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Track Two in a Hostile Peace: Northern Ireland

Byron L. Bland and Brenna Marea Powell

Northern Ireland's Good Friday Agreement (April 10, 1998) stands as a landmark peace settlement, yet it neither reflected nor established any stable resolution to the conflict. Northern Ireland has lurched from crisis to crisis since the Agreement, with politics as bitterly divided today as fifteen years ago. In 2013, months of violent street protests over the flying of the British flag brought the city of Belfast to a standstill. One hundred and forty seven police officers were injured during the flags protests, and over three hundred injured in other disturbances during the same year.[1] The flags protests cost Belfast business owners up to $25 million in lost revenue, and cost taxpayers over $30 million dollars to police.[2] Perhaps just as significant were the political costs in terms of damaged relationships, anger and distrust.

In the wake of these turbulent events, the authors of this chapter were asked, along with our colleagues Duncan Morrow and Jonny Byrne from the University of Ulster, to convene quiet, unofficial talks between political parties, the police, and key community leaders in Northern Ireland. The talks were held in Cardiff, Wales in May 2013. These discussions and the subsequent process they initiated came to be known as the Cardiff Process. Despite efforts to keep the talks from the public eye, they were held under the glare of media attention. At the conclusion of the talks, the participants issued a statement reaffirming a set of principles including a commitment to non-violence, support for the role of the Police Service of Northern Ireland in upholding public order, and an intent to continue the conversation.[3]

On the surface, the Cardiff statement seems unremarkable. Nevertheless, the conversations and debates that went into this collective affirmation of non-violence were probing

and consequential. From the standpoint of the stakeholders who came into the talks with very real concerns that serious bloodshed might erupt over the coming months, the statement signaled an important mutual commitment to calm rather than stoke the fires. The participants continued to meet throughout the summer, and the Cardiff process remained a point of public reference. Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Theresa Villiers was asked in a House of Commons debate to publicly identify herself with the Cardiff process, which she did.[4] Because it voiced the desire of key political factions to reject violence and keep lines of communication open among stakeholders no matter what, the Cardiff talks perhaps helped to mitigate the violence that did break out over the summer.

The Cardiff talks produced no groundbreaking policy and no breakthrough agreements promising a new day. If assessed against these standards, they might warrant a failing grade. What the Cardiff talks may have sparked instead is a growing appreciation of the role of relationships in stabilizing politics between Northern Ireland's divided communities and a greater awareness of what it will take to create these relationships. This recognition is, by no means, a small accomplishment. In fact, it is the missing element that has made Northern Ireland politics so combative and so dysfunctional over the two decades since the paramilitary ceasefires marked the formal beginnings of the peace process.

Track Two talks, like those held at Cardiff, raise important questions about the outcomes they produce, and the impact they have on larger political processes. Attempts to bring a peaceful resolution to the conflict in Northern Ireland through Track Two negotiation or dialogue processes began in the early days of the conflict and have continued in one form or another to the present day. Initiatives led by grassroots citizens, local leaders, ex-prisoners, academics, and political party members on up to government officials have used dialogue and informal

negotiations to explore new avenues towards peace, generate ideas, create understanding and build relationships. Track Two talks and dialogue processes have been comprehensive in their reach, but there is no consensus on their overall impact on the course of the conflict in Northern Ireland. In a context where the peace process has dragged on for decades, there is a long-standing weariness in Northern Ireland of 'talking for talking's sake.'

Following a brief overview of the kinds of Track Two processes that have taken place in Northern Ireland throughout the conflict and peace process, this chapter describes the approach to Track Two dialogue developed by ourselves and colleagues at the Stanford Center on International Conflict and Negotiation (SCICN), at Stanford University. In doing so, we draw on our experience as facilitators and sometimes participants in dialogue and Track Two processes in Northern Ireland from the 1990's to the current time.[5] Our approach to relational peacebuilding has informed the ideas that we have sought to impart in our dialogue and Track Two processes, the framework we used to structure the processes themselves, and the kinds of changes we thought might be possible as a result of these Track Two processes. Put most simply, the approach we present here captures what we were trying to get participants to think about, and why we thought that was important.

In our approach, the most important results of Track Two conversations lie in the realm of transforming relationships and, in particular, giving shape to peaceful relations. Our experience challenges the assumption that negotiated agreements produce peace; we maintain instead that peaceful relationships make possible successful agreements which can be implemented. In this view, the mode of transfer from unofficial Track Two conversations to the more official transactions around the negotiating table takes the form of strategies for relational transformation that are grounded in what we call the Four Question Framework. We argue that

this approach provides an effective alternative to efforts that focus on striking deals and, thus, offers a way to overcome the stalemates associated with intractable conflict.

In our discussion, to clarify a point we sometimes use the stylized language of "sides" that are opposed to one another. We recognize that in clarifying our argument, this language may also obscure important complexities, internal divisions, and ambivalences that characterize the real world.

Track Two in Northern Ireland

Since the 1970's there have been a wide range of initiatives in Northern Ireland that might be described as Track Two dialogues or negotiations. Track Two processes in Northern Ireland can be loosely grouped into three categories: exploratory talks about a way forward; local stakeholder dialogue or negotiations; and people-to-people dialogues. These categories are distinguishable from one another in terms of who participated in them, the kinds of changes they sought for the participants, who the larger audience was intended to be, and the kind of impact that was sought for that larger audience. As Peter Jones indicates in a forthcoming volume, in practice Track Two initiatives often defy scholarly distinctions between "insider" and "outsider" strategies.[6] Many Track Two initiatives in Northern Ireland sought to influence both political or paramilitary insiders as well as the 'publics' or local communities in which those political and paramilitary actors held positions of leadership.

Exploratory talks about a way forward included conversations and dialogues intended to probe whether the grounds for a political way forward might exist. Talks of this sort took place throughout the conflict, starting in the 1970s, gathering pace in the 1990's and continuing up to the all-party talks which produced the Good Friday Agreement. During the conflict, exploratory

talks were often initiated in secret: the critical link between the republican movement and the British government was developed in the early 1970's through secret contacts between a British secret service agent and members of the Nationalist community in the city of Derry.[7] Through these connections, a British Secret Intelligence Service officer ultimately helped broker the 1972 ceasefires, and met with Provisional IRA leaders Daithi O'Conaill and Gerry Adams to discuss the terms on which a delegation might travel to London to meet with British government representatives (O Dochartaigh 2008, 61; Powell 2008, 67).

Secret backchannel connections that began in the 1970's persisted. In 1973 another SIS officer named Michael Oatley built on his predecessors contacts to develop the most important and long-standing contact between the British Government and the republican movement: a Derry man named Brendan Duddy (O Dochartaigh 2008 and Powell 2008). Duddy was the instrumental line of communication to the Provisional IRA that led to the 1975 ceasefires. He was also involved in negotiations at the time of the hunger strikes, and the line of communication between Duddy and the British government, through Oatley, was maintained throughout the 1980s (Maloney 2002). In 1990 the British reached out again to the Provisional leadership through Duddy (Maloney 2002). The following year Duddy reportedly told Oatley that "the IRA might now be ready to discuss a political way forward," and arranged for him to meet secretly with Martin McGuinness (Powell 2008). This meeting was the first step towards expanding British contact with the Provisional IRA Army Council, and the backchannel talks that ultimately led to the 1994 ceasefires (Maloney 2002).

Other lines of communication were established between clergy and the parties. Long before the 1994 ceasefires, a series of secretive talks in the 1980's brought an isolated Sinn Fein back into 'talks about talks.' This line of communication came through Father Alec Reid, a

Redemptorist priest in West Belfast. Father Reid had built a friendship with Gerry Adams that dated back to his mediation in the 1970's of feuds between the Provisional and Official IRA. In the early 1980's Father Reid began a series of secret conversations with Adams, providing the first indication that Adams was "willing to discuss an alternative to the IRA's violence, and to contemplate huge ideological shifts" (Maloney 2002, 240). Eventually Reid persuaded Adams to make overtures to the leader of the moderate nationalist party, John Hume of the more moderate nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP). Although Hume rejected the idea in 1985, Father Reid succeeded in arranging a meeting between Hume and Adams in 1988. This meeting expanded into a series of talks that took place over the year and included small delegations from both parties (Coogan 1996, 333). Father Reid's backchannel efforts ultimately produced what came to be known as the Humes-Adams initiative: a series of conversations between the Sinn Féin and SDLP leaders that laid the basic groundwork for Sinn Fein's inclusion into political negotiations over the ending of the conflict.

Not all such Track Two processes at the time were a success. The public response of Unionist parties to the Humes-Adams initiative was to denounce the SDLP for talking with Sinn Fein while the Provisional IRA was not on ceasefire, and cut off contact with the SDLP. Later in 1988, a Lutheran pastor attempted to organize a secret dialogue among the SDLP, UUP, DUP and Alliance parties. Paul Arthur, a respected academic in Northern Ireland who himself convened and participated in many Track Two processes, describes what happened: "The pastor introduced, without the knowledge of any of the others, a representative for the provisional SF – and the whole thing just broke up disastrously. And then it was leaked to the media. And the people who had participated in that had to go to some lengths to save their own political careers"

(Arthur 2008, 24). By historian Tim Pat Coogan's account, this Sinn Fein representative was Father Reid (Coogan 1996, 335).

Despite these upsets, more and more exploratory Track Two processes took place as the peace process gathered momentum, designed to support the parties as they worked to find a way forward. In some cases these dialogues were structured around training or capacity-building, as with an annual series of "problem-solving workshops" for the main political parties that took place at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government during the 1990's (Arthur 2008). In other cases Track Two processes were exploratory or information-gathering exercises, as with several different delegations from Northern Ireland that traveled together to South Africa to glean lessons learned from the transition from apartheid and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.[8]

Another category of Track Two processes included local stakeholder dialogues or negotiations the sought to influence local-level confrontations. The most salient of these confrontations has been over contentious parades associated with the loyal orders (most notably the Orange Order). Stakeholder negotiations or dialogue processes have also been convened around other local issues, including the management of violence at interface areas where Protestant and Catholic communities abut one another, the flying of flags perceived to be associated with paramilitarism, rules governing the opening and closure of gates at interface walls,[9] and local development projects that had a cross-community impact (Jarman 2008). Parades, interfaces and other sites of tension took on a larger meaning and a ritualized character because of the broader conflict, and in turn gave that broader conflict meaning as well.

SCICN's direct engagement with local stakeholder Track Two processes included the Democratising Governance in Transition (DGiT) project and the May 2013 Cardiff talks. DGiT

is an initiative led by two community organizations in North Belfast (Groundwork Northern Ireland and Intercomm), which seeks to bring community leadership and civil servants together for dialogue, the exchange of information, and better policy development regarding regeneration at interface areas. In June, 2012 DGiT brought a group of community leaders representing three interface areas and civil servants from agencies such as the Northern Ireland Housing Executive, Belfast City Council, and the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) to Stanford for a week of dialogue hosted and facilitated by the authors. The purpose of the dialogue was to develop strategies for better collaboration and information-sharing between community organizations and civil service agencies in the delivery of public goods and services for marginalized interface communities.

A key feature of stakeholder dialogues and negotiations has been that individual participants often take part as representatives of stakeholder groups, in the pursuit of local objectives such as managing intercommunal violence. Stakeholders include people such as clergy, members of loyal orders, community activists, youth workers, and in some cases individuals understood to have affiliations (if unspoken) with paramilitary organizations. Participants to the process have the authority to represent different interests, as well as make good on commitments, precisely because of their institutional or organizational positions. These processes have had a direct intended audience of the stakeholder groups themselves, and more indirectly, the local communities in which they were embedded. The ideas, strategies and in some cases specific agreements that emerged from these processes may not be legal documents, but they were intended to influence the actions of stakeholder groups in clear and identifiable ways.

Two networks of community activists provide early examples of ongoing Track Two process among local stakeholders: the Springfield Inter-Community Development Project (SICDP)[10] and the Community Development Centre (CDC) North Belfast. SICDP formed in 1988 as a network of community workers on both sides of the Springfield Road interface in North and West Belfast. The interface was separated in part by one of the oldest and longest "peace walls" in Belfast, a site of regular violence and rioting. Tensions were fed every summer by a series of contentious parades through the area, and violence could be sparked by fast-flying rumors of attacks coming from the other side. SICDP brought community and youth workers from both sides of the divide together to promote dialogue and address intercommunal conflict. A network of community and youth workers at CDC took a similar approach in nearby North Belfast. Community workers struggling to quell the violence often had no idea how a rumor had started or what was happening on the other side of the wall. When violence broke out, passage from one side to the other became impossible. Communication breakdowns fueled the violence, and so in the summer of 1997 CDC formed the first cell phone network of activists (Jarman 2008). SICDP followed suit and formed another mobile phone network around the Springfield Road interface.

In people-to-people dialogue groups, participants generally took part as individual citizens, rather than as representatives of a group. As with people-to-people dialogues in other conflict regions, the goals of dialogue processes varied (see e.g. Maoz *forthcoming*). In some cases the goal was simply encounter; dialogue presented an opportunity for members of opposing communities to meet and talk with one another. There are numerous such examples of women's groups, youth activity clubs, or arts and literary groups which sought to bridge the divide. The intention was that encounter would shape participants perceptions of the other side,

reduce prejudice and hostility, and build trust. These changes among participants might in turn influence their families and social networks in similar ways.

Other people-to-people dialogue projects had more targeted objectives. An important example is Community Dialogue (CD), who SCICN partnered with from inception. A group of Unionist, Nationalist, republican and loyalist community leaders formed CD in early 1998. Led by Father Brian Lennon, a Jesuit priest, the founders of CD believed that a settlement to the conflict was imminent, but that such a settlement might not have the support among grassroots communities to support its successful implementation. They established CD to provide a forum for community members who might not otherwise have the opportunity to discuss the impending agreement, debate its merits, and take some ownership of their opinions about it. Father Lennon later wrote, "The instinct for [CD] came from a belief that ordinary people were to a large extent excluded from the peace process, especially in its early stages... [This was] a source of major problems because deals worked out behind closed doors had to be sold to the wider public" (Lennon 2004).

Shortly afterwards, events proved the CD leadership correct. The Good Friday Agreement was announced in April of 1998, and was followed by a series of political crises—the Omagh bomb, the uncertain referendum of the Agreement, police reform, paramilitary decommissioning, and the collapse of the newly devolved Northern Ireland Assembly. Between 1998 and 2004, CD organized more than 500 events, including nearly 200 local group meetings and nearly 100 one or two-night residentials. To impact the larger peace process, CD published and produced materials detailing the themes and key perspectives expressed in their events. From 1998 to 2004 this included over 30 newspaper articles, 24 pamphlets describing dialogue processes, 24 radio programs, as well as a book by Father Lennon which told the organization's

story (Lennon 2004). The Community Dialogue Executive board also functioned as something of an ongoing dialogue, and included ex-prisoners, community activists from loyalist and republican communities, members of political parties, and clergy.

The focus of CD's forums and dialogue events was to ask participants to step outside of their collective identities and respond to three basic questions as individuals: *What do you want?*; *Why do you want it?*; and *What can you live with, given that others disagree?*[11] CD's goal was partly encounter, to provide a forum for members of the community to ask and discuss these questions with "those whom they saw as their enemies" (Lennon 2004). But it was also more than this. The dialogues sought to inform the larger peace process by including those ordinary people who were excluded from higher-level negotiations, but whose active consent was ultimately necessary for the peace agreement to be implemented.

The Dilemma of a Hostile Peace

The Track Two processes that continue take place in the context of a highly contested and unfinished peace process. The political landscape of Northern Ireland today has specific features that are often characterized as 'post-conflict.' In general, the notion of 'post-conflict' refers to a period of transitions from a violent past to a new and nonviolent future that has not yet taken shape. In societies struggling to move beyond war, the term is very often a misnomer because the violent past refuses to give way and thus lingers on in almost every aspect of daily life. In truth, there is nothing "post" about the "conflict" because it still rages in many aspects of social and political life, often on the verge of serious violence.

The violence of the Troubles was intimate—played out in a geographically very small place, where both Protestant and Catholic communities could be found in every region, city and

large town of the province. Belfast, Northern Ireland's largest city, is often described as a patchwork quilt of Protestant and Catholic communities. These communities experienced some of the worst violence; nearly half of the conflict-related killing that occurred during the Troubles occurred in Belfast. Although some communities in Northern Ireland were harder hit than others, the small scale of the province's geography meant that most people in Northern Ireland were not too far removed—personally, physically, and emotionally—from people who suffered from the violence as well as those who carried it out.

In particular, interface areas where Protestant and Catholic communities abut one another have remained the site of ongoing violence throughout the peace process. Intercommunal violence persisted after the Good Friday Agreement and in fact *intra*-community violence, violence which took place within communities, also spiked in the years following the Agreement (Powell *forthcoming*, Jarman 2004). The ongoing violence has meant that for many people, the conflict and the perpetual sense of threat that defined it are far from over. Despite the ceasefires, peace agreement, and eventual return to devolved administration, persistent existential threat demands that each side continually seek to prevail over the other in large and small ways. Not to win, necessarily, but to forestall catastrophic loss.

The notion of a *hostile peace* highlights better the fundamental dynamic that shapes the volatile and tenuous relationships that supposedly "post-conflict" communities have. The communities of Northern Ireland fear and distrust one another and, therefore, hold each other in violent contempt. Each side fears what would happen if the other side, left unchecked by ever-vigilant efforts to confront and impede their goals and aspirations, got what it really wanted. In 2012, a news reporter captured a good example of this dynamic during the 12th of July Orange Order parades. Amidst loud bands and much commotion, the reporter asks a loyalist couple

from North Belfast why they are out so early in the morning confronting republicans, implying not so subtly that sleeping in might be a much more satisfying option. The woman replies, "Well, if we don't, the other side is going to take over." This brief exchange embodies the dynamic of the hostile peace.[12]

In a hostile peace, efforts to unify a divided society around common goals and aspirations—the function of both "normal" politics as well as many Track Two processes aimed at resolving conflict—fail because the collaborative relationships needed to identify and promote those common goals do not exist. While nationalist/republican and unionist/loyalist communities may both want good economic opportunities, safe streets, adequate housing, a thriving culture, and so on, each feels that it is the other community that stands in the way of them attaining and enjoying these core aspirations. To have a bearable life, both think that they must prevail over the other even in interactions that might otherwise seem trivial.

The raw politics of prevailing is played out through intercommunal confrontations like the flags protests in 2013. The contentious issues causing disputes—whether the British flag flies over civic buildings or whether an Orange parade can march down a given street—are largely, but not completely, symbolic. They are, to both sides, weighty matters of public policy having great consequence. Nevertheless, the more one looks at them from a disinterested standpoint, the less substantive they become. Life goes on much the same irrespective of whether a particular flag flies, or indeed any flags fly. No radical shift in well-being occurs if a particular Orange march is or is not rerouted. It is not hyperbolic to say that the inflamed inter-communal politics of Northern Ireland are about nothing and everything at the same time.

Relational Barriers to Resolving Conflict: When "Getting to Yes" Doesn't Get to "Yes"

The context of a hostile peace has defined our scholarly work as well as our engagement with practitioners on the ground in places like Northern Ireland. Since the Center's founding in 1984, SCICN's focus of scholarly inquiry has been identifying the barriers parties face to resolving conflict and reaching agreement.[13] In part this endeavor was a response to the mainstream approach to interest-based negotiation advanced by scholars like Roger Fisher and Bill Ury in the now classic *Getting to Yes* (Fisher and Ury, 1981). In essence, the *Getting to Yes* approach centers on an asymmetric exchange between the parties. The parties are able to negotiate deals because they evaluate their interests differently. The core transaction involves trading something that one party values more in exchange for something that the other party values more. The focus is on combining interests in ways that make the transaction more lucrative for both parties—the win-win solution. There is much to recommend this approach because it offers an effective and efficient way to reach beneficial agreements between parties in conflict.

However, the scholars who founded SCICN were struck by the many real world situations, particularly those conflicts not of a business or legal nature, in which the *Getting to Yes* approach failed to produce agreement. The *Barriers* analysis emerged from asking the question of why "getting to yes" often doesn't get to "yes". In *Barriers to Conflict Resolution*, two SCICN founders Lee Ross and Robert Mnookin identified three broad types of barriers—strategic, structural, and psychological—that prevented the resolutions of conflicts in which outcomes that would leave both parties better off could be imagined (Mnookin and Ross 1995). From a *Barriers* analysis perspective, conflict resolution often involves more than packaging interests in gainful, advantageous ways.

In the 1990s, SCICN began to engage directly with practitioners in real world conflict situations. This work suggested there was a fourth kind of barrier to the resolution of conflict. This other kind of barrier was relational, and it was fundamental. Our experience suggested that in fact the most important predictor of whether or not parties could manage to overcome the other psychological, strategic and structural barriers the Center had identified was the quality of their relationship (Bland et al 2012).

Our project with the Northern Irish organization Community Dialogue, described above, focused on the question of how grassroots dialogue impacted the larger goals of political and social reconciliation. Surprisingly, in the course of our work together we found that the conceptual link between dialogue and reconciliation was more complicated than first imagined. The goal of grassroots dialogue was greater understanding between (and within) the contending sides of a conflict. Community Dialogue's process linked the dialogues they facilitated to specific policy questions relevant at the time, such as the referendum on the Good Friday Agreement, the Patten recommendations for police reform, paramilitary decommissioning and British Army demilitarization, and so on. The purpose of the dialogues was partly to hear from others with different views, but also for participants to clarify their own views and their own bottom line regarding these policy questions for themselves. Their stated goal, as Community Dialogue often reiterated in the course of their dialogues, was "understanding, not agreement" (Lennon 2004).

Community Dialogue's purpose was to produce greater understanding, while processes of social and political reconciliation aimed at building positive and constructive relationships. The difficulty was that greater understanding did not automatically lead to the conclusion that beneficial relationships were readily possible. In fact it could lead instead to the conclusion that

beneficial relationships were actually less possible than initially imagined. Sometimes talk just convinces you of why the other side is impossible to live with.

During our partnership with CD, we hosted three week-long residentials at Stanford, co-led one week-long residential which took place in Malta, and took part in other activities in Northern Ireland between 2000-2004. Initially, these dialogues were quite fruitful, but over time they increasingly produced conversations that spun from one topic to the next, linking issues with another (because in the real world everything is connected to something else) without going deeper into what was behind this proliferation of issues. The solution was to spotlight the distrustful relationship that generated the contention and to identify the relational barriers that stood in the way of resolving violent political conflict. This approach also had the benefit of moving attention away from constructing hypothetical deals that, if embraced, might produce mutual benefits, and moving toward transforming the distrustful and hostile relationships that prevented each side from embracing these deals.

The Four Question Framework: Giving Shape to Peaceful Relationships

The assumption of negotiation processes is that peaceful relationships are the outcome of the agreements struck at the negotiating table. We observed the opposite. Distrustful and hostile relationships persisted despite a negotiation process and a peace agreement that the rest of the world upheld as a model for the resolution of intractable violent conflict. In fact, distrustful and hostile relationships constituted the most important barrier to fully implementing the agreement and resolving ongoing violent conflict. The only prospect for resolving such conflict was the creation of more peaceful relationships.

A core focus of our work became asking what peaceful relationships looked like, and how the enemy relationships that characterized intractable violence conflict might be transformed into peaceful relationships. For legal and political theorist Carl Schmitt, enemy relationships had a specific political meaning that indicated extreme dissociation characterized by violence (Schmitt 1996). Roughly speaking, enemies are those who seek our destruction. This destruction can be broad in scope and can include one's culture, one's community, one's way of life beyond one's physical being. The measure of enemy relationships is the fear one has about what "they," the other side, would do if they had their way. In C*rowds and Power*, Elias Canetti describes the all-pervasive fear that enemies inspire:

> "It is always the enemy who started it. Even if he was not the first to speak out, he was certainly planning it; and if he was not actually planning it, he was certainly thinking of it, and, if he was not thinking of it, he would have thought of it" (Canetti 1973, 73),

If hostile or enemy relationships made normal politics impossible, then we needed to identify specifically how they did so. Within enemy relationships, every conflict, no matter how insignificant, puts center-stage the question of our future existence. Moreover, every compromise, no matter how minor, is surrender to an unacceptable fate. Our survival is secure only if we check the goals and ambitions of the enemy at every possible point.

Against the background of enemy relationships, we understood peaceful relationships to be the kind of relationships that give rise to the give-and-take of normal politics. Peaceful relationships were necessary to transform enemy relationships, and to support the compromises imposed on both sides by a negotiated settlement.

We concluded that peaceful relationships take shape around four interrelated issues or questions: 1) the question of a shared future, 2) the question of trustworthiness, 3) the question of loss acceptance, and 3) the question of just entitlements. These questions are developed in other writings (Bland et al 2012),[14] and a concise statement of the framework is included in this chapter as an appendix. Here we want to describe how the Four Question Framework pinpoints the defining features of peaceful relationships and make them functional in a Track Two setting.

The first question asks: *Are the parties able and willing to articulate a future for the other side that it (the other side) would find bearable?* A shared future is one that both parties find at least minimally bearable. Indeed, the focus of the question in a dialogue setting is to map out this domain of minimally bearable futures. This imagined future may be far from what either side wants or deems fair. Rather, the defining feature of a shared future is that this future has to be bearable to both sides, even if it requires, from time to time, a little 'gnashing of teeth.'

This vision of a shared future provides the key to understanding peaceful relationships. First and foremost, a vision of a shared future is not a shared vision of the future. A shared vision of the future implies agreement and is the product of political give and take. A vision of a shared future implies little or no agreement. In a shared future, the important point is not agreement but instead that the parties are willing to bear it—that is, tolerate its deficiencies and disgraces, cope with its inequity, and suffer the injuries it imposes. In situations where there is fundamental disagreement and deeply polarized divisions, this is what peace means.

The question of a shared future is both fundamental and primary. It is fundamental for two reasons. First, little that is stable or long-lasting will occur unless the parties feel that it leads to a future that they could bear. The obvious reason is that they will use violence to oppose and attempt to undo what they believe is insufferable. Second, it is only in the context of a

shared future that issues deemed too contentious to resolve become fungible in a way that makes resolution possible. It is primary in the following sense: addressing adequately this question of a shared future is a prerequisite for dealing successfully with the three questions that give form and structure to peaceful relationships.

What continues to prevent the parties of Northern Ireland from making headway on critical issues is the absence of any vision of a shared future. Without a vision of a shared future, compromise leads to surrender and destruction because our future existence is at stake at every point of contention. With a vision of a shared future, compromise leads to the collaborative interactions that can make a better future.

The second question asks: *Can the two sides trust each other to honor commitments and to take (all of) the intermediate steps necessary to reach a shared future?* Trust is widely recognized as an important, if not indispensable, element in peace, but most people in violent conflict have little idea about what trusting the other side might really entail. At some level, they believe that it involves seeing the other side say and do what they want them to. Another way of putting it is that trust arises when one side sees the other side's acquiescence to its demands. Rarely does this happen, and so trust remains elusive.

One of the reasons that trust is frequently in short supply is because it is not grounded in a vision of a shared future. Most often parties think that they must have trust to reach a shared future, but it is actually the other way around. The most useful way to define trust in a political sense is the perception of encapsulated interests (Hardin 2002). Trust emerges when one side judges that its interest are embedded within another's in such a fashion that, as either pursues its own interests, it will further the interests of both. Indeed, 'encapsulated interests' is another way of phrasing a shared future that uses the more immediate assessment of interests instead of the

more forward-looking notion of a future. Thus, it is not simply wordplay to say that trust does not produce a shared future but instead a shared future produces trust.[15]

Contrasting trust as encapsulated interest with a calculation-based conception of trust illustrates the critical role that a shared future plays in creating trust. Calculation-based trust arises from consistency in behavior within relationships that are task orientated (Lewicki and Wiethoff 2000). A party trusts another because it can rely on (or trust) the rationality with which the other calculates the cost-benefit of maintaining or severing the relationship. In other words, I trust you to calculate your interests in a particular manner. With the framework of calculation-based trust, trust is the expectation of positive result, and distrust is the expectation of negative results.

While the predictability of another's cost-benefit calculations is an indispensable element in any trustworthy relationship, the calculation-based trust account cannot explain how trust is built out of distrust in a violent conflict situation. Lewicki and Wiethoff argue that trust can be built if the parties "(1) behave the same appropriate way consistently (at different times and in different situations), (2) meet stated deadlines, and (3) perform tasks and follow through with planned activities as promised" (Lewicki and Wiethoff 2000, 96). In other words, trust should increase as the parties gain greater certainty with respect to how each other will calculate and act with respect to their interests. Yet, absent a shared future, these activities seem more likely to lead to negative predictions and outcomes and, thus, greater distrust. The critical element in turning distrust into trust is the development of a vision of a shared future.[16]

Before turning to the last two questions, it is important to note that every negotiated peace imposes loss and injustices on the parties from their perspective. The only real peace possible between deeply divided communities is one of compromises, accommodations, and

concessions. In daily life, the concrete experience of this kind of peace pales in comparison to expectations. Every-day interactions seem not only unfair but fundamentally unjust because they lack any semblance of the reciprocity that would give them legitimacy. Because people do not feel that they receive what they are due as human beings, peace is humiliating. The institutions that govern them lack, in their eyes, validity. Each side had sought a comforting calmness but they instead experience sullenness and despondency. This background frames the third and fourth questions as closely related.

The third question asks: *How can the parties come to accept the losses that a settlement imposes on them and thus make the compromise needed to reach an agreement?* The losses and compromises entailed in any settlement leads both sides to feel as if peace requires them to give everything and receive nothing in return, while giving the other side everything and requiring nothing from them in return. Both sides wonder how this arrangement could be peace. Their perceptions arise, in large part, because neither side believes that the other is giving up anything to which it actually has a justifiable claim. While at the same time they know, first hand, that what *they* are losing is costly and painful. Both parties see things this way although not necessarily to the same degree.

Interest-based negotiation strategies like those advanced in *Getting to Yes* tend to try to find ways to camouflage losses. For example, log-rolling packages wins and losses together in a deal—you get the wins only by accepting the losses. The challenge is that, when it comes to intractable conflicts in practice, parties tend to pocket the wins and try to negotiate away the losses. Negotiations are thrown back to ground zero, if not below zero because they now have even less with which to bargain. In a violent conflict situation, the reality is that negotiators cannot frame away the losses that real peace will impose. The only way forward is for both sides

to make transparent the costs that it is willing to pay in order to live in peace and to recognize in turn the cost that the other side is willing to pay. But, as with matters related to injustice which we turn to next, the success of this move depends greatly on the peace being worth paying the required costs.

The fourth and final question asks: *How can the parties work together to alleviate or rectify the most serious injustices that the settlement imposes on the parties?* The problem here is that, while both parties believe that a just peace is the only legitimate peace, they disagree fundamentally about what justice would entail. In violent circumstances, justice is often defined as receiving that to which we believe we are entitled; and, of course, differences of opinion over entitlements are at the heart of the conflict itself. Thus each side becomes the personification of injustice to the other, and the only way to overcome these injustices is to impose one's own notion of justice.

Against this dream of victory stands the notion of a shared future. In the *Ethics of Memory* (2002), Avishai Margalit uses the idea of "exclusionary reason" to explore forgiveness (Margalit 2002, 202).[17] He maintains that forgiveness is based in exclusionary reasoning, which entails having valid reasons for in acting a certain manner which overrule other valid reasons for acting in a different manner. This idea is useful here. In a long-standing conflict, both parties have valid reasons for to seek outright victory, and the goal of a shared future is a reason to act against these reasons to seek victory. In the absence of a shared future, reasons to seek victory override other considerations. In the presence of a shared future, they do not.

Within the framework of a shared future, both sides know that peace will require them to live with perceived losses and injustices. Moreover, they tend to disbelieve attempts to explain these losses and injustice away. The better course of action is to make the case that peace is

worth the losses and injustices it imposes not only on one side but on both sides. Rather than pursuing maximalist claims of justice that may have fueled the conflict, a way to make progress is for parties to work together to alleviate the most egregious injustices. To chart this course requires vision, courage, conviction, and intelligence. It is a difficult burden that leaders in time of transition struggle to shoulder. Still, the only compelling reason to pick up this weight is the honest conviction that peace is worth paying this price.

Transfer in a Hostile Peace?

Assessing transfer in any Track Two process presents some challenges. Scholarly critiques of Track Two dialogue processes have questioned whether such processes really alter perceptions of the other side. Research has indicated that some Track Two dialogue processes in Sri Lanka have increased "sympathy" for the other side among participants (Malhotra and Liyanage 2005), while other research from the Israeli-Palestinian context has demonstrated that reported changes in perceptions may be short-lived (De Vries and Maoz 2013). Another very basic challenge in assessing transfer is that any of the most important elements of the transfer process will not, and should not, be observed by facilitators. A truism at Community Dialogue residentials and our own Track Two processes was that the most important work happened at the pub. Many of the most groundbreaking conversations among participants happen informally, outside of the larger group discussion. Participants who seem unwilling to explore new ways of looking at things in the formal dialogue process—or perhaps even to engage much at all—may be extremely engaged in informal conversations later on, discussing and processing the conversation that has happened during the rest of the day. Facilitators will likely be unaware of some of the most important thinking and discussions happening as part of a dialogue process.

Moreover, some aspects of the transfer process will take a similar shape—quiet, informal, one-on-one conversations that are out of the public eye. This doesn't minimize the need to think carefully about evaluating Track Two processes, but rather suggests that those aspects which are readily observable may not be the most important.

Nevertheless there is no question that some of the Track Two processes that took place in Northern Ireland had a clear impact on the formal peace process. Without question the backchannel links between the Provisional IRA and the British government described above achieved some degree of transfer, and the same is true of the Humes-Adams initiative. In fact these cases have made their way into the history books precisely because they proved instrumental to making official negotiations possible. There are undoubtedly other backchannels or talks about talks that went nowhere or had only a limited impact. Indeed, SCICN was involved during the 1990's in several backchannel conversations that served a useful purpose in the moment but had no far-reaching consequence. And it is important to note that even the apparently successful cases had moments of failure: Hume had first agreed to secret talks with republicans in 1985, but refused to go ahead when he learned that they planned to video record the talks (Coogan 1996, 333).

Paul Arthur, a respected academic in Northern Ireland who convened and participated in many Track Two processes, is confident these processes had a positive impact on participants. This positive impact on participants in turn had "a positive incremental effect on the formal political negotiations" (Arthur 2008, 24). As Arthur describes it, "a small group of politicians became versed in a process of shared learning," laying some of the groundwork for working together in government later on. However he is skeptical about transfer beyond this:

"It is impossible to quantify the success (or otherwise) of track two initiatives because

> once we move outside a tiny elite of politicians, questions have to be asked about its utility in the wider community. There is little evidence that many of the participants attempted to disseminate their experience to a wider audience" (Arthur 2008, 30-31).

Participants may have experienced changes as a result of the Track Two process, but those changes were not translated to a wider audience.

In assessing Track Two efforts by their impact on Track One processes, it is tempting to measure transfer by whether or not Track Two processes produce agreement leading to formal deals. It is not necessarily a bad standard, but by focusing on deal-making, there is a danger of overlooking the relational element that is a prerequisite for dealing with intractable and disruptive conflict. The Good Friday Agreement was an agreement that masked very fundamental disagreements. Republicans by and large sold the agreement to their constituents as the beginning of a process of social and political transformation. Unionists sold it to their constituents as the stabilization of politics in Northern Ireland. While not necessarily conflicting in every instance, these two understandings almost always see subsequent events in very different lights. As each side acts in accordance with its understanding of the agreement, the other will see these actions as betrayals of the spirit, if not the terms, of the agreement.

The phenomenon of agreement masking mask disagreement is a dilemma for peace processes, and the issue of a ceasefire best illustrate the pitfalls involved. While parties may sign up to a ceasefire for a number of reasons, they do so with the expectation that history will unfold in a certain way. Usually, one party thinks that events will lead in the direction of a certain outcome, and the other thinks they will lead in the direction of a different outcome. (If they agreed about the general direction of events, there would not be an intractable conflict and no need for a ceasefire.) They agree that a ceasefire is a step in the right direction, but they disagree

about what the right direction might be. In other words, they can reach agreement, but this agreement is possible only because they disagree on a more fundamental issue.

Thus measuring transfer through deals struck can end up capturing as much disagreement as agreement. The Good Friday Agreement was a huge step forward, but it was not a resolution of the fundamental issues that have divided Northern Ireland since its inception. The compromises it codified pertained to the pursuit disparate goals within a democratic political process. Without doubt, the Agreement opened a vast range of political opportunities that the violent civil war had forestalled, but it proposed no agreement on the fundamental compromises left needed to advance a stable peace. Left unaddressed were the dilemmas of a hostile peace noted above. It would be foolish to suggest that deals like the Good Friday Agreement are unimportant and do not represent meaningful progress.[18] Nevertheless, there is need for criteria calibrated to the advancement of the peaceful relationships that might make politics work.

Community Dialogue's goals for their dialogue processes were explicitly *not* linked to reaching agreement (or endorsing The Agreement). Their view of transfer was more about forms of political participation. They did not articulate their process in terms of a "theory of change," but we can reconstruct one through the logic of their process. People who had the opportunity to think critically about a policy question and discuss it with others of differing views would develop a deeper understanding of their own views and the views of others, an awareness of the experiences that had produced those views, and a deeper sense of what was really important to them and to others. This greater understanding would in turn shape participants' political views about what was desirable and possible, and also "help them to be more critical of what their own politicians said" (Lennon 2004). Father Lennon, for many years the Director of Community

Dialogue, came to believe that the circumstances in which one could expect to see even this kind of transfer were limited. He writes:

> "We hoped for a change in the way individuals understood other groups. In turn we hoped that if the participants were influential they would communicate this new understanding to others within their own group and this in turn would impact on their stereotypes. In practice this was likely to happen when a number of other factors were in place: progress at the political level, an absence of major contentious issues, and several local leaders having been involved in Community Dialogue or similar processes" (Lennon 2004).

Clearly these conditions would not have held for many periods during the peace process, particularly in flashpoint areas where intercommunal conflict and violence were ongoing.

As a Center, much of our thinking emerged from the creative tension that existed between Community Dialogue and SCICN over whether the more minimalist goal of greater understanding, versus the more maximalist goal of relationship-building, should be the focus of dialogue processes. The Community Dialogue Executive was generally pragmatic about the extent to which dialogue about bitterly divisive issues would improve one's view of the other side. They had observed that even dialogue aimed at understanding could backfire, and simply function to lay bare deep disagreements and ongoing enmity. In their view, creating understanding was not guaranteed, but it was the best outcome that could be hoped for at the time. The context of a hostile peace made larger transformative goals of relationship-building or reconciliation appear unreasonable if not foolish.

We, along with others at Community Dialogue, came to the opposite conclusion. A hostile peace and the ongoing enmity and fear that drove it meant that better understanding, on

its own, would only reproduce the conflict. Such a context requires more than promoting understanding or even striking deals. A hostile peace means that relationship and trust-building are extremely difficult, but they are the critical elements necessary to transform the situation and break political deadlock. As facilitators, we have come to understand our work as creating process that supports building more peaceful working relationships among participants, and opens up possibilities for those relationships to influence how others envision and pursue a shared future.

From a focus on relationship-building, a new and different type of assessment for Track Two processes emerges. In this case, the critical concern is to measure the extent to which participants, and ultimately their constituencies, move away from enemy interactions and towards more peaceful relationships. There are many approaches to measuring or assessing the quality of peaceful relationships that can be drawn from the Four Question Framework. The most fundamental indicator is captured in the question: *What do you think would happen to you if they (the other side) got what they really wanted?* In the context of enemy relationships, the answer to this question is unbearable. Peaceful relationships, or working political relationships, yield answers that may not be pleasant, but fall short of our destruction. As a metric to assess Track Two processes, this question has the potential to identify movement on the fundamental barriers to resolving intractable conflict. As such it presents a far more powerful tool for assessing progress than subjective assessments from participants about "how the process went" or whether it was worthwhile.

Conclusion: An Alternative to Perpetual Stalemate

With respect to the Cardiff talks, the issuing of a joint statement at the conclusion was important in what it affirmed: a cross-community commitment to a non-violent political order. Nevertheless, the statement, while constructive for managing an immediate crisis, made little headway in resolving the underlying issues that were fueling the crisis. In fact, the joint statement explicitly states that the critical issues of "flags, parades, and interfaces were not on the agenda." Indeed, if Cardiff had managed to reach an agreement on these issues, it would most likely have been an agreement that masked deeper disagreement on these matters.

These deeper disagreements scuppered hopes that the formal party talks later convened by Richard Haass and Megan O'Sullivan in the fall of 2013 would produce a breakthrough. After an extension of the deadline through the winter holidays, the Haass process concluded with no meaningful agreement on parades, flags, and historical inquiries.[19] The failure to reach agreement was not simply about the lack of effective policy on contentious issues, or the exclusion from the talks of various community voices—although effective policy may be lacking, and the talks may certainly have been strengthened through greater inclusion. The real issues fueling the political deadlock as well as ongoing confrontations on the street are the relational barriers embodied in enemy relations. As long as sizable constituencies on both sides feel that their future is at serious risk in the hands of the other side, the need to check one another's power will forestall the emergence of meaningful politics and delivery of the social, political and economic dividends that peace was meant to entail.

In affirming the centrality of relationships and trust amongst the police, civil servants, political and community leaders alike, the Cardiff process was a step in the right direction. More work is clearly needed. To be successful, future Track One and Track Two processes will need to support the creation of more peaceful, working political relationships amongst leaders on both

sides of the divide, rather than focusing on deal-making and hoping that better relationships and trust emerge as a byproduct. Beyond what happens among leaders behind closed doors, future processes will also need to create opportunities to transfer or demonstrate the effects of these relationships to the wider public, through the articulation of visions—even if competing ones—of shared futures that hold a bearable place for all in Northern Ireland.

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Appendix

The Four-Question Framework

1) **The question of a shared future:** *Are the parties able and willing to articulate a future for the other side that it would find bearable?* The shared future question attempts to create a potential domain of mutually bearable futures. No agreement, or at least no lasting agreement or substantial progress toward stable politics is possible unless both parties feel that it could live a reasonably tolerable existence if the other side's basic aspirations were to be realized. The vision of a shared future is not necessarily a shared vision of the future, which implies agreement about future goals. Indeed, the future that one side seeks may be far from what the opposing side wants or would deem fair. So fundamental is the presence or absence of a commitment to a mutually bearable shared future that we are inclined to call it the "peace question."
2) **The question of trustworthiness:** *Can the two sides trust each other to honor commitments and to take (all of) the intermediate steps necessary toward that shared future?* In the context of longstanding conflict, each side feels that other has in the past fomented the conflict, broken its promises, and otherwise proven unable or unwilling to make the types of difficult compromises necessary for progress toward a settlement. Given these sentiments, both sides face a critical question: What has *changed* to make things different? Why should we *now* trust you? In other words, both parties need to be convinced that a fundamental change has occurred, a change that now makes trust possible and even sensible, and a change that the other side is prepared to accept even if not unreservedly embrace. Hearing the other side propose a future in which one is offered a bearable place and seeing other side act in accordance with that future can be that change.
3) **The question of loss acceptance:** *How can the parties come to accept the losses that a settlement imposes on them and thus make the compromise needed to reach an agreement?* A deep mutual sense of loss pervades the aftermath of virtually every negotiated peace agreement. This is that a real peace achieved by negotiated agreement as opposed to one achieved by outright victory—one comprised of compromises, concessions, and tradeoffs—pales in comparison to the hopes and dreams that fueled the conflict. Both sides tend to believe that the settlement calls for them to make important and painful concessions and offers them little or nothing in return while, at the same time, it requires the other side to concede nothing of consequence—certainly nothing to which they were ever entitled— and grants them virtually everything they wanted. It is extremely helpful if both sides recognize and acknowledge the painfulness of the losses that the other side is bearing for the sake of peace.
4) **The question of just entitlements:** *How can the parties work together to alleviate or rectify the most serious injustices that the settlement imposes on the parties?* Every peace agreement imposes losses and injustices on the parties, and thus the fundamental issue is not whether the settlement is deemed to be just by the parties—it will not be—but whether the injustices is imposes are bearable to the two parties. The fundamental question that both parties—indeed every individual as well—must answer affirmatively is whether the benefits of the peace at hand are likely to outweigh the injustices it imposes. The common task challenging both parties is to work together to make the answer to this question *yes*.

Endnotes

[1] http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/jun/05/northern-ireland-policing-loyalist-flag
[2] The Northern Ireland business association CBI NI estimated that the protest cost city center businesses up to £15 million GBP, and the Police Service of Northern Ireland estimated the protests cost £20 million GBP to police. See http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-20972438 and http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-21706714, respectively.
[3] For the full statement and other coverage, see: http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-22593012
[4] See full text at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmhansrd/cm130716/debtext/130716-0001.htm
[5] SCICN has been engaged in Northern Ireland since the early 1990's. Our most significant engagement began in 1998 with a multi-year partnership with Community Dialogue, which included multiple dialogue processes over the course of five years. Our Track Two work in Northern Ireland also included projects such as: the Healing Our Past Experiences (HOPE) Project, a cross-community, cross-province group who had lost family members in the conflict; a series of dialogues with EPIC (the Ex-Prisoners' Interpretive Centre, a loyalist ex-prisoners' group) and Intercomm (a North Belfast based community organization led by republicans and loyalists); inter-community dialogues about a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights following the St. Andrew's Agreement; a series of dialogues with Democratising Governance in Transition (DGiT), a group linking community organizations with civil service institutions; and most recently the Cardiff Process.
[6] See discussion in Peter Jones, *forthcoming*, chapter 6.
[7] A British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) officer at the newly formed UK Representative's Office named Frank Steele made the first contacts. Steele built a strong working relationship with the Royal Ulster Constabulary Commander in Derry, a rare Catholic man in the senior RUC ranks named Frank Lagan (O Dochartaigh 2008). Through Commander Lagan's connections in the Nationalist community, Steele built ties to the republican movement.
[8] See, for example: http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-15756000
[9] For example, one initiative participants in the DGiT project were involved in was very difficult negotiations over the opening of a gate in a peace wall running through a park in North Belfast. President Obama recognized these efforts in a reference to Sylvia Gordon, the Director of Groundwork NI, in remarks he made in Belfast's Waterfront Hall on June 17, 2013. Full text available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/17/remarks-president-obama-and-mrs-obama-town-hall-youth-northern-ireland
[10] See eg "Peace through dialogue - the power of words on an interface", *The Irish News*, August 8, 2003. Available online through the Newshound archives at: http://www.nuzhound.com/articles/irish_news/arts2003/aug5_peace_through_dialogue.php
[11] Most people today think of reconciliation as involving a relationship between people. An older notion of reconciliation focused on the relationship between people and a situation or particular context like the modern world (Hegel) or the Catholic Church. CD's three questions address this older concern. See Bland, "Getting Beyond Cheap Talk: Fruitful Dialogue and Building Productive Working Relationships, *SCICN Working Paper No. 208*.
[12] The clip aired on the PBS News Hour on July 11, 2012. See: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j48XwoTeFC4
[13] SCICN was founded in 1984 by an eminent group of interdisciplinary scholars at Stanford: Kenneth Arrow (Economics), Robert Mnookin (Law), Lee Ross (Social Psychology), Amos Tversky (Psychology) and Robert Wilson (Business). The Center was originally named the Stanford Center on Conflict and Negotiation (SCCN).
[14] These ideas were initially developed in a series of working papers. See Bland, "Getting Beyond Cheap Talk: Fruitful Dialogue and Building Productive Working Relationships" (SCICN Working Paper No.

208), and Bland, "Creating a Political Language for Peace: Grassroots Dialogue Within a Peace Process" (SCICN Working Paper No. 205). All working papers available through: www.law.stanford.edu/scicn

[15] The impact of uncertainty on trust is often overlooked. In *The Human Condition,* Hannah Arendt argues that promise has the capacity to create "islands" certainty in the vast sea of uncertainty surround us. Promise erect guideposts of reliability by which we can navigate our way in unpredictable times. Moreover, promise offers the only political alternative to coercion when dealing with uncertainty. A shared future frames the interactions between conflicting parties as promises to build a mutually beneficial future. These promises lay the foundation for trust to emerge. (Arendt 1958, 243-247)

[16] Lewicki and Wiethoff identify a second type of trust that they call identification-based trust (IBT). It arises from "identification with the other's desires and intentions (Lewicki and Wiethoff, 2000, 89)." They claim that IBT depends upon the parties ability to "understand and appreciate one another's wants" to the point that each could "effectively act for the other." While I don't want to dispute that trust of this nature exists, it has no relevance to the environments of distrust that track two diplomacy seek to address.

[17] Margalit attributes this idea to Joseph Raz (Margalit 2002, 202).

[18] For a more thorough treatment of the Agreement, see Ruane and Todd, 1999, and Wilford 2001.

[19] http://www.northernireland.gov.uk/haass.pdf