An Empirical Study of Transformative Use in Copyright Law

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ABSTRACT

This article presents an empirical study based on all reported transformative use decisions in U.S. copyright history through January 1, 2017. Since Judge Leval coined the doctrine of transformative use in 1990, it has been gradually approaching total dominance in fair use jurisprudence, involved in 90% of all fair use decisions in recent years. More importantly, of all the dispositive decisions that upheld transformative use, 94% eventually led to a finding of fair use. The controlling effect is nowhere more evident than in the context of the four-factor test: A finding of transformative use overrides findings of commercial purpose and bad faith under factor one, renders irrelevant the issue of whether the original work is unpublished or creative under factor two, stretches the extent of copying permitted under factor three towards 100% verbatim reproduction, and precludes the evidence on damage to the primary or derivative market under factor four even though there exists a well-functioning market for the use.

Although transformative use has harmonized fair use rhetoric, it falls short of streamlining fair use practice or increasing its predictability. Courts diverge widely on the meaning of transformative use. They have upheld the doctrine in favor of defendants upon a finding of physical transformation, purposive transformation, or neither. Transformative use is also prone to the problem of the slippery slope: courts start conservatively on uncontroversial cases and then extend the doctrine bit by bit to fact patterns increasingly remote from the original context.

This article, albeit being descriptive in nature, does have a normative connotation. Courts welcome transformative use not despite, but due to, its ambiguity, which is a flexible way to implement their intuitive judgments yet maintain the impression of stare decisis. However, the rhetorical harmony conceals the differences between a wide variety of policy concerns in dissimilar cases, invites casual references to precedents from factually unrelated contexts, and substitutes a mechanical exercise of physical or purposive transformation for an in-depth policy analysis that may provide clearer guidance for future cases.

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## Table of Contents

### INTRODUCTION

- 165

### I. OVERALL DISTRIBUTION

- 173

### II. WIN RATE

- 176

### III. THE EFFECT OF TRANSFORMATIVE USE

- 179
  - A. Factor One
  - B. Factor Two
  - C. Factor Three
  - D. Factor Four

### IV. DECONSTRUCTING TRANSFORMATIVE USE

- 204
  - A. Definition
  - B. Slippery Slope

### V. RATIONALIZING TRANSFORMATIVE USE

- 217
  - A. Traditional Justifications
  - B. Rationales in Context

### CONCLUSION

- 240
INTRODUCTION

The U.S. Copyright Act of 1976 has a swiss-cheese structure.\(^1\) While it uses only one section, Section 106, to map out the breadth of exclusive economic rights in copyrighted works,\(^2\) it devotes fifteen sections, Sections 108 to 122, to carve out a large number of specific limitations and exceptions to these exclusive rights.\(^3\) If that is not enough, Congress has further codified the fair use doctrine in Section 107 to allow courts the discretion to exempt, on a case-by-case basis, behaviors unspecified in the statutory exceptions.\(^4\) As a doctrine that defines the outer boundary of copyright exclusivity, fair use has been surprisingly ambiguous and controversial. Judge Learned Hand called it “the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright.”\(^5\) Judge David Nelson lamented that: “Fair use is one of the most unsettled areas of the law...so flexible as virtually to defy definition.”\(^6\) Judge Richard Posner explained the root of the problem: The fair use doctrine lists the four factors merely as “a checklist of things to be considered rather than a formula for decisions.”\(^7\) In other words, Congress asked judges to prepare a banquet based on a shopping list.

“The metaphysics of the law”\(^8\) has attracted some of the brightest legal minds of our time to bring forward grand theories to rationalize fair use,\(^9\) among which transformative use appears to be the most celebrated attempt so far. Judge Pierre Leval coined the term “transformative use” in his seminal 1990 Harvard Law Review commentary, Toward a Fair Use Standard,\(^10\) which focused on quotations in critical biog-

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3. Id. §§ 108-122.
4. Id. § 107.
7. Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 522 (7th Cir. 2002).
raphies. According to him, if “the secondary use adds value to the original—if the quoted matter is used as raw material, transformed in the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings—this is the very type of activity that the fair use doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment of society.”11 In 1994, Justice David Souter further refined the doctrine of transformative use in Campbell, a parody case:12

The central purpose of this investigation is to see . . . whether the new work merely “supersede[s] the objects” of the original creation, . . . or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in other words, whether and to what extent the new work is “transformative.”

This article presents an empirical study based on all reported transformative use decisions in U.S. copyright history through January 1, 2017.13 Part I confirms that transformative use has been gradually approaching total dominance in fair use jurisprudence since Campbell: While transformative use decisions as a whole account for 51.7% of all fair use decisions under Section 107, the percentage has risen closer to 90% in recent years.14 District and appellate courts in the Second and Ninth Circuits are the driving forces behind the popularity, jointly contributing 60% of all transformative use decisions.15 In terms of subject matter, visual arts, including photographs and fine arts, literary works, and audiovisual works, turn out to be far more susceptible to transformative use than music and software, which are traditionally plagued with piracy problems.16


13. For the purpose of this article, fair use decisions refer to decisions that address at least two factors of the four-factor test under § 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act and transformative use decisions refer to fair use decisions that address the concept of transformative use.


16. See Paul Goldstein, The Importance of Addressing Adequately Legitimate User Requests for Legal Access to Intellectual Property, Speech at the International
Like all grand theories, transformative use inevitably runs into the danger of being treated as the answer to anything and everything in the universe (of fair use). As lower courts stretch transformative use to fact patterns increasingly afield from the original contexts in which it emerged, i.e., critical biography and parody, the concept has taken on a life of its own, morphing in dimensions that its architects probably never envisioned. Judge Leval cautioned that transformative use does not guarantee success in claiming fair use; instead, he designed the doctrine as a threshold inquiry to quickly weed out garden-variety infringements: “if a quotation of copyrighted matter reveals no transformative purpose, fair use should perhaps be rejected without further inquiry into the other factors.”

Indeed, Justice Souter remanded the Campbell case for further fact finding in connection to factor three (i.e. the amount of music taken) and four (i.e. the effect on non-parody derivative markets) of the four-factor test, despite a clear finding of transformative use in a parody.

However, the empirical evidence presented in Part II suggests that subsequent courts have tended to treat transformative use as a shortcut to fair use. Although the win rate of a transformative use defense is 50.8% overall, it has experienced a steady increase from 26.4% before 2000 to 63.3% after 2010. Between the two copyright hubs, the Second Circuit generated a 58.5% win rate, substantially higher than the Ninth Circuit (45.8%). Most importantly, of all the dispositive decisions in the sample that upheld transformative use, 94% eventually led to a finding of fair use.

Part III explains why transformative use, a subfactor to which Section 107 does not even explicitly refer, dominates the fair use analysis. A series of correlation coefficient and logistic regression models reveal its profound effects on the four factors and their respective subfactors. Factor one, “the purpose and character of the use,” traditionally

Federation of Reproductive Rights Organizations (IFRRO) Business Models Forum and International Conference (Nov. 10, 2015), https://perma.cc/2WZ5-XR62 (“Even the quickest look at the American music industry will reveal the impact that collectives and licenses, compulsory and otherwise, can have on reducing the incidence of exceptions and limitations.”).

17. Leval, supra note 10, at 1116.
19. Once courts found no transformative use, 94% eventually found no fair use. Although transformative use appears to be nearly sufficient for a finding of fair use, it is more difficult to deduce that transformative use is necessary for a finding of fair use. More than 30 decisions outside of the sample studied were silent on transformative use and found fair use nonetheless. Notably, win rates may exhibit a selection bias: The parties tend to settle all but the most ambiguous cases and therefore cause win rates to tip towards 50%. See, e.g., John R. Allison & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, How Courts Adjudicate Patent Definiteness and Disclosure, 65 DUKE L. J. 609, 670 (2016).
20. For a great introduction of logistic regression models for social science studies, see Andy Field, Discovering Statistics Using SPSS (and Sex and Drugs
involves three subfactors—transformative use, commerciality, and bad faith. 21 However, transformative use was the only subfactor that had a statistically significant effect when factor one favored fair use. Of all the decisions where courts found transformative use, 92.1% found factor one in favor of fair use. A finding of transformative use consistently overrode a finding of commercial purpose in 91.5% of the decisions where the two pointed to opposite directions. Additionally, the bad-faith subfactor was statistically immaterial to factor one outcome in transformative use decisions.

Transformative use also diminished the weight courts allocated to factor two, “the nature of the copyrighted work.” Upon a finding of transformative use, the fact that the original work was unpublished or creative did not affect fair use outcome in a statistically significant way. The irrelevance of factor two could not be clearer than in the HathiTrust decision where the court categorically wrote off factor two without any deliberation or differentiation, even though the defendant scanned every imaginable type of book. 22

Factor three, “the amount and substantiality of the portion used,” on its face suggests a sliding scale—the larger the volume or the greater the importance of the original taken, the less likely the taking qualifies as a fair use. 23 However, the empirical evidence indicates that the actual percentage of the portion used in relation to the original work did not have any significant effect on factor three, not to mention a sliding scale. Instead, the quantity and quality of copying permitted under factor three correlated strongly with transformative use. In the decisions where courts established transformative use, a finding of verbatim reproduction of the entire work did not significantly affect the fair use outcome, yet a finding of copying the heart of the work had a modest effect nonetheless.

Transformative use controlled factor four, “the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work,” by deeply influencing how courts evaluated evidence on market harm. Of all the cases where courts found transformative use, 84.9% found factor four in favor of fair use. Courts, in dismissing the danger of market substitution, frequently referred to the fact that transformative use served an audience of a different caliber although the defendant’s audience consumed the original work in exactly the same fashion as the author had intended. The court in Cariou painstakingly enumerated a long list of celebrities who patronized the defendant, including Angelina Jolie and Brad Pitt, to illustrate what it perceived as a ridiculous accusation:

AND ROCK’N’ROLL) 223 (3d ed. 2009).

21. See Paul Goldstein, Goldstein on Copyright § 12.2.2 (2016).
22. Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d. 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2014).
23. See Leval, supra note 10, at 1122.
How could a star among stars like the defendant possibly usurp the market of a starving artist? Further, certain courts declared categorically that transformative use precluded evidence on damage to the primary or derivative market even though there existed a well-functioning market in which the plaintiff had exploited or licensed others to exploit the use. Such a position presumed that transformative use could produce no cognizable harm under the Copyright Act and stood in contrast with the nuanced approach in *Campbell*, remanding for further fact finding on factor four despite a conclusion on transformative use.

Commentators, including copyright critics, have long lamented the incoherency and unpredictability of the fair use doctrine. William F. Patry, one of the most acclaimed copyright gurus, infamously projected that the Google Books Project was unlikely to stand the fair use test on his later-deleted blog post before he joined Google as its in-house counsel. Indeed, Judge Leval intended the inquiry of transformative use to achieve “a better understanding and greater consistency and predictability of court decisions.” Now that courts appear to have identified transformative use as the one key to fair use determination, regardless of the merits in individual cases, can we at least be confident that the doctrine crystallizes fair use analysis by minimizing its indeterminacy and arbitrariness?

Part IV suggests that we cannot. While many judges have apparently arrived at a consensus that only transformative use can rescue fair use, they have achieved hardly any consensus on what transformative use actually means. We may categorize transformative use decisions into four groups depending on whether they involved “physical transformation” (i.e., adding new content or otherwise physically altering the original content) or “purposive transformation” (i.e., using the original

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work to serve a new or different purpose than the author originally intended. First, courts unsurprisingly found transformative use in 100% of the decisions involving both physical and purposive transformation, as the leading precedent *Campbell* instructed.  

Second, of the decisions where courts found physical transformation but no purposive transformation, 32.7% found transformative use. The focus on physical transformation prompted courts to balance how much the defendant copied against how much the defendant added in the context of the defendant’s work rather than measuring the extent of copying against the copyrighted work as instructed by Section 107. It virtually created a substantial *dissimilarity* test on top of the traditional substantial similarity test, despite the Supreme Court admonition against excusing anyone of “the wrong by showing how much of his work he did not pirate.”

Third, of the decisions where courts found purposive transformation but no physical transformation, 60.7% found transformative use. Courts diverged widely in their approaches to determining whether or not the defendant’s purpose differed from the plaintiff’s. Some courts purported to discover the subjective purposes that the two parties respectively had at the time of creation. This approach was not only susceptible to self-serving testimony, but also inclined to segregate or deprive a copyright market in the advent of a new technology. Other courts tried to compare the objective purposes of the original work and of the defendant’s use as perceived by reasonable observers. In practice, this approach often called upon courts to judge not law but artistic intent. Furthermore, we may conceptually dissect creative purposes into levels of abstraction. Several district courts upheld purposive transformation by focusing on a lower and more specific level (e.g., a comic versus theatrical purpose), while appellate courts overruled by focusing on a higher and more general level (e.g. entertainment purposes).

Fourth, the empirical evidence reveals a peculiarity that certain courts found transformative uses notwithstanding that the defendants copied the original works verbatim for their intrinsic purposes. Lastly, the high malleability of transformative use has given rise to a slippery slope in fair use decisions: Courts started cautiously with

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30. *Campbell*, 510 U.S. at 593.
33. See *Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp.*, 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1936).
34. See *Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.* 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
35. See infra Part IV.A.4.
uncontroversial cases involving extensively physical and purposive transformation. However, by the chain effect of analogy, they stretched the definition bit by bit toward fact patterns increasingly remote from the original context. This article presents three examples of the slippery slope: (i) from parodies that directly criticized the original works quoted, to satires that commented on society or other unrelated targets, then to appropriation arts that had no critical bearings whatsoever; (ii) from biographies that quoted the original works as historical artifacts essential to explain significant events, to companion books that did not address historical events but fictional characters or occurrences, then to photocopies that furthered the same research purposes as the authors had intended; and (iii) from reverse engineering that involved intermediate copies to develop compatible products that contained no protected expressions from the original software, to search engines that stored non-display copies of online content and presented limited thumbnail images or snippets in search results, then to mass digitization of offline content serving as a direct substitute for the original source.

Part V reveals the fundamental reason why transformative use decisions involved a high degree of uncertainty and incoherency—the concept itself was built on a dubious policy foundation. Certain courts tried to justify transformative use based on the theories of social productivity, secondary creativity, and complementary goods only to meet with strong objections by other courts. Without going so far as to hazard a grand theory, we may distill a two-step test from relatively uncontroversial decisions.

First, as Judge Leval initially taught, transformative use may play a limited role in weeding out garden-variety infringements that serve as a substitute in the primary market. An allegedly infringing use that makes neither physical nor purposive transformation is likely to compete directly with the original work.

Second, if the use is not a substitute in the primary market, a court needs to determine whether it falls within a derivative market that the copyright owner is entitled to license, i.e., a “traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed market.” None of the three traditional justifications is relevant at this step. Classifying complementary goods as transformative use is in tension with copyright control over derivative works. While promoting social benefits and secondary creativity are constitutional goals in general, it is worth noting that both licensed and unlicensed uses of an original work may in theory generate the

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37. See Leval, supra note 10 at 1116.
38. American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 930 (2d Cir. 1994).
same amount of social benefit. Arguably, a licensed use is superior for it may additionally provide an incentive to the original author. The key question for courts in weighing fair use is not whether a use is justifiable but whether a use without a license is justifiable. A defendant may establish a legitimate justification if, but for the fair use defense, uses of the kind as well as the ensuing social benefits could not occur through market transactions. \(^{41}\) Neither would a reasonable author be concerned with the unlicensed use where, absent market transactions, she could not receive any royalties in any event. \(^{42}\) Half a loaf (social benefits without incentives to the authors) is better than no bread (no social benefits and no incentives). This article presents a variety of rationales underlining transformative use decisions that all suggest a consensual license is infeasible in the market, including information asymmetry, the holdout problem, and transaction costs. Each of these rationales involves a distinct policy concern and scarcely depends on a finding of either physical or purposive transformation.

To sum up, this empirical study is positive in nature and does not focus on the merits of individual decisions from a normative perspective. Instead, it simply answers three empirical questions: First, how popular is the doctrine of transformative use in fair use decisions? Second, how much does a finding of transformative use affect the outcomes of fair use decisions? Third, does transformative use reflect a coherent standard that courts are able to apply in a consistent way, treating like defendants alike?

However, the empirical evidence does have a normative connotation. Although transformative use has apparently harmonized the rhetoric of fair use jurisprudence, it falls short of streamlining fair use practice among courts, users, and authors. Therefore, not only is the value of making such a catchphrase outside of the statute greatly diminished but the formalistic harmony may disguise the incoherency beneath and cause further confusions in copyright industries. Lower courts welcome transformative use as a flexible way to implement intuitive judgments yet maintain the impression of stare decisis. Whenever a court exonerates an otherwise infringing use out of a policy concern, it usually has no difficulty in finding a precedent of either physical or purposive transformation on which to rest its decision, given the malleability of the concept and the expansive scope of relevant case law. Nonetheless, the uniform label of transformative use tends to conceal the differences between a wide variety of policy concerns in dissimilar cases, invite casual references to precedents from factually unrelated contexts, and substitute a mechanical exercise of physical or purposive transformation for

42. Id., at 549 (“[T]he author’s consent to a reasonable use of his copyrighted works ha[d] always been implied by the courts as a necessary incident of the constitutional policy of promoting the progress of science and the useful arts . . . .”).
an in-depth policy analysis that may provide clearer guidance for future cases.

As enthusiastic as Judge Leval is about transformative use,43 he has been candid about the limitations of the doctrine. He admitted in 2015 that it was not surprising to find inconsistency in lower court opinions as judges “may be quick to reach out for what look like easy handholds that are often based on errant dicta.”44 In the Google Books decision, he refocused transformative use narrowly on “criticism or commentary on the original or provision of information about it,” and uttered the following admonition:45

The word “transformative” cannot be taken too literally as a sufficient key to understanding the elements of fair use. It is rather a suggestive symbol for a complex thought, and does not mean that any and all changes made to an author’s original text will necessarily support a finding of fair use.

This is a sensible and timely clarification of transformative use. However, if we need “a suggestive symbol,” an overarching catchphrase to refer to a complex set of distinct policy rationales that courts must evaluate on a case-by-case basis to carve out exemptions, we may already have one in the statute: it is called fair use.46

I. Overall Distribution

This empirical study relies on all reported transformative use decisions in the U.S. copyright history by January 1, 2017.47 The total population consists of 260 fair use decisions that addressed transformative

47. The data collection, mostly conducted in September 2017, contained the following steps: First, a Westlaw search in the “Federal Cases” database generated 397 decisions using the keywords “advanced: (fair use!) & (transformative! productive!) & DA (bef 01-01-2017)” Second, a Lexis search in the “U.S. Federal; Cases” database generated 387 decisions, using the keywords “(transformative! or productive!) and (fair use!)” and “Before Jan 01, 2017”. Third, an in-depth review
use, however briefly, accounting for 51.7% of all fair use decisions under Section 107, i.e. from January 1, 1978 to January 1, 2017.48

As we may see from Figure 1, the doctrine of transformative use did not draw much attention from courts immediately after Judge Leval coined the term in 1990.49 During the first four years after its publication, transformative use was only quoted once a year. However, its popularity started to skyrocket once Justice Souter explicitly endorsed it in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose in 1994.50 The share of transformative use decisions in fair use decisions jumped from 8% to 41% one year later. The percentage further increased from 60% to 90% around 2007, when influential decisions including Perfect 10 v. Amazon were handed down.51 Another boost for transformative use happened in 2012, when a series of Google Books decisions started to come out.52 The percentage appears to stabilize at 90% in recent years.

49. Leval, supra note 10, at 1106.
51. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007).
In terms of distribution by circuit, Figure 2 confirms the common belief that federal courts at the Second Circuit (27.3%) and the Ninth Circuit (32.7%) are the hubs of transformative use, jointly contributing 60% of all transformative use decisions.
**Figure 3** illustrates the most frequent subject matters involved in transformative use decisions. The three industries that transformative use affects the most appear to be publishing (29.6%), motion picture (19.2%), and visual art including both photograph and fine art (38.1%). The music (10%) and software (3.1%) industries, which are traditionally swamped with piracy problems and take the lion’s share of copyright infringement litigation, are nonetheless relatively immune from transformative use.53

**Figure 3: Distribution of Transformative Use Cases by Subject Matter**

The population consists of 56 appellate court decisions, of which 20 reversed district court decisions (for a reversal rate of 35.7%) and 11 included dissenting opinions (for a dissent rate of 19.6%). These reversal and dissent rates are not significantly different from those of fair use decisions in general.54

II. **Win Rate**

**Figure 4** introduces the overall win rate of transformative use defenses in the population sampled. Of the 238 dispositive decisions studied, 121 (50.8%) found fair use. Notably, the win rate was not evenly

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53. See, e.g., Cotropia et al., *supra* note 15, at 1993 (finding music and software are among the top three industries in copyright litigation).

54. Similarly, from the perspective of the 203 district court decisions, 37 were appealed (for an appeal rate of 18.2%), of which 16 were reversed (for a reversal rate of 43.2%).

55. See Beebe, *supra* note 47, at 575 (presenting the reversal and dissent rates in fair use decisions as a whole).
distributed over time. Before 1995, transformative use was never successful in any copyright cases. Between 1995 and 2000, the win rate was on average 26.4%. During the decade from 2001 to 2010, the average win rate soared to 54.3%. It further improved to 63.3% between 2011 and 2016.

**Figure 4: Win Rate for Transformative Use Defense over Time**
Figure 5 demonstrates circuit variation in the win rates of transformative use. If we ignore the circuits that have handled fewer than 10 transformative use decisions, the federal courts within the following three circuits enjoy the highest win rates: the Fourth Circuit (81.1%), the Second Circuit (58.5%), and the Eleventh Circuit (57.1%). The three circuits that generate the lowest win rates are the First Circuit (20%), the Third Circuit (36.4%) and the Sixth Circuit (38.5%). Between the two copyright hubs, the Ninth Circuit has a 45.8% win rate, significantly lower than that of the Second Circuit.

**Figure 5: Win Rate for Transformative Use Defense by Circuit**

*Number of cases is too small to determine win rate with certainty
Zooming in further on the Second and Ninth Circuits makes visible a peculiar phenomenon as illustrated by Figure 6: In the Second Circuit, all industries except publishing have win rates that significantly exceed 50%; by contrast, in the Ninth Circuit, only publishing has a win rate above 50%.

**Figure 6: Win Rates for Transformative Use Defense by Subject Matter in the 2nd and 9th Circuits**

III. The Effect of Transformative Use

This Part explores the most intriguing question in the empirical study—how much influence does transformative use have on the outcomes of fair use decisions?

On its face, transformative use appears to be a small portion of overall fair use analysis. First, the fair use doctrine under Section 107 has three paragraphs—a preamble, the four-factor test, and a clarification on unpublished works. Second, the four-factor test requires courts to consider:

1. the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
2. the nature of the copyrighted work;
3. the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and

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(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.

Third, transformative use is noticeably only a subfactor under factor one, among no less than nine subfactors that courts have traditionally considered (Figure 7).

**FIGURE 7: FAIR USE TOPOGRAPHY**

However, transformative use, a subfactor to which Section 107 does not even explicitly refer, appears to totally dominate the outcome of fair use analysis. Among the 238 dispositive decisions in the sample, 121 found transformative use. Of these decisions, 94% found fair use even though Judge Leval originally suggested that transformative use should not guarantee success in claiming fair use. There are 7 outliers and 4 of them were eventually overruled by appellate courts. Likewise, 117 of the dispositive decisions sampled found no transformative use. Of these decisions, 110 (94%) found no fair use, and 1 of the 7 outliers was overruled by the appellate court.

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To understand why transformative use highly coincides with fair use outcomes, we need to look into the effects of transformative use on the four factors and their respective subfactors. Our analysis starts with correlations between fair use outcome and each of the four factors in the 238 dispositive decisions sampled. Table 1 indicates that factor one and factor four highly correlate with fair use outcome, followed by factor three, while factor two only modestly correlates with fair use outcome. In any event, the correlation coefficients for all the factors are statistically significant. However, if we instead do a partial correlation controlling for transformative use (Table 2), the correlation coefficients of all the factors are substantially diminished.

Table 3 reports a logistic regression of fair use outcome as a function of the four factors. It confirms the significance of factor one, factor four, and to a lesser degree factor three. Again, factor two appears to be a non-factor. The following subparts further explain how transformative use dominates the outcomes of factor one and four, raises the extent of copying allowed under factor three, and diminishes the weight that courts allocate to factor two.

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60. For Tables 1-11, each of the four factors was coded as a trinary variable (-1, 0, 1): 1 = a finding in favor of fair use, -1 = a finding against fair use, and 0 = neutral or ambiguous. Fair use outcome was coded as a binary variable (0, 1): 1 = fair use and 0 = no fair use.

61. R² = 0.72 (Cox & Snell). X² = 299.5, p < .000. Correctly predicted 97.5%.
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**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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Table 3: Logistic Regression of Outcome as Function of Factors
A. Factor One

Factor one, “the purpose and character of the use,” had the strongest correlation with fair use outcome among the four factors as Table 1 indicated above. Of the 238 dispositive decisions sampled, 120 found factor one favored fair use, of which 114 (95%) found fair use; 108 found factor one disfavored fair use, of which 105 (97.2%) found no fair use.62

In weighing factor one, courts traditionally address three subfactors, including whether the use is of a commercial character, whether the defendant engages in any bad-faith behavior, and whether the use is transformative.63 However, transformative use evidently played a much larger role than the other two subfactors in determining factor one outcome. Table 4 indicates that the correlation coefficient of transformative use was at least three times that of other subfactors such as commercialism and propriety of the use.64 Table 5 points out that, where factor one was found in favor of fair use, only transformative use was statistically significant among all the subfactors.65 Indeed, of all the decisions where courts found transformative use, 116 (92.1%) found factor one in favor of fair use; of all the decisions where courts found no transformative use, 115 (85.8%) found factor one against fair use.66

The Supreme Court suggested an inverse relationship in Campbell that “the more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.”67 140 (53.8%) of all the 260 decisions studied explicitly echoed the teaching. The empirical evidence confirmed that a
finding of transformative use clearly dominated a finding of commercial use. Of the 82 decisions where courts found transformative use in favor of fair use but commercial use against fair use, 75 (91.5%) held that transformative use prevailed by determining factor one outcome. 68 In other words, where the defendant’s use was found commercial, a finding of transformative use (vis-à-vis non-transformative use) increased the chance of a fair use finding from 4.2% to 94.9%, among the 238 dispositive decisions sampled. Overall, commercial use coincided with factor one outcome in 133 (51.2%) of the decisions sampled, reflective of a predictor not much better than flipping a coin.

The question of whether the defendant engaged in any bad-faith behavior had a negligible effect on factor one. Among all the 260 decisions studied, only 46 (17.7%) ever addressed the bad-faith inquiry. 69 Among these, only in 2 decisions did courts find both bad faith and transformative use. Both eventually found fair use anyway. 70 Although the Supreme Court in Harper & Row emphasized the propriety of the defendant’s conduct as being relevant to the character of the use, 71 lower courts concluded, correctly at least in a descriptive sense, “a finding of bad faith is not to be weighed very heavily within the first fair use factor and cannot be made central to fair use analysis.” 72

68. A finding of no transformative use however did not appear to totally offset a finding of noncommercial use. Of the 22 decisions where courts found neither transformative use nor commercial nature, only 12 (54.5%) found factor one against fair use.

69. In the 12 decisions where bad faith was found, 5 (41.7%) found factor one against fair use. In the 34 decisions where no bad faith was found, 28 (82.4%) found factor one in favor of fair use.


72. NXIVM Corp., at 479 n.2.
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**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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<sup>a</sup> The reference category is: .00.
B. Factor Two

Factor two, “the nature of the copyrighted work,” did not have any significant effect on fair use outcome as evidenced by the fact that it coincided with fair use outcome only in 130 (54.6%) of the 238 dispos-itive decisions in the sample.73

Courts normally consider two subfactors with regard to factor two—whether the copyrighted work is creative or factual, and whether the copyrighted work is unpublished or published. A creative or unpublished work is generally believed to stand closer to the core of copyright protection and therefore allow a smaller leeway for fair use.74 Table 7 confirms the significant effects of these subfactors on factor two while the creative nature had a much larger effect than the unpublished nature (Table 6).75 Though, neither of the subfactors ultimately determined the direction of fair use outcome, consistent with factor two as a whole.76

The diminished effects of factor two and its subfactors were to a large extent attributable to transformative use. First, of all the decisions sampled where courts found transformative use, 58 (46%) explicitly discounted the relevance of factor two, for example, by suggesting that factor two “be of less (or even of no) importance when assessed in the context of certain transformative uses.”77

Second, of the 76 decisions where the original work was creative but the defendant’s use was found to be transformative, only 43 (56.6%) found factor two decisively in favor of no fair use; the rest found factor two was either neutral (10.5%), only slightly disfavored fair use (28.9%),

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73. 53 decisions found factor two favored fair use, of which 39 (73.6%) found fair use. 154 decisions found factor two disfavored fair use, of which 91 (59.1%) found no fair use.
75. R² = 0.64 (Cox & Snell). X² = 267.3, p < .000. Correctly predicted 87.7%.
76. The creative nature modestly correlated with fair use outcome unlike the unpublished nature, which was not statistically significant at all. Of the 238 dispos-itive decisions sampled, 156 found a creative work in favor of no fair use, of which 88 (56.4%) found no fair use, and 57 found a factual work in favor of fair use, of which 37 (64.9%) found fair use.
or even tipped towards fair use (3.9%). Similarly, of the 14 decisions where the original works was unpublished but the defendant’s use was found transformative, only 6 (42.9%) found factor two decisively in favor of no fair use; the rest found factor two was either neutral (28.6%), only slightly disfavored fair use (21.4%), or even tilted towards fair use (7.1%). The most telling was the fact that 2 of the 5 decisions involving a creative and unpublished work still found factor two was either neutral or only slightly disfavored fair use.

Third, of the 238 dispositiv e decisions in the sample, where the original work was creative, a finding of transformative use (vis-à-vis non-transformative use) increased the chance of a fair use finding from 1.2% to 91.8%; likewise, where the original work was unpublished, a finding of transformative use (vis-à-vis non-transformative use) dramatically improved the chance of a fair use finding from 0% to 100%.

In other words, transformative use, albeit having a limited effect on the overall direction of factor two, subtly influenced the weight courts allocated to factor two, due to a liberal interpretation of Supreme Court teachings. When the Supreme Court held in Campbell that factor two is unlikely to “help much in separating the fair use sheep from the infringing goats,” it explicitly focused the holding on parodies that “almost invariably copy publicly known, expressive works.” Lower courts gradually extended the holding to other transformative uses that have little critical bearing over the original work, to a point where the court in HathiTrust categorically wrote off factor two without any deliberation or differentiation even though the defendant scanned every type of book imaginable.

79. The outlier was White v. West Publ’g. Corp., 29 F. Supp. 3d 396, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
82. See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 710 (2d Cir. 2013) (appropriation art); Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 612 (2d Cir. 2006) (biography). Cf. Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 220 (2d Cir. 2015) (stating “the second factor favors fair use . . . because the secondary use transformatively provides valuable information about the original, rather than replicating protected expression in a manner that provides a meaningful substitute for the original.”).
83. Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d. 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2014).
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* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
## TABLE 7: MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF FACTOR TWO

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*a. The reference category is: .00.*
C. Factor Three

Factor three, “the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole,” significantly correlated with fair use outcome, albeit to a lesser extent than factor one and factor four. Of the 238 dispositive decisions sampled, 70 found factor three favored fair use, of which 67 (95.7%) found fair use; 124 found factor three disfavored fair use, of which 103 (83.1%) found no fair use.84

The definition of factor three has both quantitative and qualitative components, on its face suggesting a sliding scale in which the larger the volume or the greater the importance of the portion taken, the less likely the taking qualifies as a fair use.85 The empirical evidence however painted a more complicated picture. First, the actual percentage of the portion used did not appear to have any effect on factor three outcome, not to mention a sliding scale.86 Second, Table 8 reveals a peculiar issue: Copying a qualitatively important portion of the original work (“copying the heart”) better correlated with factor three outcome than copying the entirety of the original work (“copying the entirety”).87 It is difficult to imagine how a defendant managed to copy the entire work without simultaneously copying its heart.88 Third, Table 9 suggests transformative use, which technically did not even constitute a subfactor thereof, had the most significant effect on factor three outcome, especially where factor three favored fair use; copying the heart only had a modest effect, and copying the entirety had no significant effect at all.89 On a related note, transformative use was found in 46.6% of the 133 decisions where the defendant copied the entirety, but only

84. Factor three coincided with fair use outcome in 170 (71.4%) of the dispositive decisions.
85. See Leval, supra note 10, at 1122.
86. 33.5% of all the 260 decisions sampled addressed factor three without referring to the actual percentage of the original work taken by the defendant. Therefore, the percentage was not presented in the correlation and regression analysis for conciseness.
87. For Tables 8 and 9, copying the entirety was coded into a binary variable (0, 1): 1 = a finding in favor of fair use and 0 = a finding against fair use, due to little ambiguity in the decisions regarding whether the entirety was copied.
89. R² = 0.58 (Cox & Snell). X² = 223.3, p < .000. Correctly predicted 73.8%.
in 31.9% the 94 decisions where the defendant copied the heart. This disparity contradicted the opinion by Judge Leval in On Davis suggesting “fragmentary copying is more likely to have a transformative purpose than wholesale copying.”

The most plausible explanation for the above findings is that transformative use affected the weight that courts allocated to the other two subfactors. As a result, copying the heart turned into more of a legal conclusion regarding fair use while copying the entirety was strictly a factual finding. First, in 141 (53.2%) of the 260 decisions studied, courts in evaluating factor three inquired whether the quantity and value of the materials used were necessary or reasonable for the purpose of the copying. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Campbell, “the extent of permissible copying varies with the purpose and character of the use.” On the whole, 146 (56.2%) of all the decisions studied explicitly concluded that a finding of transformative use should correlate with the extent of copying allowed under factor three.

Second, of the 62 decisions where the defendant copied the entirety but her use was found transformative, only 10 (16.1%) found factor three decisively in favor of no fair use; the rest found factor three was either neutral (48.4%), only slightly disfavored fair use (4.8%), or even militated towards fair use (30.6%). Similarly, of the 30 decisions where the defendant copied the heart but her use was found transformative, only 10 (33.3%) found factor three decisively in favor of no fair

---

91. There appears to be a fine line between “necessary” and “reasonable.” See, e.g., Chi. Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 2003) (suggesting “reasonably necessary” rather than “strictly necessary”); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F. 3d 811, 821 (9th Cir. 2003) (“If the secondary user only copies as much as is necessary for his or her intended use, then this factor will not weigh against him or her.”); Castle Rock Entm’t v. Carol Pub’g Grp., 150 F.3d 132, 144 (2d Cir. 1998) (“The inquiry must focus upon whether ‘[t]he extent of . . . copying’ is consistent with or more than necessary to further ‘the purpose and character of the use.’”). Cf. Cariou v. Prince, 714 F. 3d 694, 710 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[T]he law does not require that the secondary artist may take no more than is necessary”); Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 804 (9th Cir. 2003) (“We do not require parodic works to take the absolute minimum amount of the copyrighted work possible.”); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1273 (11th Cir. 2001) (“The Supreme Court in Campbell did not require that parodists take the bare minimum amount of copyright material necessary to conjure up the original work.”).
93. See, e.g., Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 222 (2d Cir. 2015); Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2014); Sundeman v. Seajay Soc’y, Inc., 142 F.3d 194, 205-06 (4th Cir. 1998).
use; the rest found factor three was either neutral (16.7%), only slightly disfavored fair use (3.3%), or even tilted towards fair use (46.7%).

Third, of the 238 dispositive decisions studied, where the defendant copied the entirety, a finding of transformative use (vis-à-vis non-transformative use) raised the chance of a fair use finding from 6.6% to 96.7%; likewise, where the defendant copied the heart, a finding of transformative use (vis-à-vis non-transformative use) ballooned the chance of a fair use finding from 1.6% to 82.1%.

The Supreme Court in Sony purported to create a narrow exception for time-shifting to the “ordinary effect [of wholesale copying] of militating against a finding of fair use.” It appeared to carve out another exception in Campbell for a parody to “conjure up” enough of the original to make its critical target recognizable: “Copying does not become excessive in relation to parodic purpose merely because the portion taken was the original’s heart.” The empirical evidence shows these exceptions have increasingly become the norm among lower courts at least in the context of transformative use.


95. Of the 38 decisions where courts found the defendant did not copy the heart, 33 found fair use and 2 found no fair use, which is why copying the heart modestly correlated with fair use outcome. See Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 201 (3rd Cir. 2003) (factor three favoring fair use); Video-Cinema Films, Inc. v. Lloyd E. Rigler-Lawrence E. Deutsch Found., No. 04 Civ. 5332(NRB), 2005 WL 2875327, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).


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\(^a\) The reference category is: .00.
D. Factor Four

Factor four, “the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work,” strongly correlated with fair use outcome. Of the 238 dispositive decisions sampled, 121 found factor four favored fair use, of which 112 (92.6%) found fair use; 108 found factor one disfavored fair use, of which 103 (94.5%) found no fair use. Nonetheless, factor four actually had a slightly smaller effect than factor one did on fair use outcome in the sample (as Table 3 indicated above), even though the Supreme Court in *Harper & Row* claimed that the “last factor is undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use.”

Courts generally took account not only of harm to the original work (“primary market”) but also of harm to the market for derivative works (“derivative market”) in the context of factor four. However, Table 10 indicates that transformative use, a subfactor nominally under factor one, correlated more closely with factor four than the above two subfactors did. Indeed, of all the decisions where courts found transformative use, 107 (84.9%) found factor four in favor of fair use; of all the decisions where courts found no transformative use, 101 (75.4%) found factor four against fair use. Additionally, 121 (46.6%) of all the decisions studied explicitly highlighted the interaction between transformative use and factor four.

Table 11 reveals, while transformative use had a significant effect on factor four, the fact that the defendant’s use harmed the primary or derivative market had no significant effect, especially where courts found factor four tilted towards fair use. The empirical evidence showed transformative use profoundly affected both the direction and weight that courts allocated to the subfactors regarding market harm. Where courts found transformative use, 97 (77%) of these decisions found no

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98. Factor four coincided with fair use outcome in 215 (90.3%) of the dispositive decisions.
99. Both factors have highly significant effects on fair use outcome to avoid any doubt.
102. Transformative use coincided with factor four in 208 (80%) of all the decisions sampled.
103. Nonetheless, the fact that the defendant’s use did NOT harm the primary market appeared to be a significant predictor for a finding of fair use, while any harm to the derivative market (or lack thereof) was not significant either way. $R^2 = 0.69$ (Cox & Snell). $X^2 = 305.9$, $p < .000$. Correctly predicted 88.1%. 
damage to the primary market, and 14 (11.1%) were silent on the primary market; of the 15 decisions where courts found transformative use but damage to the primary market, 11 (73.3%) further found the damage was irrelevant to fair use determination.\textsuperscript{104} Similarly, where courts found transformative use, 57 (45.2%) of these decisions found no damage to the derivative market, and 52 (41.3%) were silent on the derivative market; of the 17 decisions where courts found transformative use but damage to the derivative market, 9 (59.2%) further found the damage was irrelevant to fair use determination.\textsuperscript{105}

Of the 238 dispositive decisions in the sample, where courts found damage to the primary market, a finding of transformative use (vis-à-vis non-transformative use) instantly improved the chance of a fair use finding from 0% to 92.9%; where courts found damage to the derivative market, a finding of transformative use (vis-à-vis non-transformative use) increased the chance of a fair use finding from 3.2% to 64.7%.

The pervasive effect of transformative use on factor four originated from a combination of several narrow holdings by the Supreme Court that lower courts applied in an increasingly liberal way.

First, in terms of the primary market, the Supreme Court suggested in \textit{Campbell} that a parody is unlikely to act as a substitute for the original “because the parody and the original usually serve different market functions.”\textsuperscript{106} It admonished that “biting criticism that merely suppresses demand” instead of usurping it does not produce any harm cognizable under the Copyright Act.\textsuperscript{107}

Lower courts subtly extended the scope of the holdings from parody and criticism to other uncritical forms of transformative use. They frequently referred to how the defendant’s works appealed to an audience

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{104} See \textit{e.g.}, Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 709 (2d Cir. 2013); Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 224 (2d Cir. 2015); A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 644 (4th Cir. 2009).
\item \textsuperscript{105} See \textit{e.g.}, American Institute of Physics v. Schwegman, 2013 WL 4666330, at *16 (D. Minn. 2013); TCA Television Corp. v. McCollum, 151 F. Supp. 3d 419, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), rev’d, 839 F. 3d 168 (2d Cir. 2016); Fox News Network, LLC v. TVeyes, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 3d 379, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). Overall, where courts found transformative use, 95 (75.4%) of these decisions found no damage to either the primary or derivative market; of the 31 decisions where courts found damage, 19 (61.3%) further found the damage was irrelevant to fair use determination. By contrast, where a court found no transformative use, 101 (75.4%) of these decisions found certain market harm one way or the other. Of all the decisions in the sample, only 3 asserted that market harm was still relevant despite a finding of transformative use, but all were overruled eventually. See Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1559 (S.D. Cal. 1996), aff’d, 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir.1997) (overruling transformative use); Castle Rock Entm’t v. Carol Publ’g Gp., 955 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d 150 F.3d 152 (2d. Cir. 1998) (overruling transformative use); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (N.D. Ga. 2001), rev’d, 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001) (overruling fair use).
\item \textsuperscript{106} \textit{Campbell} 510 U.S. at 591.
\item \textsuperscript{107} Id. at 592.
\end{itemize}
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of a totally different caliber from the plaintiff’s although their respective audiences consumed the works in exactly the same fashion. For example, the court in Cariou pointed to the fact that the original author earned just over $8000 in royalties while the defendant sold millions of dollars’ worth of appropriation art to the rich and famous. The court painstakingly enumerated a long list of celebrity patrons such as Angelina Jolie and Brad Pitt to illuminate what it perceived as a ridiculous accusation: How could a star among stars like the defendant possibly usurp the market of a starving artist?

Second, the Supreme Court instructed in Campbell that, although “the licensing of derivatives is an important economic incentive to the creation of originals... the market for potential derivative uses includes only those that creators of original works would in general develop or license others to develop.” Its holding lent support to the position of the Texaco decision: Courts must consider “only traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed markets” in evaluating an impact on potential licensing revenues. This limitation of cognizable derivative market makes sense to the extent that it is circular reasoning to automatically uphold lost royalties as conclusive evidence on market harm disfavoring fair use. The copyright owner would be entitled to license royalties only if the court found no fair use in the first place.

Conceptually, the best evidence to establish that a derivative market is “traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed” is the very existence of a well-functioning market that the copyright owner has exploited or licensed others to exploit. However, lower courts regularly disregarded such evidence once transformative use was found, based on the assumption that “copyright owners may not preempt ex-


109. Cariou, 714 F.3d at 709.

110. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592-593.

111. American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 930 (2d Cir. 1994).

112. Leval, supra note 10, at 1124 (“By definition every fair use involves some loss of royalty revenue because the secondary user has not paid royalties.”). See also, Mark A. Lemley, Should a Licensing Market Require Licensing?, 70 L. & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 185, 190 (2007).

ploitation of transformative markets... by actually developing or licensing others to develop those markets.” 114 This belief prompted certain courts to take a step further in recent decisions to categorically discount any damage to the derivative market.115

Third, in an attempt to negate its own holding in Sony that established a presumption of market harm against commercial use,116 the Supreme Court clarified in Campbell: When “the second use is transformative, market substitution is at least less certain, and market harm may not be so readily inferred.”117 It criticized lower courts for taking the presumption out of context, as it was never intended to apply outside the narrow scope of “verbatim copying of the original in its entirety for commercial purposes.”118 Ironically, lower courts took this new teaching out of context and pushed it to the extreme by turning transformative use into a presumption of no market harm cognizable under factor four.119

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114. Castle Rock Entm’t v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 150 F.3d 132, 145 n. 11 (2d Cir. 1998).

115. See, e.g., Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 614 (2d Cir. 2006); Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d in part, vac’d in part, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014); Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 709 (2d Cir. 2013); Am. Inst. of Physics v. Schwegman, 2013 WL 4666330, at *16 (D. Minn. 2013); Rivera v. Mendez & Compania, 988 F. Supp. 2d 159, 171 (D.P.R. 2013); TCA Television Corp. v. McCollum, 151 F. Supp. 3d 419, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), rev’d, 839 F. 3d 168 (2d Cir. 2016). Table 11 confirmed that a finding of damage to the derivative market (or lack thereof) did not significantly affect fair use outcome, unlike damage to the primary market.


118. Id.

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**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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a. The reference category is: .00.
IV. DECONSTRUCTING TRANSFORMATIVE USE

A. Definition

As the empirical evidence indicated above, transformative use, a subfactor that does not ever appear in Section 107, has gradually come to dominate fair use analysis.\(^ {120}\) It essentially turned the four-factor test into a one-factor test. This article, descriptive in nature, will not judge whether the trend is good or bad from a normative perspective.

Nonetheless, since we have now identified the one key to fair use determination, can we at least be confident that transformative use simplifies the fair use analysis by increasing its certainty and predictability? The empirical evidence suggests that we cannot. Although many judges have an apparent consensus that only transformative use can rescue fair use, they hardly have any consensus on what transformative use actually means.\(^ {121}\)

The classic definition of transformative use appears in *Campbell*, a carefully-worded decision by Justice Souter:\(^ {122}\)

> The central purpose of this investigation is to see . . . whether the new work merely “supersede[s] the objects” of the original creation, . . . or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in other words, whether and to what extent the new work is “transformative.”

The definition appears to include two elements: First, the defendant’s use added new content or otherwise physically altered the original content, which I refer to as “physical transformation.” Second, the defendant used the original work to serve a new or different purpose than the author originally intended, which I refer to as “purposive transformation.”

The natural question is whether a court needs to find both physical and purposive transformation to establish transformative use. The answer is clearly no according to the decisions studied. Figure 8 presents

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120. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). A logistic regression of fair use outcome as a function of all the subfactors bolsters the empirical findings: Transformative use had the largest effect on fair use outcome, the legal conclusion that the defendant did not copy the heart of the original or did not damage the primary market of the original had certain modest effects, and none of the other subfactors were statistically significant.

121. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.

122. *Campbell*, 510 U.S. at 579.
the interaction between physical transformation and purposive transformation, which we are going to analyze in more detail in the following subparts.

FIGURE 8: INTERACTION BETWEEN PHYSICAL AND PURPOSIVE TRANSFORMATION

<table>
<thead>
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<tr>
<td>Physical Transformation</td>
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<td>16/49 (32.7%) Cariou v. Prince</td>
</tr>
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<td>37/61 (60.7%) Authors Guild v. Google</td>
<td>5/82 (6.1%) Righthaven v. Jama</td>
</tr>
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</table>

1. Physical Transformation and Purposive Transformation

The easiest decisions are those where the defendant engaged in both physical and purposive transformation. Unsurprisingly, courts found transformative use in all of the 68 decisions in this scenario. *Campbell* is undoubtedly the leading precedent among similar parody/criticism decisions: The defendant borrowed the first sentence and bass riff of Roy Orbison’s song, “Oh, Pretty Woman,” to create a parody that contained substantial new creative content and ridiculed the naivete of the original regarding street life.123

Another example is the *Arrow* decision where the defendant produced a biographical film titled *Lovelace* to document the life and relationship of Linda Lovelace, who starred in a high-profile pornographic film *Deep Throat*.124 The biography recreated three of the most famous scenes, nearly four minutes, from a sixty-one-minute original. The borrowings were highly transformative to the extent that the biography did not recycle any old footage but had new actors depicting the filming process of these scenes for the new purpose of juxtaposing the public’s overwhelmingly positive reception to the original with Lovelace’s emotional sufferings behind the scenes.

2. Physical Transformation without Purposive Transformation

Of the 49 decisions where courts found physical transformation but no purposive transformation, only 16 (32.7%) found transformative use. The typical example is *Cariou*: Although the defendant added new expressive content to the borrowed materials, he admitted that he did not criticize or otherwise comment on the original photos.125 The court

123. *Id.*
125. Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 706 (2d Cir. 2013). See also Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1177 (9th Cir. 2013) (emphasizing “[i]n the typical ‘non-
found transformative use on the ground of new esthetics reasonably perceivable from the defendant’s works, even though they did not serve any purpose different from the esthetic and decorative purposes of the originals.

In addition to appropriation art cases, the scenario often happened in the context of quotation cases where the defendant quoted previous research in a new research project in a related field. For example, the defendant in Williamson quoted brief passages from the book Patton’s Principles: A Handbook for Managers Who Mean It! in his own book on General Patton’s philosophy and management strategies named Patton on Leadership: Strategic Lessons for Corporate Warfare. The court found the quotation was transformative because it was consistent with the “way that any academic or scientific scholar uses the work of prior scholars, building on the earlier work and using its ideas to create something new.”

 Courts that attached importance to physical transformation were inclined to balance how much the defendant copied against how much the defendant added, within the context of the defendant’s work. The district court in Seltzer opined that, even though Green Day used virtually the entirety of the original image “Scream Icon” in a video backdrop for their concert, it “was but one of many visual elements used to convey the mood, tone, and meaning of Green Day’s [work].” Accordingly, the court found factor three in favor of fair use even though the Copyright Act only instructs courts to consider the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work, rather than the defendant’s work. Such a holding is tantamount to creating a substantial dissimilarity test on top of the traditional substantial similarity test. It contradicts the principle established by the Supreme Court: “No plagiarist can excuse the wrong by showing how much of his work he did not pirate.”

transformation‘ case, the use is one which makes no alteration to the expressive content or message of the original work.”).


128. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). See, e.g., Cariou, 714 F. 3d at 710 (“Prince transformed those photographs into something new and different and, as a result, [factor three] weighs heavily in Prince’s favor.”); Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 611 (2d Cir. 2006) (“The extent to which unlicensed material is used in the challenged work can be a factor in determining whether a biographer’s use of original materials has been sufficiently transformative to constitute fair use.”); Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 2016 WL 3181206, at *10 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (“The number of lines of code duplicated constituted a tiny fraction of one percent of the copyrighted works (and even less of Android, for that matter.”).

129. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.

3. **Purposive Transformation without Physical Transformation**

It appears that purposive transformation had a stronger effect than physical transformation on a finding of transformative use. Of the 61 decisions where courts found purposive transformation but no physical transformation, 37 (60.7%) found transformative use as opposed to 32.7% in the previous scenario. Taking the Google Books Project as an example, Google has scanned millions of books provided by publishers and libraries since 2004 without adding any new expressive content. Nonetheless, the courts held that the wholesale copying constituted transformative use because Google used the digitized corpus primarily for non-display purposes including development of search engines and data mining tools.

Theoretically, there may be two approaches to determining whether or not the defendant’s purpose is different from the plaintiff’s. First, a court may try to discover the subjective purposes that the two parties respectively had at the time of creation. This subjective approach has obvious difficulties. For one thing, courts inevitably wrestle with self-serving statements and post-hoc justifications. For another, the subjective approach tends to tip towards fair use whenever the defendant’s use stemmed from a new technology that arrived after the creation of the original work because it was arguably impossible for the plaintiff to foresee the new use \textit{ex ante}. The approach would run the risk of unduly segregating the copyright market if carried to its logical conclusion: All the works created before the advent of a new technology would be subject to fair use while those created afterwards would likely enjoy copyright protection to the extent that the authors would be in a better position to claim a subjective purpose of exploiting the use. A greater danger would be that, once a court declared a new use was fair because the original author could not have foreseen the use, it established a precedent that excuses all future uses of the kind although future authors

\begin{quote}
132. See, e.g., Blanch v. Koons, 467 F. 3d 244, 253 (2d Cir. 2006) (relying extensively on the defendant’s testimony); Henley v. DeVore, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1156 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (defendant purporting to use the plaintiff’s song in a campaign video for the purpose of criticizing the plaintiff and other Obama supporters, and plaintiff claiming he never supported President Obama); Fuentes v. Mega Media Holdings, Inc., 2011 WL 2601356, at *7 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (The defendant incorporated unpublished footages of more than an hour in length for a proclaimed commentary purpose.).
133. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 600 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“We should not make it easy for musicians to exploit existing works and then later claim that their rendition was a valuable commentary on the original.”).
\end{quote}
will be aware of the new use in all likelihood precisely because of the litigation. However, if history is any guidance, courts did not categorically exempt new uses just because they were unforeseeable to authors at the time of creation, especially where the new uses could potentially swallow copyright markets. The doctrine of equivalents under patent law provides a useful analogy. As the Supreme Court clarified in *Festo*, a patent claim may cover a new technology that may have been unforeseeable at the time of the application but was an obvious equivalent at the time of infringement (often referred to as “an after-arising technology”) despite prosecution history estoppel.

Second, a court may compare the objective purposes of the original work and of the defendant’s use as perceived by reasonable observers. This objective approach has its own limitations. As courts adjudicated the vast majority of transformative use cases at motion-to-dismiss, preliminary injunction, and summary judgment stages, judges of law would often be called on to serve as judges of artistic views without the benefit of extensive evidence on record. As Justice Holmes pointed out, “it would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of [art], outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.” Furthermore, the objective approach, by using the perspectives of average reasonable persons as a benchmark, could penalize pioneer artists with extraordinary visions ahead of their times. Finally, the objective approach may not necessarily avoid the problem of unforeseeable new technologies.

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135. Cf. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 US 417, 449 (1984) (finding fair use because the plaintiff could not clearly explain why time-shifting was harmful to a copyright market); Fox Broad. Co., Inc. v. Dish Network LLC, 747 F. 3d 1060, 1069 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding fair use despite clear evidence that consumers engaged in commercial skipping).


140. Of the 260 decisions in the sample, 21 (8.1%) were at the motion-to-dismiss stage, 33 (12.7%) at the preliminary injunction stage, and 178 (68.5%) at the summary judgement stage.


142. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
Purposive transformation is a highly malleable standard that courts may adapt to varied fact patterns, which is probably one of the reasons why purposive transformation gains popularity in fair use decisions notwithstanding its limitations. For instance, we may conceptually dissect creative purposes into levels of abstraction. If a court focuses on a lower and more specific level, it often appears that the two parties have completely different purposes. If a court focuses on a higher and more general level, it is much easier to tell that the works essentially serve the same purpose. Taking the TCA decisions as an example, the defendant borrowed a comedy routine in a Broadway play. The district court focused on a lower level by observing that, while the original work was a lighthearted comedy, its use in the play served a different purpose, i.e., as a McGuffin to set up the plot in a dark comedy. Therefore, it found the use was transformative. By contrast, the appellate court focused on a higher level by concluding that both the original work and the defendant’s use served the comic purpose. It eventually reversed the finding of transformative use.

Another example is the Castle Rock decisions where the defendant published a book titled *The Seinfeld Aptitude Test* that contained trivia questions regarding the popular sitcom *Seinfeld*. The district court recognized that the trivia book qualified as a criticism or comment on *Seinfeld* at a more specific level. The appellate court overruled the finding of transformative use because the sitcom and the trivia book both served the entertainment purpose at a more general level.

Courts found purposive transformation also in cases where the defendant extended the enjoyment of the original work to a new audience even though the new audience consumed the original work in exactly the same fashion. A typical example is the Swatch decision where the plaintiff convened a conference call to go through its earnings report with a limited number of invited investment analysts. The defendant obtained a sound recording of the conference call without permission and disseminated it to subscribers of its financial news, a potentially wider group of investors and analysts. The court concluded that the defendant’s use was transformative “in function or purpose without altering or actually adding to the original work.”

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144. Castle Rock Entm’t v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 955 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d, 150 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 1998). See also Murphy v. Millennium Radio Grp. LLC, 2010 WL 1372408, at *5 (D.N.J. 2010), rev’d, 650 F.3d 295 (3rd Cir. 2011) (appellate court disagreeing with the district court on whether the defendant’s use of a photo to promote a radio program had a different purpose from the plaintiff’s initial use to spread news).
146. Id., at 85 (“Bloomberg’s message—‘This is what they said’—is a very different message from Swatch Group’s—‘This is what you should believe.’”).
Similarly, the court in *Campinha-Bacote* found transformative use where the plaintiff originally designed a mnemonic model to educate healthcare professionals about cultural competency and the defendant later adapted the plaintiff’s model in her presentation slides prepared to train new teachers in a public school about cultural competency.\(^{147}\) As another example, the court in *Oracle* indicated that the two works in question had different purposes because the plaintiff initially developed the Java platform for desktop and laptop environments, and the defendant developed the Android system mainly for a mobile environment, which incorporated the declaring codes and SSO of 37 API packages from Java.\(^{148}\) The above holdings appear to suggest a counter-intuitive conclusion that adapting a PC videogame for smartphones or adapting a PlayStation game for Xbox could potentially constitute fair use.

4. **No Physical Transformation and No Purposive Transformation**

It appears to be an unavoidable conclusion that courts should consistently reject transformative use where neither physical nor purposive transformation existed. To our surprise, however, courts actually found transformative use in five of the decisions in the scenario. For example, although a website posted a news report in its entirety to report the same news as the original, a court still considered the use transformative because the assignee plaintiff was a so-called “copyright troll,” whose use was litigation driven.\(^{149}\) Other courts deemed it as transformative use to photocopy finished exams for parents to evaluate students’ performances\(^{150}\) or to perform Latin songs as background music for Latin-themed radio programs.\(^{151}\)

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See also *Stern v. Does*, 978 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1045 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (finding forwarding an email to a third party was transformative use); *Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood*, 965 F. Supp. 553, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), rev’d, 150 F. 3d 104 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding transformative use where the defendant retransmitted local radio programs to advertisers in a distant location).
B. Slippery Slope

The concept of transformative use is not only elusive but also susceptible to slippery slope reasoning: courts started conservatively on uncontroversial cases involving strong physical and purposive transformation. However, by the chain effect of analogy, they stretched the definition bit by bit to fact patterns that were increasingly remote from the original context. The concept eventually approached the breaking point. The following subparts illustrate how this slippery slope progression has occurred in transformative use decisions by using three groups of cases as examples: criticism and comment, scholarship and research, and intermediate copying.

1. Criticism and Comment

Justice Souter confirmed in *Campbell* that “parody has an obvious claim to transformative value” because the defendant created a new work to criticize or otherwise comment on the original one. Of the 22 decisions in the sample where courts identified a parody, all invariably found transformative use.

Lower courts before long started to extend the scope of transformative use to cover loose forms of parody, satire or criticism that aimed not at the original work directly but at other elements in connection with the original work, including its subject, its author, and its social environment. In *Kienitz*, the defendant poked fun at a local politician by printing his photo portrait on T-shirts sold at a block party. In *Colting*, the defendant published a sequel to *Catcher in the Rye* that included the original author J.D. Salinger as a character portrayed in an unflattering light. In *Blanch*, a visual artist borrowed a portion of a fashion photograph in his new painting to criticize the materialistic culture that

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152. See generally Volokh, supra note 36, at 116.


the photograph represented.156 Of the 44 decisions where the defendant’s non-parody use nonetheless commented on an element in connection with the original work, 31 (70.5%) found transformative use.

The Cariou decision recently took a step further than Blanch by declaring: “The law imposes no requirement that a work comment on the original or its author in order to be considered transformative.”157 Accordingly, a subsequent artist may appropriate the original work as raw material to create her new expression that has no critical bearing whatsoever. Of the 16 appropriation art decisions studied, 8 (50%) found transformative use.158

2. Scholarship and Research

Courts showed a high degree of tolerance towards biographies and documentaries that quoted original works.159 In these cases, the original work usually functioned as an historical artifact that was essential for researchers to uncover or explain significant events. Researchers have limited freedom to choose among different artifacts without compromising the accuracy and integrity of their historical scholarship. If a biography or documentary used a copyrighted work in a fleeting manner mainly for a factual purpose, many courts were unwilling to subject it to the reins of the copyright owner, who sometimes had a motive to bend inconvenient truth or request exorbitant royalties.160 Of the 20 biography and documentary decisions in the sample, 17 (85%) upheld transformative use.

Companion books (e.g., The Seinfeld Aptitude Test) might appear similar to biographies to the extent that they borrowed elements in the original works to illustrate facts concerning the same.161 However, there is a key difference: The so-called “facts” described in companion books are not about historical events, but about fictional characters or occurrences created by authors. On the one hand, the more a companion book

156. Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 253 (2d Cir. 2006).
160. See infra note 255 and accompanying text.
161. See, e.g., Castle Rock Entm’t v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 150 F.3d 132, 143 (2d Cir. 1998); Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Carol Publ’g Group, 11 F. Supp. 2d 329, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 333 F. Supp. 2d 705, 713 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
quotes from the original work, the more valuable it would be as a research reference. On the other hand, extensive borrowing from creative content may be tantamount to retelling the fictional stories for intrinsic entertainment purposes and capture the market niche preserved by copyright protection for the original author. Therefore, it makes sense for courts to be conservative with companion books. The RDR case was widely publicized, where several loyal enthusiasts created the *Harry Potter Lexicon*, an encyclopedia that collected and organized information on characters, fictional creatures, and magic objects appearing in the *Harry Potter* series. The court indicated that any transformative use was diminished due to verbatim copying of expressive content in excess of what was reasonable for the research purpose. Overall, of the 10 decisions on companion books studied, only one found transformative use, and its finding was later overruled by the appellate court.

To sum up, while biographies often exhibited both physical and purposive transformation, companion books tended to involve excessive copying, which diminished the research purpose despite new intellectual contribution. How about research-related behaviors that did not clearly involved any physical or purposive reform? There are 13 decisions studied where the defendant made photocopies of academic works for researchers or students to study, which was exactly the intended purpose of these books. Curiously, 4 (30.8%) of these decisions still found transformative use.

For instance, publishers lodged a series of lawsuits against patent attorneys who photocopied academic articles as part of patent prosecution practice. The courts consistently exempted such photocopying as transformative use on the ground that the parties used the copyrighted works for different purposes: The plaintiffs published academic articles in their journals to inform the scientific community of advancements in scientific research; The defendants made photocopies for prior art analysis and selected some of them for submission to USPTO or foreign patent offices to assist patent examiners in understanding the state of the art. However, it is not difficult to see, at a higher and more general level, both exploitations served the research purpose. It is also factually inaccurate to deny that patent prosecution may be one of the intrinsic purposes for academic publication, especially given that the

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166. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a).
United States has transformed from a first-to-invent system to a first-to-file system since March 16, 2013, joining the rest of the world.\textsuperscript{167} First publication now has substantial benefits for a patent applicant defensively and offensively. It may not only preempt a rival application for the same invention, but preserve a one-year grace period for one’s own application.\textsuperscript{168} Some commentators actually called the new regime a “first-to-publish” system.\textsuperscript{169} Therefore, courts should not unduly dismiss the possibility that inventors raced to publish their works for the very purpose of patent prosecution with patent attorneys as their target audience.

Admittedly, limited photocopying of academic works for research or teaching purposes may indeed constitute fair use for important policy reasons (to be discussed in more detail in Part V). However, transformative use would become a superfluous soundbite without tangible boundaries if stretched so far as to comprise uses with neither physical nor purposive transformation.

3. Intermediate Copying

A perfect example of the slippery slope phenomenon is the trend in intermediate copying decisions where the defendant made copies of the original work that were not accessible to the general public as an intermediate step to develop a different product. The issue of intermediate copying typically emerged in copyright disputes involving reverse engineering. For instance, the defendant in \textit{Connectix} had reproduced and dissembled the operating system (BIOS) in a PlayStation console for the purpose of gaining access to the unprotected ideas and functional elements that otherwise would have been unavailable.\textsuperscript{170} More importantly, the defendant used that information to develop an independent product that was compatible with PlayStation games but did not contain any protected expressions from the original work. Therefore, the court declared that the intermediate copies made for reverse engineering purposes were transformative and non-infringing.

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{168. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2013).}
\footnotetext{170. Sony Comput. Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, (9th Cir. 1992); cf. Walt Disney Prods. v. Filmation Assocs., 628 F. Supp. 871, 876 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (suggesting intermediate copying could constitute infringement even when the end product did not itself contain copyrighted material).}
\end{footnotes}
Courts extended the basic rationale for reverse engineering to a variety of search engine cases. They upheld transformative use on the ground that the wholesale copies made by Google and other search engines were invisible to the general public and were necessary to develop comprehensive digital databases that accurately responded to search requests. Nonetheless, there were two key differences between how copies were used in search engines and reverse engineering. First, software developers usually deleted intermediate copies after the completion of reverse engineering, whereas search engines needed to continuously store the verbatim copies for their ongoing operations. Second, the new software resulting from reverse engineering did not contain any protected expression of the original, whereas search engines sometimes presented thumbnail images or snippets to assist end users in understanding search results.

There are noticeable differences even among search engine cases. For example, in *Kelly*, the search engine copied copyrighted images that had been made available online with due authorization. It is arguable that copyright owners have granted implied licenses for the general public to copy the online images. By contrast, in the *Google Books* cases, Google scanned and digitized millions of books that copyright owners had never decided to offer online, which rendered the implied license inapplicable. Neither were the two *Google Books* cases identical: First, the HathiTrust libraries did not allow users to view any portion of the scanned books while Google presented snippets of limited original expressions in the books. Second, HathiTrust was a nonprofit educational entity while Google was a profit-motivated commercial corporation. Third, the HathiTrust libraries had legally owned all hard copies through purchase or donation prior to scanning, while Google did not possess any legitimate copies prior to scanning. In other words, scanning potentially substituted purchases by Google but not those by the libraries. Lastly, while the HathiTrust libraries engaged in fair use for themselves, Google *inter alia* facilitated fair use by others in exchange for commercial benefits.

172. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1166 (9th Cir. 2007); Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 216 (2d Cir. 2015).
175. Cf. Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 216 (2d Cir. 2015); Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 97 (2d Cir. 2014).
176. Curiously, the relevant decisions never addressed the issue of whether Google employees might access the scanned books internally.
177. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 74 (1976) ("[I]t would not be possible for a non-profit institution, by means of contractual arrangements with a commercial
Notwithstanding the various differences among search engine cases, courts consistently agreed that search engines benefited authors and users alike by serving the new purpose of promoting access to the original works, the non-display uses of verbatim copies and small portions of protected expressions displayed in search results were not substitutes for the original works, and the license market for search engine usage was either non-existent or not cognizable in the fair use analysis. Of the 13 search engine decisions in the sample, 12 found transformative use and the lone exception did not prevent a finding of fair use anyway.¹⁷⁸

Several recent cases approach, if they do not cross, the boundary of intermediate copying. In *Oracle*, Google copied 37 out of 166 Java API packages to develop the Android platform for smartphone applications.¹⁷⁹ Unlike reverse engineering cases where the defendants strived to achieve compatibility with the original software, the Android platform was not compatible with Java programs at all.¹⁸⁰ Furthermore, while reverse engineering typically led to end products that did not contain any original expressions, the Android platform incorporated a substantial amount of the Java source code, including the declaring code and SSO taxonomy of the API packages. Despite the fact that the plaintiff was licensing a derivative version of the Java platform for mobile devices, the court upheld a finding of transformative use on the ground that the plaintiff initially developed the Java platform for desktop and laptop environments and Google developed the Android platform for a mobile environment.

The defendant in *TVEyes* recorded all content broadcast by 1400 television and radio stations twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week to build a searchable database for its subscribers, who could then obtain transcripts and video clips of the programs that met their search requests.¹⁸¹ Although TVEyes analogized itself to a search engine, there was a key difference between them. Search engines referred users to the original sources. The thumbnails or snippets in search results contained minimal expressive content and could hardly serve the same purpose as the original works. By contrast, TVEyes offered its subscribers video clips of up to ten minutes. It did not lead viewers to the original sources copying enterprise, to authorize the enterprise to carry out copying and distribution functions that would be exempt if conducted by the non-profit institution itself.

¹⁸⁰ Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1350 (9th Cir. 2014).
but instead competed directly with the licensed videos that the plaintiffs were distributing online in a similar fashion. As a matter of fact, TVEyes was strikingly similar to news clipping services and other forms of abridgement.\textsuperscript{182} Of the 11 abridgement decisions studied, all found infringement except TVEyes.\textsuperscript{183}

The court in \textit{TVEyes} tried to distinguish TVEyes from news clipping services by suggesting that TVEyes was uniquely transformative in the following ways: First, unlike traditional clipping services conveying news in text only, TVEyes provided a richer context by combining images, sounds, and text. However, the court was silent on the fact that, in both cases, the natures of the clips relied on the natures of their respective sources. Second, the court suggested that, by “indexing and excerpting all content appearing in television... TVEyes provides a service that no content provider provides.”\textsuperscript{184} Curiously, the evidence showed that the plaintiff was actually distributing its television clips through various online channels, almost all of which enabled the search functionality. Maybe the court was referring to the fact that no one before TVEyes had ever set up an all-inclusive database offering a complete catalogue of videos from all content providers. It was a shame indeed, but neither was such a one-stop shop realistic for the online media, which nonetheless successfully enforced their copyright against news clipping providers that tapped into all news sources. Third, the court emphasized, while news clipping services aggregated online content already available to the general public, TVEyes provided content otherwise unavailable to its subscribers because it copied a number of cable programs that the plaintiff had not completely offered online. In other words, TVEyes extended the enjoyment of the original works to users who did not subscribe to cable services. It is peculiar that the court found this to be a reason in favor of transformative use rather than copyright infringement.

\section*{V. RATIONALIZING TRANSFORMATIVE USE}

\subsection*{A. \textit{Traditional Justifications}}

Transformative use decisions involved a great amount of uncertainty and incoherency because the concept itself was built on a dubious

\textsuperscript{182} See, e.g., L.A. News Serv. v. Tullo, 973 F. 2d 791, 799 (9th Cir. 1992); Pac. and S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F. 2d 1490, 1496 (11th Cir. 1984).


\textsuperscript{184} TVEyes, 43 F. Supp. 3d at 392 (“TVEyes is the only service that creates a database of \textit{everything} that television channels broadcast, twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week.”).
policy foundation. Certain courts tried to justify transformative use based on the theories of social productivity, secondary creativity, and complementary goods, only to meet with strong objections by other courts. The search for transformative use rationales at times morphed into a tug of war between the Second Circuit, the birthplace of transformative use, and the Seventh Circuit, the powerhouse of the law and economics school.

1. Productive Use

Judge Leval, the architect of transformative use, suggested that the concept originated from a preexisting doctrine called “productive use.” The Ninth Circuit in the Betamax decision first introduced productive use into judicial practice: “As the first sentence of § 107 indicates, fair use has traditionally involved what might be termed the ‘productive use’ of copyrighted material.” A use is deemed productive to the extent that it result in “some added benefit to the public beyond that produced by the first author.” To satisfy the test for productive use, a defendant needs not show that the use substantially benefitted the public, but only that the use could have benefitted the public marginally.

Productive use has an inherent tendency to overstretch the reach of fair use, with marginal social benefits as the test for fair use. Even run-of-the-mill copyright piracy may arguably add social benefits by widening access to copyrighted works in the short run. This was one of the reasons why the Supreme Court repeatedly downplayed the importance of productive use. Judge Leval himself cautioned that “‘productive’ was not necessarily an ideal description of the line of authorities because it risked the misconception that it encompassed any copying for a socially useful purpose.”

185. Leval, supra note 10, at 1111. A total of 16 decisions addressed productive use before the advent of transformative use.
189. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 455, n. 40 (1984) (“But the notion of social ‘productivity’ cannot be a complete answer to this analysis. A teacher who copies to prepare lecture notes is clearly productive. But so is a teacher who copies for the sake of broadening his personal understanding of his specialty.”); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985) (“The fact that an article arguably is ‘news’ and therefore a productive use is simply one factor in a fair use analysis.”).
Despite admonition by the Supreme Court, the spirit of productive use lives on under the new label of transformative use. Not only did a number of lower courts equate transformative use with productive use in the context of factor one,\textsuperscript{191} social productivity concerns also gave rise to a balancing test in the context of factor four.\textsuperscript{192} Several courts alleged that the evaluation of factor four required a “balancing of the benefit the public will derive if the use is permitted and the personal gain the copyright owner will receive if the use is denied.”\textsuperscript{193}

This balancing test is clearly flawed and misleading for several reasons: First, it ignores the possibility of market transaction by assuming a use would always be denied if found infringing. Second, it overlooks the long-run effect should the challenged use become widespread.\textsuperscript{194} Third, a complete cost-benefit analysis requires the copyright side of the balance to include not only the private benefits gained by the copyright owner, but also the social benefits received by the general public if the use is licensed. Such social benefits are comprised of the consumer surplus resulting from the licensed use of the original work and of all the future works incentivized by copyright royalties. The balancing test would be constantly skewed towards the defendant if a court discounts the social benefits of copyright transactions.\textsuperscript{195}

The above observation is based on basic economic principles of copyright protection, which reflect a trade-off between incentive and access.\textsuperscript{196} Information products including works of authorship have certain characteristics of a public good, i.e., “non-excludability” (or


\textsuperscript{192} Leval, supra note 10, at 1127.

\textsuperscript{193} Of the 19 decisions in the sample that recognized the balancing test, 13 eventually upheld fair use. See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions, 353 F.3d 792, 805 (9th Cir. 2003); Swatch Group Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. v. Bloomberg L.P., 756 F.3d 73, 90 (2d Cir. 2014); Fox News Network, LLC v. TVEyes, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 3d 379, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).


\textsuperscript{195} Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985) (“[To] propose that fair use be imposed whenever the ‘social value [of dissemination] . . . outweighs any detriment to the artist,’ would be to propose depriving copyright owners of their right in the property precisely when they encounter those users who could afford to pay for it.” (quoting Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1615 (1982))).

\textsuperscript{196} For detailed surveys of economic theories on copyright, see PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 1 (3d ed. 2016); Gillian K. Hadfield. The Economics of Copyright: An Historical Perspective, 38 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 1, 1-46 (1988).
“inappropriability”) and “non-rivalry” (or “indivisibility”). 197 “Non-excludability” means that, once information is created and distributed, it is physically difficult to exclude others from enjoying it. The consumption of information is “non-rivalrous” where it may be enjoyed simultaneously by an infinite number of people without incidentally affecting the enjoyment by others. In economic terms, the marginal cost of extending the consumption to another person is near zero. Under such circumstances, it is extremely difficult for authors to recoup the fixed costs of creating their works in a market without property rights because competitors, who are free to copy the same works without incurring the fixed costs, will soon drive the prices towards the marginal costs of reproduction and distribution. 198 Therefore, the market tends to undersupply those valuable works absent sufficient incentive for intellectual creation. Copyright law is intended to solve the incentive problem by granting authors exclusive control, for a limited period of time, over the reproduction and dissemination of their works, which in turn generates market opportunities for pricing their works above marginal costs. The markup allows authors to recoup their initial investments in creative works, although the increased price may inhibit access by certain consumers who are willing to pay the marginal cost but not the premium.

Figure 9 illustrates the fallacy of a balancing test that weighs the public benefits if the use is deemed fair against the private benefits of the author if the use is found infringing. From a static efficiency perspective, if copyright protection is granted, an author would receive the benefit of the rectangle designated as PS (“Producer Surplus”), consumers would receive the benefit of the triangle designated as CS (“Consumer Surplus”), and the triangle designated as DL (“Deadweight Loss”) is the consumption forfeited due to unwillingness to pay the license price. If copyright protection is denied, consumers would receive the total of PS, CS and DL. A court would inevitably tip towards fair use, in weighing the public benefits in the fair use scenario (PS, CS and DL) against the private benefits of the author in the copyright scenario (PS). Nonetheless, from a dynamic efficiency perspective, we should add to the copyright side of equation CS of the original work, and PS and CS of all the

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198. From an ex post perspective, once a work is created, the author would be unable to internalize the fixed costs and therefore suffer a competitive disadvantage over free riders who do not bear the fixed costs. From an ex ante perspective, even if the author tries to negotiate a price with all potential users before the work is created, game theory suggests that many users may underbid the work attempting to free ride other consumers’ contribution.
future works, which would otherwise not be created but for the incentive provided by PS of the original work.

To sum up, the correct balancing test or the cost-benefit analysis should weigh PS, CS and DL of the original work in the fair use scenario against PS and CS of the original work and of the future works in the copyright scenario. The balance would tip towards copyright as long as DL of the original work is smaller than PS and CS of the future works.

**FIGURE 9: ECONOMICS OF COPYRIGHT**

![Graph showing the economics of copyright]

2. **Secondary Creativity**

Judge Leval appeared to submit that transformative use may be justified to the extent that it promotes secondary creativity, focusing on whether “the quoted matter is used as raw material” to create a new work.199 The Supreme Court in *Campbell* also alluded to the justification: “[Fair use] permits [and requires] courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute, when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster.”200

On both occasions, they quoted the seminal decision *Folsom v. Marsh* by Justice Story as the foundation of transformative use,201 However,

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this case actually strived to draw a line between a reproduction that involved only mechanical copying and a derivative work that incorporated intellectual contribution by the secondary author, under the legal assumption that a derivative work was per se noninfringing.

The plaintiffs in Folsom published a twelve-volume compilation titled The Writings of George Washington, which consisted of 6763 pages. The defendant published another two-volume anthology of extracts of Washington’s writings titled The Life of Washington. The latter work consisted of 866 pages, 353 of which were copied verbatim from the former. Justice Story concluded that the defendant’s use constituted copyright infringement rather than a “fair and bona fide abridgment.” He indicated that, to qualify as a fair abridgement, there “must be real, substantial condensation of the materials, and intellectual labor and judgment bestowed thereon; and not merely the facile use of the scissors; or extracts of the essential parts, constituting the chief value of the original work.”

The emphasis on “intellectual labor” instead of “the facile use of the scissors” as the touchstone for noninfringement was consistent with earlier English decisions that regularly deemed abridgments and translations as non infringing. For instance, Lord Hardwicke suggested “abridgments may with great propriety be called a new book, because not only the paper and print, but the invention, learning, and judgment of the author is shewn in them.” Similarly, Lord Parker pointed out that “a translation might not be the same with the reprinting the original, on account that the translator has bestowed his care and pains upon it, and so not within the prohibition of the act.”

The outcomes are unsurprising given the fact that Folsom and the English precedents it relied on predated the derivative right, a latecomer in the history of copyright law. The first U.S. copyright law, the Copyright Act of 1790, modeled after the Statue of Anne of 1710, merely granted the rights of “printing, reprinting, publishing and vending,” which narrowly covered literal copying of copyrighted works. Accordingly, U.S. courts at the time routinely held that abridgements...
and translations \(^{208}\) did not constitute infringement. It was not until 80 years later that the Copyright Act was eventually amended to show the first trace of the derivative right, i.e., “the right to dramatize or to translate their own works.” \(^{209}\) The current Copyright Act of 1976 expressly provides for an exclusive right “to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work.” \(^{210}\) A derivative work is defined as “a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.” \(^{211}\) Therefore, abridgments and translations in which secondary authors transform the original works clearly fall into the scope of copyright exclusivity under current law.

The historical background sheds light on the inherent tension between transformative use and the derivative right. Secondary creativity embedded in transformative use served as the benchmark to distinguish an infringing reproduction from a fair abridgement before the advent of the derivative right. However, it is an anachronism to use the same rationale to justify fair use in modern copyright cases regarding derivative works. As Judge Easterbrook observed in *Kienitz*: “To say that a new use transforms the work is precisely to say that it is derivative and thus, one might suppose, protected under § 106(2).” \(^{212}\) Indeed, using an ex-

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\(^{208}\) See, e.g., Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201, 207 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 13,514) (“To make a good translation of a work, often requires more learning, talent and judgment, than was required to write the original. Many can transfer from one language to another, but few can translate. To call the translations of an author’s ideas and conceptions into another language, a copy of his book, would be an abuse of terms, and arbitrary judicial legislation.”).

\(^{209}\) Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212.

\(^{210}\) 17 U.S.C. § 106(2).

\(^{211}\) Id., § 101.

\(^{212}\) *Kienitz* v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014). Cf., Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 215-16 (2d Cir. 2015) (drawing a distinction between a fair use that has a “transformative purpose” and a derivative work that involves “transformations in the nature of changes of form.”). The understanding of derivative works in the latter decision was questionable as illustrated by its suggestion that “the recasting of a novel as an e-book” is a typical example of derivative works. Id. at 215 (quoting Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 95 (2d Cir. 2014)). Meanwhile, Judge Leval admitted “that the word ‘transformative,’ if interpreted too broadly, can also seem to authorize copying that should fall within the scope of an author’s derivative rights.” Id. at 216.
isting work “as raw material, transformed in the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings” is the hallmark of a derivative work. Authors and artists often create a work with an eye to its potential to be used as “raw material” for secondary works, being a music score for cover songs, a thriller for movie adaptations, or a photograph for news stories. The more successful a work is, the more it breeds different reinterpretations—there are a thousand Hamlets in a thousand people’s eyes. “It is fundamentally at odds with the scheme of copyright to accord lesser rights in those works that are of greatest importance to the public.”

More importantly, modern copyright law abounds in new tools to secure breathing room for secondary creativity without hampering the derivative right. First, the exclusive rights of a copyright owner only extend to actual copying of her copyrighted work. Independent creation of a work of authorship, even if it happens to be identical to a pre-existing one, would not constitute copyright infringement. In fact, such a work would likely be considered original and entitled to a copyright separate from the pre-existing one. Second, copyright protection only extends to expressions rather than ideas in a work of authorship. The idea/expression dichotomy suggests that a secondary author could intentionally imitate a pre-existing work as closely as possible provided the borrowings are limited to unprotected ideas. Third, a number of federal courts require a “substantial similarity” between the secondary work and the original work to establish copyright infringement. The doctrine not only incorporates the idea/expression dichotomy but also exempts any de minimis use that does not capture the original’s audience. Accordingly, it is unclear how much marginal benefit transformative use may produce beyond the ambit of the above doctrines, especially given the amount of confusion and uncertainty that it has produced in practice.

3. Complementary Goods

Judge Posner suggested that the doctrine of transformative use essentially reflects the economic rationale of complement vis-à-vis substitute: “copying that is complementary to the copyrighted work (in the sense that nails are complements of hammers) is fair use, but copying

213. Leval, supra note 10, at 1111.
215. See, e.g., Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936) (“[B]ut if by some magic a man who had never known it were to compose anew Keats’s Ode on a Grecian Urn, he would be an ‘author’ and, if he copyrighted it, others might not copy that poem, though they might of course copy Keats’s.”).
217. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
that is a substitute for the copyrighted work (in the sense that nails are substitutes for pegs or screws) . . . is not fair use."\textsuperscript{218}

Complements (or “complementary goods”) in economic terms refer to two goods that consumers usually purchase and use together because they complement each other in functionality.\textsuperscript{219} As a result, the more one good is consumed, the more the other is also consumed. This means that a decrease in the price of one good will result in an increase of the demand of the other and an increase in the price of one good will conversely lead to a decrease of the demand of the other. To get an idea of how complementary two goods are, we generally look at the cross elasticity of demand, which is the percentage change in the quantity of one good divided by the percentage change in the price of the other.\textsuperscript{220} The cross elasticity of demand is negative for complementary goods, and the larger in absolute value is the cross-elasticity of demand, the stronger is the degree of complementarity.\textsuperscript{221} An everyday example of complementary goods is hot dogs and hot dog buns.\textsuperscript{222} Any time a grocery store puts hot dog buns on sale, we can expect that the sales of hot dogs will increase simultaneously, even though the price of hot dogs remains unchanged. The reason is that consumers usually budget and purchase hot dogs and hot dog buns together. A discount for either good lowers the total price of the two goods, which in turn stimulates the combined consumption.\textsuperscript{223}

However, Judge Leval outright rejected the rationale of complementary goods as a useful guide to draw a distinction between an infringing derivative work and a noninfringing transformative use.\textsuperscript{224} On the one hand, various derivative works that copyright owners traditionally license are exactly complementary to the original works. For example, the more popular a movie adaptation (say \textit{Harry Potter}) is, the more powerful it is in promoting the sales of the original novels. Judge Posner

\textsuperscript{218} Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 517-18 (7th Cir.2002) (“The distinction between complementary and substitutional copying [is confusingly] said to be between ‘transformative’ and ‘superseding’ copies . . . .”).


\textsuperscript{220} Robert Frank, Microeconomics and Behavior 186 (2008).

\textsuperscript{221} Complementary goods are the opposite of substitute goods (or substitutes), which have similar functions so that the demand for a good will fall if the price of a substitute is reduced. The cross-elasticity of demand is positive for substitutes and, the larger is the cross-elasticity of demand, the stronger is the degree of substitutability.

\textsuperscript{222} In reality, many products are assemblies of components and each component is necessary for the final products. Those components are, technically speaking, strongly complementary with one another so that consumers must buy and use them as a whole.


\textsuperscript{224} Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 216 (2d Cir. 2015).
himself admitted that “[w]ere control of derivative works not part of a copyright owner’s bundle of rights, it would be clear that [defendant’s] books fell on the complement side of the divide and so were sheltered by the fair-use defense.” On the other hand, certain fair uses are technically not complementary to the original works at all. A harsh review or parody of a movie, a classic example of transformative use, would significantly damage the box office of the original movie if widely distributed. Although Judge Posner called such a criticism a “negative complement,” it is hardly a complement in economic terms while exhibiting no negative cross elasticity of demand.

B. Rationales in Context

Although it proves difficult, if not impossible, to identify a grand theory of transformative use, we may distill a two-step test from relatively uncontroversial decisions. First, a court needs to verify whether the alleged infringing use directly competes with the original work as a substitute in the primary market. Physical or purposive transformation may play a useful role at this initial step. A copy that serves the same purpose with minimal changes would be unlikely to pass the initial step. To this extent, the doctrine of transformative use serves as a filter to quickly dispose of garden-variety infringement.

Second, if the alleged infringing use is not a substitute in the primary market, a court needs to determine whether the use falls within a derivative market that the copyright owner is entitled to license, i.e., a “traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed market.” It is at this step that none of the three traditional justifications may fully support the expansive range of transformative use decisions. To classify complementary goods as transformative use is in tension with copyright control over derivative works. Promoting social benefits and secondary creativity is of course a laudable goal consistent with the philosophical underpinning of Anglo-American copyright legislation.

225. Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 518 (7th Cir. 2002).
226. Id.
228. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (“The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by which an important public purpose may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors . . . by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired.”); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents
less, it is worth noting that both licensed and unlicensed uses of an original work may in theory generate the same amount of social benefit. Arguably, a licensed use is superior for it may additionally provide an incentive to the original author. The key question for courts in weighing fair use is not whether a use is justifiable but whether a use without a license is justifiable. In other words, courts should evaluate whether, without the fair use defense, uses of the kind as well as the ensuing social benefits would occur naturally through market transactions.\textsuperscript{229} If not, the defendant could establish a legitimate justification for fair use on the basis of social benefits because half a loaf (social benefits without incentives to the authors) is better than no bread (no social benefits and no incentives). Furthermore, a reasonable owner would not be concerned with the unlicensed use for which, absent market transactions, she could not receive any royalties in any event.\textsuperscript{230}

This subpart presents an illustrative and non-exhaustive survey of varied justifications underlining transformative use decisions including information asymmetry, the holdout problem, and transaction costs.\textsuperscript{231} These justifications, while all suggesting a consensual license is unlikely in the market, involve distinct policy concerns and scarcely depend on a finding of either physical or purposive transformation. This subpart hence demonstrates the fundamental reasons why transformative use decisions gained increasing popularity, yet diminished the predictability of the fair use doctrine and caused substantial confusions in copyright practice. Lower courts welcome transformative use as an intuitive way to maintain the impression of \textit{stare decisis}. Whenever a court exonerates an otherwise infringing use out of a policy concern, it usually has no difficulty in finding a precedent of either physical or purposive

\begin{itemize}
\item of authors and inventors in \textquote{Science and useful Arts.\textquoteright\textquote{)}; United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (\textquote{The copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration.\textquoteright\textquote{)}).
\item Id. at 593.
\item Commentators suggested that fair use is equivalent to subsidy to users who generate positive externality to society overall. For instance, classroom uses facilitate a well-educated citizenry, but teaching institutions may only internalize part of the social benefits generated and therefore be discouraged to pay full prices for the licensed works. See Jane C. Ginsburg, \textit{Fair Use for Free, or Permitted-but-Paid?}, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1383, 1393 (2014). The externality scenario, although theoretically sound, does not appear to play a major role in fair use decisions. First, although statutory exemptions may arguably reflect the externality concern (e.g. § 108), case law on educational use is focused primarily on transaction costs. Second, educational uses usually involve academic works authored by scientists and researchers. These works also generate externality by promoting public knowledge that benefits society as a whole while the authors receive limited private benefits. It is unclear why we should force one group of externality creators to subsidize another group. Third, in the absence of prohibitive transaction costs, relevant parties may negotiate to internalize the externality. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, \textit{ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW} 11 (7th ed. 2014).
\end{itemize}
transformation on which to rest its decision, thanks to the malleability of the concept and the expansive scope of relevant case law. Nonetheless, the uniform label of transformative use tends to conceal the differences between a wide variety of policy concerns in dissimilar cases, invite casual references to precedents from factually unrelated contexts, and substitute a formalistic exercise of physical or purposive transformation for an in-depth policy analysis that may provide clearer guidance for future cases.

1. Information Asymmetry

   a. Parody v. Satire

   Although Campbell is widely celebrated as the leading precedent that introduced the concept of transformative use into case law, transformative use may not sufficiently explain the dichotomy between parody and satire suggested by the Supreme Court in Campbell. Both parody and satire are undeniably transformative to the extent that both entail physical transformation resulting from the new content created by the secondary author and purposive transformation involving a critical purpose different from the original one. However, the Supreme Court as well as lower courts are inclined to afford more leeway to parody than satire, on the basis of a distinct policy concern over information asymmetry.

   Copyrighted works such as movies and books are orthodox examples of “experience goods,” for their utilities are based on personal preferences and individual tastes rather than objectively measurable attributes. Therefore, consumers are unable to fully assess their value without having experienced them, whereas those who have experienced them are less enthusiastic to pay for their value. To overcome the valuation problem, copyright owners may use previews or trailers to signal the

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232. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
234. Id. at 580-81 (“Parody needs to mimic an original to make its point . . . whereas satire can stand on its own two feet and so requires justification for the very act of borrowing.”). See also Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992); Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1400 (9th Cir. 1997).
235. In other words, without quality information, consumers may be unwilling to buy an experience good either before they experience it (due to uncertainty in quality) or after they experience it (due to depreciation). See, e.g., Richard E. Caves, Creative Industries: Contracts between Art and Commerce 3 (1998) (“There is great uncertainty about how consumers will value a newly produced creative product, short of actually producing the good and placing it before them.”); Martin Peitz & Patrick Waelbroeck, An Economist’s Guide to Digital Music, 51 Cesifo Econ. Stud. 359, 360-61 (2005) (confirming music constitutes “an experience good, which is a good that needs to be ‘tasted’ before consumers can assess its value.”).
quality of their works. Word of mouth, in particular reviews by experts in the field, further minimizes search costs by providing consumers with trustworthy quality information. Notably, the market would undersupply impartial and critical reviews were courts to permit copyright owners to control fleeting quotations of their original works in any reviews. The reason is that copyright owners have intrinsic incentive to create an information asymmetry by suppressing negative reviews and promoting positive reviews available to consumers. It would be unlikely for a producer to grant a license to a scathing review that potentially destroys the box office of her movie. Such private censorship would not only have important ramifications in connection with freedom of speech but also result in inefficient transactions in the market. Assume that a consumer would evaluate a movie in the amount of $3 if equipped with perfect information about its quality. Accordingly, she would be unwilling to pay for a $9 ticket to watch the movie. However, if overwhelmingly favorable reviews misled her to overestimate its value at $11, she would determine to watch the movie and then incur a $6 loss. As a result, the information asymmetry produces a socially wasteful transaction that may benefit no one but the producer.

By denying copyright owners control over reviews, criticisms, and other comments on their original works, the fair use defense alleviates the problem of information asymmetry and facilitates the consumption of experience goods. Parody, as one form of criticism or comment, must take aim at an aspect of the original work, e.g., its content, author, or subject. Copyright owners have an inherent tendency to censor parody. By contrast, satire merely uses the original work as a vehicle to


237. See, e.g., Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 759 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Many copyright owners would block all parodies . . .”); Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 437 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Parodists will seldom get permission from those whose works are parodied. Self-esteem is seldom strong enough to permit the granting of permission even in exchange for a reasonable fee.”).

238. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (stating “copyright law contains built-in First Amendment accommodations”); Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 801 (9th Cir. 2003) (Parody has “socially significant value as free speech under the First Amendment.”); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1264 (11th Cir. 2001) (“First Amendment privileges are also preserved through the doctrine of fair use.”).

239. Once consumers figure out that all reviews have been preapproved by copyright owners, reviews would cease to serve as a useful tool to prevent information asymmetry.


comment on overall society or other unrelated targets. Copyright owners are naturally less concerned about licensing a satire, which generally does not reveal quality information or reflect negatively on the original work. Even if someone intends to control satire through copyright, it is often impractical because the license market abounds in raw materials useful but substitutable for the purpose of poking fun at society as a whole. Courts rightfully required stronger justifications for satire than for parody in accordance with different risks of information asymmetry.

b. News Reporting

Although Section 107 specifies news reporting as one of the illustrative purposes under the fair use test, case law produced mixed results at best. Of the 27 news reporting decisions studied, only 12 (44.4%) found fair use. Similar fact patterns often led to opposite outcomes, even in the cases of wholesale copying. For example, the court in Núñez concluded that it was transformative use for a newspaper to exhibit naked photographs from the modeling profile of a Miss Puerto Rico Universe to report the controversy surrounding her fitness to retain the crown in the aftermath of these photos. Conversely, the court in Monge rejected transformative use where a celebrity gossip magazine published wedding photographs of a professional singer and her manager to report their previously undisclosed marriage. In each case, the defendant basically kept the photos intact but used them for a different news reporting purpose. The Monge court tried to distinguish Núñez by pointing out, among other things, that “the pictures were the story” in Núñez whereas “the controversy here has little to do with photos.” This explanation was unavailing to the extent that the wedding photos were clearly pertinent to the news report as direct evidence on the marriage.

From the perspective of information asymmetry, the key difference appears to be that the news in Monge had no critical bearing on its subjects. The news in Núñez was, on the contrary, accompanied by extensive editorial commentary reflecting negatively on the Miss Puerto Rico Universe. Therefore, the latter case ran a higher risk of private censorship to prevent public dissemination of unfavorable information.

Courts consistently upheld transformative use in cases where the defendants quoted copyrighted works to report critical or embarrassing news.\textsuperscript{247} Meanwhile, the absence of any criticism or comment led many courts to hold that news reporting lacked a transformative nature.\textsuperscript{248} The nuanced approach suggests that courts allowed the market to function barring an imminent danger of censorship.\textsuperscript{249}

2. Holdout

a. Biography

A biography or documentary regularly quotes multiple original works as historical artifacts that are essential to illuminate or interpret significant occurrences. Although a copyrighted work normally has plenty of close noninfringing substitutes in an open market, such as a song, a picture, or a video,\textsuperscript{250} a biographer has limited freedom to choose among different artifacts without sacrificing the accuracy and integrity of her historical research. For instance, if a producer set out to film a biography about a famous actor, viewers would inevitably expect


\textsuperscript{249} Brief quotations of copyrighted works in news programs may also give rise to transaction cost concerns, especially in terms of time-sensitive news that copyright clearance may cause a costly delay. See Part V.C. for detailed discussions on transaction costs.

\textsuperscript{250} See Paul Goldstein, Copyright, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 84 (1992) (“Although we would prefer not to admit it, one author’s expression will always be substitutable for another’s.”); Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1727, 1730 (2000) (“[C]opyrights do not prevent competitors from creating works with the same functional characteristics . . . .”).
the biography to present certain footage from the most successful movies featuring the actor. Similarly, it would be gross negligence to produce a documentary on the evolution of the alien genre of Hollywood movies without comparing actual footage of representative movies from various generations to document changes in themes and special effects. Whether the license market abounds in other movies with equivalent entertainment value is plainly irrelevant here. If the producer were required but unable to secure copyright licenses for all the original footage, she would be confronted with an unenviable choice between making an incomplete and unprofessional documentary or giving up the whole project.

This dilemma exhibits a typical holdout problem where the whole bargain breaks down because of strategic behaviors even if all the relevant copyright owners are willing to license their original works for the biography or documentary. The major reason is that multiple copyright owners, each having the potential power to veto the whole service, tend to charge excessive prices for copyright licenses, which often results in royalties that are prohibitively expensive as a whole. In theory, all the copyright owners would be better off if they set royalties at a moderate level that would render the project financially feasible. In practice, some would likely hold out in the licensing negotiation, demanding exorbitant royalties and discounting their negative impacts on the practicability of the whole transaction.

Economists refer to this inefficiency as “double marginalization,” arising from the cases where two or more firms offer comple-

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254. The issue, first studied by French economist Cournot, is also known as Cournot Complements. See Augustin A. Cournot, Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth 117 (Nathaniel T. Bacon trans., Macmillan 1897) (1838). For modern applications of “Cournot complements”, see, e.g., Richard J. Gilbert & Michael L. Katz, An Economist’s Guide to U.S. v. Microsoft, 15 J. Econ. Persp. 25, 41 (2001) (“[T]he sum of the operating system and application prices set by an integrated monopolist will be lower than the sum of those prices when set separately by two independent firms each with significant
mentary goods and each has some market power in its respective market (a phenomenon that characterizes the interaction between upstream authors and downstream biographers). Assuming they made pricing decisions for the complementary goods independently of each other, they cannot take into account the externality where a price increase for one good lowers the demand for the other. Therefore, the two firms would likely set higher prices in aggregate, produce lower quantities, and ultimately obtain less profit than if a single firm produced both complementary goods. A fair use defense that exonerates brief quotations of copyrighted works in a biography clearly minimizes the inefficiency in the holdout problem by removing the disproportionate leverage that any copyright owner of an historical artifact could otherwise wield on the whole project.

Additionally, certain courts appeared to uphold fair use in modest quotations in biographies and documentaries mainly out of the concern of information asymmetry.255 The copyright owner of a single work quoted in a biography, if allowed the excessive power to undermine or veto the historical research, may have the tendency to bargain over the narrative of historical events. Such copyright owners are often the subjects, or related to the subjects, of the biography. It could be very tempting for them to modify inconvenient truths and prohibit unflattering depictions, especially in the cases of critical biographies. Were courts to require a biographer to seek approval from her research subjects for fleeting factual uses of their works, the license market would produce predominantly biographies favored by the research subjects. The holdout problem could further augment the effect of private censorship on the supply of impartial biographies as historical research usually involves multiple copyrighted works.

b. Evidence

As mentioned above, several courts absolved verbatim copies of academic articles during patent prosecution practice as transformative use on the ground that the parties used the original works for different purposes.256 However, the concern over the holdout problem offers a

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255. See, e.g., Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Ltd. Partnership, 737 F.3d 932, 944 (4th Cir. 2013) (“Social commentary as well as historical narrative could be affected if, for example, companies facing unwelcome inquiries could ban all depiction of their logos.”).

better explanation for the fair use findings than the unrealistic presumption that scientists never publish any academic articles for patent priority purposes.\textsuperscript{257}

The USPTO requires a patent applicant to select and submit copies of all prior art material to patentability, which frequently include a number of articles published in scientific journals.\textsuperscript{258} Omission of any prior art may jeopardize a patent application to the extent that the USPTO has the legal authority to penalize an applicant who violates the disclosure requirement by denying her application.\textsuperscript{259} Were copies of prior art subject to copyright control, a patent applicant would be required to secure a license for each and every publication included, and these generally have no market substitutes for patent prosecution purposes. Accordingly, each of the copyright owners of these publications would theoretically have the power to hold out and demand exorbitant royalties with a realistic threat to veto the whole patent application. A bargain breakdown would likely occur if multiple copyright owners request royalties that exceed the market value of a patent application in aggregate. A fair use finding clearly resolves the holdout problem by outright removing the veto powers of the copyright owners over copies of prior art.

The reasoning applies equally to evidence in judicial proceedings as prior art for patent prosecution practice is basically evidence in quasi-judicial proceedings. The holdout problem may arise where preexisting copyrighted materials happen to be the key evidence in subsequent litigation, if the fair use defense did not apply. By threatening to withhold the key evidence, each copyright owner in bargaining for a license could credibly hold the entire litigation for ransom and demand royalties of up to the whole award in value. Therefore, in the cases where relevant copyright materials preceded their evidential values, federal courts have traditionally upheld fair use to prevent undue obstruction to judicial proceedings.\textsuperscript{260} Such a ruling is consistent with the plain language of the legislative history surrounding the fair use defense, which recognizes that use of copyrighted materials as judicial evidence may constitute fair use.\textsuperscript{261}

\textsuperscript{257} See supra note 169 and accompanying text. This is not a case of insurmountable transaction costs as copyright licenses for photocopying by law firms are readily available through the Copyright Clearance Center (“CCC”) in the same procedures as those for other forms of photocopying.

\textsuperscript{258} 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2018).

\textsuperscript{259} Id. (denying patent where “fraud on the Office was practiced or attempted or the duty of disclosure was violated through bad faith or intentional misconduct”).


Nonetheless, it does not follow that the holdout problem would invariably arise in all cases involving judicial evidence. For instance, if the defendant specifically hired the plaintiff to generate evidence for the purpose of litigation (e.g., making photographs of a disputed construction site), the plaintiff would not be able to hold out during negotiation because it would normally occur prior to the making of the evidence.\(^2\) If a photographer requested excessive royalties, the defendant could simply choose another photographer. Therefore, if the defendant decided to retain the original photographer, she should not be able to excuse herself of the obligations under the copyright license by later complaining that the agreed upon royalties were too high.

3. **Transaction Costs**

   a. **Photocopying**

   The *Texaco* decision by Judge Leval, which first elaborated on the concept of transformative use in case law, was also famous for its holding that photocopying for a research purpose might not constitute fair use.\(^3\) He distinguished *Texaco* from an earlier decision *Williams & Wilkins*, which exempted photocopying of medical journal articles carried out by scientists at the National Institute of Health and the National Medical Library.\(^4\) Judge Leval pointed out to the emergence of a collecting society Copyright Clearance Center ("CCC") to economize on transaction costs as one of the major reasons photocopying became less likely to constitute fair use a few years after *Williams & Wilkins*.

   Prior to CCC, an honest consumer who would be happy to pay copyright royalties faced an almost insurmountable barrier of substantial transaction costs involved in obtaining a license. Even if she copied a single page from a journal, which might actually entail a license fee of no more than a dollar, she would have to identify the copyright owner and her contact details, approach the copyright owner for a license, negotiate a proper license fee, document the usage, and eventually pay the agreed amount. The search and administrative costs could easily suppress the total amount of copyright royalties, which would render the whole transaction financially infeasible. Therefore, the court in *Williams & Wilkins* were justifiably concerned in 1973 that, if the scientists were forced to go through the costly and time-consuming license process

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264. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1347 (Ct. Cl. 1973), *aff’d* by equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
first, it would seriously hamper scientific research because many scientists would simply stop photocopying.265

By contrast, CCC has dramatically decreased transaction costs since its inception in 1978 by offering consumers a variety of innovative licensing packages.266 For example, a user may now choose the Transactional Reporting Service (“TRS”), which provides the user with a blanket permission to photocopy from any CCC-registered publication as long as the user reports the making of photocopies and pays the fees required by copyright owners. Alternatively, a user may choose the Annual Authorization Service (“AAS”), which is a blanket annual license to make photocopies for internal use of any copyrighted material contained in any of the journals and books registered with the CCC while the annual license fee is determined on the basis of a limited photocopying survey, factored by the user’s employee population and the copying fees for the journals regularly copied by the user. As a result of lower transaction costs, a finding of copyright infringement would no longer deprive researchers of the useful tool of photocopying. Instead, they may quickly obtain copyright licenses through efficient market transactions, which benefit users and authors alike.

The Second Circuit expressly affirmed the rationale of transaction costs: “it is sensible that a particular unauthorized use should be considered ‘more fair’ when there is no ready market or means to pay for the use, while such an unauthorized use should be considered ‘less fair’ when there is a ready market or means to pay for the use.”267

The reasoning in Texaco continues to be influential in the digital age. The Eleventh Circuit recently adjudicated a complex fair use case concerning the alleged infringement by Georgia State University, which allowed professors to compile and distribute electronic course packs based on digital excerpts of academic books and journal articles.268 The court essentially held that the course packs would be more likely to constitute fair use in the cases where the copyright owner or CCC had not, at the time of the disputed uses, offered digital excerpts of the original works through a reasonable license program, such as the Electronic Course Content Service (“ECCS”) for licensing of digital excerpts by educational users on a per-use basis. It suggested that “if a copyright holder has not made a license available to use a particular work in a particular manner, the inference is that the author or publisher did not think that there would be enough such use to bother making a license
available." 269 In other words, the availability of a license itself is a strong indicator of whether the license is worth the transaction costs.

Photocopying decisions teach us two important lessons. First, copyright owners should be diligent in entering into new markets and designing innovative business models to lower transaction costs in order to preempt possible fair use defenses regarding new technologies. Second, a fair use finding based on transaction costs may not be permanent. Courts may allow copyright owners to override a fair use finding at a later point by showing market transactions regarding uses of the same kind have become financially feasible due to minimized transaction costs.

b. Search Engine

Commentators sometimes pointed to the Google Books Project as a poster child of the holdout problem. 270 On the one hand, Google scanned millions of books to compile a digital corpus for the purpose of developing book search engines and data mining tools. On the other hand, it engaged in negotiation with publishers and authors to launch an online bookstore comparable to Amazon, which it discontinued after Judge Chin rejected the Google Books Settlement. 271

Theoretically, the holdout problem may arise where a project involves a number of copyright owners and every permission is essential for the whole project to function. 272 Therefore, a copyright owner could strategically withhold her permission to increase her share of copyright royalties, which could potentially cause a negotiation breakdown. This is not the case in the Google Books Project. It is unclear why it is even necessary for such a project to include all the books of the world in order to become a viable business.

Assume that Google has obtained licenses for the majority of the books scanned but accidentally includes one without authorization. If the author claimed copyright infringement, Google could remove the infringing work from the digital database and continue its operation with other licensed works. A single party can hardly have the veto power to block the entire project, which renders the holdout problem remote. 273 As a matter of fact, Google has slowed down scanning books

269. Id. at 1277. See Paul Goldstein, Copyright’s Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial Jukebox 160 (2003).
272. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
273. For recent articles that address the holdout problem, see John M. Golden, Commentary, “Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111, 2139 (2007); Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX.
from libraries almost to a complete halt, even though federal courts held
that the existing project is exempt from copyright liability as transform-
ative use.274 Apparently, the marginal benefit of scanning more books
for the purposes of designing book search engines and training web
search algorithms quickly diminishes after having scanned 30 million
books, although Google announced in 2010 that there are a total of 130
million books in the world (129,864,880 to be precise).275

Notably, the clearance difficulty in the Google Books Project does not
result mainly from orphan work issues where searching costs for locat-
ing relevant copyright owners are prohibitively high. It has been esti-
"mented that merely a fourth of the whole corpus consists of potential or-
phan works.276 Google, the largest search engine of the world, had no
problem in identifying the vast majority of relevant copyright owners
and was actually in the process of negotiating licensing agreements with
publishers even before the litigation commenced.277 Neither does the
sheer volume of copyrighted works involved in the Google Books Project
by itself justify a statutory exemption. The increase in transaction costs
has been approximately proportionate to the increased volume and in-
creased value of the overall database. It makes little sense to argue cate-
gorically that the more copyrighted works a database contains, the less
reasonable it is to request a copyright license.

The key barrier appears to be that the incremental value of any indi-
vidual work to the whole project is often lower than the transaction
costs needed to obtain a license for the work.278 Even if locating a cop-
yright owner takes one dollar, a perfectly reasonable search cost, Google
would not reach out for a license if scanning her book added three cents

L. REV. 1991, 1993 (2007); J. Gregory Sidak, Holdup, Royalty Stacking, and the Pre-
sumption of Injunctive Relief for Patent Infringement: A Reply to Lemley and Shapiro, 92

274. See Jennifer Howard, Google Begins to Scale Back Its Scanning of Books from
University Libraries, THE CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Mar. 9, 2012),
https://perma.cc/D52N-T2HK.

275. See Leonid Taycher, Inside Google Books: Books of the World, Stand Up and Be
Counted! All 129,864,880 of You., GOOGLE: INSIDE SEARCH BLOG (Aug. 5, 2010,
8:26 AM), https://perma.cc/258A-TDET.

276. See Michael Cairns, 580,388 Orphan Works—Give or Take,
PERSONANONDATA (Sept. 9, 2009), https://perma.cc/764S-JXUA.

2013), aff’d, 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015).

278. Therefore, the Google Books Project actually includes four categories of
works: (i) public domain works; (ii) works whose owners opt in; (iii) works whose
owners may be searchable but searching costs exceed their marginal values; and
(iv) orphan works whose owners are not locatable with a diligent search. If we de-
define a diligent search by using, as a benchmark, the marginal value of the captioned
book, the third and fourth categories would merge into one. See Bernard Lang, Or-
phan Works and the Google Book Search Settlement: An International Perspective, 55
to the whole project. This is not different in nature from the license hurdle faced every day by television and radio broadcasters who use a large number of musical works for their programs. If history is any indication, the best solution is not to bypass copyright transactions. Instead, we may pool various copyrighted works together through major publishers or collecting societies to facilitate the issuance of blanket licenses for mass digitization. This approach takes advantage of economies of scale to decrease transaction costs as the formations of ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC do for music rights clearance.279

Website search engines provide a slightly different example.280 Although a comprehensive collection of web content is the foundation of a search engine, any individual webpage is a small portion that may easily be replaced or omitted without any meaningful impact to the overall function of a search engine. Because a search engine actually assists consumers in locating web content, website owners who made their content available online without limitation are often willing to grant a license for free and even pay a search engine to include their webpages in search results. Under the circumstances, the license fee is effectively zero or negative.281 Were a large number of website owners to charge no royalties in market transactions, we could further economize on transaction costs by turning an opt-in system into an opt-out system.282 For instance, courts may presume implied licenses granted by website owners on the condition that the search engine has made available a reasonable mechanism for those who prefer to opt out of the implied licenses. Transaction costs would be lower for some owners to opt out than for the search engine to approach all relevant owners.

However, the presumption that copyright owners are willing to grant search engines royalty-free licenses does not carry the same weight in the Google Book Project, especially with regard to authors who have not offered digital copies of their books online in the first place. Additionally, while website designers are generally familiar with the robots.txt protocol to easily opt out of web crawler indexing, there is currently no uniform and easy-to-use opt-out protocol for print books across all kinds of mass digitization projects, which are proliferating all

279. In the limited cases where transition costs remain insurmountable and substantially impede digitization projects, a court may apply a limitation on liability, which would become unavailable the moment new mechanisms emerge to diminish the transaction costs.

280. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 154 (9th Cir. 2007); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 815 (9th Cir. 2002).

281. Arguably, it may not be optimal herein to establish a collecting society with the monopolistic power to charge positive prices and incur substantial administrative costs for handling copyright royalties.

282. See, e.g., Ty, Inc. v. Publ’n Int’l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 517-18 (7th Cir. 2002); Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1122 (D. Nev. 2006) (“There is compelling evidence that site owners would not demand payment for this use of their works.”).
over the world. It is equally unclear how authors may efficiently monitor the increasing number of mass digitization projects, which may or may not have scanned their books. If an author determines to withhold her works out of digitization, she must carefully comply with varied procedures set by multiple projects in different countries. These daunting tasks are exactly the kind of formalities that the drafters of the Berne Convention envisioned while determining to prohibit any formality as a precondition for the enjoyment and exercise of exclusive rights.  

CONCLUSION

The history of the fair use defense under Section 107, from its inception, has witnessed a long list of catchphrases coming into and out of fashion, including “productive use,” “market imperfection,” “price discrimination,” “functional test,” and “complementary goods,” to name a few. The latest and most famous is “transformative use,” which has been approaching total dominance in fair use jurisprudence, involved in 90% of all fair use decisions in recent years. Of all the dispositive decisions that upheld transformative use, 94% eventually led to a finding of fair use. The controlling effect is nowhere more evident than in the context of the four-factor test: a finding of transformative use overrides findings of commercial purpose and bad faith under factor one, makes irrelevant the issue of whether the original work is creative or unpublished under factor two, stretches the extent of copying permitted under factor three towards 100% verbatim reproduction, and precludes the evidence on damage to the primary or derivative market under factor four even though there exists a well-functioning market for the use.

Nonetheless, it is difficult to say with confidence that transformative use is an improvement over its ancestors. While the new label has harmonized fair use rhetoric, it falls short of streamlining fair use practice or increasing its predictability. Courts diverge widely on the meaning of transformative use. They have upheld the doctrine in favor of defendants upon a finding of physical transformation, purposive transformation, or neither. Transformative use is prone to the problem of the slippery slope: courts start cautiously on uncontroversial cases and then extend the doctrine bit by bit to fact patterns increasingly remote from the original context.

Perhaps, Judge Leval was correct in suggesting: “Deploring a test’s vagueness is easy. Much more difficult is to come up with” a better

284. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
one. Perhaps, we will never discover a greater theory than transformative use. If that is the case, we would not be left with no means to further streamline the fair use doctrine though. Instead of continuing the quest for a grand theory, our energies may be better spent on empirically verifying the wide variety of distinct policy concerns underlining fair use decisions. In-depth policy analyses taking account of different efficiency and equity considerations in individual cases would certainly call for more intellectual effort from judges than casual references to a soundbite, but would go a long way towards truly improving the coherency and predictability in fair use jurisprudence.286