Unbundled Bargains: Multi-Agreement Dealmaking in Complex Mergers and Acquisitions

Details

Author(s):
  • Cathy Hwang
Publish Date:
June 1, 2016
Publication Title:
University of Pennsylvania Law Review (forthcoming)
Format:
Journal Article
Citation(s):
  • Cathy Hwang, Unbundled Bargains: Multi-Agreement Dealmaking in Complex Mergers and Acquisitions, 164 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1403 (2016).
Related Organization(s):

Abstract

Why are some bargains memorialized in dozens of related agreements, rather than just one definitive agreement? This Article uses mergers and acquisitions (M&A) deals as a lens through which to understand why some bargains are governed by arrangements that this Article calls “unbundled bargains.” In an unbundled bargain, elements of a complex deal are broken out and memorialized in separate, but related, agreements. Unbundled bargains are common in M&A deals—deals are governed by a definitive acquisition agreement, and also by employment agreements, transition services agreements, intellectual property assignment agreements, and many other ancillary agreements that shape the deal’s terms.

This Article shows that the boundaries of a deal extend beyond the acquisition agreement and into the manifold parts of an unbundled bargain. In the process, this Article makes three contributions to the literature. First, it undertakes the literature’s first comprehensive account of why ancillary agreements exist, and shows that M&A deals are, invariably, governed by unbundled bargains. Second, it shows that unbundled bargains reduce dealmaking costs ex ante and deal enforcement costs ex post by making deals more modular and improving the quality of each modular part. Third, reframing many related agreements as one unbundled bargain has significant implications for contract theory and transactional practice. This Article argues that when parties’ intent is memorialized in an unbundled bargain, courts should take a more expansive view of what constitutes the boundaries of the deal and interpret disputes arising out of deal agreements using other parts of the unbundled bargain as context. This “permeable interpretation” default, when applied to M&A deal disputes, incorporates many of the benefits of both textualist and contextualist approaches to contract interpretation. It also motivates parties to unbundle their bargains when doing so improves deal quality and reduces dealmaking cost, because no matter how unbundled a deal becomes, all of the parts will be interpreted as one.