128	6	111	6	1	0

number	contest	year	court	provir	date	name	gender	exam_score	exam_rank	total_part	initial_qualif	qualif_id	initial_sum	initial_rank	appeal_qualif	appeal_sum	appeal_rank	ic	final_rank	variation	executive	exec_id
48	74	2003	1	2	1	Figueroa, Arturo	1	48	9	11	67 NA	8	115	8	78	126	8	111	NA	NA	0	0
48	74	2003	1	2	1	Garzia, Jose	1	42	10	11	72 NA	9	114	9	72	114	9	111	NA	NA	0	0
48	74	2003	1	2	1	Da Pra, Raul	1	30	11	11	76 NA	10	106	10	76	106	10	111	NA	NA	0	0
48	74	2003	1	2	1	Lobo, Guillermo	1	60	8	11	22 NA	82	11	40	100	11	111	NA	NA	0	0	
49	75	2004	1	21	1	Zucchi, Hector	1	81	4	7	91 NA	172	1	96	177	1	119	1	0	0	1	3
49	75	2004	1	21	1	Calvi, Patricia	2	87	1	7	77 NA	164	2	77	164	2	119	2	0	0	0	0
49	75	2004	1	21	1	Zapata, Felicia	2	82	3	7	75 NA	157	3	78	160	3	119	3	0	0	0	0
49	75	2004	1	21	1	Botta, Rodolfo	1	74	5	7	78 NA	152	4	78	152	4	119	NA	NA	0	0	0
49	75	2004	1	21	1	Sallent, Adrian	1	85	2	7	55 NA	140	5	55	140	5	119	NA	NA	0	0	0
49	75	2004	1	21	1	Chede, Luis	1	56	6	7	72 NA	128	6	70	126	6	119	NA	NA	0	0	0
49	75	2004	1	21	1	Martinez, Martin	1	48	7	7	76 NA	124	7	76	124	7	119	NA	NA	0	0	0
50	78	2004	1	13	1	Montanaro, Domingo	1	77	1	12	55.4 NA	132.4	1	74.45	151.45	1	111	1	0	0	0	0
50	78	2004	1	13	1	Di Giuseppe, Dante	1	48.5	8	12	75.8 NA	124.3	2	83.15	131.65	4	111	4	-2	0	0	0
50	78	2004	1	13	1	Pina Garcia, Alejandrc	1	67.5	3	12	52 NA	119.5	3	73	140.5	2	111	3	0	0	0	0
50	78	2004	1	13	1	Bento, Walter	1	65	4	12	52 NA	117	4	74.15	139.15	3	111	2	2	3	3	3
50	78	2004	1	13	1	Arrabal, Olga	2	44	9	12	67 NA	111	5	77	121	8	111	NA	NA	0	0	0
50	78	2004	1	13	1	Pascua Olguin, Francit	1	52	6	12	54 NA	106	6	78.15	130.15	6	111	6	0	0	0	0
50	78	2004	1	13	1	Bertuzzi, Pablo	1	69	2	12	36.4 NA	105.4	7	60.75	129.75	7	111	7	0	0	0	0
50	78	2004	1	13	1	Garcia Wenk, Alfredo	1	50	7	12	44 NA	94	8	81	131	5	111	5	3	0	0	0
50	78	2004	1	13	1	Fruchtenicht, Jorge	1	55.6	5	12	37 NA	92.6	9	52	107.6	9	111	NA	NA	0	0	0
50	78	2004	1	13	1	Oyuela, Jorge	1	38	11	12	44 NA	82	10	52.9	90.9	11	111	NA	NA	0	0	0
50	78	2004	1	13	1	Orozco, Eduardo	1	25	12	12	52 NA	77	11	67	92	10	111	NA	NA	0	0	0
50	78	2004	1	13	1	Llorens, Mariano	1	39	10	12	27 NA	66	12	47	86	12	111	NA	NA	0	0	0
51	83	2004	6	3	2	Freiler, Eduardo	1	80	2	16	77.8	4	157.8	1	80.8	160.8	1	120	1	0	1	3
51	83	2004	6	3	2	Montanaro, Domingo	1	100	1	16	55.55	4	155.55	2	54.65	154.65	2	120	2	0	0	0
51	83	2004	6	3	2	Obligado, Daniel	1	70	3	16	83.2	4	153.2	3	80.2	150.2	3	120	3	0	0	0
51	83	2004	6	3	2	Morin, Daniel	1	60	5	16	77.8	4	137.8	4	79.8	139.8	4	120	4	0	0	0
51	83	2004	6	3	2	Ramos Padilla, Juan	1	65	4	16	72.5	4	137.5	5	72.6	137.6	5	120	5	0	0	0
51	83	2004	6	3	2	Garcia Wenk, Alfredo	1	50	6	16	75	4	125	6	76	126	6	120	6	0	0	0
51	83	2004	6	3	2	Esmoris, Alejandro	1	50	6	16	72	4	122	7	69	119	8	120	NA	NA	0	0
51	83	2004	6	3	2	Di Masi, Gerardo	1	50	6	16	69.7	4	119.7	8	69.7	119.7	7	120	7	1	0	0
51	83	2004	6	3	2	Ballester, Jorge	1	40	9	16	78	4	118	9	79	119	8	120	8	1	0	0
51	83	2004	6	3	2	Isaurralde, Horacio	1	30	10	16	70	4	100	10	70	100	10	120	NA	NA	0	0
51	83	2004	6	3	2	Ramos, Liliana	2	30	10	16	69.9	4	99.9	11	69.9	99.9	11	120	NA	NA	0	0
51	83	2004	6	3	2	Cisneros, Daniel	1	20	12	16	77	4	97	12	78	98	12	120	NA	NA	0	0
51	83	2004	6	3	2	Castillo Lynch, Carlos	1	20	12	16	74	4	94	13	74	94	13	120	NA	NA	0	0
51	83	2004	6	3	2	Besanson, Roberto	1	20	12	16	72.25	4	92.25	14	73.25	93.25	14	120	NA	NA	0	0
51	83	2004	6	3	2	Radrizzani, Miguel	1	5	16	16	75	4	80	15	75	80	15	120	NA	NA	0	0
51	83	2004	6	3	2	Santacroce, Carlos	1	10	15	16	64	4	74	16	64	74	16	120	NA	NA	0	0
52	84	2003	1	1	2	Farah, Eduardo	1	100	1	23	66.4	5	166.4	1	76.8	176.8	1	119	1	0	1	3
52	84	2003	1	1	2	Salas, Juan	1	90	5	23	69.5	5	159.5	2	69.5	159.5	3	119	2	0	0	0
52	84	2003	1	1	2	Faluccci, Julian	1	95	3	23	63	5	158	3	62.66	157.66	5	119	NA	NA	0	0
52	84	2003	1	1	2	Grunberg, Adrian	1	95	3	23	62.16	5	157.16	4	67.95	162.95	2	119	NA	NA	0	0
52	84	2003	1	1	2	Basso, Sebastian	1	90	5	23	65.8	5	155.8	5	68.86	158.86	4	119	3	2	0	0
52	84	2003	1	1	2	del Valle, Roberto	1	80	7	23	73.2	5	153.2	6	73.2	153.2	6	119	NA	NA	0	0
52	84	2003	1	1	2	Azzolin, Horacio	1	100	1	23	39.64	5	139.64	7	50.72	150.72	7	119	NA	NA	0	0
52	84	2003	1	1	2	Mc Intosh, Maria	2	75	9	23	63.8	5	138.8	8	63.8	138.8	8	119	NA	NA	0	0
52	84	2003	1	1	2	Capparelli, Facundo	1	65	11	23	73.7	5	138.7	9	73.6	138.6	9	119	NA	NA	0	0
52	84	2003	1	1	2	Bertuzzi, Pablo	1	80	7	23	55.6	5	135.6	10	55.6	135.6	10	119	NA	NA	0	0

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number	contest_year	court	provir	date	name	gender	exam_score	exam_rank	total_part	initial_qualif	qualif_id	initial_sum	initial_rank	appeal_qualif	appeal_sum	appeal_rank	ic_final	rank_variation	executive	exec_id
52	84	2003	1	1	2	Errandonea, Julio	1	65	11	23	70	135	11	70	135	11	119	NA	NA	0
52	84	2003	1	1	2	Errandonea, Saul	1	75	9	23	58.3	133.3	12	58.3	133.3	12	119	NA	NA	0
52	84	2003	1	1	2	Cristofani, Gustavo	1	60	13	23	60.5	120.5	5	60.5	120.5	14	119	NA	NA	0
52	84	2003	1	1	2	Funes, Magdalena	2	55	15	23	62.05	117.05	14	75.3	130.3	13	119	NA	NA	0
52	84	2003	1	1	2	Ferrari, Carlos	1	55	15	23	60.95	115.95	15	60.95	115.95	15	119	NA	NA	0
52	84	2003	1	1	2	Razona, Julio	1	40	20	23	75.5	115.5	16	75.5	115.5	16	119	NA	NA	0
52	84	2003	1	1	2	Erbetta, Guillermo	1	40	20	23	67.85	107.85	17	67.85	107.85	17	119	NA	NA	0
52	84	2003	1	1	2	Sanchez, Marcelo	1	55	15	23	52.8	107.8	18	52.8	107.8	18	119	NA	NA	0
52	84	2003	1	1	2	Pinto, Ricardo	1	45	18	23	61.7	106.7	19	61.7	106.7	19	119	NA	NA	0
52	84	2003	1	1	2	Fruchtenicht, Jorge	1	45	18	23	43.45	88.45	20	43.45	88.45	20	119	NA	NA	0
52	84	2003	1	1	2	Lozada, Esteban	1	40	20	23	43.7	83.7	21	43.7	83.7	21	119	NA	NA	0
52	84	2003	1	1	2	Moviglia, Oscar	1	20	23	23	59.5	79.5	22	59.5	79.5	22	119	NA	NA	0
52	84	2003	1	1	2	Ramirez, Juan	1	60	13	23	5	65	23	5	65	23	119	NA	NA	0
53	85	2004	7	3	2	Giammichelli, Jose	1	70	3	11	83	153	1	83.3	153.3	2	112	3	-2	0
53	85	2004	7	3	2	Rojas, Ana Maria	2	77	2	11	72.63	149.63	2	77.5	154.5	1	112	1	1	3
53	85	2004	7	3	2	Cammarata, Adriana	2	80	1	11	66.95	146.95	3	67.45	147.45	3	112	2	1	3
53	85	2004	7	3	2	Prota, Carlos	1	65	4	11	74.1	139.1	4	75.6	140.6	4	112	4	0	0
53	85	2004	7	3	2	Roson, Maria	2	55	8	11	78.65	133.65	5	79.15	134.15	5	112	NA	NA	0
53	85	2004	7	3	2	Braghini, Alicia	2	58	6	11	71.8	129.8	6	75.8	133.8	6	112	NA	NA	0
53	85	2004	7	3	2	Llana, Gloria	2	40	10	11	82	122	7	82	122	7	112	NA	NA	0
53	85	2004	7	3	2	Mora, Fernando	1	63	5	11	54.48	117.48	8	57.82	120.82	8	112	NA	NA	0
53	85	2004	7	3	2	Koval, Amelia	2	51	9	11	65.15	116.15	9	65.15	116.15	9	112	NA	NA	0
53	85	2004	7	3	2	Ulloa, Angel	1	56	7	11	47.25	103.25	10	47.25	103.25	10	112	NA	NA	0
53	85	2004	7	3	2	Pineiro, Viviana	2	9	11	11	78.15	87.15	11	69.15	78.15	11	112	NA	NA	0
54	86	2003	1	15	2	Pandolfi, Maria	2	92	1	8	61.8	153.8	1	63.8	155.8	1	111	1	0	1
54	86	2003	1	15	2	Tortorola, Beatriz	2	65	2	8	64	129	2	73.5	138.5	2	111	2	0	0
54	86	2003	1	15	2	Luchino, Andres	1	45	8	8	83.5	128.5	3	79.5	124.5	4	111	4	-1	0
54	86	2003	1	15	2	Lugones, Alberto	1	55	3	8	67.5	122.5	4	72.5	127.5	3	111	3	1	0
54	86	2003	1	15	2	Cesano, Maria	2	50	4	8	68	118	5	68	118	5	111	5	0	0
54	86	2003	1	15	2	Casas, Juan	1	45	7	8	70.7	115.7	6	70.7	115.7	6	111	NA	NA	0
54	86	2003	1	15	2	Fruchtenicht, Jorge	1	50	4	8	65	115	7	65	115	7	111	NA	NA	0
54	86	2003	1	15	2	Sanchez Heredia, Seri	1	50	4	8	58.75	108.75	8	58.75	108.75	8	111	NA	NA	0
55	87	2004	9	3	2	Hergott, Oscar	1	80	3	21	79.25	159.25	1	NA	162.5	1	111	1	0	1
55	87	2004	9	3	2	Esmoris, Alejandro	1	85	1	21	66	151	2	NA	152	2	111	2	0	0
55	87	2004	9	3	2	Montanaro, Domingo	1	85	1	21	64.75	149.75	3	NA	149.75	3	111	3	0	0
55	87	2004	9	3	2	Castillo Lynch, Carlos	1	60	4	21	68	128	4	NA	128	11	111	NA	NA	0
55	87	2004	9	3	2	Ramos, Liliana	2	35	6	21	66	101	5	NA	141	4	111	4	1	0
55	87	2004	9	3	2	Obligado, Daniel	1	25	12	21	76	101	6	NA	139	5	111	5	1	0
55	87	2004	9	3	2	Garcia Wenk, Alfredo	1	30	8	21	69.5	99.5	7	NA	135.5	7	111	7	0	0
55	87	2004	9	3	2	Fernandez, Eduardo	1	35	6	21	63.75	98.75	8	NA	133.75	9	111	9	-1	0
55	87	2004	9	3	2	Baffigi, Gabriel	1	30	8	21	66.75	96.75	9	NA	136.75	6	111	6	3	0
55	87	2004	9	3	2	Faluccci, Julian	1	40	5	21	54	94	10	NA	134	8	111	8	2	0
55	87	2004	9	3	2	Garay, Guillermo	1	30	8	21	61	91	11	NA	127	13	111	NA	NA	0
55	87	2004	9	3	2	Paduczak, Sergio	1	25	12	21	65.25	90.25	12	NA	131.25	10	111	NA	NA	0
55	87	2004	9	3	2	Mainardi, Martin	1	30	8	21	60	90	13	NA	115	16	111	NA	NA	0
55	87	2004	9	3	2	Di Masi, Gerardo	1	15	17	21	72.5	87.5	14	NA	127.5	12	111	NA	NA	0
55	87	2004	9	3	2	Calitri, Olga	2	20	14	21	65	85	15	NA	117	15	111	NA	NA	0
55	87	2004	9	3	2	Santacroce, Carlos	1	20	14	21	64	84	16	NA	109	17	111	NA	NA	0
55	87	2004	9	3	2	Patanella, Patricia	2	20	14	21	63	83	17	NA	123	14	111	NA	NA	0

number	contest	year	court	provir	date	name	gender	exam_score	exam_rank	total	part	initial_qualif	qualif_id	initial_sum	initial_rank	sum_appeal	rank_appeal	ic	final_rank	variation	executive	exec_id	
55	87	2004	9	3	2	Tosi, Jorge	1	10	19	21	15	73	70	80	18	105	20	111	NA	NA	0	0	
55	87	2004	9	3	2	Radrizzani, Miguel	1	10	19	21	15	68	66	78	19	108	18	111	NA	NA	0	0	
55	87	2004	9	3	2	Rey Ordonez, Julio	1	10	19	21	15	66	66	76	20	106	19	111	NA	NA	0	0	
55	87	2004	9	3	2	Verrier, Cesar	1	15	17	21	21	42.25	42.25	57.25	21	87.25	21	111	NA	NA	0	0	
56	88	2003	1	1	2	Tortorola, Beatriz	2	96	1	15	15	73	73	169	1	81	1	119	1	0	1	3	
56	88	2003	1	1	2	Montanaro, Domingo	1	87	3	3	15	59.5	59.5	146.5	2	68.78	2	119	2	0	0	0	
56	88	2003	1	1	2	Basso, Sebastian	1	73	4	15	15	61	61	134	3	134	5	119	4	-1	0	0	
56	88	2003	1	1	2	Selser, Julio	1	68	9	15	15	63.5	63.5	131.5	4	79.5	3	119	NA	NA	0	0	
56	88	2003	1	1	2	Azzolin, Horacio	1	91	1	15	15	39.5	39.5	130.5	5	47.64	4	119	3	2	0	0	
56	88	2003	1	1	2	Becerra, Gustavo	1	71	7	15	15	58	58	129	6	58	6	119	5	1	0	0	
56	88	2003	1	1	2	Rodriguez, Sergio	1	72	5	15	15	56	56	128	7	56	7	119	NA	NA	0	0	
56	88	2003	1	1	2	Bayle, Jose	1	72	5	15	15	52.3	52.3	124.3	8	52.3	8	119	NA	NA	0	0	
56	88	2003	1	1	2	Candela, Walter	1	68	9	15	15	51.9	51.9	119.9	9	51.9	9	119	NA	NA	0	0	
56	88	2003	1	1	2	Fruchtenicht, Jorge	1	65	11	15	15	52	52	117	10	52	10	119	NA	NA	0	0	
56	88	2003	1	1	2	Riquert, Fabian	1	71	7	15	15	41.9	41.9	112.9	11	41.9	11	119	NA	NA	0	0	
56	88	2003	1	1	2	Moviglia, Oscar	1	54	12	15	15	57.5	57.5	111.5	12	57.5	12	119	NA	NA	0	0	
56	88	2003	1	1	2	Santacroce, Carlos	1	48	13	15	15	62	62	110	13	62	13	119	NA	NA	0	0	
56	88	2003	1	1	2	Bava, Martin	1	42	15	15	15	58.8	58.8	100.8	14	58.8	14	119	NA	NA	0	0	
56	88	2003	1	1	2	Sanchez, Marcelo	1	47	14	15	15	50.3	50.3	97.3	15	50.3	15	119	NA	NA	0	0	
57	89	2003	1	1	2	Ercolini, Julian	1	93	2	34	34	76.1	76.1	169.1	1	83.2	1	114	1	0	0	0	
57	89	2003	1	1	2	Sica, Jorge	1	86	10	34	34	78	78	164	2	79.5	2	114	3	-1	0	0	
57	89	2003	1	1	2	Culotta, Juan	1	90	3	34	34	69.6	69.6	159.6	3	75.5	2	114	2	1	2	3	
57	89	2003	1	1	2	Salas, Juan	1	90	3	34	34	69.5	69.5	159.5	4	69.5	5	114	NA	NA	0	0	
57	89	2003	1	1	2	Scotto, Mariano	1	90	3	34	34	67.5	67.5	157.5	5	72.15	4	114	4	1	0	0	
57	89	2003	1	1	2	Moramarc, Alejandro	1	90	3	34	34	65.4	65.4	155.4	6	67.4	7	114	NA	NA	0	0	
57	89	2003	1	1	2	Gonzalez Charvay, Ad	1	88	7	34	34	65.8	65.8	153.8	7	71.5	5	114	5	2	0	0	
57	89	2003	1	1	2	Passero, Marcelo	1	85	11	34	34	68.8	68.8	153.8	8	69.9	8	114	NA	NA	0	0	
57	89	2003	1	1	2	Grunberg, Adrian	1	85	11	34	34	62.08	62.08	147.08	9	64.96	9	114	NA	NA	0	0	
57	89	2003	1	1	2	Fernandez, Marcelo	1	80	13	34	34	63.9	63.9	143.9	10	63.9	12	114	NA	NA	0	0	
57	89	2003	1	1	2	Borinsky, Mariano	1	87	8	34	34	56	56	143	11	60.1	10	114	NA	NA	0	0	
57	89	2003	1	1	2	Bertuzzi, Pablo	1	87	8	34	34	54.6	54.6	141.6	12	54.6	15	114	NA	NA	0	0	
57	89	2003	1	1	2	Rodriguez, Sergio	1	76	15	34	34	65.15	65.15	141.15	13	65.15	16	114	NA	NA	0	0	
57	89	2003	1	1	2	Pinto, Ricardo	1	80	13	34	34	60.7	60.7	140.7	14	65.21	11	114	NA	NA	0	0	
57	89	2003	1	1	2	Costabel, Nestor	1	72	16	34	34	67	67	139	15	70.66	13	114	NA	NA	0	0	
57	89	2003	1	1	2	Dias, Horacio	1	60	25	34	34	78.3	78.3	138.3	16	78.3	17	114	NA	NA	0	0	
57	89	2003	1	1	2	Lafourcade, Raquel	2	72	16	34	34	65.2	65.2	137.2	17	66	138	18	114	NA	NA	0	0
57	89	2003	1	1	2	Cubelli, Jorge	1	63	20	34	34	71.5	71.5	134.5	18	71.5	21	114	NA	NA	0	0	
57	89	2003	1	1	2	Dilario, Elena	2	70	18	34	34	64.3	64.3	134.3	19	67.45	19	114	NA	NA	0	0	
57	89	2003	1	1	2	Azzolin, Horacio	1	94	1	34	34	39	39	133	20	47.72	14	114	NA	NA	0	0	
57	89	2003	1	1	2	Hergott, Oscar	1	54	28	34	34	77.5	77.5	131.5	21	81.5	20	114	NA	NA	0	0	
57	89	2003	1	1	2	Signori, Enrique	1	65	19	34	34	63	63	128	22	63	128	22	114	NA	NA	0	0
57	89	2003	1	1	2	Beron, Ezequiel	1	62	21	34	34	62.5	62.5	124.5	23	59.9	26	114	NA	NA	0	0	
57	89	2003	1	1	2	Gasipi, Pablo	1	55	27	34	34	69.2	69.2	124.2	24	69.2	23	114	NA	NA	0	0	
57	89	2003	1	1	2	Basso, Sebastian	1	58	26	34	34	65.8	65.8	123.8	25	65.8	24	114	NA	NA	0	0	
57	89	2003	1	1	2	Candela, Walter	1	62	21	34	34	57.04	57.04	119.04	26	60.67	25	114	NA	NA	0	0	
57	89	2003	1	1	2	Patanella, Patricia	2	51	29	34	34	66	66	117	27	70	121	27	114	NA	NA	0	0
57	89	2003	1	1	2	Selser, Julio	1	36	33	34	34	76.6	76.6	112.6	28	76.6	28	114	NA	NA	0	0	
57	89	2003	1	1	2	Mariluis, Delia	2	47	31	34	34	60.2	60.2	107.2	29	60.2	29	114	NA	NA	0	0	
57	89	2003	1	1	2	Llorens, Mariano	1	61	24	34	34	36	36	97	30	36	30	114	NA	NA	0	0	

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number	contest_year	count	provinc	date	name	gender	exam_score	exam_rank	total_part	initial_qualif	qualif_id	initial_sum	initial_rank	appeal_qualif	appeal_sum	appeal_rank	final_rank	rank_variation	executive	exec_id	
57	89	2003	1	1	2	Verrier, Cesar	1	45	32	34	47	8	92	31	94	31	114	NA	NA	0	
57	89	2003	1	1	2	Santacroce, Carlos	1	23	34	34	64	8	87	32	64	87	32	114	NA	NA	0
57	89	2003	1	1	2	Esteban, Gabriela	2	62	21	34	2	64	33	33	64	33	114	NA	NA	0	
57	89	2003	1	1	2	Presti, Daniel	1	51	29	34	3	54	34	34	54	34	114	NA	NA	0	
58	90	2003	1	1	2	Tortorola, Beatriz	2	100	1	30	77	9	177	1	83	183	1	111	1	0	
58	90	2003	1	1	2	Montano, Domingo	1	95	2	30	67.5	9	162.5	2	72.5	167.5	2	111	2	0	
58	90	2003	1	1	2	Poli, Carlos	1	85	5	30	71	9	156	3	72	157	4	111	4	-1	
58	90	2003	1	1	2	Armella, Luis	1	95	2	30	51.3	9	146.3	4	64	159	3	111	3	3	
58	90	2003	1	1	2	Arias Duval, Martin	1	70	6	30	69.8	9	139.8	5	73.8	143.8	5	111	5	0	
58	90	2003	1	1	2	Llobera, Hugo	1	50	9	30	86	9	136	6	88	138	6	111	NA	NA	
58	90	2003	1	1	2	Azzolin, Horacio	1	95	2	30	36.8	9	131.8	7	39.8	134.8	7	111	NA	NA	
58	90	2003	1	1	2	Basso, Sebastian	1	65	7	30	58.3	9	123.3	8	58.3	123.3	8	111	NA	NA	
58	90	2003	1	1	2	Rodriguez, Sergio	1	50	9	30	70.55	9	120.55	9	70.55	120.55	10	111	NA	NA	
58	90	2003	1	1	2	Patanella, Patricia	2	45	13	30	72	9	117	10	72	117	11	111	NA	NA	
58	90	2003	1	1	2	Sarlo, Ruben	1	30	22	30	85	9	115	11	85	115	12	111	NA	NA	
58	90	2003	1	1	2	Aristizabal, Maria	2	50	9	30	64.5	9	114.5	12	64.5	114.5	13	111	NA	NA	
58	90	2003	1	1	2	Goldberg, Marcelo	1	45	13	30	68	9	113	13	68	113	14	111	NA	NA	
58	90	2003	1	1	2	Di Matteo, Angel	1	35	18	30	76	9	111	14	86	121	9	111	NA	NA	
58	90	2003	1	1	2	Brola, Daniel	1	45	13	30	65.75	9	110.75	15	65.75	110.75	15	111	NA	NA	
58	90	2003	1	1	2	Borinsky, Mariano	1	50	9	30	58.75	9	108.75	16	58.75	108.75	16	111	NA	NA	
58	90	2003	1	1	2	Lozada, Esteban	1	60	8	30	46.5	9	106.5	17	46.5	106.5	17	111	NA	NA	
58	90	2003	1	1	2	Verrier, Cesar	1	40	16	30	63.5	9	103.5	18	63.5	103.5	18	111	NA	NA	
58	90	2003	1	1	2	Moramarc, Alejandro	1	40	16	30	63	9	103	19	63	103	19	111	NA	NA	
58	90	2003	1	1	2	Ojeda, Alberto	1	35	18	30	65.8	9	100.8	20	65.8	100.8	20	111	NA	NA	
58	90	2003	1	1	2	Gonzalez Elicabe, Arie	1	35	18	30	60.5	9	95.5	21	60.5	95.5	21	111	NA	NA	
58	90	2003	1	1	2	Roumieu, Felix	1	30	22	30	64	9	94	22	64	94	22	111	NA	NA	
58	90	2003	1	1	2	Rodriguez, Monica	2	30	22	30	62.05	9	92.05	23	62.05	92.05	23	111	NA	NA	
58	90	2003	1	1	2	Mariuis, Della	1	25	26	30	66	9	91	24	66	91	24	111	NA	NA	
58	90	2003	1	1	2	Bava, Martin	1	35	18	30	55	9	90	25	55	90	25	111	NA	NA	
58	90	2003	1	1	2	Schiavini, Sergio	1	25	26	30	63	9	88	26	63	88	26	111	NA	NA	
58	90	2003	1	1	2	Garcia de la Torre, Pal	1	20	28	30	65	9	85	27	65	85	27	111	NA	NA	
58	90	2003	1	1	2	Rodriguez, Ricardo	1	20	28	30	61	9	81	28	61	81	28	111	NA	NA	
58	90	2003	1	1	2	Becerra, Gustavo	1	30	22	30	50	9	80	29	50	80	29	111	NA	NA	
58	90	2003	1	1	2	Santacroce, Carlos	1	15	30	30	64	9	79	30	64	79	30	111	NA	NA	
59	91	2003	1	6	2	Tortorola, Beatriz	2	76.2	1	9	78.5	10	154.7	1	NA	154.7	1	119	1	0	
59	91	2003	1	6	2	Fresneda, Gustavo	1	58.3	3	9	77	10	135.3	2	NA	136.3	2	119	2	0	
59	91	2003	1	6	2	Rodriguez, Sergio	2	59.4	2	9	63	10	122.4	3	NA	122.4	3	119	3	0	
59	91	2003	1	6	2	Nirempinger, Zunilda	2	44.4	4	9	55.5	10	99.9	4	NA	101.9	4	119	4	0	
59	91	2003	1	6	2	Fruchtenicht, Jorge	1	36.3	6	9	57.3	10	93.6	5	NA	93.7	5	119	NA	NA	
59	91	2003	1	6	2	Bayle, Jose	1	41.05	5	9	46.4	10	87.45	6	NA	87.45	6	119	NA	NA	
59	91	2003	1	6	2	Verbeek, Carlos	1	20.4	9	9	63.5	10	83.9	7	NA	83.9	7	119	NA	NA	
59	91	2003	1	6	2	Caceres, Esteban	1	24.8	8	9	58.8	10	83.6	8	NA	83.6	8	119	NA	NA	
59	91	2003	1	6	2	Gimenez, Francisco	1	26.6	7	9	44.74	10	71.34	9	NA	70.95	9	119	NA	NA	
60	92	2003	2	7	2	Gutierrez, Jorge	1	59	2	7	73.61	11	132.61	1	73.61	132.61	1	114	1	0	
60	92	2003	2	7	2	Tortorola, Beatriz	2	29	6	7	68.35	11	97.35	2	73	102	4	114	4	-2	
60	92	2003	2	7	2	Suarez, Aldo	1	60	1	7	32.67	11	92.67	3	51.4	111.4	2	114	2	1	
60	92	2003	2	7	2	Bailaque, Marcelo	1	39	4	7	53.15	11	92.15	4	54.15	93.15	5	114	NA	NA	
60	92	2003	2	7	2	Baffigi, Gabriel	1	53	3	7	36.81	11	89.81	5	51	104	3	114	3	2	
60	92	2003	2	7	2	Seniow, Mirta	2	15	7	7	70	11	85	6	70	85	6	114	NA	NA	

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number	contest	year	court	provir	date	name	gender	exam_score	exam_rank	total_part	initial_qualif	qualif_id	initial_sum	initial_rank	appeal_qualif	appeal_sum	appeal_rank	ic	final_rank	variation	executive	exec_id
60	92	2003	2	7	2	Bayle, Jose	1	38	5	7	21.42	11	59.42	7	30.25	68.25	7	114	NA	NA	0	0
61	93	2004	9	9	2	Carbajal, Fernando	1	95	1	11	68.5	12	163.5	1	60.5	155.5	2	112	1	0	0	0
61	93	2004	9	9	2	Peralta, Carlos	1	85	3	11	65	12	150	2	71	156	1	112	2	0	0	0
61	93	2004	9	9	2	Garcia Wenk, Alfredo	1	60	9	11	88.25	12	148.25	3	88.25	148.25	3	112	3	0	1	3
61	93	2004	9	9	2	Gaynor, Eduardo	1	65	6	11	74	12	139	4	74	139	4	112	NA	NA	0	0
61	93	2004	9	9	2	Barcarolo, Maria	2	65	6	11	71	12	136	5	71	136	5	112	NA	NA	0	0
61	93	2004	9	9	2	Ojeda, Carlos	1	60	9	11	60	12	120	6	60	120	7	112	NA	NA	0	0
61	93	2004	9	9	2	Lopez, Neri	1	65	6	11	51.5	12	116.5	7	51.5	116.5	8	112	NA	NA	0	0
61	93	2004	9	9	2	Cacace, Gerardo	1	75	5	11	38.5	12	113.5	8	38.5	113.5	9	112	NA	NA	0	0
61	93	2004	9	9	2	Gaig, Alberto	1	90	2	11	23	12	113	9	31.75	121.75	6	112	NA	NA	0	0
61	93	2004	9	9	2	Santacroce, Carlos	1	40	11	11	69	12	109	10	70	110	10	112	NA	NA	0	0
61	93	2004	9	9	2	Dantiak, Edgar	1	80	4	11	28.55	12	108.55	11	28.55	108.55	11	112	NA	NA	0	0
62	95	2004	9	13	2	Bento, Walter	1	90	1	20	65.6	13	155.6	1	66.5	156.5	1	120	1	0	0	0
62	95	2004	9	13	2	Blanco, Maria	2	75	4	20	74	13	149	2	73	148	2	120	2	0	1	3
62	95	2004	9	13	2	Aragone, Alberto	1	75	4	20	73	13	148	3	72	147	3	120	3	0	0	0
62	95	2004	9	13	2	de la Reita, Maria	2	85	2	20	58	13	143	4	58.3	143.3	4	120	4	1	0	0
62	95	2004	9	13	2	Caunedo, Fernando	1	70	6	20	72.25	13	142.25	5	67.93	137.93	5	120	5	0	0	0
62	95	2004	9	13	2	Pina Garcia, Alejandro	1	60	7	20	64.75	13	124.75	6	64.75	124.75	6	120	6	0	0	0
62	95	2004	9	13	2	Jardel, Pablo	1	80	3	20	41.5	13	121.5	7	42.25	122.25	7	120	7	0	0	0
62	95	2004	9	13	2	Piccardo, Alfredo	1	55	10	20	66	13	121	8	66	121	8	120	NA	NA	0	0
62	95	2004	9	13	2	Garcia Wenk, Alfredo	1	45	13	20	72.5	13	117.5	9	75	120	9	120	NA	NA	0	0
62	95	2004	9	13	2	Tacca, Carlos	1	35	14	20	82.5	13	117.5	10	83.5	118.5	10	120	NA	NA	0	0
62	95	2004	9	13	2	Anzoategui, Javier	1	50	11	20	65.5	13	115.5	11	64.2	114.2	11	120	NA	NA	0	0
62	95	2004	9	13	2	Faluccci, Julian	1	57	8	20	54.5	13	111.5	12	50.71	107.71	12	120	NA	NA	0	0
62	95	2004	9	13	2	Grunberg, Adrian	1	50	11	20	58.5	13	108.5	13	55.52	105.52	13	120	NA	NA	0	0
62	95	2004	9	13	2	Arrabal, Olga	1	25	15	20	82	13	107	14	72	97	15	120	NA	NA	0	0
62	95	2004	9	13	2	Almeida, Alejandro	1	57	8	20	45.25	13	102.25	15	44.75	101.75	14	120	NA	NA	0	0
62	95	2004	9	13	2	Selser, Julio	1	20	16	20	74.5	13	94.5	16	74.5	94.5	17	120	NA	NA	0	0
62	95	2004	9	13	2	Lopez Meyer, Cesar	1	20	16	20	73.25	13	93.25	17	69.25	89.25	18	120	NA	NA	0	0
62	95	2004	9	13	2	Santacroce, Carlos	1	20	16	20	71	13	91	18	67	87	19	120	NA	NA	0	0
62	95	2004	9	13	2	Olguin, Francisco	1	20	16	20	64.75	13	84.75	19	75	95	16	120	NA	NA	0	0
62	95	2004	9	13	2	Montanaro, Domingo	1	10	20	20	58.75	13	68.75	20	54.65	64.65	20	120	NA	NA	0	0
63	97	2004	9	16	2	Marquez, Armando	1	95	2	12	86	14	181	1	86	181	1	111	1	0	1	3
63	97	2004	9	16	2	Sanchez, Fernando	1	93	3	12	82	14	175	2	84	177	2	111	2	0	0	0
63	97	2004	9	16	2	de la Rosa, Rafael	1	90	5	12	76	14	166	3	76	166	3	111	3	0	0	0
63	97	2004	9	16	2	Lopez Meyer, Cesar	1	85	6	12	69.25	14	154.25	4	69.25	154.25	5	111	NA	NA	0	0
63	97	2004	9	16	2	Silva, Alejandro	1	92	4	12	70.65	14	162.65	5	63.5	155.5	4	111	NA	NA	0	0
63	97	2004	9	16	2	Grunberg, Adrian	1	96	1	12	55.52	14	151.52	6	52.52	148.52	7	111	NA	NA	0	0
63	97	2004	9	16	2	Iribarren, Pablo	1	80	7	12	70.5	14	150.5	7	72	152	6	111	NA	NA	0	0
63	97	2004	9	16	2	Garcia, Maria del Carr	2	75	8	12	71	14	146	8	70	145	8	111	NA	NA	0	0
63	97	2004	9	16	2	Baffigi, Gabriel	1	70	9	12	70.5	14	140.5	9	67.5	137.5	9	111	NA	NA	0	0
63	97	2004	9	16	2	Garcia Wenk, Alfredo	1	55	11	12	76	14	131	10	75	130	10	111	NA	NA	0	0
63	97	2004	9	16	2	Piccardo, Alfredo	1	60	10	12	67	14	127	11	66	126	11	111	NA	NA	0	0
63	97	2004	9	16	2	Santacroce, Carlos	1	55	11	12	67	14	122	12	67	122	12	111	NA	NA	0	0
64	101	2004	2	21	2	Vidal, Elda	2	84	1	12	71.3	15	155.3	1	72.3	156.3	1	111	1	0	1	3
64	101	2004	2	21	2	Vazquez, Marcela	2	65	5	12	84.5	15	149.5	2	47.5	112.5	10	111	NA	NA	0	0
64	101	2004	2	21	2	Calvi, Patricia	2	63	6	12	80	15	143	3	81	144	11	111	4	-1	0	0
64	101	2004	2	21	2	Baffigi, Gabriel	1	79	2	12	61.2	15	140.2	4	62.2	141.2	3	111	2	2	0	0
64	101	2004	2	21	2	Moisa, Benjamin	1	72	3	12	67.25	15	139.25	5	68.25	140.25	4	111	3	2	0	0

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number	contest	year	court	provir	date	name	gender	exam_score	exam_rank	total_part	initial_qualif	qualif_id	initial_sum	initial_rank	appeal_qualif	appeal_sum	appeal_rank	ic	final_rank	variation	executive	exec_id
64	101	2004	2	21	2	Poli, Carlos	1	67	4	12	68.5	15	135.5	6	69.5	136.5	5	111	NA	NA	0	0
64	101	2004	2	21	2	Puccinelli, Oscar	1	53	10	12	82.5	15	135.5	7	78.95	131.95	8	111	NA	NA	0	0
64	101	2004	2	21	2	Bailaque, Marcelo	1	63	6	12	71	15	134	8	69	132	7	111	NA	NA	0	0
64	101	2004	2	21	2	Lugones, Alberto	1	50	12	12	78	15	128	9	82.25	132.25	6	111	NA	NA	0	0
64	101	2004	2	21	2	Piccardo, Alfredo	1	63	6	12	62	15	125	10	NA	NA	0	111	NA	NA	0	0
64	101	2004	2	21	2	Montanaro, Domingo	1	59	9	12	61.9	15	120.9	11	64.6	123.6	9	111	NA	NA	0	0
64	101	2004	2	21	2	Grau, Cesar	1	53	10	12	56.5	15	109.5	12	56.5	109.5	11	111	NA	NA	0	0
65	102	2005	2	14	2	Montanaro, Domingo	1	82	1	22	59.45	8	141.45	1	62.5	144.5	1	112	NA	NA	0	0
65	102	2005	2	14	2	Caceres, Ana	2	67	2	22	71	8	138	2	71	138	3	112	2	0	1	3
65	102	2005	2	14	2	Campitelli, Jorge	1	60	3	22	74.5	8	134.5	3	80	140	2	112	1	2	0	0
65	102	2005	2	14	2	Oliva, Juan	1	42	13	22	82.8	8	124.8	4	82.8	124.8	4	112	3	1	0	0
65	102	2005	2	14	2	Poli, Carlos	1	57	4	22	64.75	8	121.75	5	65.5	122.5	5	112	NA	NA	0	0
65	102	2005	2	14	2	Panza, Rodolfo	1	44	9	22	74.4	8	118.4	6	78.4	122.4	6	112	NA	NA	0	0
65	102	2005	2	14	2	Ojeda, Carlos	1	57	4	22	60	8	117	7	60	117	7	112	NA	NA	0	0
65	102	2005	2	14	2	Piccardo, Alfredo	1	49	6	22	66.25	8	115.25	8	NA	NA	0	112	NA	NA	0	0
65	102	2005	2	14	2	Moisa, Benjamin	1	49	6	22	65.25	8	114.25	9	65.95	114.95	8	112	NA	NA	0	0
65	102	2005	2	14	2	Zuetta, Selva	2	44	9	22	68	8	112	10	68	112	9	112	NA	NA	0	0
65	102	2005	2	14	2	Matiauda, Miguel	1	44	9	22	67	8	111	11	67	111	10	112	NA	NA	0	0
65	102	2005	2	14	2	Ziman, Nicolas	1	44	9	22	66	8	110	12	66	110	11	112	NA	NA	0	0
65	102	2005	2	14	2	Rebak, Roque	1	32	15	22	77.4	8	109.4	13	77.4	109.4	13	112	NA	NA	0	0
65	102	2005	2	14	2	Vencharutti, Rosanna	2	42	13	22	66.5	8	108.5	14	67.5	109.5	12	112	NA	NA	0	0
65	102	2005	2	14	2	Chavez, Ramon	1	32	15	22	70	8	102	15	70	102	14	112	NA	NA	0	0
65	102	2005	2	14	2	Esquivel, Carlos	1	24	19	22	73.3	8	97.3	16	73.3	97.3	15	112	NA	NA	0	0
65	102	2005	2	14	2	Verriet, Cesar	1	47	8	22	45.5	8	92.5	17	45.5	92.5	16	112	NA	NA	0	0
65	102	2005	2	14	2	Herter, Juan	1	24	19	22	68.5	8	92.5	18	68.5	92.5	17	112	NA	NA	0	0
65	102	2005	2	14	2	Farina, Nora	2	32	15	22	60	8	92	19	60	92	18	112	NA	NA	0	0
65	102	2005	2	14	2	Gonzalez, Miguel	1	24	19	22	66	8	90	20	66	90	19	112	NA	NA	0	0
65	102	2005	2	14	2	Costa, Graciela	2	10	22	22	68	8	78	21	68	78	20	112	NA	NA	0	0
65	102	2005	2	14	2	Rodriguez Gimenez, J.	1	25	18	22	35.5	8	60.5	22	35.5	60.5	21	112	NA	NA	0	0
66	103	2004	9	1	2	Fernandez, Eduardo	1	80	1	13	93	12	173	1	77.46	157.46	1	120	1	0	0	0
66	103	2004	9	1	2	Dias, Horacio	1	80	1	13	81.5	12	161.5	2	76.25	156.25	2	120	4	-2	0	0
66	103	2004	9	1	2	Compareid, Carlos	1	70	3	13	78	12	148	3	78	148	4	120	3	0	0	0
66	103	2004	9	1	2	Sagretti, Hector	1	70	3	13	77.05	12	147.05	4	79.5	149.5	3	120	2	2	3	3
66	103	2004	9	1	2	Yaji, Juan	1	55	6	13	80.4	12	135.4	5	80.8	135.8	5	120	NA	NA	0	0
66	103	2004	9	1	2	Garcia Wenk, Alfredo	1	40	8	13	88.25	12	128.25	6	76	116	9	120	NA	NA	0	0
66	103	2004	9	1	2	Montanaro, Domingo	1	65	5	13	60.35	12	125.35	7	65.65	130.65	6	120	NA	NA	0	0
66	103	2004	9	1	2	Desimone, Guillermo	1	35	11	13	89	12	124	8	82	117	8	120	NA	NA	0	0
66	103	2004	9	1	2	Quadrini, Guillermo	1	55	6	13	60	12	115	9	69	124	7	120	NA	NA	0	0
66	103	2004	9	1	2	Katok, Claudia	2	40	8	13	73.8	12	113.8	10	69.8	109.8	11	120	NA	NA	0	0
66	103	2004	9	1	2	Duran, Roberto	1	30	12	13	83.4	12	113.4	11	84.4	114.4	10	120	NA	NA	0	0
66	103	2004	9	1	2	Beron, Ezequiel	1	40	8	13	56.5	12	96.5	12	62.7	102.7	12	120	NA	NA	0	0
66	103	2004	9	1	2	Berrazal, Pablo	1	30	12	13	44.5	12	74.5	13	47.3	77.3	13	120	NA	NA	0	0
67	104	2004	1	13	2	Arrabal, Olga	2	90	2	10	86.5	16	176.5	1	90.75	180.75	1	119	1	0	1	3
67	104	2004	1	13	2	Castellanos, Alejandrc	1	95	1	10	67.5	16	162.5	2	72	167	2	119	2	0	0	0
67	104	2004	1	13	2	Martinez Peroni, Jose	1	70	4	10	92.5	16	162.5	3	95	165	3	119	3	0	0	0
67	104	2004	1	13	2	Montanaro, Domingo	1	70	4	10	68.05	16	138.05	4	68.05	138.05	4	119	NA	NA	0	0
67	104	2004	1	13	2	Poli, Carlos	1	70	4	10	63	16	133	5	64.5	134.5	5	119	NA	NA	0	0
67	104	2004	1	13	2	Terzi, Graciela	2	55	7	10	77.5	16	132.5	6	77.5	132.5	6	119	NA	NA	0	0
67	104	2004	1	13	2	Lago, Daniel	1	75	3	10	50.5	16	125.5	7	50.5	125.5	7	119	NA	NA	0	0

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number	contest	year	court	provir	date	name	gender	exam_score	exam_rank	total_part	initial_qualif	qualif_id	initial_sum	initial_rank	appeal_qualif	appeal_rank	sum_appeal	sum_appeal_rank	final_rank	rank_variation	executive	exec_id
67	104	2004	1	13	2	Pardo, Alfredo	1	45	9	10	74	119	8	119	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0
67	104	2004	1	13	2	Pena, Maria	2	45	9	10	73.2	16	118.2	9	69.2	114.2	9	119	NA	NA	0	0
67	104	2004	1	13	2	Verrier, Cesar	1	55	7	10	57.15	16	112.15	10	57.15	112.15	10	119	NA	NA	0	0
68	105	2005	1	12	2	Castellanos, Alejandro	1	90	1	11	56	13	146	1	70.5	160.5	1	120	1	0	0	0
68	105	2005	1	12	2	Montanaro, Domingo	1	70	2	11	74.5	13	144.5	2	76.85	146.85	2	120	NA	NA	0	0
68	105	2005	1	12	2	Stoller, Enrique	1	55	3	11	74	13	129	3	70.5	125.5	4	120	3	0	0	0
68	105	2005	1	12	2	Yoma, Jose	1	45	5	11	75	13	120	4	81	126	3	120	2	0	0	0
68	105	2005	1	12	2	Garzon, Mario	1	35	8	11	68	13	103	5	68	103	6	120	NA	NA	0	0
68	105	2005	1	12	2	Nieto Ortiz, Manuel	1	35	8	11	66	13	101	6	66	101	7	120	NA	NA	0	0
68	105	2005	1	12	2	Fruchtenicht, Jorge	1	45	5	11	52	13	97	7	54	99	8	120	NA	NA	0	0
68	105	2005	1	12	2	Herrera, Daniel	1	40	7	11	56.5	13	96.5	8	63.5	103.5	5	120	NA	4	3	3
68	105	2005	1	12	2	Alvarez, Jorge	1	55	3	11	40	13	95	9	40	95	9	120	NA	NA	0	0
68	105	2005	1	12	2	Godoy, Humberto	1	35	8	11	57	13	92	10	57	92	10	120	NA	NA	0	0
68	105	2005	1	12	2	Verrier, Cesar	1	20	11	11	54.35	13	74.35	11	54.35	74.35	11	120	NA	NA	0	0
69	106	2005	2	17	2	Ayala Flores, Maria	2	85	2	15	98	15	183	1	98	183	1	111	NA	NA	0	0
69	106	2005	2	17	2	Araoz Figueroa, Adolfo	1	95	1	15	63.5	15	158.5	2	63.5	158.5	2	111	1	1	0	0
69	106	2005	2	17	2	Loutayf Ranea, Robert	1	55	8	15	96	15	151	3	96	151	3	111	2	1	1	3
69	106	2005	2	17	2	Sola, Ernesto	1	80	3	15	63	15	143	4	63	143	4	111	NA	NA	0	0
69	106	2005	2	17	2	Bavio, Julio	1	70	4	15	69	15	139	5	70	140	5	111	4	1	0	0
69	106	2005	2	17	2	Villada, Jorge	1	60	6	15	77	15	137	6	77	137	6	111	3	3	3	3
69	106	2005	2	17	2	Cataldi, Maria	1	50	11	15	78	15	128	7	78	128	7	111	NA	NA	0	0
69	106	2005	2	17	2	Aguilar, Horacio	1	55	8	15	69.25	15	124.25	8	69.25	124.25	8	111	NA	NA	0	0
69	106	2005	2	17	2	Moisa, Benjamin	1	60	6	15	62.75	15	122.75	9	62.75	122.75	9	111	NA	NA	0	0
69	106	2005	2	17	2	Fleming, Abel	1	55	8	15	65.5	15	120.5	10	65.5	120.5	10	111	NA	NA	0	0
69	106	2005	2	17	2	Guzzo, Lucio	1	45	13	15	75.5	15	120.5	11	75.5	120.5	11	111	NA	NA	0	0
69	106	2005	2	17	2	Bomba Royo, Martin	1	70	4	15	42.7	15	112.7	12	42.7	112.7	12	111	NA	NA	0	0
69	106	2005	2	17	2	Piccardo, Alfredo	1	40	14	15	61	15	101	13	NA	NA	0	111	NA	NA	0	0
69	106	2005	2	17	2	Cardenas Ortiz, Maria	2	40	14	15	57.25	15	97.25	14	57.25	97.25	13	111	NA	NA	0	0
69	106	2005	2	17	2	Verrier, Cesar	1	50	11	15	42.8	15	92.8	15	42.8	92.8	14	111	NA	NA	0	0
70	108	2005	1	1	2	Forns, Martina	2	75	1	12	76.5	11	151.5	1	72.5	147.5	1	120	1	0	1	3
70	108	2005	1	1	2	Auge, Juan	1	70	2	12	72	11	142	2	74	144	2	120	2	0	0	0
70	108	2005	1	1	2	Poli, Carlos	1	60	3	12	69.5	11	129.5	3	73.5	133.5	3	120	3	0	0	0
70	108	2005	1	1	2	Sassi, Edgardo	1	55	5	12	71.25	11	126.25	4	74.7	129.7	4	120	NA	NA	0	0
70	108	2005	1	1	2	Espinola, Rafael	1	40	7	12	77	11	117	5	76	116	5	120	NA	NA	0	0
70	108	2005	1	1	2	Aristizabal, Maria	2	45	6	12	70	11	115	6	69.5	114.5	6	120	NA	NA	0	0
70	108	2005	1	1	2	Sallent, Adrian	1	60	3	12	52.75	11	112.75	7	53.25	113.25	7	120	NA	NA	0	0
70	108	2005	1	1	2	Gilligan, Miguel	1	20	11	12	85.5	11	105.5	8	86.5	106.5	8	120	NA	NA	0	0
70	108	2005	1	1	2	Verrier, Cesar	1	40	7	12	58.3	11	98.3	9	58.3	98.3	9	120	NA	NA	0	0
70	108	2005	1	1	2	Becerra, Gustavo	1	40	7	12	51	11	91	10	51	91	10	120	NA	NA	0	0
70	108	2005	1	1	2	Mariuis, Delia	2	20	11	12	65.5	11	85.5	11	65.5	85.5	11	120	NA	NA	0	0
70	108	2005	1	1	2	Maresca, Paulo	1	30	10	12	37.4	11	67.4	12	37.4	67.4	12	120	NA	NA	0	0
71	109	2005	1	1	2	Capparelli, Facundo	1	90	1	13	73	6	163	1	73	163	1	120	NA	NA	0	0
71	109	2005	1	1	2	Castellanos, Alejandro	1	80	2	13	69.7	6	149.7	2	73.5	153.5	2	120	1	1	1	3
71	109	2005	1	1	2	Fruchtenicht, Jorge	1	70	4	13	69	6	139	3	53.2	123.2	11	120	NA	NA	0	0
71	109	2005	1	1	2	Belforte, Eduardo	1	68	5	13	69.1	6	137.1	4	70.6	138.6	4	120	3	1	0	0
71	109	2005	1	1	2	Bertuzzi, Pablo	1	68	5	13	68.2	6	136.2	5	68.2	136.2	5	120	4	1	0	0
71	109	2005	1	1	2	Poli, Carlos	1	65	7	13	69.5	6	134.5	6	77.5	142.5	6	120	2	4	0	0
71	109	2005	1	1	2	Salas, Juan	1	60	8	13	73.25	6	133.25	7	73.25	133.25	6	120	5	2	0	0
71	109	2005	1	1	2	Moramarc, Alejandro	1	55	10	13	73.75	6	128.75	8	73.75	128.75	7	120	NA	NA	0	0

number	contest	year	court	provir	date	name	gender	exam_score	exam_rank	total	part	initial_qualif	qualif_id	initial_sum	initial_rank	appeal_qualif	appeal_sum	appeal_rank	appeal_ic	final_rank	variation	executive	exec_id
71	109	2005	1	1	2	Julian, Rafael	1	75	3	147.45	6	147.45	9	52.45	127.45	8	120	NA	NA	NA	0	0	
71	109	2005	1	1	2	Araoz de Lamadrid, O	1	55	10	124.4	6	124.4	10	71.4	126.4	9	120	NA	NA	NA	0	0	
71	109	2005	1	1	2	Vicente, Nelson	1	55	10	123.4	6	123.4	11	68.4	123.4	10	120	NA	NA	NA	0	0	
71	109	2005	1	1	2	Povina, Fernando	1	60	8	115.25	6	115.25	12	55.25	115.25	12	120	NA	NA	NA	0	0	
71	109	2005	1	1	2	Pradas, Rodolfo	1	45	13	79.5	6	79.5	13	34.5	79.5	13	120	NA	NA	NA	0	0	
72	110	2005	2	1	2	Aristuiz, Adolfo	1	40	10	140	14	140	1	100	140	1	119	1	119	1	0	0	
72	110	2005	2	1	2	Zristizabal, Maria	2	68	1	135.5	14	135.5	2	67.5	135.5	2	119	2	119	2	0	0	
72	110	2005	2	1	2	Compareid, Carlos	1	55	6	133	14	133	3	78	133	3	119	3	119	3	0	1	
72	110	2005	2	1	2	Dias, Horacio	1	60	5	132.25	14	132.25	4	72.25	132.25	4	119	NA	NA	NA	0	0	
72	110	2005	2	1	2	Poli, Carlos	1	67	2	129.5	14	129.5	5	62.5	129.5	5	119	4	119	4	1	0	
72	110	2005	2	1	2	Montanaro, Domingo	1	65	3	125.1	14	125.1	6	60.1	125.1	6	119	NA	NA	NA	0	0	
72	110	2005	2	1	2	Charlin, Jose	1	63	4	121.7	14	121.7	7	58.7	121.7	7	119	NA	NA	NA	0	0	
72	110	2005	2	1	2	Isauralde, Horacio	1	43	9	113	14	113	8	71	114	8	119	NA	NA	NA	0	0	
72	110	2005	2	1	2	Rodriguez Gimenez, Ji	1	45	8	98.5	14	98.5	9	53.5	98.5	9	119	NA	NA	NA	0	0	
72	110	2005	2	1	2	Becerra, Gustavo	1	55	6	96.5	14	96.5	10	41.5	96.5	10	119	NA	NA	NA	0	0	
72	110	2005	2	1	2	Santacroce, Carlos	1	27	11	86	14	86	11	59	86	11	119	NA	NA	NA	0	0	
73	111	2006	4	3	2	Gusman, Alfredo	1	86	1	177.95	9	177.95	1	74	160	2	119	2	119	2	-1	0	
73	111	2006	4	3	2	Vincenti, Rogelio	1	81	3	159.6	9	159.6	2	78.6	159.6	3	119	3	119	3	-1	0	
73	111	2006	4	3	2	Lanusse, Pedro	1	68	8	165.5	9	165.5	3	90.5	158.5	4	119	4	119	4	-1	0	
73	111	2006	4	3	2	Monti, Laura	2	68	9	163	9	163	4	90	158	5	119	NA	NA	NA	0	0	
73	111	2006	4	3	2	Fernandez, Sergio	1	84	2	159.2	9	159.2	5	78.2	162.2	1	119	1	119	1	4	3	
73	111	2006	4	3	2	Treacy, Guillermo	1	66	10	157.05	9	157.05	6	64.4	130.4	14	119	NA	NA	NA	0	0	
73	111	2006	4	3	2	Trionfetti, Victor	1	65	11	153	9	153	7	79	144	10	119	NA	NA	NA	0	0	
73	111	2006	4	3	2	Balbin, Carlos	1	54	14	153	9	153	8	93.5	147.5	7	119	NA	NA	NA	0	0	
73	111	2006	4	3	2	Corti, Horacio	1	53	15	149	9	149	9	79.25	132.25	12	119	NA	NA	NA	0	0	
73	111	2006	4	3	2	Otheguy, Osvaldo	1	57	13	149	9	149	10	92	149	6	119	NA	NA	NA	0	0	
73	111	2006	4	3	2	Mora, Roberto	1	71	4	146.8	9	146.8	11	74.8	145.8	9	119	NA	NA	NA	0	0	
73	111	2006	4	3	2	Do Pico, Clara	2	69	6	145	9	145	12	77	146	8	119	NA	NA	NA	0	0	
73	111	2006	4	3	2	Poli, Carlos	1	69	6	141.5	9	141.5	13	62	131	13	119	NA	NA	NA	0	0	
73	111	2006	4	3	2	Isasmendi, Armando	1	53	15	139	9	139	14	86	139	11	119	NA	NA	NA	0	0	
73	111	2006	4	3	2	Becerra, Gustavo	1	63	12	126	9	126	15	47	110	16	119	NA	NA	NA	0	0	
73	111	2006	4	3	2	Liberatori, Elena	2	44	17	125.2	9	125.2	16	81.2	125.2	15	119	NA	NA	NA	0	0	
73	111	2006	4	3	2	Liszczynky, Carlos	1	71	4	119.8	9	119.8	17	35.8	106.8	17	119	NA	NA	NA	0	0	
73	111	2006	4	3	2	Barraza, Javier	1	34	18	118.15	9	118.15	18	68	102	18	119	NA	NA	NA	0	0	
74	112	2005	1	1	2	Montanaro, Domingo	1	87	7	166.98	4	166.98	1	79.98	166.98	2	111	NA	NA	NA	0	0	
74	112	2005	1	1	2	Cavallini, Raul	1	96	2	166.5	4	166.5	2	70.5	166.5	4	111	3	111	3	-1	0	
74	112	2005	1	1	2	Arrollo Saigado, Sand	2	94	3	165.95	4	165.95	3	73.45	167.45	1	111	1	111	1	2	3	
74	112	2005	1	1	2	Salas, Juan	1	93	4	161.15	4	161.15	4	73.75	166.75	3	111	2	111	2	2	0	
74	112	2005	1	1	2	Llorens, Mariano	1	92	5	159.49	4	159.49	5	46	138	10	111	NA	NA	NA	0	0	
74	112	2005	1	1	2	Azzolin, Horacio	1	97	1	155.4	4	155.4	6	60.42	157.42	6	111	NA	NA	NA	0	0	
74	112	2005	1	1	2	Apolo, Jorge	1	75	9	155	4	155	7	85	160	5	111	4	111	4	3	0	
74	112	2005	1	1	2	Bertuzzi, Pablo	1	88	6	148.92	4	148.92	8	61.99	149.99	7	111	NA	NA	NA	0	0	
74	112	2005	1	1	2	Viera, Mauricio	1	75	9	142.55	4	142.55	9	67.55	142.55	9	111	NA	NA	NA	0	0	
74	112	2005	1	1	2	Passero, Marcelo	1	70	12	141.73	4	141.73	10	72.73	142.73	8	111	NA	NA	NA	0	0	
74	112	2005	1	1	2	Manson, Enrique	1	80	8	134.18	4	134.18	11	56.34	136.34	11	111	NA	NA	NA	0	0	
74	112	2005	1	1	2	Venditti, Walter	1	55	14	132.2	4	132.2	12	77.2	132.2	12	111	NA	NA	NA	0	0	
74	112	2005	1	1	2	Terrrosa, Alejandro	1	60	13	129.15	4	129.15	13	69.15	129.15	13	111	NA	NA	NA	0	0	
74	112	2005	1	1	2	Povina, Fernando	1	75	9	124.94	4	124.94	14	49.94	124.94	14	111	NA	NA	NA	0	0	
74	112	2005	1	1	2	Poli, Carlos	1	48	16	124	4	124	15	76	124	15	111	NA	NA	NA	0	0	

number	contest	year	court	provir	date	name	gender	exam_score	exam_rank	total	part	initial_qualif	qualif_id	initial_sum	initial_rank	appeal_qualif	appeal_sum	appeal_rank	final_rank	rank_variation	executive	exec_id
74	112	2005	1	1	2	Culotta, Juan	1	49	15	31	31	79	4	128	16	79	128	16	111	NA	0	0
74	112	2005	1	2	Barroetavena, Diego	1	45	21	31	31	78.5	4	123.5	17	78.5	123.5	17	111	NA	0	0	0
74	112	2005	1	1	2	Ramos Padilla, Juan	1	46	20	31	73.5	4	119.5	18	73.5	119.5	18	111	NA	0	0	0
74	112	2005	1	1	2	Laino Dondiz, Magdalk	2	47	18	31	72.4	4	119.4	19	72.4	119.4	19	111	NA	0	0	0
74	112	2005	1	1	2	Dilario, Elena	2	45	21	31	72.73	4	117.73	20	72.73	117.73	20	111	NA	0	0	0
74	112	2005	1	1	2	Beron, Ezequiel	1	47	18	31	69.5	4	116.5	21	69.5	116.5	21	111	NA	0	0	0
74	112	2005	1	1	2	Sica, Jorge	1	42	24	31	74	4	116	22	74	116	22	111	NA	0	0	0
74	112	2005	1	1	2	Mariuis, Delia	2	40	25	31	75	4	115	23	75	115	23	111	NA	0	0	0
74	112	2005	1	1	2	Gonzalez Charvav, Ad	1	38	27	31	74.15	4	112.15	24	74.15	112.15	24	111	NA	0	0	0
74	112	2005	1	1	2	Araoz de Lamadrid, O	1	45	21	31	67.07	4	112.07	25	67.07	112.07	25	111	NA	0	0	0
74	112	2005	1	1	2	Perez, Norberto	1	30	29	31	74	4	104	26	74	104	26	111	NA	0	0	0
74	112	2005	1	1	2	Ramos, Sebastian	1	40	25	31	61.2	4	101.2	27	64.2	104.2	26	111	NA	0	0	0
74	112	2005	1	1	2	Verrier, Cesar	1	30	29	31	67.5	4	97.5	28	67.5	97.5	28	111	NA	0	0	0
74	112	2005	1	1	2	Nogales, Eduardo	1	35	28	31	57.9	4	92.9	29	57.9	92.9	29	111	NA	0	0	0
74	112	2005	1	1	2	Martinez Frugoni, Carl	1	20	31	31	71.75	4	91.75	30	71.75	91.75	30	111	NA	0	0	0
74	112	2005	1	1	2	Sosa, Maria	2	48	16	31	19.5	4	67.5	31	19.5	67.5	31	111	NA	0	0	0
75	114	2005	2	4	2	Sanchez Torres, Abel	1	89	1	11	89	5	178	1	87.8	176.8	1	112	1	0	1	3
75	114	2005	2	4	2	Altamira, Raul	1	63	7	11	91	5	154	2	96	159	2	112	2	0	0	0
75	114	2005	2	4	2	del Barco, Alipio	1	73	2	11	79	5	152	3	79	152	3	112	NA	NA	0	0
75	114	2005	2	4	2	Sanchez Torres, Julio	1	62	9	11	88	5	150	4	89	151	5	112	NA	NA	0	0
75	114	2005	2	4	2	Arrieta, Marcelo	1	63	7	11	83.6	5	146.6	5	83.6	146.6	6	112	NA	NA	0	0
75	114	2005	2	4	2	Moisa, Benjamin	1	72	4	11	71.75	5	143.75	6	76.75	148.75	7	112	NA	NA	0	0
75	114	2005	2	4	2	Tinti, Guillermo	1	73	2	11	70	5	143	7	79	152	3	112	3	4	0	0
75	114	2005	2	4	2	Martinez, Hector	1	67	5	11	71.8	5	138.8	8	71.8	138.8	8	112	NA	NA	0	0
75	114	2005	2	4	2	Ussher, Gustavo	1	65	6	11	67.5	5	132.5	9	67.5	132.5	9	112	NA	NA	0	0
75	114	2005	2	4	2	Roldan, Martin	1	61	10	11	21	5	82	10	21	82	10	112	NA	NA	0	0
75	114	2005	2	4	2	Posse, Francisco	1	30	11	11	35.5	5	65.5	11	35.5	65.5	11	112	NA	NA	0	0
76	115	2005	9	22	2	Tuppo, Hernan	1	80	1	19	66	13	146	1	66	146	1	120	1	0	0	0
76	115	2005	9	22	2	Ruiz Alvelda, Guillem	1	60	2	19	63.5	13	123.5	2	63.5	123.5	2	120	4	-2	0	0
76	115	2005	9	22	2	Turk, Cesar	1	50	3	19	69.25	13	119.25	3	67.25	117.25	3	120	NA	NA	0	0
76	115	2005	9	22	2	Cipolatti, Omar	1	40	5	19	78.5	13	118.5	4	74.5	114.5	6	120	NA	NA	0	0
76	115	2005	9	22	2	Belforte, Eduardo	1	50	3	19	65	13	115	5	65	115	5	120	3	2	0	0
76	115	2005	9	22	2	Diaz, Federico	1	30	8	19	85	13	115	6	83	113	7	120	NA	NA	0	0
76	115	2005	9	22	2	Pravia, Alberto	1	40	5	19	71.5	13	111.5	7	75.75	115.75	4	120	2	5	3	3
76	115	2005	9	22	2	Juarez, Raul	1	30	8	19	71	13	101	8	71	101	9	120	NA	NA	0	0
76	115	2005	9	22	2	Viana, Graciela	2	40	5	19	59.25	13	99.25	9	66.75	106.75	8	120	NA	NA	0	0
76	115	2005	9	22	2	Noli, Maria	2	10	15	19	84	13	94	10	84	94	10	120	NA	NA	0	0
76	115	2005	9	22	2	Lindow, Isabel	2	20	11	19	71	13	91	11	71	91	11	120	NA	NA	0	0
76	115	2005	9	22	2	Cornet, Ramon	1	20	11	19	65.75	13	85.75	12	66.75	86.75	12	120	NA	NA	0	0
76	115	2005	9	22	2	Luna, Lorna	2	10	15	19	73	13	83	13	73	83	13	120	NA	NA	0	0
76	115	2005	9	22	2	Zurita, Marquesa	2	10	15	19	73	13	83	14	73	83	14	120	NA	NA	0	0
76	115	2005	9	22	2	Vale, Eva	2	10	15	19	70.75	13	80.75	15	70.75	80.75	15	120	NA	NA	0	0
76	115	2005	9	22	2	Bothamley, Federico	1	30	8	19	41.25	13	71.25	16	41.25	71.25	16	120	NA	NA	0	0
76	115	2005	9	22	2	Velarde, carlos	1	10	15	19	60.25	13	70.25	17	60.25	70.25	17	120	NA	NA	0	0
76	115	2005	9	22	2	Maud, Ana	2	20	11	19	50	13	70	18	50	70	18	120	NA	NA	0	0
76	115	2005	9	22	2	Curá, Walter	1	20	11	19	42.5	13	62.5	19	42.5	62.5	19	120	NA	NA	0	0
77	116	2005	9	23	2	Jimenez, Luis	1	85	4	12	79	14	164	1	82	167	2	111	2	-1	1	3
77	116	2005	9	23	2	Quadri, Guillermo	1	95	1	12	68	14	163	2	72.25	167.25	1	111	1	1	0	0
77	116	2005	9	23	2	Maino, Fernando	1	80	5	12	66.4	14	146.4	3	67	147	4	111	4	-1	0	0

number	contest	year	court	provir	date	name	gender	exam_score	exam_rank	total_part	initial_qualif	qualif_id	initial_sum	initial_rank	appeal_qualif	appeal_rank	sum_appeal	sum_appeal_rank	final_rank	rank_variation	executive	exec_id
77	116	2005	9	23	2	Belforte, Eduardo	1	95	1	12	47.35	14	142.35	4	53.65	148.65	3	111	3	1	0	0
77	116	2005	9	23	2	Bertuzzi, Pablo	1	90	3	12	46	14	136	5	51.5	141.5	5	111	NA	NA	0	0
77	116	2005	9	23	2	Juarez, Raul	1	70	6	12	63	14	133	6	63	133	6	111	NA	NA	0	0
77	116	2005	9	23	2	Baffigi, Gabriel	1	50	8	12	70.25	14	120.25	7	70.25	120.25	7	111	NA	NA	0	0
77	116	2005	9	23	2	Poli, Carlos	1	50	8	12	58.9	14	108.9	8	58.9	108.9	8	111	NA	NA	0	0
77	116	2005	9	23	2	Zappatini, Oscar	1	35	10	12	73	14	108	9	73	108	9	111	NA	NA	0	0
77	116	2005	9	23	2	Reyes, Eduardo	1	35	10	12	71	14	106	10	71	106	10	111	NA	NA	0	0
77	116	2005	9	23	2	Lozada, Esteban	1	70	6	12	32.2	14	102.2	11	34.2	104.2	11	111	NA	NA	0	0
77	116	2005	9	23	2	Ruiz, Daniel	1	35	10	12	63.2	14	98.2	12	63.2	98.2	12	111	NA	NA	0	0
78	117	2005	3	3	2	Allan, Rita	2	75	6	20	81.85	12	156.85	2	82.5	157.5	1	112	1	1	1	3
78	117	2005	3	3	2	Gilardi, Cecilia	2	70	8	20	81.8	12	151.8	4	81.8	151.8	2	112	3	1	0	0
78	117	2005	3	3	2	Dane, Laura	2	80	2	20	72.25	12	152.25	3	71.5	151.5	3	112	NA	NA	0	0
78	117	2005	3	3	2	Biotti, Maria	2	70	8	20	81.2	12	151.2	5	81.2	151.2	4	112	2	3	0	0
78	117	2005	3	3	2	Lavie Pico, Enrique	1	75	6	20	73.5	12	148.5	7	75.5	150.5	5	112	4	3	2	3
78	117	2005	3	3	2	Manetti, Adriana	2	70	8	20	75.5	12	145.5	10	80.5	150.5	6	112	NA	NA	0	0
78	117	2005	3	3	2	Schafrik, Fabiana	2	60	18	20	78.5	12	138.5	12	89	149	7	112	NA	NA	0	0
78	117	2005	3	3	2	Poli, Carlos	1	80	2	20	66.5	12	146.5	8	68.5	148.5	8	112	NA	NA	0	0
78	117	2005	3	3	2	Barraza, Javier	1	65	13	20	93	12	158	1	80.75	145.75	9	112	NA	NA	0	0
78	117	2005	3	3	2	Villarruel, Maria	2	80	2	20	65.65	12	145.65	9	64.65	144.65	10	112	NA	NA	0	0
78	117	2005	3	3	2	Seijas, Gabriela	2	85	1	20	66.1	12	151.1	6	59.1	144.1	11	112	NA	NA	0	0
78	117	2005	3	3	2	Cardenas, Juan	1	65	13	20	79	12	144	11	78	143	12	112	NA	NA	0	0
78	117	2005	3	3	2	Loizaga, Maria	2	70	8	20	62.8	12	132.8	13	62.8	132.8	13	112	NA	NA	0	0
78	117	2005	3	3	2	Rota, Patricia	2	80	2	20	50.95	12	130.95	14	50.5	130.5	14	112	NA	NA	0	0
78	117	2005	3	3	2	Geroldi, Viviana	2	65	13	20	60	12	125	15	60	125	15	112	NA	NA	0	0
78	117	2005	3	3	2	Torres, Ismael	1	40	20	20	83.45	12	123.45	16	83.45	123.45	16	112	NA	NA	0	0
78	117	2005	3	3	2	Ulloa Franco, Angel	1	70	8	20	51.25	12	121.25	17	51.25	121.25	17	112	NA	NA	0	0
78	117	2005	3	3	2	Pico Terrero, Javier	1	65	13	20	40	12	105	20	47.8	112.8	18	112	NA	NA	0	0
78	117	2005	3	3	2	Napoli, Sergio	1	60	18	20	49.95	12	109.95	19	51.95	111.95	19	112	NA	NA	0	0
78	117	2005	3	3	2	Liszczynski, Carlos	1	65	13	20	45	12	110	18	45	110	20	112	NA	NA	0	0
79	118	2005	1	4	2	Valentinuzzi, Oscar	1	58	7	10	81	10	139	1	82	140	1	112	1	0	1	3
79	118	2005	1	4	2	Martinez, Hector	1	63	4	10	72	10	135	2	72	135	2	112	NA	NA	0	0
79	118	2005	1	4	2	Posse, Francisco	1	78	1	10	54.8	10	132.8	3	54.8	132.8	5	112	2	1	0	0
79	118	2005	1	4	2	Belforte, Eduardo	1	67	3	10	65.6	10	132.6	4	66.6	133.6	4	112	3	1	0	0
79	118	2005	1	4	2	Fauda, Maria	2	68	2	10	62.9	10	130.9	5	65.9	133.9	3	112	NA	NA	0	0
79	118	2005	1	4	2	Roldan, Martin	1	61	5	10	58	10	119	6	58	119	6	112	4	2	0	0
79	118	2005	1	4	2	Garzon, Mario	1	46	10	10	68.45	10	114.45	7	70.2	116.2	9	112	NA	NA	0	0
79	118	2005	1	4	2	Johnson, Jorge	1	48	9	10	64	10	112	8	71	119	7	112	NA	NA	0	0
79	118	2005	1	4	2	Zenere, Gisela	2	51	8	10	59	10	110	9	67	118	8	112	NA	NA	0	0
79	118	2005	1	4	2	Becerra, Gustavo	1	59	6	10	43.5	10	102.5	10	43.5	102.5	10	112	NA	NA	0	0
80	119	2005	8	3	2	Maza, Miguel	1	85	1	10	93	10	178	1	91	176	1	119	1	0	0	0
80	119	2005	8	3	2	Prota, Carlos	1	70	3	10	72.9	10	142.9	2	74	144	2	119	2	0	0	0
80	119	2005	8	3	2	Gusman, Alfredo	1	85	1	10	57	10	142	3	58	143	3	119	4	-1	0	0
80	119	2005	8	3	2	Dorado, Nora	1	70	3	10	70	10	140	4	73	143	4	119	3	1	3	3
80	119	2005	8	3	2	Milano, Rodolfo	1	40	8	10	72.9	10	112.9	5	75.4	115.4	5	119	NA	NA	0	0
80	119	2005	8	3	2	de la Torre, Francisco	1	45	6	10	67.25	10	112.25	6	69.05	114.05	6	119	NA	NA	0	0
80	119	2005	8	3	2	Braghini, Alicia	2	45	6	10	66.3	10	111.3	7	67.25	112.25	7	119	NA	NA	0	0
80	119	2005	8	3	2	Santana, Gabriel	1	55	5	10	54.75	10	109.75	8	54.75	109.75	8	119	NA	NA	0	0
80	119	2005	8	3	2	Becerra, Gustavo	1	40	8	10	36.25	10	76.25	9	36.25	76.25	9	119	NA	NA	0	0
80	119	2005	8	3	2	Ulloa, Angel	1	35	10	10	38	10	73	10	38	73	10	119	NA	NA	0	0

Appendix A

number	contest	year	court	provir	date	name	gender	exam_score	exam_rank	total_part	initial_qualif	qualif_id	initial_sum	initial_rank	appeal_qualif	appeal_sum	appeal_rank	appeal_ic	final_rank	rank_variation	executive	exec_id
81	121	2005	9	3	2	Obligado, Daniel	1	70	5	19	86	15	156	1	86	156	1	120	1	0	1	3
81	121	2005	9	3	2	Panelo, Julio	1	70	5	19	78	15	148	2	81	151	4	120	4	-2	3	3
81	121	2005	9	3	2	Rizzi, Luis	1	77	2	19	70	15	147	3	77.8	154.8	3	120	3	0	0	0
81	121	2005	9	3	2	Duran, Roberto	1	62	11	19	85	15	147	3	95	157	2	120	2	1	0	0
81	121	2005	9	3	2	Bertola, Maria	2	65	10	19	79	15	144	5	84	149	5	120	NA	NA	0	0
81	121	2005	9	3	2	Ramos, Liliana	2	66	8	19	77	15	143	6	77	143	7	120	NA	NA	0	0
81	121	2005	9	3	2	Cavallini, Raul	1	70	5	19	70.5	15	140.5	7	70.5	140.5	9	120	NA	NA	0	0
81	121	2005	9	3	2	Grunberg, Adrian	1	88	1	19	51.5	15	139.5	8	57.25	145.25	6	120	NA	NA	0	0
81	121	2005	9	3	2	Belforte, Eduardo	1	76	3	19	63.5	15	139.5	9	66.2	142.2	8	120	NA	NA	0	0
81	121	2005	9	3	2	Desimone, Guillermo	1	59	15	19	79	15	138	10	79	138	11	120	NA	NA	0	0
81	121	2005	9	3	2	Poli, Carlos	2	60	12	19	74	15	134	11	76	136	12	120	NA	NA	0	0
81	121	2005	9	3	2	Pallioti, Adriana	2	66	8	19	67	15	133	12	72	138	10	120	NA	NA	0	0
81	121	2005	9	3	2	Lopez Iniguez, Maria	2	75	4	19	54	15	129	13	50.5	125.5	13	120	NA	NA	0	0
81	121	2005	9	3	2	Schwab, Martin	1	54	16	19	71	15	125	14	71.5	125.5	14	120	NA	NA	0	0
81	121	2005	9	3	2	Paz, Marta	2	40	17	19	84	15	124	15	84	124	15	120	NA	NA	0	0
81	121	2005	9	3	2	Falucci, Julian	1	60	12	19	58.5	15	118.5	16	58.5	118.5	16	120	NA	NA	0	0
81	121	2005	9	3	2	Lopez, Susana	2	40	17	19	77	15	117	17	77	117	17	120	NA	NA	0	0
81	121	2005	9	3	2	Bertuzzi, Pablo	1	60	12	19	56	15	116	18	56	116	18	120	NA	NA	0	0
81	121	2005	9	3	2	Patanello, Patricia	2	40	17	19	70	15	110	19	70	110	19	120	NA	NA	0	0
82	122	2006	9	9	2	Belforte, Eduardo	1	90	1	14	80.95	9	170.95	1	58	148	1	111	1	0	1	3
82	122	2006	9	9	2	Carbajal, Fernando	1	80	3	14	79.5	9	159.5	2	65.5	145.5	3	111	3	-1	0	0
82	122	2006	9	9	2	Tuppo, Hernan	1	80	3	14	70	9	150	3	66	146	2	111	2	1	0	0
82	122	2006	9	9	2	Cacace, Gerardo	1	85	2	14	63.15	9	148.15	4	43.5	128.5	8	111	NA	NA	0	0
82	122	2006	9	9	2	Ontiveros, Carlos	1	60	6	14	87.5	9	147.5	5	85.5	145.5	4	111	NA	NA	0	0
82	122	2006	9	9	2	Ojeda, Carlos	1	60	6	14	77	9	137	6	71	131	6	111	5	1	0	0
82	122	2006	9	9	2	Alonso, Daniel	1	60	6	14	77	9	137	7	69.5	129.5	7	111	NA	NA	0	0
82	122	2006	9	9	2	Boonman, Vanessa	2	75	5	14	57.3	9	132.3	8	56.3	131.3	5	111	4	4	0	0
82	122	2006	9	9	2	Barcarolo, Maria	2	50	10	14	76	9	126	9	74	124	9	111	NA	NA	0	0
82	122	2006	9	9	2	Mierrez, Jorge	1	55	9	14	66	9	121	10	42.25	97.25	12	111	NA	NA	0	0
82	122	2006	9	9	2	Alvarino, Timoteo	1	40	13	14	71	9	111	11	69	109	11	111	NA	NA	0	0
82	122	2006	9	9	2	Gonzalez Costa, Lilian	2	40	13	14	65	9	105	12	72	112	10	111	NA	NA	0	0
82	122	2006	9	9	2	Fernandez Bedoya, Ar	1	50	10	14	44	9	94	13	37.25	87.25	13	111	NA	NA	0	0
82	122	2006	9	9	2	Erguay, Clarivel	2	50	10	14	25.65	9	75.65	14	36.75	86.75	14	111	NA	NA	0	0
83	123	2006	1	21	2	Sutter, German	1	96	1	17	78.85	5	174.85	1	78.85	174.85	1	119	1	0	0	0
83	123	2006	1	21	2	Vera Barros, Carlos	1	91	2	17	78.8	5	169.8	2	NA	NA	0	119	NA	NA	0	0
83	123	2006	1	21	2	Salas, Juan	1	89	5	17	75.25	5	164.25	3	75.25	164.25	2	119	2	1	0	0
83	123	2006	1	21	2	Belforte, Eduardo	1	90	3	17	70.15	5	160.15	4	68.65	158.65	4	119	3	1	0	0
83	123	2006	1	21	2	Bailaque, Marcelo	1	90	3	17	70	5	160	5	70	160	3	119	4	1	2	3
83	123	2006	1	21	2	Gambacorta, Mario	1	84	7	17	67.65	5	151.65	6	67.65	151.65	5	119	5	1	0	0
83	123	2006	1	21	2	Abasolo, Miguel	1	70	10	17	81	5	151	7	81	151	6	119	NA	NA	0	0
83	123	2006	1	21	2	Bottazzi, Juan	1	85	6	17	65	5	150	8	65	150	7	119	NA	NA	0	0
83	123	2006	1	21	2	Cristofani, Gustavo	1	80	9	17	67.75	5	147.75	9	67.75	147.75	8	119	NA	NA	0	0
83	123	2006	1	21	2	Angelini, Roberto	2	83	8	17	63.5	5	146.5	10	63.5	146.5	9	119	NA	NA	0	0
83	123	2006	1	21	2	Patanello, Patricia	2	60	14	17	69	5	129	11	69	129	10	119	NA	NA	0	0
83	123	2006	1	21	2	Candiotti, Jose	1	65	11	17	55	5	120	12	55	120	11	119	NA	NA	0	0
83	123	2006	1	21	2	Fruchtenicht, Jorge	1	65	11	17	54.2	5	119.2	13	54.2	119.2	12	119	NA	NA	0	0
83	123	2006	1	21	2	Zapata, Felicia	2	32	17	17	74	5	106	14	74	106	13	119	NA	NA	0	0
83	123	2006	1	21	2	Vazquez, Marcela	2	55	15	17	50.9	5	105.9	15	50.9	105.9	14	119	NA	NA	0	0
83	123	2006	1	21	2	Martin, Sergio	1	65	11	17	6.3	5	71.3	16	6.3	71.3	15	119	NA	NA	0	0

number	contest	year	court	provir	date	name	gender	exam_score	exam_rank	total_part	initial_qualif	qualif_id	initial_sum	initial_rank	appeal_qualif	appeal_rank	sum_appeal	sum_appeal_rank	ic_final	rank_variation	executive	exec_id
83	123	2006	1	21	2	Villatte, Adolfo	1	50	16	17	5.8	5	55.8	17	5.8	16	55.8	16	119	NA	0	0
84	126	2005	2	5	2	Aromi, Gabriela	2	70	3	28	72.5	14	142.5	1	72.2	1	142.2	1	111	1	0	0
84	126	2005	2	5	2	Oliva, Juan	1	55	11	28	81.8	14	136.8	2	82.8	4	137.8	4	111	NA	0	0
84	126	2005	2	5	2	Gonzalez, Ramon	1	57	10	28	77.05	14	134.05	3	77.05	6	134.05	6	111	3	0	1
84	126	2005	2	5	2	Altabe, Marta	2	61	7	28	72.95	14	133.95	4	80.75	2	141.75	2	111	2	0	0
84	126	2005	2	5	2	Alonso, Daniel	1	64	4	28	67.4	14	131.4	5	69.4	7	133.4	7	111	6	-1	0
84	126	2005	2	5	2	Alegre, Juan	1	45	15	28	85	14	130	6	94	3	139	3	111	5	0	0
84	126	2005	2	5	2	Ojeda, Carlos	1	61	7	28	68	14	129	7	71	8	132	8	111	NA	0	0
84	126	2005	2	5	2	Sierra, Maria Eugenia	2	47	13	28	80	14	127	8	80	10	127	10	111	NA	0	0
84	126	2005	2	5	2	Belforte, Eduardo	1	74	1	28	51.46	14	125.46	9	55.21	129.21	9	111	NA	NA	0	0
84	126	2005	2	5	2	Lozano, Raul	1	43	20	28	77.8	14	120.8	10	80.8	123.8	11	111	NA	NA	0	0
84	126	2005	2	5	2	Castillo, Ramon	1	60	9	28	55	14	115	11	55	115	15	111	NA	NA	0	0
84	126	2005	2	5	2	Sotelo, Mirta	2	42	21	28	70.3	14	112.3	12	94	136	5	111	4	8	3	3
84	126	2005	2	5	2	Sarmiento, Maria	2	73	2	28	39.25	14	112.25	13	50	123	12	111	NA	NA	0	0
84	126	2005	2	5	2	Floriani, Aida	2	45	15	28	66	14	111	14	66	111	17	111	NA	NA	0	0
84	126	2005	2	5	2	Macci, Stella Maris	2	44	19	28	66.8	14	110.8	15	66.8	110.8	18	111	NA	NA	0	0
84	126	2005	2	5	2	Ceroleni, Fermin	1	45	15	28	65.2	14	110.2	16	74.5	119.5	13	111	NA	NA	0	0
84	126	2005	2	5	2	Goitia, Rosita	2	45	15	28	65.2	14	110.2	17	67.2	112.2	16	111	NA	NA	0	0
84	126	2005	2	5	2	Alderete, Fernando	1	37	26	28	71.4	14	108.4	18	71.4	108.4	19	111	NA	NA	0	0
84	126	2005	2	5	2	Lopez, Oscar	1	41	22	28	67	14	108	19	67	108	20	111	NA	NA	0	0
84	126	2005	2	5	2	Avalos, Guillermo	1	41	22	28	66	14	107	20	66	107	21	111	NA	NA	0	0
84	126	2005	2	5	2	Rebak, Roque	1	40	24	28	65.8	14	105.8	21	77.4	117.4	14	111	NA	NA	0	0
84	126	2005	2	5	2	Cacace, Gerardo	1	62	6	28	37.5	14	99.5	22	43.5	105.5	22	111	NA	NA	0	0
84	126	2005	2	5	2	Rossi, Rosa	2	39	25	28	56	14	95	23	56	95	24	111	NA	NA	0	0
84	126	2005	2	5	2	Garcia, Sandra	2	63	5	28	27.75	14	90.75	24	36	99	23	111	NA	NA	0	0
84	126	2005	2	5	2	Fasola, Susana	2	30	28	28	57.7	14	87.7	25	57.7	87.7	25	111	NA	NA	0	0
84	126	2005	2	5	2	Garcia, Patricia	2	52	12	28	26.9	14	78.9	26	26.9	78.9	27	111	NA	NA	0	0
84	126	2005	2	5	2	Mieroz, Jorge	1	47	13	28	37.85	14	84.85	27	40.35	87.35	26	111	NA	NA	0	0
84	126	2005	2	5	2	Boico, Roberto	1	35	27	28	37.45	14	72.45	28	40.45	75.45	28	111	NA	NA	0	0
85	130	2006	2	6	2	Carbajal, Fernando	1	93	1	27	74	16	167	1	74	167	2	120	1	0	0	0
85	130	2006	2	6	2	Fresneda, Gustavo	1	91	2	27	76	16	167	2	77	168	1	120	NA	NA	0	0
85	130	2006	2	6	2	Altabe, Marta	2	77	8	27	83.5	16	160.5	3	83.5	160.5	4	120	4	-1	0	0
85	130	2006	2	6	2	Denogens, Maria	2	80	7	27	80	16	160	4	80	160	5	120	5	-1	1	3
85	130	2006	2	6	2	Aguilar, Jose	1	85	5	27	74.6	16	159.6	5	75.2	160.2	3	120	3	2	2	3
85	130	2006	2	6	2	Sotelo, Mirta	2	63	15	27	95	16	158	6	97	160	6	120	6	2	0	0
85	130	2006	2	6	2	Alonso, Daniel	1	83	6	27	71	16	154	7	71	154	7	120	NA	NA	0	0
85	130	2006	2	6	2	Sierra, Maria Eugenia	2	75	9	27	78.75	16	153.75	8	78.75	153.75	8	120	NA	NA	0	0
85	130	2006	2	6	2	Gonzalez, Ramon	1	70	11	27	82	16	152	9	82	152	9	120	NA	NA	0	0
85	130	2006	2	6	2	Ceroleni, Fermin	1	73	10	27	78.75	16	151.75	10	78.75	151.75	10	120	NA	NA	0	0
85	130	2006	2	6	2	Oliva, Juan	1	60	18	27	86.5	16	146.5	11	86.5	146.5	11	120	NA	NA	0	0
85	130	2006	2	6	2	Sarmiento, Maria	2	87	4	27	58	16	145	12	58	145	12	120	NA	NA	0	0
85	130	2006	2	6	2	Lopez, Oscar	1	69	12	27	70	16	139	13	70	139	13	120	NA	NA	0	0
85	130	2006	2	6	2	Macci, Stella Maris	2	67	14	27	71.75	16	138.75	14	71.75	138.75	14	120	NA	NA	0	0
85	130	2006	2	6	2	Sanchez, Jose	1	54	19	27	71	16	125	15	71	125	15	120	NA	NA	0	0
85	130	2006	2	6	2	Boico, Roberto	1	89	3	27	35.5	16	124.5	16	35.5	124.5	16	120	NA	NA	0	0
85	130	2006	2	6	2	Rebak, Roque	1	39	24	27	84	16	123	17	84	123	17	120	NA	NA	0	0
85	130	2006	2	6	2	Saife, Juan	1	43	22	27	74.5	16	117.5	18	74.5	117.5	18	120	NA	NA	0	0
85	130	2006	2	6	2	Belforte, Eduardo	1	61	17	27	53.5	16	114.5	19	53.5	114.5	19	120	NA	NA	0	0
85	130	2006	2	6	2	Cacace, Gerardo	1	68	13	27	44.25	16	112.25	20	44.25	112.25	21	120	NA	NA	0	0

number	contest_year	court	provir	date	name	gender	exam_score	exam_rank	total_part	initial_qualif	qualif_id	initial_sum	initial_rank	appeal_qualif	appeal_sum	appeal_rank	ic	final_rank	variation	executive	exec_id	
85	130	2006	2	6	2	Fasola, Susana	1	40	23	27	71	16	111	71	111	23	120	NA	NA	0	0	
85	130	2006	2	6	2	Ojeda, Carlos	1	44	21	27	66	16	110	70	114	20	120	NA	NA	0	0	
85	130	2006	2	6	2	Penel, Cristina	1	49	20	27	60.75	16	109.75	60.75	109.75	24	120	NA	NA	0	0	
85	130	2006	2	6	2	Borthwick, Adolfo	1	31	26	27	77.2	16	108.2	81.2	112.2	22	120	NA	NA	0	0	
85	130	2006	2	6	2	Floriani, Aida	2	35	25	27	68	16	103	68	103	25	120	NA	NA	0	0	
85	130	2006	2	6	2	Mieraz, Jorge	1	62	16	27	40.75	16	102.75	40.75	102.75	26	120	NA	NA	0	0	
85	130	2006	2	6	2	Galassi, Gloria	2	26	27	27	65	16	91	65	91	27	120	NA	NA	0	0	
86	133	2006	1	4	2	Belforte, Eduardo	1	96	1	14	69.4	4	165.4	1	72.55	168.55	1	112	1	0	0	
86	133	2006	1	4	2	Martinez, Hector	1	82	2	14	72	4	154	2	72	154	2	112	NA	NA	0	0
86	133	2006	1	4	2	Garzon, Mario	1	77	4	14	71	4	148	3	71	148	3	112	3	0	0	
86	133	2006	1	4	2	Rebak, Roque	1	60	10	14	86	4	146	4	86	146	4	112	2	2	3	4
86	133	2006	1	4	2	Ceroleni, Fermin	1	65	7	14	78.5	4	143.5	5	78.5	143.5	5	112	4	1	0	0
86	133	2006	1	4	2	Fresneda, Gustavo	1	62	9	14	78	4	140	6	78	140	6	112	NA	NA	0	0
86	133	2006	1	4	2	Montesi, Graciela	2	65	7	14	73.35	4	138.35	7	73.35	138.35	7	112	5	2	0	0
86	133	2006	1	4	2	Larrea, Mariano	1	75	5	14	59	4	134	8	59	134	8	112	NA	NA	0	0
86	133	2006	1	4	2	Lozada, Esteban	1	80	3	14	49.8	4	129.8	9	53.1	133.1	9	112	NA	NA	0	0
86	133	2006	1	4	2	Cacace, Gerardo	1	70	6	14	54	4	124	10	57.95	127.95	10	112	NA	NA	0	0
86	133	2006	1	4	2	Montesi, Pablo	1	53	11	14	67.5	4	120.5	11	68.25	121.25	11	112	NA	NA	0	0
86	133	2006	1	4	2	Johnson, Jorge	1	35	13	14	70	4	105	12	70	105	12	112	NA	NA	0	0
86	133	2006	1	4	2	Santacroce, Carlos	1	17	14	14	70	4	87	13	70	87	13	112	NA	NA	0	0
86	133	2006	1	4	2	Abad, Damian	1	50	12	14	32.6	4	82.6	14	32.6	82.6	14	112	NA	NA	0	0
87	134	2007	9	20	3	Gimenez, Luis	1	80	1	12	83.35	10	163.35	1	82.35	162.35	1	119	1	0	0	0
87	134	2007	9	20	3	Ceroleni, Fermin	1	65	8	12	75.5	10	140.5	2	65.5	130.5	6	119	5	-3	0	0
87	134	2007	9	20	3	Chavez, Jorge	1	70	5	12	70	10	140	3	62	132	2	119	3	0	1	4
87	134	2007	9	20	3	Reynaldi, Mario	1	70	5	12	61	10	131	4	62	132	2	119	4	0	1	4
87	134	2007	9	20	3	Belforte, Eduardo	1	75	4	12	53.5	10	128.5	5	56.4	131.4	5	119	NA	NA	0	0
87	134	2007	9	20	3	Deluca, Luis	1	70	5	12	56.75	10	126.75	6	61.75	131.75	4	119	2	4	0	0
87	134	2007	9	20	3	Cacace, Gerardo	1	78	3	12	45.25	10	123.25	7	35.75	113.75	8	119	NA	NA	0	0
87	134	2007	9	20	3	Lozada, Esteban	1	80	1	12	40.75	10	120.75	8	37.65	117.65	7	119	6	2	0	0
87	134	2007	9	20	3	Cabral, Joaquin	1	65	8	12	52.25	10	117.25	9	44.85	109.85	11	119	NA	NA	0	0
87	134	2007	9	20	3	Fasola, Susana	2	50	10	12	61.5	10	111.5	10	61.5	111.5	10	119	NA	NA	0	0
87	134	2007	9	20	3	Ruggero, Alejandro	1	50	10	12	60	10	110	11	65	115	9	119	7	4	3	4
87	134	2007	9	20	3	Alvarez, Hebe	2	40	12	12	68	10	108	12	68	108	12	119	NA	NA	0	0
88	135	2006	1	1	2	Montanaro, Domingo	1	62	1	18	82	6	144	1	82	144	1	121	1	0	0	0
88	135	2006	1	1	2	Fresneda, Gustavo	1	47	4	18	79	6	126	2	79	126	2	121	NA	NA	0	0
88	135	2006	1	1	2	Selser, Julio	1	42	7	18	79.5	6	121.5	3	79.5	121.5	5	121	NA	NA	0	0
88	135	2006	1	1	2	Larrea, Mariano	1	60	2	18	61	6	121	4	62	122	4	121	3	1	0	0
88	135	2006	1	1	2	Ceroleni, Fermin	1	45	5	18	76	6	121	5	80	125	3	121	2	3	3	3
88	135	2006	1	1	2	Poli, Carlos	1	50	3	18	70	6	120	6	70	120	6	121	4	2	0	0
88	135	2006	1	1	2	Belforte, Eduardo	1	35	9	18	71.4	6	106.4	7	71.4	106.4	9	121	NA	NA	0	0
88	135	2006	1	1	2	Alonso, Daniel	1	30	12	18	74.5	6	104.5	8	74.5	104.5	10	121	NA	NA	0	0
88	135	2006	1	1	2	Maiztegui, Eduardo	1	38	8	18	66	6	104	9	70	108	8	121	6	3	0	0
88	135	2006	1	1	2	Chede, Luis	1	34	10	18	69	6	103	10	74.6	108.6	7	121	5	5	0	0
88	135	2006	1	1	2	Lozada, Esteban	1	45	5	18	53.3	6	98.3	11	53.5	98.5	11	121	NA	NA	0	0
88	135	2006	1	1	2	Fruchtenicht, Jorge	1	32	11	18	66.5	6	98.5	12	66.5	98.5	12	121	NA	NA	0	0
88	135	2006	1	1	2	Cacace, Gerardo	1	30	12	18	56.75	6	86.75	13	56.75	86.75	13	121	NA	NA	0	0
88	135	2006	1	1	2	Scandroglio, Miriam	2	20	14	18	65	6	85	14	65	85	14	121	NA	NA	0	0
88	135	2006	1	1	2	Rodriguez, Marta	2	20	14	18	64	6	84	15	64	84	15	121	NA	NA	0	0
88	135	2006	1	1	2	Zapata, Felicia	2	13	17	18	71	6	84	16	71	84	16	121	NA	NA	0	0

Appendix A

number	contest_year	court	provinc	date	name	gender	exam_score	exam_rank	total_part	initial_qualif	qualif_id	initial_sum	initial_rank	appeal_qualif	appeal_rank	sum_appeal	sum_appeal_rank	appeal_ic	final_rank	rank_variation	executive	exec_id
88	135	2006	1	1	2	Martin, Sergio	1	15	16	18	18	60.5	17	46.5	17	61.5	17	121	NA	NA	0	0
88	135	2006	1	2	2	Garciazo, Silvia	2	12	18	18	37.25	6	49.25	18	37.25	49.25	18	121	NA	NA	0	0
89	137	2006	13	3	2	Borinsky, Mariano	1	80	2	19	15	159	1	79	1	159	2	111	2	-1	0	0
89	137	2006	13	3	2	Caputo, Rafael	1	80	2	19	15	158	2	80.5	2	160.5	1	111	1	1	2	3
89	137	2006	13	3	2	Petroni, Daniel	1	70	6	19	15	149	3	81.5	3	151.5	3	111	3	0	1	3
89	137	2006	13	3	2	Rosito Peralta, Maria	2	83	1	19	15	141.5	4	64	4	147	4	111	4	0	0	0
89	137	2006	13	3	2	Beron, Ezequiel	1	72	5	19	15	137	5	69	5	141	5	111	6	-1	1	3
89	137	2006	13	3	2	Catania, Alejandro	1	80	2	19	15	133.5	6	53.5	6	133.5	7	111	5	1	2	3
89	137	2006	13	3	2	Goni, Sandra	2	70	6	19	15	133	7	63	7	133	8	111	NA	NA	0	0
89	137	2006	13	3	2	Araoz de Lamadrid, O	1	60	9	19	15	130.75	8	70.75	8	130.75	9	111	NA	NA	0	0
89	137	2006	13	3	2	Grunberg, Adrian	1	58	10	19	15	129	9	71	9	129	10	111	NA	NA	0	0
89	137	2006	13	3	2	Metrovich, Gustavo	1	62	8	19	15	128.5	10	76	10	138	6	111	7	3	0	0
89	137	2006	13	3	2	Selser, Julio	1	35	14	19	15	117	11	82	11	117	13	111	NA	NA	0	0
89	137	2006	13	3	2	Azzolin, Horacio	1	55	11	19	15	116.5	12	65	12	120	11	111	NA	NA	0	0
89	137	2006	13	3	2	Perilli, Karina	2	50	12	19	15	116.25	13	69.25	13	119.25	12	111	NA	NA	0	0
89	137	2006	13	3	2	Albamonte, Luisa	2	35	14	19	15	106	14	71	14	106	14	111	NA	NA	0	0
89	137	2006	13	3	2	Novatti, Maria	2	30	16	19	15	106	15	76	15	106	15	111	NA	NA	0	0
89	137	2006	13	3	2	Merello, Patricia	2	45	13	19	15	103	16	58	16	103	16	111	NA	NA	0	0
89	137	2006	13	3	2	Ochoa, Hector	1	30	16	19	15	99	17	69	17	99	17	111	NA	NA	0	0
89	137	2006	13	3	2	Mariluis, Delia	2	30	16	19	15	93.5	18	63.5	18	93.5	18	111	NA	NA	0	0
89	137	2006	13	3	2	Santacroce, Carlos	1	20	19	19	15	90.5	19	70.5	19	90.5	19	111	NA	NA	0	0
90	139	2006	9	10	2	Perez, Jose	1	95	1	15	13	171	1	76	1	171	1	121	1	0	0	0
90	139	2006	9	10	2	Batule, Domingo	1	90	2	15	13	165.25	2	75.25	2	165.25	3	121	4	-2	0	0
90	139	2006	9	10	2	Penel, Cristina	1	90	2	15	13	164	3	70	3	160	6	121	NA	NA	0	0
90	139	2006	9	10	2	Pravia, Alberto	1	90	2	15	13	163.5	4	78	4	168	2	121	2	2	0	0
90	139	2006	9	10	2	Snopek, Liliana	2	90	2	15	13	162	5	72	5	162	4	121	3	2	2	3
90	139	2006	9	10	2	Savio, Hugo	1	90	2	15	13	160.5	6	72	6	162	4	121	NA	NA	0	0
90	139	2006	9	10	2	Olivera Pastor, Carlos	1	90	2	15	13	159	7	69	7	159	8	121	NA	NA	0	0
90	139	2006	9	10	2	Ase, Efrain	1	90	2	15	13	158.25	8	68.25	8	158.25	9	121	NA	NA	0	0
90	139	2006	9	10	2	Juarez, Mario	1	85	11	15	13	158	9	75	9	160	7	121	NA	NA	0	0
90	139	2006	9	10	2	Belforte, Eduardo	1	90	2	15	13	149.5	10	59.5	10	149.5	10	121	NA	NA	0	0
90	139	2006	9	10	2	Cataldi, Maria	2	60	13	15	13	137	11	81	11	141	11	121	NA	NA	0	0
90	139	2006	9	10	2	Mosca Reghin, Maria	2	60	13	15	13	134.75	12	74.75	12	134.75	12	121	NA	NA	0	0
90	139	2006	9	10	2	Gallo, Paula	2	90	2	15	13	123.5	13	33.5	13	123.5	13	121	NA	NA	0	0
90	139	2006	9	10	2	Hairabetian, Jose	1	60	13	15	13	119	14	59	14	119	15	121	NA	NA	0	0
90	139	2006	9	10	2	Carlos, Silvina	2	80	12	15	13	110.25	15	41.25	15	121.25	14	121	NA	NA	0	0
91	141	2007	2	1	3	Farah, Eduardo	1	93	2	13	13	172.5	1	78.5	1	171.5	1	101	1	0	0	0
91	141	2007	2	1	3	Calvete, Federico	1	92	3	13	13	171	2	78	2	170	2	101	2	0	0	0
91	141	2007	2	1	3	Gusman, Alfredo	1	95	1	13	13	170.46	3	74.75	3	169.75	3	101	NA	NA	0	0
91	141	2007	2	1	3	Gurruchaga, Hugo	1	80	7	13	13	167	4	85	4	165	4	101	3	1	2	4
91	141	2007	2	1	3	Montanaro, Domingo	1	87	5	13	13	152.19	5	66.19	5	153.19	5	101	NA	NA	0	0
91	141	2007	2	1	3	Poli, Carlos	1	79	8	13	13	151.5	6	73.5	6	152.5	6	101	NA	NA	0	0
91	141	2007	2	1	3	Crisuolo, Alberto	1	68	12	13	13	151	7	80	7	148	9	101	NA	NA	0	0
91	141	2007	2	1	3	Passero, Marcelo	1	82	6	13	13	150.7	8	68.7	8	150.7	7	101	NA	NA	0	0
91	141	2007	2	1	3	Compareid, Carlos	1	71	10	13	13	147	9	78	9	149	8	101	NA	NA	0	0
91	141	2007	2	1	3	Calitri, Olga	2	69	11	13	13	145.75	10	76.75	10	145.75	10	101	NA	NA	0	0
91	141	2007	2	1	3	Becerra, Gustavo	1	88	4	13	13	134.8	11	46.8	11	134.8	11	101	NA	NA	0	0
91	141	2007	2	1	3	Rodriguez, Reinaldo	1	54	13	13	13	133.5	12	79.5	12	133.5	12	101	NA	NA	0	0
91	141	2007	2	1	3	Boico, Roberto	1	78	9	13	13	119.5	13	41.95	13	119.95	13	101	NA	NA	0	0

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number	contest_year	court	provinc	date	name	gender	exam_score	exam_rank	total_part	initial_qualif	qualif_id	initial_sum	initial_rank	appeal_qualif	appeal_sum	appeal_rank	ic_final	rank_variation	executive	exec_id
92	143	2007	1	1	3 Sassi, Edgardo	1	90	1	9	76	13	166	1	80	170	1	111	1	0	0
92	143	2007	1	1	3 Benavides, Laura	2	80	2	9	74	13	154	2	77	157	2	111	2	0	0
92	143	2007	1	1	3 Auge, Juan Pablo	1	70	3	9	72	13	142	3	75	145	3	111	3	0	1
92	143	2007	1	1	3 Poli, Carlos	1	55	5	9	80	13	135	4	80	135	6	111	NA	0	0
92	143	2007	1	1	3 Dousset, Guillermo	1	55	5	9	68.5	13	123.5	5	70	125	5	111	NA	0	0
92	143	2007	1	1	3 Paladino, Jorge	1	55	5	9	74.25	13	129.25	6	81	136	4	111	NA	0	0
92	143	2007	1	1	3 Becerra, Gustavo	1	60	4	9	66.75	13	126.75	7	66	126	7	111	NA	0	0
92	143	2007	1	1	3 Charlin, Jose	1	45	8	9	77	13	122	8	77	122	8	111	NA	0	0
92	143	2007	1	1	3 Mariluis, Delia	2	40	9	9	57	13	97	9	70	110	9	111	NA	0	0
93	144	2007	9	24	3 Pravia, Alberto	1	89	1	12	78.75	5	167.75	1	79.95	168.95	2	111	NA	0	0
93	144	2007	9	24	3 Caramuti, Carlos	1	72	6	12	95	5	167	2	96	168	1	111	1	0	0
93	144	2007	9	24	3 Diaz, Federico	1	83	2	12	77.75	5	160.75	3	84	167	3	111	2	1	0
93	144	2007	9	24	3 Belforte, Eduardo	1	81	3	12	64.75	5	145.75	4	66.45	147.45	4	111	NA	0	0
93	144	2007	9	24	3 Alonso, Daniel	1	73	5	12	70	5	143	5	70	143	5	111	4	1	0
93	144	2007	9	24	3 Noli, Maria	2	44	9	12	85	5	129	6	86	130	6	111	3	3	3
93	144	2007	9	24	3 Povina, Fernando	1	77	4	12	47	5	124	7	47	124	7	111	5	2	0
93	144	2007	9	24	3 Pedrera, Manuel	1	50	8	12	73	5	123	8	73	123	8	111	NA	0	0
93	144	2007	9	24	3 Nacul, Juan	1	52	7	12	70.9	5	122.9	9	70.9	122.9	9	111	NA	0	0
93	144	2007	9	24	3 Castro, Julio	1	16	10	12	75	5	91	10	75	91	10	111	NA	0	0
93	144	2007	9	24	3 Giffoniello, Estela	2	14	12	12	75	5	89	11	75	89	11	111	NA	0	0
93	144	2007	9	24	3 Turk, Cesar	1	15	11	12	69	5	84	12	69	84	12	111	NA	0	0
94	146	2007	11	3	3 Saint Genez, Alejandr	1	75	2	6	81	12	156	1	75	150	1	119	1	0	0
94	146	2007	11	3	3 Guarinoni, Ricardo	1	55	5	6	87.3	12	142.3	2	85.3	140.3	4	119	4	-2	1
94	146	2007	11	3	3 Soto, Francisco	1	60	4	6	81.6	12	141.6	3	78.6	138.6	3	119	3	0	0
94	146	2007	11	3	3 Gusman, Alfredo	1	80	1	6	60.25	12	140.25	4	69.7	149.7	2	119	2	2	4
94	146	2007	11	3	3 Lopez, Edgardo	1	65	3	6	54.95	12	119.95	5	51.85	116.85	5	119	5	0	0
94	146	2007	11	3	3 Becerra, Gustavo	1	50	6	6	43.6	12	93.6	6	43.6	93.6	6	119	NA	0	0
95	149	2007	2	1	3 Calvete, Federico	1	100	1	13	80.3	9	180.3	1	84.6	184.6	1	101	1	0	0
95	149	2007	2	1	3 Gusman, Alfredo	1	75	4	13	90	9	165	2	76	151	3	101	4	-2	0
95	149	2007	2	1	3 Poli, Carlos	1	83	3	13	79.2	9	162.2	3	75.2	158.2	2	101	2	1	0
95	149	2007	2	1	3 Aristizabal, Maria	2	90	2	13	71	9	161	4	NA	NA	0	101	NA	0	0
95	149	2007	2	1	3 Alvarez, Cesar	1	60	6	13	86.7	9	146.7	5	84.75	144.75	4	101	3	2	4
95	149	2007	2	1	3 Montanaro, Domingo	1	55	8	13	85.2	9	140.2	6	67.7	122.7	8	101	NA	0	0
95	149	2007	2	1	3 Auge, Juan Pablo	1	65.5	5	13	72	9	137.5	7	71	136.5	5	101	5	2	0
95	149	2007	2	1	3 Compareid, Carlos	1	58	7	13	78	9	136	8	78	136	6	101	6	2	0
95	149	2007	2	1	3 Maljar, Daniel	1	40	10	13	81.7	9	121.7	9	55.5	95.5	9	101	8	1	0
95	149	2007	2	1	3 Caltri, Olga	2	45	9	13	76.4	9	121.4	10	78.9	123.9	7	101	7	3	0
95	149	2007	2	1	3 Isauralde, Horacio	1	33	11	13	71.05	9	104.05	11	72	105	10	101	NA	0	0
95	149	2007	2	1	3 Righero, Victor	1	30.5	12	13	70	9	100.5	12	65	95.5	11	101	NA	0	0
95	149	2007	2	1	3 Becerra, Gustavo	1	20	13	13	69.7	9	89.7	13	51.5	71.5	12	101	NA	0	0
96	151	2007	2	17	3 Rabbi-Baldi, Luis	1	88	3	21	90	8	178	1	86	174	2	122	2	-1	0
96	151	2007	2	17	3 Noli, Maria	2	87	4	21	87	8	174	2	90	177	1	122	1	1	0
96	151	2007	2	17	3 Padros, Ramiro	1	90	1	21	74	8	164	3	75	165	3	122	NA	0	0
96	151	2007	2	17	3 Aguilar, Horacio	1	89	2	21	74.5	8	163.5	4	74.5	163.5	4	122	3	1	3
96	151	2007	2	17	3 Batule, Domingo	1	82	6	21	76.5	8	158.5	5	77	159	5	122	NA	0	0
96	151	2007	2	17	3 Alonso, Daniel	1	84	5	21	71.5	8	155.5	6	71.5	155.5	6	122	NA	0	0
96	151	2007	2	17	3 Isasmendi, Armando	1	65	12	21	86.5	8	151.5	7	86.5	151.5	7	122	NA	0	0
96	151	2007	2	17	3 Snopek, Liliana	2	74	8	21	77	8	151	8	77	151	8	122	NA	0	0
96	151	2007	2	17	3 Cardero, Jose	1	74	8	21	73.5	8	147.5	9	73.5	147.5	9	122	NA	0	0

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number	contest_year	court	provir	date	name	gender	exam_score	exam_rank	total_part	initial_qualif	qualif_id	initial_sum	initial_rank	appeal_qualif	appeal_sum	appeal_rank	appeal_ic	final_rank	rank_variation	executive	exec_id
96	151	2007	2	17	3	Bavio, Julio	1	68	10	21	77	8	145	10	77	10	122	NA	NA	0	0
96	151	2007	2	17	3	Reynoso, Raul	1	59	15	21	81.5	8	140.5	11	81.5	11	122	NA	NA	0	0
96	151	2007	2	17	3	Guzzo, Lucio	1	59	15	21	79.5	8	138.5	12	79.5	12	122	NA	NA	0	0
96	151	2007	2	17	3	Lopez, Edgardo	1	76	7	21	61.25	8	137.25	13	61.25	13	122	NA	NA	0	0
96	151	2007	2	17	3	Mosca Reghin, Maria	2	67	11	21	70	8	137	14	70	14	122	NA	NA	0	0
96	151	2007	2	17	3	Villada, Jorge	1	51	17	21	86	8	137	15	86	15	122	NA	NA	0	0
96	151	2007	2	17	3	Sola, Ernesto	1	61	13	21	69	8	130	16	69	16	122	NA	NA	0	0
96	151	2007	2	17	3	Nacul, Juan	1	61	13	21	66.8	8	127.8	17	66.8	17	122	NA	NA	0	0
96	151	2007	2	17	3	Cataldi, Maria	2	38	21	21	82.5	8	120.5	18	82.5	18	122	NA	NA	0	0
96	151	2007	2	17	3	Juarez, Mario	1	44	18	21	73	8	117	19	74	19	122	NA	NA	0	0
96	151	2007	2	17	3	Gimenez, Alejandra	2	43	19	21	64	8	107	20	64	20	122	NA	NA	0	0
96	151	2007	2	17	3	Gloss, Alejandro	1	42	20	21	46.5	8	88.5	21	46.5	21	122	NA	NA	0	0
97	152	2007	2	21	3	Puccinelli, Oscar	1	45	5	8	98	11	143	1	96	1	123	1	0	0	0
97	152	2007	2	21	3	Alonso, Daniel	1	65	1	8	74	11	139	2	73	2	123	NA	NA	0	0
97	152	2007	2	21	3	Vazquez, Marcela	2	65	1	8	73.75	11	138.75	3	73	3	123	NA	NA	0	0
97	152	2007	2	21	3	Barbara, Fernando	1	65	1	8	72.75	11	137.75	4	72.75	4	123	2	2	2	4
97	152	2007	2	21	3	Acosta, Daniel	1	45	5	8	78.25	11	123.25	5	88	5	123	3	2	0	0
97	152	2007	2	21	3	Calvi, Patricia	2	45	5	8	77	11	122	6	78	6	123	NA	NA	0	0
97	152	2007	2	21	3	Saccone, Adriana	2	40	8	8	70	11	110	7	73	7	123	NA	NA	0	0
97	152	2007	2	21	3	Boglioli, Alfredo	1	50	4	8	55.7	11	105.7	8	59.7	8	123	NA	NA	0	0
98	153	2007	9	21	3	Vazquez, Ricardo	1	90	1	12	65.5	4	155.5	1	74.5	1	123	1	0	1	4
98	153	2007	9	21	3	Lopez, Hernan Martin	1	80	2	12	64.9	4	144.9	2	64.9	2	123	2	0	0	0
98	153	2007	9	21	3	Sutter, German	1	70	3	12	63	4	133	3	71.45	3	123	3	0	0	0
98	153	2007	9	21	3	Alonso, Daniel	1	60	4	12	70	4	130	4	74.5	4	123	NA	NA	0	0
98	153	2007	9	21	3	Bailaque, Marcelo	1	50	6	12	70	4	120	5	71	5	123	NA	NA	0	0
98	153	2007	9	21	3	Busaniche, Mateo	1	60	4	12	49	4	109	6	51.5	6	123	4	2	0	0
98	153	2007	9	21	3	Vera, Carlos	1	30	7	12	74.25	4	104.25	7	72.25	7	123	NA	NA	0	0
98	153	2007	9	21	3	Nacul, Juan	1	20	8	12	71.5	4	91.5	8	71.5	8	123	NA	NA	0	0
98	153	2007	9	21	3	Abasolo, Miguel	1	20	8	12	70	4	90	9	70	9	123	NA	NA	0	0
98	153	2007	9	21	3	Dapueeto, Miguel	1	10	10	12	72	4	82	10	72	10	123	NA	NA	0	0
98	153	2007	9	21	3	Belforte, Eduardo	1	10	10	12	57.05	4	67.05	11	57.05	11	123	NA	NA	0	0
98	153	2007	9	21	3	Vazquez, Marcela	2	10	10	12	56	4	66	12	56	12	123	NA	NA	0	0
99	154	2007	1	8	3	Ceroleni, Ferrn	1	95	1	8	78.8	8	173.8	1	78.8	1	123	1	0	0	0
99	154	2007	1	8	3	Maiztegui, Eduardo	1	91	2	8	78.4	8	169.4	2	78.4	2	123	3	-1	0	0
99	154	2007	1	8	3	Fresneda, Gustavo	1	87	4	8	79	8	166	3	76	4	123	NA	NA	0	0
99	154	2007	1	8	3	Alonso, Daniel	1	89	3	8	74	8	163	4	74	3	123	4	0	1	4
99	154	2007	1	8	3	Aranguren, Beatriz	2	80	6	8	78.3	8	158.3	5	79.9	5	123	2	3	0	0
99	154	2007	1	8	3	Morahan, Fabian	1	85	5	8	70.4	8	155.4	6	70.4	6	123	5	1	0	0
99	154	2007	1	8	3	Sanguinetti, Nora	1	75	7	8	73	8	148	7	75	7	123	NA	NA	0	0
99	154	2007	1	8	3	Abasolo, Miguel	1	65	8	8	78	8	143	8	67	8	123	NA	NA	0	0
100	155	2007	1	8	3	Aranguren, Beatriz	2	85.1	1	6	78.8	1	163.9	1	83.1	1	101	1	0	1	4
100	155	2007	1	8	3	Alonso, Daniel	1	81.4	3	6	79.5	1	160.9	2	81.4	2	101	2	0	0	0
100	155	2007	1	8	3	Fresneda, Gustavo	1	79.7	4	6	79	1	158.7	3	79.7	3	101	4	-1	0	0
100	155	2007	1	8	3	Morahan, Fabian	1	85	2	6	70.55	1	155.55	4	85	4	101	3	1	0	0
100	155	2007	1	8	3	Maiztegui, Eduardo	1	75.5	6	6	79.4	1	154.9	5	75.5	5	101	5	0	0	0
100	155	2007	1	8	3	Becerra, Gustavo	1	79.6	5	6	66	1	145.6	6	81.6	6	101	6	0	0	0
101	159	2008	9	1	3	Desimone, Guillermo	1	70	2	8	79	17	149	1	79	1	101	NA	NA	0	0
101	159	2008	9	1	3	Alegre, Francisco	1	75	1	8	58	17	136	2	67	2	101	NA	NA	0	0
101	159	2008	9	1	3	Martinez Astorino, Rol	1	60	4	8	72	17	132	3	83	3	101	1	2	0	0

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number	contest_year	court	provir	date	name	gender	exam_score	exam_rank	total_part	initial_qualif	qualif_id	initial_sum	initial_rank	appeal_qualif	appeal_sum	appeal_rank	ic_final	rank_variation	executive	exec_id	
101	159	2008	9	1	3	Daudet, Maria	2	60	4	8	66	17	126	4	67	127	5	101	NA	0	0
101	159	2008	9	1	3	Lucchelli, Rafael	1	40	6	8	72.5	17	112.5	5	61.75	101.75	7	101	NA	0	0
101	159	2008	9	1	3	Bertuzzi, Pablo	1	70	2	8	39.25	17	109.25	6	58.25	128.25	4	101	NA	2	4
101	159	2008	9	1	3	Lorenzo, Norberto	1	25	8	8	59.5	17	84.5	7	78	103	6	101	3	4	0
101	159	2008	9	1	3	Becerra, Gustavo	1	40	6	8	37.75	17	77.75	8	38.75	78.75	8	101	NA	0	0
102	161	2008	1	4	3	Ochoa, Carlos	1	68	4	11	91	18	159	1	93	161	1	122	1	0	4
102	161	2008	1	4	3	Alonso, Daniel	1	76	1	11	75	18	151	2	73	149	3	122	3	-1	0
102	161	2008	1	4	3	Fauda, Maria	2	75	2	11	68	18	143	3	75	150	2	122	2	1	0
102	161	2008	1	4	3	Becerra, Gustavo	1	74	3	11	67	18	141	4	67	141	4	122	NA	0	0
102	161	2008	1	4	3	Montesi, Graciela	2	60	5	11	75.7	18	135.7	5	81	141	5	122	NA	0	0
102	161	2008	1	4	3	Montesi, Pablo	1	56	6	11	72.5	18	128.5	6	74.5	130.5	6	122	NA	0	0
102	161	2008	1	4	3	Garzon, Mario	1	52	7	11	72.1	18	124.1	7	72.1	124.1	7	122	NA	0	0
102	161	2008	1	4	3	Plaza Posada, Rafael	1	40	10	11	76	18	116	8	79	119	8	122	NA	0	0
102	161	2008	1	4	3	Martinez, Hector	1	42	8	11	71.8	18	113.8	9	71.8	113.8	10	122	NA	0	0
102	161	2008	1	4	3	Suarez, Jose	1	41	9	11	69.5	18	110.5	10	69.5	110.5	11	122	NA	0	0
102	161	2008	1	4	3	Johnson, Jorge	1	40	10	11	62	18	102	11	74.5	114.5	9	122	NA	0	0
103	165	2007	1	7	3	Gelvez, Fernando	1	59	1	3	84	2	143	1	NA	NA	1	NA	1	0	0
103	165	2007	1	7	3	Chernicoff, Luis	1	56	2	3	78	2	134	2	NA	NA	2	NA	2	0	0
103	165	2007	1	7	3	Sastre, Hugo	1	52	3	3	69	2	121	3	NA	NA	3	NA	3	0	1
104	167	2008	1	22	3	Alonso, Daniel	1	96	1	14	76	1	172	1	75.5	171.5	1	101	1	0	0
104	167	2008	1	22	3	Reynaga, Juan	1	90	2	14	72.5	1	162.5	2	72.5	162.5	2	101	2	0	0
104	167	2008	1	22	3	Nassif, Angel	1	88	3	14	71.5	1	159.5	3	61.5	149.5	4	101	NA	0	0
104	167	2008	1	22	3	Alvelda, Guillermo	1	86	4	14	73	1	159	4	65.75	151.75	3	101	4	0	0
104	167	2008	1	22	3	Moreno, Orlando	1	82	5	14	64.5	1	146.5	6	54.75	136.75	7	101	NA	0	0
104	167	2008	1	22	3	Povinia, Fernando	1	80	6	14	62	1	142	8	56.5	136.5	9	101	NA	0	0
104	167	2008	1	22	3	Budgeau, Bernardo	1	79	7	14	45	1	124	14	38	117	14	101	NA	0	0
104	167	2008	1	22	3	Turk, Cesar	1	74	8	14	74.5	1	148.5	5	62.5	136.5	8	101	NA	0	0
104	167	2008	1	22	3	Nacul, Juan	1	72	9	14	70.2	1	142.2	7	62.4	134.4	10	101	NA	0	0
104	167	2008	1	22	3	Lindow, Isabel	2	70	10	14	71	1	141	9	61	131	11	101	NA	0	0
104	167	2008	1	22	3	Barrionuevo, Aristobu	1	67	11	14	70.5	1	137.5	10	70.5	137.5	5	101	NA	0	0
104	167	2008	1	22	3	Johnson, Jorge	1	64	12	14	72	1	136	11	61	125	13	101	NA	0	0
104	167	2008	1	22	3	Molinari, Guillermo	1	62	13	14	73	1	135	12	75	137	6	101	3	9	4
104	167	2008	1	22	3	Romero, Raul	1	60	14	14	67.5	1	127.5	13	66.5	126.5	12	101	NA	0	0
105	171	2007	7	3	3	Braghini, Alicia	2	80	1	8	77.25	19	157.25	1	79.25	159.25	1	122	1	0	4
105	171	2007	7	3	3	Pineiro, Viviana	2	75	2	8	78	19	153	2	80	155	2	122	2	0	0
105	171	2007	7	3	3	Giannichelli, Jose	1	55	5	8	80.5	19	135.5	3	82.5	137.5	3	122	3	0	0
105	171	2007	7	3	3	Zapata, Felicia	2	65	3	8	70	19	135	4	71	136	4	122	NA	0	0
105	171	2007	7	3	3	Ulloa, Angel	1	50	6	8	56.5	19	106.5	5	53.5	103.5	6	122	NA	0	0
105	171	2007	7	3	3	Nostas, Antonio	1	40	7	8	59.6	19	99.6	6	57	97	7	122	NA	0	0
105	171	2007	7	3	3	Catarado, Emmanuel	1	65	3	8	34.5	19	99.5	7	39.5	104.5	5	122	NA	0	0
105	171	2007	7	3	3	De Vedia, Gabriel	1	40	7	8	42.85	19	82.85	8	42.85	82.85	8	122	NA	0	0
106	173	2008	6	3	3	Farah, Eduardo	1	70	1	16	80.4	20	150.4	1	81.8	151.8	1	123	1	0	4
106	173	2008	6	3	3	Ballester, Jorge	1	50	2	16	85	20	135	2	89	139	2	123	2	0	1
106	173	2008	6	3	3	Lopez Biscayart, Javier	1	30	4	16	86	20	116	3	86	116	3	123	3	0	0
106	173	2008	6	3	3	Montanaro, Domingo	1	40	3	16	71	20	111	4	73	113	4	123	4	0	0
106	173	2008	6	3	3	Delgado, Sergio	1	30	4	16	81	20	111	5	82	112	5	123	5	0	0
106	173	2008	6	3	3	Salas, Luis	1	20	9	16	87	20	107	6	87	107	6	123	6	0	0
106	173	2008	6	3	3	Mass, Jose	1	30	4	16	76	20	106	7	76	106	7	123	NA	0	0
106	173	2008	6	3	3	Ramos Padilla, Juan	1	30	4	16	74	20	104	8	74	104	8	123	NA	0	0

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number	contest	year	court	provir	date	name	gender	exam_score	exam_rank	total_part	initial_qualif	qualif_id	initial_sum	initial_rank	appeal_qualif	appeal_sum	appeal_rank	appeal_ic	final_rank	variation	executive	exec_id
106	173	2008	6	3	3	Sarlo, Ruben	1	20	9	16	84	20	104	9	84	104	8	123	NA	0	0	0
106	173	2008	6	3	3	Desimone, Guillermo	1	20	9	16	75.5	20	95.5	10	75.5	95.5	10	123	NA	0	0	0
106	173	2008	6	3	3	Santacroce, Carlos	1	20	9	16	71	20	91	11	71	91	11	123	NA	0	0	0
106	173	2008	6	3	3	Dilo, Juan	1	30	4	16	57.75	20	87.75	12	57.75	87.75	12	123	NA	0	0	0
106	173	2008	6	3	3	Silvestroni, Mariano	1	20	9	16	62.5	20	82.5	13	62.5	82.5	13	123	NA	0	0	0
106	173	2008	6	3	3	Velarde, Carlos	1	10	15	16	65.5	20	75.5	14	65.5	75.5	14	123	NA	0	0	0
106	173	2008	6	3	3	Verrier, Cesar	1	20	9	16	49.5	20	69.5	15	49.5	69.5	15	123	NA	0	0	0
106	173	2008	6	3	3	Maldonado, Eduardo	1	10	15	16	42	20	52	16	42	52	16	123	NA	0	0	0
107	44	2002	12	3	1	Lopez Biscayart, Javier	1	90	7	29	80	NA	170	1	80	170	1	107	2	-1	1	3
107	44	2002	12	3	1	Robiglio, Carolina	2	95	1	29	73	NA	168	2	74	169	3	107	3	-1	0	0
107	44	2002	12	3	1	Garcia Berro, Diego	1	93	3	29	74	NA	167	3	72	165	2	107	1	2	2	3
107	44	2002	12	3	1	Grunberg, Adrian	1	94	2	29	72	NA	166	4	70	164	4	107	NA	0	0	0
107	44	2002	12	3	1	Straccia, Maria	2	91	5	29	74	NA	165	5	73	164	4	107	4	1	1	3
107	44	2002	12	3	1	Caputo, Rafael	1	92	4	29	70	NA	162	6	69	161	6	107	5	1	0	0
107	44	2002	12	3	1	Etchegoyen, Martin	1	80	8	29	75	NA	155	7	75	155	8	107	NA	0	0	0
107	44	2002	12	3	1	Tedesco, Ignacio	1	74	9	29	71	NA	145	8	71	145	9	107	NA	0	0	0
107	44	2002	12	3	1	Beron, Ezequiel	1	91	5	29	53	NA	144	9	65	156	7	107	NA	0	0	0
107	44	2002	12	3	1	Sustaita, Guillermo	1	68	10	29	73	NA	141	10	71	139	11	107	NA	0	0	0
107	44	2002	12	3	1	Thomas, Ricardo	1	60	12	29	80	NA	140	11	80	140	10	107	NA	0	0	0
107	44	2002	12	3	1	Baba, Martin	1	62	11	29	71	NA	133	12	72	134	12	107	NA	0	0	0
107	44	2002	12	3	1	Montanaro, Domingo	1	46	13	29	72	NA	118	13	71	117	13	107	NA	0	0	0
107	44	2002	12	3	1	Delgado, Sergio	1	42	14	29	75	NA	117	14	75	117	13	107	NA	0	0	0
107	44	2002	12	3	1	Bacigalupo, Pablo	1	36	16	29	77	NA	113	15	77	113	15	107	NA	0	0	0
107	44	2002	12	3	1	Almendras, Oscar	1	42	14	29	69	NA	111	16	69	111	16	107	NA	0	0	0
107	44	2002	12	3	1	Barroetavena, Diego	1	32	17	29	74	NA	106	17	76	108	17	107	NA	0	0	0
107	44	2002	12	3	1	Cubelli, Jorge	1	32	17	29	71	NA	103	18	69	101	18	107	NA	0	0	0
107	44	2002	12	3	1	Villar, Mario	1	21	25	29	81	NA	102	19	80	101	19	107	NA	0	0	0
107	44	2002	12	3	1	Montero, Martin	1	28	21	29	71	NA	99	20	71	97	20	107	NA	0	0	0
107	44	2002	12	3	1	Meirovich, Gustavo	1	24	23	29	69	NA	93	21	69	93	20	107	NA	0	0	0
107	44	2002	12	3	1	Portocarrero, Elpidio	1	28	21	29	54	NA	82	22	54	82	22	107	NA	0	0	0
107	44	2002	12	3	1	Herrera, Julio	1	30	20	29	48	NA	78	23	48	78	23	107	NA	0	0	0
107	44	2002	12	3	1	Itrat, Marcelo	1	32	17	29	43	NA	75	24	43	75	24	107	NA	0	0	0
107	44	2002	12	3	1	Tosi, Jorge	1	4	27	29	69	NA	73	25	69	73	25	107	NA	0	0	0
107	44	2002	12	3	1	Senes, Concepcion	2	4	27	29	68	NA	72	26	68	72	26	107	NA	0	0	0
107	44	2002	12	3	1	Romano, Jaime	1	0	29	29	70	NA	70	27	70	70	27	107	NA	0	0	0
107	44	2002	12	3	1	Miittello, Sergio	1	24	23	29	46	NA	70	28	46	70	28	107	NA	0	0	0
107	44	2002	12	3	1	Verrier, Cesar	1	20	26	29	30	NA	50	29	30	50	29	107	NA	0	0	0
108	61	2002	14	3	1	Garcia Vitor, Enrique	1	96	1	10	72	NA	168	1	78	174	1	115	1	0	0	0
108	61	2002	14	3	1	Ledesma, Angela	2	86	2	10	74	NA	160	2	86	172	2	115	2	0	1	3
108	61	2002	14	3	1	Diez Ojeda, Augusto	1	81	4	10	67	NA	148	3	79	160	3	115	3	0	0	0
108	61	2002	14	3	1	Camina, Maria	2	80	5	10	67	NA	147	4	72	152	5	115	NA	0	0	0
108	61	2002	14	3	1	Michelli, Jorge	1	83	3	10	62	NA	145	5	72	155	4	115	NA	0	0	0
108	61	2002	14	3	1	Degreef, Hugo	1	72	7	10	62	NA	134	6	72	144	6	115	NA	0	0	0
108	61	2002	14	3	1	Caminos, Miguel	1	60	9	10	66	NA	126	7	66	126	7	115	NA	0	0	0
108	61	2002	14	3	1	Obligado, Daniel	1	50	10	10	48	NA	98	8	59	109	8	115	NA	0	0	0
108	61	2002	14	3	1	Santacroce, Carlos	1	79	6	10	17	NA	96	9	17	96	9	115	NA	0	0	0
108	61	2002	14	3	1	Rojit, Julio	1	64	8	10	23	NA	87	10	23	87	10	115	NA	0	0	0
109	63	2002	15	3	1	Bonzon, Juan	1	63	6	8	64.5	NA	127.5	1	72.5	135.5	1	117	3	-2	1	3
109	63	2002	15	3	1	Huarte, Alberto	1	70	2	8	56.5	NA	126.5	2	63.5	134.5	2	117	1	1	0	0

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number	contest	year	court	provin	date	name	gender	exam_score	exam_rank	total_part	initial_qualif	qualif_id	initial_sum	initial_rank	appeal_qualif	sum_appeal	rank_appeal	lic_final_rank	rank_variation	executive	exec_id
109	63	2002	15	3	1	Abinal, Pablo	1	70	2	8	54.5	NA	124.5	3	57.5	127.5	3	117	2	1	0
109	63	2002	15	3	1	Garcia Berro, Diego	1	72	1	8	46	NA	118	4	53	125	4	117	4	0	0
109	63	2002	15	3	1	Rivas Diez, Maria Luz	2	64	5	8	50	NA	114	5	60	124	5	117	5	1	0
109	63	2002	15	3	1	Robiglio, Carolina	2	49	7	8	57	NA	106	6	64.5	113.5	6	117	NA	0	0
109	63	2002	15	3	1	Verrier, Cesar	1	70	2	8	20	NA	90	7	20	90	7	117	NA	0	0
109	63	2002	15	3	1	Rojit, Julio	1	7	8	8	54.7	NA	61.7	8	54.5	61.5	8	117	NA	0	0
110	172	2008	1	1	3	Becerra, Gustavo	1	76	1	10	76.25	21	152.25	1	61.75	137.75	1	101	1	0	NA
110	172	2008	1	1	3	Zapata, Felicia	2	58	3	10	79	21	137	2	78	136	3	101	2	0	NA
110	172	2008	1	1	3	Sineriz, Javier	1	68	2	10	67.5	21	135.5	3	68.25	136.25	2	101	4	-1	NA
110	172	2008	1	1	3	Boglioli, Alfredo	1	58	3	10	75.1	21	133.1	4	76.1	134.1	4	101	NA	NA	NA
110	172	2008	1	1	3	Martinez, Martin	1	52	6	10	78	21	130	5	78	130	5	101	3	2	NA
110	172	2008	1	1	3	Guasco, Marina	2	55	5	10	62	21	117	6	62	117	6	101	NA	NA	NA
110	172	2008	1	1	3	Hassuani, Gustavo	1	45	10	10	65.75	21	110.75	7	65.75	110.75	7	101	NA	NA	NA
110	172	2008	1	1	3	Pendino, Jose	1	50	8	10	41.1	21	91.1	8	41.1	91.1	8	101	NA	NA	NA
110	172	2008	1	1	3	Martinez, Natalia	2	52	6	10	8.25	21	60.25	9	8.25	60.25	9	101	NA	NA	NA
110	172	2008	1	1	3	Tognola, Adriana	2	50	8	10	0	21	50	10	0	50	10	101	NA	NA	NA
111	174	2008	13	3	3	Azzolin, Horacio	1	88	2	23	69.05	21	157.05	1	72.05	160.05	1	123	NA	NA	NA
111	174	2008	13	3	3	Peralta Urquiza, Maria	2	85	4	23	70.5	21	155.5	2	70.5	155.5	2	123	1	1	NA
111	174	2008	13	3	3	Povinia, Fernando	1	88	2	23	64.5	21	152.5	3	64.5	152.5	3	123	NA	NA	NA
111	174	2008	13	3	3	Perilli, Karina	2	75	6	23	76.1	21	151.1	4	76.1	151.1	4	123	2	2	NA
111	174	2008	13	3	3	Meitrovich, Gustavo	1	65	9	23	86	21	151	5	86	151	5	123	3	2	NA
111	174	2008	13	3	3	Villela, Guillermo	1	70	7	23	72.25	21	142.25	6	72	142	6	123	NA	NA	NA
111	174	2008	13	3	3	Imas, Luis	1	70	7	23	72	21	142	7	72	142	7	123	NA	NA	NA
111	174	2008	13	3	3	Echegaray, Sergio	1	65	9	23	76	21	141	8	76	141	8	123	NA	NA	NA
111	174	2008	13	3	3	Goldberg, Marcelo	1	65	9	23	76	21	141	9	76	141	9	123	NA	NA	NA
111	174	2008	13	3	3	Maduena, Marisa	2	65	9	23	75	21	140	10	75	140	11	123	NA	NA	NA
111	174	2008	13	3	3	Diaz de Calaon, Leticia	2	60	14	23	78.5	21	138.5	11	78.5	138.5	12	123	NA	NA	NA
111	174	2008	13	3	3	Turano, Pablo	1	90	1	23	47.85	21	137.85	12	50.85	140.85	10	123	NA	NA	NA
111	174	2008	13	3	3	Carbajales, Maria	1	83	5	23	51.2	21	134.2	13	54.7	137.7	13	123	NA	NA	NA
111	174	2008	13	3	3	Bellini, Paula	1	65	9	23	68.65	21	133.65	14	70.65	135.65	14	123	NA	NA	NA
111	174	2008	13	3	3	Maldonado, Eduardo	1	60	14	23	64	21	124	15	56	116	17	123	NA	NA	NA
111	174	2008	13	3	3	Zysman, Diego	1	45	20	23	78.45	21	123.45	16	78.45	123.45	15	123	NA	NA	NA
111	174	2008	13	3	3	Ruiz Ramirez, Amandi	2	50	18	23	73	21	123	17	73	123	16	123	NA	NA	NA
111	174	2008	13	3	3	Santacroce, Carlos	1	45	20	23	70	21	115	18	70	115	18	123	NA	NA	NA
111	174	2008	13	3	3	Smith, Maria Alejandr	2	60	14	23	47.1	21	107.1	19	47.1	107.1	19	123	NA	NA	NA
111	174	2008	13	3	3	Verrier, Cesar	1	45	20	23	61	21	106	20	61	106	20	123	NA	NA	NA
111	174	2008	13	3	3	Galvan, Juan Pedro	1	45	20	23	52	21	97	21	52	97	21	123	NA	NA	NA
111	174	2008	13	3	3	Merello, Patricia	2	60	14	23	1	21	61	22	1	61	22	123	NA	NA	NA
111	174	2008	13	3	3	Chouela, Diego	1	50	18	23	3	21	53	23	4	54	23	123	NA	NA	NA
112	163	2008	1	13	3	Pascua Olguin, Franci	1	67	4	8	94.5	18	161.5	1	94.5	161.5	2	122	3	-2	NA
112	163	2008	1	13	3	Pina Garcia, Alejandrc	1	75	1	8	85.75	18	160.75	2	89.75	164.75	1	122	1	1	NA
112	163	2008	1	13	3	De la Reta, Maria	2	75	1	8	74	18	149	3	77	152	3	122	2	1	NA
112	163	2008	1	13	3	Tacca Conte Grand, Gi	1	68	3	8	80.15	18	148.15	4	80.15	148.15	4	122	NA	NA	NA
112	163	2008	1	13	3	Alonso, Daniel	1	66	5	8	73	18	139	5	77	143	5	122	NA	NA	NA
112	163	2008	1	13	3	Nacul, Juan	1	60	6	8	75.5	18	135.5	6	75.5	135.5	6	122	NA	NA	NA
112	163	2008	1	13	3	Castilla, Juan	1	57	7	8	76	18	133	7	77	134	7	122	NA	NA	NA
112	163	2008	1	13	3	Guzzo, Lucio	1	25	8	8	69.55	18	94.55	8	69.55	94.55	8	122	NA	NA	NA
113	156	2007	1	1	3	Vilas, Graciela	2	80	2	9	79.5	5	159.5	1	79.5	159.5	1	123	1	0	NA
113	156	2007	1	1	3	Candiotti, Jose	1	85	1	9	67.8	5	152.8	2	67.8	152.8	4	123	3	-1	NA

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number	contest	year	court	provin	date	name	gender	exam_score	exam_rank	total_part	initial_qualif	qualif_id	initial_sum	initial_rank	appeal_qualif	appeal_sum	appeal_rank	ic_final	rank_variation	executive	exec_id	
113	156	2007	1	1	3	Alonso, Daniel	1	78	3	9	72	5	150	3	76	154	3	123	4	0	NA	NA
113	156	2007	1	1	3	Fresneda, Gustavo	1	70	4	9	79	5	149	4	79	149	5	123	NA	NA	NA	NA
113	156	2007	1	1	3	Alurralde, Aldo	1	70	4	9	74.25	5	144.25	5	84.25	154.25	2	123	2	3	NA	NA
113	156	2007	1	1	3	Boglioli, Alfredo	1	28	6	9	71.95	5	99.95	6	71.95	99.95	6	123	NA	NA	NA	NA
113	156	2007	1	1	3	Zaragoza, Victor	1	25	8	9	60	5	85	7	60	85	7	123	NA	NA	NA	NA
113	156	2007	1	1	3	Martin, Andrea	2	19	9	9	41.25	5	60.25	8	41.25	60.25	8	123	NA	NA	NA	NA
113	156	2007	1	1	3	Bruno Campana, Vivie	2	28	6	9	5	5	33	9	5	33	9	123	NA	NA	NA	NA
114	147	2008	9	4	3	Lascano, Carlos	1	60	4	18	100	1	160	1	100	160	1	124	1	0	NA	NA
114	147	2008	9	4	3	Spinka, Roberto	1	56	7	18	96	1	152	2	94	150	2	124	2	0	NA	NA
114	147	2008	9	4	3	Villada, Jorge	1	60.33	2	18	84	1	144.33	3	84	144.33	3	124	NA	NA	NA	NA
114	147	2008	9	4	3	Valdes, Eduardo	1	62	3	18	79.1	1	141.1	4	79.1	141.1	4	124	NA	NA	NA	NA
114	147	2008	9	4	3	Garcia Wenk, Alfredo	1	60	4	18	80.5	1	140.5	5	80.5	140.5	5	124	NA	NA	NA	NA
114	147	2008	9	4	3	Asis, Jorge	1	49.33	10	18	85.2	1	134.53	6	85.2	134.53	6	124	4	2	NA	NA
114	147	2008	9	4	3	Navarro, Liliana	2	51.66	9	18	74.8	1	126.46	7	74.8	126.46	7	124	3	4	NA	NA
114	147	2008	9	4	3	Falcucci, Julian	1	63.33	1	18	60	1	123.33	8	60	123.33	8	124	NA	NA	NA	NA
114	147	2008	9	4	3	Belforte, Eduardo	1	56.66	6	18	62.45	1	119.11	9	62.45	119.11	9	124	NA	NA	NA	NA
114	147	2008	9	4	3	Arrieta, Marcelo	1	35.66	15	18	83.4	1	119.06	10	83.4	119.06	10	124	NA	NA	NA	NA
114	147	2008	9	4	3	Nacul, Juan	1	41.33	13	18	69	1	110.33	11	69	110.33	11	124	NA	NA	NA	NA
114	147	2008	9	4	3	Castelli, Lorena	2	52.33	8	18	56.1	1	108.43	12	56.1	108.43	12	124	NA	NA	NA	NA
114	147	2008	9	4	3	Esquivel, Carlos	1	33.33	16	18	74.3	1	107.63	13	74.3	107.63	13	124	NA	NA	NA	NA
114	147	2008	9	4	3	Cornet, Ramon	1	42.66	11	18	63.8	1	106.46	14	63.8	106.46	14	124	NA	NA	NA	NA
114	147	2008	9	4	3	Santacroce, Carlos	1	27.66	17	18	71	1	98.66	15	71	98.66	15	124	NA	NA	NA	NA
114	147	2008	9	4	3	Sarmiento, Carolina	2	42.66	11	18	54.95	1	97.61	16	54.95	97.61	16	124	NA	NA	NA	NA
114	147	2008	9	4	3	Dapueyo, Miguel	1	20.66	18	18	69	1	89.66	17	69	89.66	17	124	NA	NA	NA	NA
114	147	2008	9	4	3	Lopez Villagra, Tristan	1	38.33	14	18	42.8	1	81.13	18	42.8	81.13	18	124	NA	NA	NA	NA
115	148	2008	9	3	3	Garcia Berro, Diego	1	67	1	17	84	15	151	1	85	152	1	124	1	0	NA	NA
115	148	2008	9	3	3	Desimone, Guillermo	1	67	1	17	74.5	15	141.5	2	75.5	142.5	2	124	4	NA	NA	NA
115	148	2008	9	3	3	Farah, Eduardo	1	60	3	17	79	15	139	3	82	142	3	124	NA	3	NA	NA
115	148	2008	9	3	3	Grunberg, Adrian	1	65	4	17	70.5	15	135.5	4	75.5	140.5	4	124	2	2	NA	NA
115	148	2008	9	3	3	Amirante, Oscar	1	55	5	17	77.5	15	132.5	5	77.5	132.5	5	124	3	2	NA	NA
115	148	2008	9	3	3	Panelo, Julio	1	50	6	17	81.5	15	131.5	6	81.5	131.5	6	124	NA	NA	NA	NA
115	148	2008	9	3	3	Cearras, Carlos	1	45	8	17	81.5	15	126.5	7	82.4	127.4	7	124	NA	NA	NA	NA
115	148	2008	9	3	3	Calvete, Federico	1	45	8	17	80.5	15	125.5	8	82.5	127.5	7	124	NA	NA	NA	NA
115	148	2008	9	3	3	Gorini, Jorge	1	40	11	17	78.5	15	118.5	9	81.5	121.5	10	124	NA	NA	NA	NA
115	148	2008	9	3	3	Schwab, Martin	1	45	8	17	72	15	117	10	78	123	9	124	NA	NA	NA	NA
115	148	2008	9	3	3	Pallioti, Adriana	2	40	11	17	73	15	113	11	74	114	11	124	NA	NA	NA	NA
115	148	2008	9	3	3	Bertuzzi, Pablo	1	50	6	17	56.5	15	106.5	12	59.5	109.5	12	124	NA	NA	NA	NA
115	148	2008	9	3	3	Montanaro, Domingo	1	35	13	17	70	15	105	13	74.8	109.8	13	124	NA	NA	NA	NA
115	148	2008	9	3	3	Leon, Estela	2	30	14	17	71.5	15	101.5	14	72	102	14	124	NA	NA	NA	NA
115	148	2008	9	3	3	Righero, Victor	1	30	14	17	66.5	15	96.5	15	66.5	96.5	15	124	NA	NA	NA	NA
115	148	2008	9	3	3	Santacroce, Carlos	1	25	16	17	66	15	91	16	70	95	16	124	NA	NA	NA	NA
115	148	2008	9	3	3	Dapueyo, Miguel	1	15	17	17	76	15	91	17	76	91	17	124	NA	NA	NA	NA
116	160	2008	1	1	3	Montanaro, Domingo	1	90	1	5	78	3	168	1	82	172	1	122	1	0	NA	NA
116	160	2008	1	1	3	Baba, Martin	1	70	2	5	78	3	148	2	79	149	2	122	2	0	NA	NA
116	160	2008	1	1	3	Cordoba, Raul	1	65	3	5	73	3	138	3	73	138	3	122	3	0	NA	NA
116	160	2008	1	1	3	Charlin, Jose	1	45	4	5	73	3	118	4	79	124	4	122	NA	NA	NA	NA
116	160	2008	1	1	3	Vazquez Gil, Anibal	1	40	5	5	52	3	92	5	52	92	5	122	NA	NA	NA	NA
117	177	2008	1	24	3	Povinia, Fernando	1	90	1	12	71	3	161	1	63	153	3	123	2	-1	NA	NA
117	177	2008	1	24	3	Lopez Herrera, Edgark	1	85	2	12	68	3	153	2	80.65	165.65	1	123	1	1	NA	NA

Appendix A

number	contest	year	court	provir	date	name	gender	exam_score	exam_rank	total_part	initial_qualif	qualif_id	initial_sum	initial_rank	appeal_qualif	appeal_sum	appeal_rank	lic_final	rank_variation	executive	exec_id	
117	177	2008	1	24	3	Diaz Velez, Jose	1	75	3	12	76	3	151	3	75	150	5	123	4	-1	NA	NA
117	177	2008	1	24	3	Bejas, Raul	1	65	5	12	75	3	140	4	83	148	4	123	3	1	NA	NA
117	177	2008	1	24	3	Vallejo, Erica	2	60	6	12	79	3	139	5	78	138	6	123	NA	NA	NA	NA
117	177	2008	1	24	3	Repetto, Agustin	1	70	4	12	55	3	125	6	91	161	2	123	NA	NA	NA	NA
117	177	2008	1	24	3	Nacul, Juan	1	50	9	12	69	3	119	7	77	127	7	123	NA	NA	NA	NA
117	177	2008	1	24	3	Maturana, Ricardo	1	55	7	12	61	3	116	8	71	126	8	123	NA	NA	NA	NA
117	177	2008	1	24	3	Lobo, Bernardo	1	30	11	12	74	3	104	9	37.5	67.5	12	123	NA	NA	NA	NA
117	177	2008	1	24	3	Nieva, Ernesto	1	40	10	12	62	3	102	10	66.65	106.65	10	123	NA	NA	NA	NA
117	177	2008	1	24	3	Nieva Conejos, Maria	2	30	11	12	67	3	97	11	82	112	9	123	NA	NA	NA	NA
117	177	2008	1	24	3	Kassar, Wendy	2	55	7	12	36	3	91	12	40	95	11	123	NA	NA	NA	NA
118	178	2008	3	3	3	Cayssials, Pablo	1	80	1	28	71.65	17	151.65	1	74.65	154.65	1	122	1	0	NA	NA
118	178	2008	3	3	3	Lopez Mendoza, Jose	1	60	5	28	74	17	134	2	78	138	2	122	2	0	NA	NA
118	178	2008	3	3	3	Schafrik, Fabiana	2	60	5	28	71	17	131	3	72	132	4	122	NA	NA	NA	NA
118	178	2008	3	3	3	Claypole, Axia	2	60	5	28	68	17	128	4	76	136	3	122	3	1	NA	NA
118	178	2008	3	3	3	Pico Terreno, Javier	1	70	2	28	57.1	17	127.1	5	59.5	129.5	5	122	NA	NA	NA	NA
118	178	2008	3	3	3	Dos Santos, Marcelo	1	60	5	28	64.75	17	124.75	6	70.15	130.15	5	122	NA	NA	NA	NA
118	178	2008	3	3	3	Carrillo, Santiago	1	70	2	28	52.85	17	122.85	7	57.55	127.55	7	122	NA	NA	NA	NA
118	178	2008	3	3	3	Fumari, Esteban	1	50	11	28	72.25	17	122.25	8	73.5	123.5	8	122	4	4	NA	NA
118	178	2008	3	3	3	Cicero, Nidia	2	60	5	28	62.15	17	122.15	9	61.15	121.15	10	122	NA	NA	NA	NA
118	178	2008	3	3	3	Auge, Juan Pablo	1	50	11	28	71	17	121	10	71	121	11	122	NA	NA	NA	NA
118	178	2008	3	3	3	Seijas, Gabriela	2	50	11	28	70	17	120	11	70	120	12	122	NA	NA	NA	NA
118	178	2008	3	3	3	Civit, Francisco	1	50	11	28	65.8	17	115.8	12	65.8	115.8	14	122	NA	NA	NA	NA
118	178	2008	3	3	3	Biotti, Maria	2	30	25	28	84.5	17	114.5	13	86.5	116.5	13	122	NA	NA	NA	NA
118	178	2008	3	3	3	Barraza, Javier	1	50	11	28	64.35	17	114.35	14	73.25	123.25	9	122	NA	NA	NA	NA
118	178	2008	3	3	3	Galeano, Juan Jose	1	70	2	28	44	17	114	15	44	114	16	122	NA	NA	NA	NA
118	178	2008	3	3	3	Gilardi, Maria Cecilia	2	30	25	28	81	17	111	16	85.5	115.5	15	122	NA	NA	NA	NA
118	178	2008	3	3	3	Grosso, Eduardo	1	40	18	28	70.5	17	110.5	17	70.5	110.5	17	122	NA	NA	NA	NA
118	178	2008	3	3	3	Rota, Patricia	2	40	18	28	63.1	17	103.1	18	63.1	103.1	18	122	NA	NA	NA	NA
118	178	2008	3	3	3	Cardenas, Juan	1	40	18	28	61.5	17	101.5	19	61.5	101.5	19	122	NA	NA	NA	NA
118	178	2008	3	3	3	Lyall, Douglas	1	60	5	28	39.5	17	99.5	20	39.5	99.5	21	122	NA	NA	NA	NA
118	178	2008	3	3	3	Stupenengo, Juan	1	50	11	28	49.25	17	99.25	21	49.5	99.5	20	122	NA	NA	NA	NA
118	178	2008	3	3	3	Manetti, Adriana	2	40	18	28	59	17	99	22	59	99	22	122	NA	NA	NA	NA
118	178	2008	3	3	3	Dane, Laura	2	40	18	28	53.75	17	93.75	23	53.75	93.75	24	122	NA	NA	NA	NA
118	178	2008	3	3	3	Schurig, Harry	1	50	11	28	41.75	17	91.75	24	43.75	93.75	23	122	NA	NA	NA	NA
118	178	2008	3	3	3	Aranda, Fermin	1	20	28	28	65	17	85	25	65	85	25	122	NA	NA	NA	NA
118	178	2008	3	3	3	Sineriz, Javier	1	40	18	28	40.95	17	80.95	26	40.95	80.95	26	122	NA	NA	NA	NA
118	178	2008	3	3	3	Gerding, Hernan	1	40	18	28	37	17	77	27	37	77	27	122	NA	NA	NA	NA
118	178	2008	3	3	3	Liszczynski, Carlos	1	30	25	28	33.1	17	63.1	28	33.1	63.1	28	122	NA	NA	NA	NA
119	132	2006	3	4	2	Belforte, Eduardo	1	90	1	13	72.8	5	162.8	1	73.3	163.3	1	111	1	0	NA	NA
119	132	2006	3	4	2	Montesi, Graciela	2	85	3	13	76.95	5	161.95	2	76.95	161.95	2	111	2	0	NA	NA
119	132	2006	3	4	2	Martinez, Hector	1	80	4	13	71.8	5	151.8	3	71.8	151.8	3	111	NA	NA	NA	NA
119	132	2006	3	4	2	Cacace, Gerardo	1	90	1	13	49.75	5	139.75	4	57	147	4	111	3	1	NA	NA
119	132	2006	3	4	2	Rebak, Roque	1	55	8	13	80.5	5	135.5	5	81.5	136.5	6	111	4	1	NA	NA
119	132	2006	3	4	2	Ceroleni, Fermin	1	60	5	13	74.8	5	134.8	6	78.8	138.8	5	111	NA	NA	NA	NA
119	132	2006	3	4	2	Garzon, Mario	1	60	5	13	71.2	5	131.2	7	71.2	131.2	7	111	NA	NA	NA	NA
119	132	2006	3	4	2	Johnson, Jorge	1	55	8	13	71	5	126	8	71	126	8	111	NA	NA	NA	NA
119	132	2006	3	4	2	Larrea, Mariano	1	60	5	13	61	5	121	9	61	121	9	111	NA	NA	NA	NA
119	132	2006	3	4	2	Candiotti, Jose	1	45	10	13	61.4	5	106.4	10	61.4	106.4	10	111	NA	NA	NA	NA
119	132	2006	3	4	2	Fresneda, Gustavo	1	25	11	13	77	5	102	11	77	102	11	111	NA	NA	NA	NA

number	contest	year	court	provir	date	name	gender	exam_score	exam_rank	total_part	initial_qualif	qualif_id	initial_sum	initial_rank	appeal_qualif	appeal_sum	appeal_rank	appeal_ic	final_rank	variation	executive	exec_id
119	132	2006	3	4	2	Santacroce, Carlos	1	15	12	13	62.5	5	77.5	12	62.5	77.5	12	111	NA	NA	NA	NA
119	132	2006	3	4	2	Mackay, Kenneth	1	15	12	13	60	5	75	13	60	75	13	111	NA	NA	NA	NA

Appendix B.
R. Coding

```
# Reading and attaching the table
cuadro <- read.table("completetable.txt", header=TRUE)
attach(cuadro)

# Section 4. Methodology -----
# Table 1. Concursos by year
onlyone <- cuadro[!is.na(final_rank) & final_rank==1,] #only one
entry by contest
table1 <- table(onlyone$year)

# Figure 1. Applicants by contest
plot(onlyone$number, onlyone$total_part, type="h", lwd=2,
xlab="Contest", ylab="Participants", xlim=c(1,119), axes=FALSE)
box()
legend("topright", "Median = 12", lty=2, inset=0.05, box.lty=0)
axis(1, at=onlyone$number, labels=onlyone$contest)
axis(2)
abline(h=12, lty=2)

# Section 5. Findings -----
# 5.1. Finding 1
# Figure 2. Score's range modification in the appeals phase by
concurso
plot(number, (appeal_sum-initial_sum), type="l", xlab="Concurso
number", ylab="Score's range modification (points)", xlim=c(1,119),
axes=FALSE)
box()
axis(1, at=number, labels=contest)
axis(2)

# Mean of score's range modification
range <- 0
for (i in 1:119){
  range[i] <- max(appeal_sum[number==i] - initial_sum[number==i],
na.rm=T) - min(appeal_sum[number==i] - initial_sum[number==i], na.rm=T)
}
  range <- range[-c(2,3,103)] #excluding those without appeal granted
  mean(range)

# 5.2 Finding 2.
# 5.2.1 Variation at the Judicial Council
finding2.1 <- matrix(c(sum(initial_rank==final_rank, na.rm=TRUE),
sum(initial_rank>final_rank, na.rm=TRUE), sum(initial_rank<final_rank,
na.rm=TRUE)),1,3)
colnames(finding2.1) <- list("Unchanged", "Improved", "Dropped")
print(finding2.1)

#Table 2. Changes in the short-list from Initial to Final Ranking
#including data for the non nominated concursos
for(i in 110:119){
  executive[number==i][1] <- 1}
for(i in c(114,115,118)){
  executive[number==i][2] <- 1}
```

```

# Number of short-listed unchanged
shortlisted.unchanged <- 1
for (i in 1:119){
  shortlisted.unchanged[i] <- sum(initial_rank[number==i] <=
sum(executive[number==i] != 0, na.rm=TRUE) + 2 &
final_rank[number==i]<= sum(executive[number==i]!=0, na.rm=TRUE) +2,
na.rm=TRUE)}
  sum(shortlisted.unchanged)

#Number of short-listed that improved
shortlisted.improved <- 1
for (i in 1:119){
  shortlisted.improved[i] <- sum(initial_rank[number==i] >
sum(executive[number==i] != 0, na.rm=T) + 2 & final_rank[number==i]<=
(sum(executive[number==i]!=0, na.rm=TRUE) +2), na.rm=TRUE)}
  sum(shortlisted.improved)
#how many concursos with improved?
table(shortlisted.improved)

# For appeals replaced final_rank by appeal_rank (not included)

# 5.2.2. Variation at the executive

# Figure 3. Nominees' position in the final ranking by President
nominated <- cuadro[!is.na(executive) & executive>0,] # only the
nominated
par(mfrow=c(2,2), mgp=c(0.7,0,0), mar=c(2,2,2,1))
labels <- c("De la Rúa", "Duhalde", "Kirchner", "Fernandez")
for(i in 1:4){
  elected.vector <-
c(table(nominated$final_rank[nominated$exec_id==i])/sum(table(nominated
$final_rank[nominated$exec_id==i]))*100)
  barplot(elected.vector, ylim=c(0,50), main=labels[i],
xlab="Position in the final ranking", ylab="Percentage of Nominees",
width=1, xlim=c(0.3,length(elected.vector)*1.2+0.5), axes=FALSE )
  box()
  #axis(1)
  position <- seq(0.7,length(elected.vector)*1.2 ,1.2)
  text(position,elected.vector[1:length(elected.vector)]+1.9,
round(elected.vector[1:length(elected.vector)], digits=1))
  text(max(position),40, "n = ")
  text(max(position)+0.5,40,
sum(table(nominated$final_rank[nominated$exec_id==i]))}

# Figure 4. Nominees' position in the initial ranking by President
par(mfrow=c(2,2), mgp=c(0.7,0,0), mar=c(2,2,2,1))
labels <- c("De la Rúa", "Duhalde", "Kirchner", "Fernandez")
for(i in 1:4){
  elected.vector <-
c(table(nominated$initial_rank[nominated$exec_id==i])/sum(table(nominat
ed$initial_rank[nominated$exec_id==i]))*100)
  barplot(elected.vector, ylim=c(0,40), main=labels[i],
xlab="Position in the initial ranking", ylab="Percentage of Nominees",
width=1, xlim=c(0.3,length(elected.vector)*1.2+0.5), axes=FALSE )
  box()
  #axis(1)
  position <- seq(0.7,length(elected.vector)*1.2 ,1.2)

```

```

text(position,elected.vector[1:length(elected.vector)]+1.9,
round(elected.vector[1:length(elected.vector)], digits=1))
text(max(position),35, "n = ")
text(max(position)+0.8,35,
sum(table(nominated$initial_rank[nominated$exec_id==i]))))

# Table 3. Changes in the short-list from Initial to Final Ranking
by nominating President.

# All Presidents
# Unchanged short-listed nominated
shortlisted.nominated <- 1
for (i in 1:109){
shortlisted.nominated[i] <- sum(initial_rank[number==i] <=
sum(executive[number==i] != 0, na.rm=TRUE) + 2
& executive[number==i] > 0, na.rm=TRUE ))
sum(shortlisted.nominated)

# Improved Short-listed nominated
shortlisted.improved.nominated <- 1
for (i in 1:109){
shortlisted.improved.nominated[i] <- sum(initial_rank[number==i] >
sum(executive[number==i] != 0, na.rm=TRUE) + 2
& executive[number==i] > 0, na.rm=TRUE ))
sum(shortlisted.improved.nominated)

#By President
president.shortlisted.nominated <- matrix(rep(0,4*119),4)
president.improved.nominated <- matrix(rep(0,4*119),4)
for (j in 1:4){
for (i in 1:119){
president.shortlisted.nominated[j,i] <- sum(initial_rank[number==i]
<= sum(executive[number==i] != 0, na.rm=T) + 2
& executive[number==i] > 0 & !is.na(executive[number==i]) &
exec_id[number==i]==j, na.rm=TRUE )
president.improved.nominated[j,i] <- sum(initial_rank[number==i] >
sum(executive[number==i] != 0, na.rm=T) + 2
& executive[number==i] > 0 & !is.na(executive[number==i])
&exec_id[number==i]==j, na.rm=TRUE )
}}
presidents <- list("De la Rúa", "Duhalde", "Kirchner", "Fernandez")
rownames(president.shortlisted.nominated) <- presidents
rownames(president.improved.nominated) <- presidents
rowSums(president.shortlisted.nominated);
rowSums(president.improved.nominated)

# 5.3. Finding 3
# Figure 5. Nominees who were outliers
par(mfrow=c(1,1))
plot(number[executive>0], variation_net[executive>0], ylim=c(-
5,10), xlab="Contest", ylab="Variation", axes=F, cex=1.5, col="grey20",
pch=16)
abline(h=c(-1.5,2.5),lty=3, lwd=1.5)
abline(h=c(-3,5), lty=2, lwd=1.5)
abline(h=0, lty=1, lwd=1.5)
axis(1, at=number, label=contest)
axis(2, at=seq(-8,10,1))

```

```

box()
text(105,8.3, "Molinari, Guillermo")
text(84,8.7,"Sotello, Mirta")
text(21,8.7, "Antelo, Guillermo")
text(17,6.4, "Najurieta, Maria")
text(43,7.6, "Lijo, Ariel")
text(35,5.5, "Rodriguez, Reinaldo")

#Figure 6. Ranking for concurso 33 (this code was used to
visualize the whole data, and for that reason is more complicated than
needed).
for(i in 21){ #changed 1:119 for 21
initial <- initial_rank[number==i]
appeal <- appeal_rank[number==i]
final <- final_rank[number==i]
elected <- executive[number==i]
total <- matrix(c(initial,appeal,final, elected), ncol=4)
final.na <- na.omit(final_rank[number==i])
final.vec <- c(final.na)
part.na <- total_part[number==i & final.vec==1]
part <- max(part.na,na.rm=T)
plot(total[,1,], ylim=c(part,1), xlim=c(1,3), type="n", axes=F,
xlab="", ylab="")
axis(1, at=c(1,2,3), labels=c("Initial","Appeal","Final"))
axis(2, at=c(part:1))
box()
for(j in 1:part){
lines(total[j,1:3], type="b")#,
col=ifelse(total[j,4]>0,"red","grey10"))
} }

# 5.4 Finding 4. Impact of legal reforms
#Figure 7. Montanaro's initial qualifications
plot(sort(contest[name=="Montanaro, Domingo"]),
initial_qualif[name=="Montanaro, Domingo"], xlim=c(0,170),
ylim=c(20,90), type="b", xlab="Contest", ylab="score", axes=F)
box()
axis(1, at=contest[name=="Montanaro, Domingo"],
label=contest[name=="Montanaro, Domingo"])
axis(2, at=seq(20,90,10), label=seq(20,90,10))
abline(v=80, lty=2)
text(30, 25, "Period 1")
text(126, 25, "Period 2 and 3")

#Table 4. Mean variation after the appelas phase by period
appeals1 <- appeal_sum[date==1] - initial_sum[date==1]
appeals2 <- appeal_sum[date!=1] - initial_sum[date!=1]
table4 <- rbind(summary(appeals1), summary(appeals2))
sd(appeals1, na.rm=TRUE); sd(appeals2, na.rm=TRUE)
t.test(appeals1, appeals2) # t.test for the difference

#Table 5. Mean Variation for period 2 and 3
period2.3 <- rbind(summary(variation_net[date==2]),
summary(variation_net[date==3]))
period2.3 <- cbind(period2.3, c(sd(variation_net[date==2],
na.rm=TRUE), sd(variation_net[date==3], na.rm=TRUE)))

```

```

#Figure 8. Variation between initial and appeal ranking for
period 2 and 3
plot(contest[date==2], variation_net[date==2], ylim=c(-5,10),
xlim=c(82,178), xlab="Concurso", ylab="Variation", axes=FALSE, cex=1.2)
box()
axis(1,at=c(contest[date==2], contest[date==3]),
label=c(contest[date==2], contest[date==3]))
axis(2, at=seq(-5,10,1))
points(contest[date==3], variation_net[date==3], pch=16,
cex=1.2)
legend("topleft", legend=c("period 2", "period 3"), pch=c(1,16),
bty="l", inset=0.035, cex=0.9)

#Table 6. Rankings of the non consented nominees
assaf <- c(initial_sum[name=="Assaf, Amalina" &
contest==74],initial_rank[name=="Assaf, Amalina" & contest==74],
appeal_rank[name=="Assaf, Amalina" & contest==74],
final_rank[name=="Assaf, Amalina" & contest==74],
variation_net[name=="Assaf, Amalina" & contest==74])
monti <- c(initial_sum[name=="Monti, Victor " & contest==74],
initial_rank[name=="Monti, Victor " & contest==74],
appeal_rank[name=="Monti, Victor " & contest==74],
final_rank[name=="Monti, Victor " & contest==74],
variation_net[name=="Monti, Victor " & contest==74])
compaired <- c(initial_sum[name=="Compareid, Carlos" &
contest==110], initial_rank[name=="Compareid, Carlos" & contest==110],
appeal_rank[name=="Compareid, Carlos" & contest==110],
final_rank[name=="Compareid, Carlos" & contest==110],
variation_net[name=="Compareid, Carlos" & contest==110])
aguilar <- c(initial_sum[name=="Aguilar, Horacio" &
contest==151], initial_rank[name=="Aguilar, Horacio" & contest==151],
appeal_rank[name=="Aguilar, Horacio" & contest==151],
final_rank[name=="Aguilar, Horacio" & contest==151],
variation_net[name=="Aguilar, Horacio" & contest==151])
nonconsented <- rbind(assaf, monti, compaired, aguilar)
print(nonconsented)

#5.6 Gender dispartity
sum(gender==1); sum(gender==2) #total participants
sum(gender==1 & final_rank>0, na.rm=TRUE)#short-listed
sum(gender==2 & final_rank>0, na.rm=TRUE)
sum(gender==1 & executive>0, na.rm=TRUE) #nominees
sum(gender==2 & executive>0, na.rm=TRUE)

#-----

```

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