After the Singapore Summit on Tuesday, June 11, 2018, President Trump and North Korea’s Chairman Kim Jong-un signed a joint statement aimed at the de-nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In the discussion that follows, International Law expert Allen Weiner explains key aspects of the negotiation.

What are the most significant outcomes of the Singapore Summit between President Trump and North Korea’s Kim Jong-un? Is the world safer today?

First, we need to assess the Joint Statement issued by President Trump and Chairman Kim in context.  There is nothing in the statement that has not been included in past statements with North Korea (except for a provision about the DPRK committing to cooperate in recovering Korean War era POW/MIA remains).  Indeed, prior statements, like the Joint Statement issued in 2005 as part of the Six-Party talks that were being held at the time, had more meat on them.  Of course, there obviously have been discussions between the negotiating teams that go beyond what is in the Joint Statement, with more details, so we don’t know all of the specific commitments that might have been made.

Second, the meeting probably strengthens Chairman Kim’s position both at home and internationally, and will divert attention from the some of North Korea’s deeply destabilizing international behavior and the regime’s atrocious human rights record.

On the positive side, the meeting will without question serve—at least for a time—to reduce tensions on the Korean peninsula.  There is much that we do not know about the discussions that took place President Trump and Chairman Kim and their teams, and the long-term outcome of the process that will follow today’s meeting is also uncertain.  But we do know that, for at least a time, North Korea will not be conducting additional nuclear weapons or long-range missile tests, and that the aggressive rhetoric we have observed over the past year or so will be toned down.  This significantly reduces the risk of escalation or inadvertent—and potentially devastating —conflict on the Korean peninsula.

President Trump also promised to stop what he referred to as “war games,” the joint military exercises that the U.S. and South Korean engage in yearly. How significant is that? Can the president make this decision unilaterally?

This stated moratorium on joint exercises with South Korean armed forces is a significant step, and frankly reflects a major concession on the part of the U.S. The U.S. had long resisted North Korean calls for us to halt these joint exercises; we had refused without significant North Korean concessions on its nuclear program—we had insisted on more than the nonbinding commitment embodied in the Singapore Joint Statement.  Moreover, in his press conference, President Trump spoke about his desire to bring U.S. soldiers in South Korea back home. This raises serious concerns about weakening the U.S. security commitment towards South Korea —something that has been a long-term strategic objective of the DPRK.  Obviously, joint exercises can be resumed just as easily as they can be halted, but this was a quite astonishing concession on the part of the United States with little concrete to show for it.  If Chairman Kim is playing the long game, and does not sincerely intend to eliminate his nuclear weapons program, which certainly cannot be ruled out in view of North Korean behavior in the past, he may have succeeded in damaging the strategic partnership between the U.S. and South Korea.

How involved have America’s regional allies be in this negotiation? Do you expect them to be part of the discussion going forward?

According to press reports, President Trump has been in regular contact with Prime Minister Abe of Japan and South Korea’s President Moon.  The U.S. Government has generally consulted quite closely with Japan and South Korea on the Korean nuclear crisis.  What is less clear is how much input our allies had with President Trump and his team in what ultimately was agreed to in Singapore.  The general, one-page Joint Statement issued by the two parties presumably only reflects a small portion of what the leaders and their delegations discussed, and perhaps only a portion of what they agreed upon.

What role did China play in the summit? How significant was it? And do you expect them to have a role going forward? And did Russia play any role?

China played a significant role in the meeting and the process leading up to it.  We know that China’s frustration with the DPRK’s significant expansion of its nuclear activities, and its resentment of North Korea’s seeming indifference to China’s interests, led China to support strengthened U.N. sanctions in the Security Council and, more importantly, to step up enforcement of those sanctions.  This was a significant source of increased economic pressure on North Korea, which we can only assume contributed to its willingness to reach out first to South Korea and later the United States to explore the possibility of negotiations to address the Korean nuclear conflict.  We also know that China’s President Xi met with Chairman Kim prior to the Singapore meeting to discuss, and perhaps even coordinate positions.

Russia’s role has been less significant, but it does bear emphasizing that Russia—like China—did not veto the Security Council resolutions that increased sanctions against North Korea.  We often fail to realize that despite the rivalry between the U.S., on the one hand, and China and Russia on the other, the proliferation of nuclear weapons is not in either Russian or Chinese interests.

Presuming a deal is made, is President Trump under any obligation to bring it to Congress? What role would Congress play?

It depends, of course, on the terms of any agreements that will be concluded.  And if this process plays out positively, which of course remains a big if, we would expect to see a series of steps taken by each side over what is likely to be a period of years.  Some steps, like the conclusion of a peace treaty with North Korea, would require congressional involvement.  On the other hand, most of our sanctions against North Korea have been adopted pursuant to legislation that delegates broad authority to the President, who has the authority to adjust those sanctions.  There are some North Korea specific sanctions laws; more importantly, any effort to provide assistance to North Korea would, at a minimum, require Congress to appropriate funds.

The President has significant discretion in deciding how to move forward in the relationship with North Korea.  As President Obama discovered after finalizing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran, however, if a congressional majority opposes a president’s foreign policy initiatives, Congress can enact legislation that could make it difficult, if not impossible, for the president to move forward.

Do you expect human rights to be part of the negotiation?

That’s not clear.  My best guess is that the immediate focus of negotiations will be to try to work out modalities for the elimination of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and its nuclear and missile production capability.  If we see positive progress on those issues, and the two countries begin to normalize their relations, I can see the United States adding the human rights issue to the agenda.  But I suspect President Trump will be unlikely to jeopardize the relationship he seeks to cultivate with Chairman Kim by calling him out on North Korea’s deplorable human rights record.  If human rights do become an issue in the relationship, I suspect they will be handled by lower-ranking officials and will at most play a secondary role to the nuclear/security issues.

What do you think the long-term impact of the summit will be?

We still don’t know whether North Korea has made a strategic commitment to abandon its nuclear weapons and associated weapons production capabilities, or whether this is a step calculated to reduce international pressure on the DPRK, to weaken the security relationship between the U.S. and its north Asian allies, and to create some strategic space for Pyongyang.  What we observed in Singapore doesn’t enable us to answer the question of what North Korea really intends to do.  As the process goes forward, we must be open to the possibility that Chairman Kim, who undoubtedly believes his term as leader of his country will last longer that President Trump’s, is merely playing for time.

Allen S. Weiner is a Senior Lecturer in Law and Director, Stanford Program in International and Comparative Law at Stanford Law School.