Stanford LawSchool | Stanford Center for Racial Justice

RESEARCH REPORT
June 2025

Police Use of Force Policies Across America

Regulations from 100 Cities, Post-Floyd Policy Reforms, and Revisiting Constitutional Standards

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ABOUT THE STANFORD CENTER FOR RACIAL JUSTICE

The Stanford Center for Racial Justice works to counter racial division and political polarization through research and conversations exploring racial dimensions of contentious issues in America. We envision a society free from race-driven polarization and inequality, where people recognize racism's far-reaching effects and understand that addressing such challenges requires diverse backgrounds, perspectives, and ideologies. Functioning as a research and dissemination engine, we produce analyses and facilitate discussions on pressing controversies, aiming to provide trustworthy insights on racial dimensions of divisive issues, particularly where they intersect with economic inequality, educational opportunity, and safety.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The Stanford Center for Racial Justice is grateful for the generosity of those who provide support to make this report and all our work possible. The authors express their gratitude to Ralph Richard Banks and Hoang Pham for their strategic guidance and thoughtful feedback on this report. The authors also thank George Brown for his stewardship of the Center's Model Use of Force Policy project and guidance on the report's data and methodology, as well as the many lawyers from the firm Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP that contributed to the Center's use of force research and analysis.

The authors further thank Rory Pulvino and Victor Wu for their insightful feedback on an earlier draft of this report. The authors also extend special thanks to Riley Burton, Isabelle Rose Coloma, and Mira Joseph for their essential contributions to the report's database and policy landscape analysis.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Five years after George Floyd's killing sparked unprecedented demands for police reform, questions persist about the changes that have–and haven't–been made to American policing. Many Americans may be surprised to learn that policing rules vary significantly across jurisdictions, with stark differences in how officers are permitted to use force. One city may require officers to try de-escalating a traffic stop before using any force, while another city may permit officers to immediately draw their weapons without attempting alternatives.

The post-Floyd reform movement has produced a complex landscape of change: departments have largely converged on reforms like chokehold bans and requiring officers to intervene against excessive force, but they remain deeply divided on fundamental questions of when and how force should be used. Our study, which we believe represents the largest systematic analysis of American force regulations to date, examines 22 distinct policy dimensions across the nation's 100 largest cities, comprising 2,200 total regulations collected through 2023. This research was motivated by the troubling and well-documented relationship between race and police violence and the ongoing need to address systemic issues at the intersection of race, policy, and use of force.

Since 2020, forty-five states have enacted reform-oriented policing laws, with at least thirty-one states specifically passing new legislation addressing use of force. Sustained public activism and federal oversight of policing during the Obama and Biden administrations have reinforced this reform movement. The percentage of departments prohibiting chokeholds has surged from 22% to 92% since 2015-2016, while departments with duties to intervene against excessive force have more than tripled from 29% to 95%.

Significantly, 48% of departments have now adopted some version of a "necessary" standard for force use that sets a higher bar than the minimum constitutional "objectively reasonable" standard required by the Supreme Court in *Graham v. Connor* (1989), indicating departments' willingness to exceed constitutional requirements. However, major gaps persist in areas where broader consensus might be expected–only 79% of departments require attempting de-escalation before using force, just 41% restrict pepper spray use against handcuffed persons, and merely 54% designate deadly force as an option of last resort.

Recently, the U.S. Department of Justice announced it would rescind findings of constitutional violations and close civil rights investigations into police conduct in Minneapolis, where Floyd was murdered, as well as Louisville (KY), Phoenix (AZ), Trenton (NJ), Memphis (TN), Mount Vernon (NY), Oklahoma City (OK), and the Louisiana State Police. The Trump administration appears poised to significantly limit federal involvement in police reform more broadly. On the campaign trail, President Trump explicitly stated his intention to "give our police their power back" and "give them immunity from prosecution," signaling a marked shift from post-2020 reform efforts.

Our research takes on particular significance in this political moment. With full Republican control of the executive and legislative branches, federal legislative initiatives to regulate police practices are effectively foreclosed for the foreseeable future. Police reform efforts will necessarily focus on state and local jurisdictions, where policymakers

frequently look to policies and initiatives in other communities when developing new regulations. To support this continuing work, we have developed an interactive database–a use of force Policy Explorer–that provides unprecedented access to comprehensive policy assessments and key regulatory language. This resource will offer an unmatched level of comparative data and transparency to support evidence-based policymaking as police reform continues to evolve at the state and local level.

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INTRODUCTION

Four years to the month after George Floyd's killing ignited a nationwide movement for police reform, another tragedy unfolded in Fort Walton Beach, Florida.[1] On May 3, 2024, Roger Fortson, an active duty U.S. airman and Black man, was fatally shot by a sheriff's deputy three seconds after he opened his front door holding a legally owned gun at his side. This incident, echoing concerns about violent police actions that gained national attention in 2020, renewed debates about how much has truly changed in the use of force by American police since Floyd's death.[2]

The Okaloosa County Sheriff's Office's response was swift and unusually decisive. They found the deputy's use of force "not objectively reasonable" and terminated his employment before the month ended.[3] In August 2024, state prosecutors charged the officer with manslaughter and the criminal case is awaiting trial.[4]

Yet, this incident sheds light on a deeper issue. The agency's use of force policy, like many across the nation, relies on the "objective reasonableness" standard set by the U.S. Supreme Court in *Graham v. Connor* (1989).[5] While the department concluded the deputy violated the *Graham* standard, these determinations are rare–agencies and courts typically find that police conduct meets *Graham's* requirements. This highlights an intrinsic tension in America's policing system: officers are governed by a constitutional standard that, while occasionally violated, may itself be insufficient to prevent devastating consequences. And this framing raises a critical question: while individual officers may fail to follow policy, to what extent might the policies and standards themselves be part of the problem?

In this report, we aim to document how much police use of force regulation has changed since George Floyd's death and reveal the wide variation that remains across America's law enforcement agencies. The report provides a detailed examination of contentious and unresolved issues that remain despite recent reform efforts, exploring both common features and differences in policy language and regulatory approaches. We also assess the breadth of policy coverage, including often overlooked areas such as vehicle pursuits, canine use, and crowd control.

We contend that significant variations and gaps persist in how agencies approach key use of force issues, reflecting ongoing debates within American law enforcement. Our research attempts to understand how the post-Floyd reform movement has–and hasn't–changed America's approach to regulating force, identifying new steps departments are taking to avoid unnecessary force, as well as areas where policies have remained constant. In analyzing these policies, we seek to uncover emerging trends, such as potential shifts from the *Graham* standard, and highlight opportunities for further development in America's force policies.

To test our hypotheses, we collected policies through 2023 from the 100 largest U.S. cities, whose police departments serve over 64 million Americans. We developed a detailed coding scheme covering a broad range of force concepts and topics. Some codes were designed to capture the adoption of consensus reforms that emerged from the post-Floyd movement, such as chokehold bans. However, most codes were crafted to probe

our theories about force issues currently under debate and how various policymaking choices are reflected in these regulations. For comparative analysis, we utilize a dataset of use of force policy provisions from 89 of these agencies from 2015-2016, allowing us to identify trends and changes over time.

This comprehensive analysis represents one component of a three-part research project by the Stanford Center for Racial Justice contributing to the ongoing discourse on police reform: (1) this report–what we believe to be the largest systematic analysis of American force regulations to date–examining 22 distinct policy dimensions across 100 jurisdictions, comprising 2,200 total observations; (2) an interactive database–the use of force Policy Explorer–that includes our thorough assessments of agency policies along with key excerpts of policy language, providing an unmatched level of comparative data and transparency in this field; and (3) a Model Use of Force Policy–10 policy modules addressing key use of force areas such as weapons, de-escalation strategies, and physical force–drawing heavily from our analysis of the regulations in America's largest cities. The research was motivated, in significant part, by the troubling and well-documented relationship between race and police violence.[6] As the police killing of Roger Fortson demonstrates, years after George Floyd's death, the need for understanding and addressing systemic issues at the intersection of race, policy, and use of force remains urgent.

Use of force regulations have emerged as a central focus in the national dialogue about policing in America, extending beyond efforts to hold individual officers accountable for excessive force. This issue has been at the forefront of legislative efforts, such as the George Floyd Justice in Policing Act, and has driven grassroots advocacy campaigns like the "8 Can't Wait" initiative.[7] High-profile criminal trials of police officers, including those of Derek Chauvin for George Floyd's murder, Kim Potter for Daunte Wright's killing, and Jason Van Dyke for Laquan McDonald's fatal shooting, have further heightened public scrutiny of these policies.[8] Despite this intense focus, there is no single federal law dictating use of force policy for all law enforcement nationwide. Instead, around 18,000 U.S. police agencies are left largely to develop their own policies, guided only by a patchwork of state laws, accreditation guidelines, and federal and state court decisions.[9]

America's decentralized approach to regulating policing, coupled with the complex interplay of agency policies, state statutes, and caselaw, makes reforming use of force policies a challenging endeavor. The need to balance legal considerations with the tactical and operational realities of policing further complicates these efforts. While there has been an increase in research on use of force across social, behavioral, and medical sciences, it remains unclear how much of this knowledge has been incorporated into actual force policies.[10] The lack of centralized policy databases and infrequent analyses of these regulations has left law enforcement agencies, policymakers, and advocates without a clear picture of policy trends, leading practices, and areas of ongoing debate–particularly in the wake of a significant period of reform energy.

The depth and breadth of our analysis can offer insights for policymakers, law enforcement leaders, and police reform advocates as they navigate the complex process of researching, debating, and crafting new policies. Our findings reveal key trends and challenges in the current regulatory environment, serving as an evidence-based foundation for future reform efforts. Among the significant findings are our observations on the emerging shift away from the *Graham* standard in use of force policies.

This research takes on particular significance as a second Trump administration takes steps to limit federal involvement in police oversight and reform. The Justice Department recently announced it would rescind findings of constitutional violations and close civil rights investigations into police conduct in Minneapolis, where Floyd was murdered, as well as Louisville (KY), Phoenix (AZ), Trenton (NJ), Memphis (TN), Mount Vernon (NY), Oklahoma City

(OK), and the Louisiana State Police. These actions align with President Trump's campaign promises to "give our police their power back" and "give them immunity from prosecution," signaling a fundamental shift that could have substantial implications for America's regulation of policing practices.[11]

With full Republican control of the executive and legislative branches, federal legislative initiatives to regulate police practices–such as the George Floyd Justice in Policing Act–are effectively foreclosed for the foreseeable future.[12] The primary venue for police reform will remain state and local jurisdictions, where policymakers will frequently look to policies and reform initiatives in other communities when developing new regulations. These political dynamics underscore the importance of understanding current trends in force regulations and their effectiveness, particularly as the landscape of police reform continues to evolve at the state and local level.

Section I of this report reviews the expanding scholarship on use of force policies and policymaking, discussing the evolution of research in this area. It then investigates the post-Floyd reform movement, examining the widespread efforts to regulate American policing that emerged in the wake of George Floyd's murder. This section also explains how these trends and developments shaped the core research questions of this study.

Section II presents the methodology and results of our study of use of force policies in the 100 largest U.S. cities. It details our data collection process, coding methods, and empirical analysis techniques. The section then provides an in-depth examination of our findings, covering areas of widespread reform such as chokehold bans and intervention duties, as well as areas of significant variation like overarching use of force standards and weapon regulations.

We conclude by synthesizing the key findings from our research, reflecting on the evolution of police use of force policies since George Floyd's death while acknowledging the complexities and challenges that persist. The conclusion highlights the importance of further research on policy effectiveness and calls for more comprehensive data collection on use of force incidents. By summarizing these points, the conclusion underscores the ongoing nature of police reform efforts and the critical role that evidence-based approaches should play in shaping the future of American policing.

We recognize that policies are but one piece of a complex puzzle. On their own, they cannot compensate for inadequate training, ineffective implementation, or insufficient accountability measures. However, it is equally true that even the most robust training, implementation, and accountability programs likely cannot overcome the limitations of flawed or poorly constructed policies. For this reason, we see comprehensive and well-crafted use of force policies as a crucial first step on the path to improving policing.

Regulating Use of Force: Expanding Scholarship, Post-Floyd Reforms, and Key Evaluation Questions

EXPANDING SCHOLARSHIP ON USE OF FORCE POLICIES AND POLICYMAKING

Researchers are showing a growing interest in use of force policies and policymaking.[13] In 2011, William Terrill, Eugene Paoline III, and Jason Ingram surveyed a stratified, random sample of more than 1,000 U.S. law enforcement agencies, sparking a trend of empirical studies on force regulations.[14] Their study found that it was difficult to identify standard practices across the country and, while more than eighty percent of responding departments used a type of use of force continuum, departments chose and modified their policies "in a multitude of ways - all unfortunately, with no empirical evidence as to which approach is best or even better than another."[15]

Brandon Garrett and Seth Stoughton (2017) analyzed the content of the force policies used by the nation's 50 largest police departments, finding that even the largest agencies, which they theorized might be the most sophisticated and aware of leading practices, varied widely in their regulations.[16] Around half of the policies analyzed did not provide officers with guidance on how to approach situations or discuss de-escalation tactics. Regarding general force standards, just under half the agencies counseled either minimizing the need to use force–a conceptual step short of strict necessity–or using only necessary force itself.[17] The Supreme Court's *Graham* decision and Fourth Amendment doctrine, the authors found, "exerts real pull on these police policies," with about half of the policies borrowing language from *Graham* in their standards for using force.[18]

Osagie Obasogie and Zachary Newman also conducted a content analysis of use of force regulations in 2017 and 2019 articles, employing a more robust set of eighteen codes to examine the policies from the seventy-five largest cities.[19] Their analysis found that while all policies contained references to the "reasonableness" standard from *Graham*, there was significant variation in the substantive protections and restrictions provided.[20] Only about half of the policies included de-escalation requirements, and even fewer contained substantive rules like proportionality (17%) or requiring officers to exhaust alternatives before using force (31%).[21] The authors argue this demonstrates how police departments largely reproduce the ambiguous constitutional standard without providing meaningful guidance to officers.[22] Furthermore, they contend this allows police to shape the meaning of "reasonable" force through policies that are often deferred to by courts, creating an endogenous process where police preferences become constitutional law.[23]

Michael Smith, writing after George Floyd's killing and the ensuing protests, reviewed these studies (2022) and, with Rob Tillyer and Robin Engel (2021), discussed a related analysis of a major police department's policies on deadly force.[24] Synthesizing the newer scholarship, Smith concluded that use of force polices are "often inadequate to the task of controlling the use of force," courts are "unduly deferential to police policies," and the constitutional rules set by the Supreme Court are "too vague to provide meaningful guidance to the police."[25] Recent studies have further expanded the literature of force policies and policymaking, including a comparison of use of force policies in the twenty largest cities to international human rights law and standards (University of Chicago Law School Global Human Rights Clinic, 2020) and an examination of how regulations govern the use of force and could play a role in judicial doctrine (David Goode, 2018).[26]

Campaign Zero, a police reform advocacy organization, and Samuel Sinyangwe also conducted an analysis of use of force policies that merits attention. In 2016, the group collected and assessed the regulations of the ninety-one largest U.S. cities across eight policy dimensions.[27] These concepts–which included whether departments restricted chokeholds, required de-escalation, and mandated intervention in excessive force incidents–would later evolve into a set of widely-discussed policy proposals, better known by the slogan "8 Can't Wait," eight specific reforms promoted as measures that could immediately reduce excessive force, amidst a national movement to reform policing in 2020.[28]

POST-FLOYD POLICE REFORM MOVEMENT AND SWEEPING EFFORTS TO REGULATE POLICING

George Floyd's killing in 2020 by Minneapolis police officer Derek Chauvin ignited protests across the U.S. and sparked a national conversation about reining in excessive force and confronting racial injustices faced by Black Americans. More than two years later, in 2023, Memphis police brutally beat Tyre Nichols to death, fueling further calls for reform while also spurring law enforcement executives, civil rights advocates, and political leaders to reflect on the changes that had–and hadn't–been made to policing.[29] During the five years since Floyd's murder, public focus and activism on policing practices reached unprecedented levels. From local police departments to state capitols, to Congress and the Oval Office, law enforcement officials, legislators, and President Biden attempted to reform and regulate policing.[30]

These efforts came during a period when policy and practice changes seemed inevitable. A study measuring the public's interest in police reform found the days after Floyd's death corresponded with the highest number of Google searches on the topic ever recorded (John Ayers et al. 2020).[31] The public's confidence in police dropped to a new low, falling five points to 48 percent in a Gallup survey and marking the first time in the 27-year trend that the measure was below the majority level.[32] Another survey by the Associated Press-NORC Center for Public Affairs Research showed 48 percent of Americans expressing that police violence against the public is a serious problem, up from 32 percent in 2015.[33]

National policing organizations, long resistant to calls for reform, signaled a new openness to rethinking force regulations. In July 2020, the International Association of Chiefs of Police and ten allied policing organizations updated their collaborative *National Consensus Policy and Discussion Paper on the Use of Force* to prohibit the use of vascular neck restraints unless deadly force is authorized.[34] This proposed restriction joined other consensus recommendations like a requirement that officers provide medical care, a duty for officers to intervene and stop excessive force, and a similar prohibition on chokeholds that were included in the initial version of the policy published in 2017.[35]

The deaths of Floyd, Nichols, and other Black Americans at the hands of police, the shift in public opinion against the status quo, and the embrace of broadly supported reforms by prominent policing organizations paved the way for sweeping efforts to regulate policing. Our analysis of a database developed by the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) to track new legislation addressing policing revealed that 45 states have enacted reform-oriented policing laws since 2020.[36] These new regulations cover topics ranging from training and oversight to officer certification, technology like body-worn cameras, and data transparency.[37] Moreover, our review of the NCSL database found that at least 31 states passed new laws addressing the use of force.[38]

Advocacy organizations pursuing policing and criminal justice reforms also initiated focused efforts to track state-level use of force law and policy changes. According to Everytown for Gun Safety, an organization that campaigns nationally against gun violence, seven states have, by law or policy, limited the use of deadly force to situations where it is necessary to prevent imminent death or serious bodily harm.[39] Campaign Zero, the group behind the "8 Can't Wait" set of use of force reforms, identifies 25 states that have adopted one or more of the proposed policy recommendations since 2020.[40]

The federal government simultaneously engaged in targeted interventions to drive police reform at the local level. From 2020-2024, the U.S. Department of Justice's Civil Rights Division opened at least 10 investigations into the policing practices of specific local and state agencies, including the Louisville, Memphis, Minneapolis, Phoenix, and Trenton police departments.[41] When these investigations uncover unconstitutional policing practices, the DOJ typically enters into negotiations with the individual agency or city, often resulting in an agreement that mandates specific policy reforms and requires departments to implement more stringent use of force guidelines.[42] However, federal support for these interventions appears to be ending under the Trump administration.

EVALUATING POLICY CHANGE: QUESTIONS GUIDING OUR ANALYSIS

The state-level shift towards regulating policing, particularly the use of force, has prompted modifications to force practices in police departments across the U.S.[43] However, the effects of these changes on the policies that shape everyday police conduct remain largely unexamined. Our study aims to uncover the impact of the post-Floyd police reform movement on the policies that guide and govern the behavior of hundreds of thousands of police officers.

We sought to determine whether the post-Floyd movement and heightened regulatory focus altered police departments' standards for using force, their rules around weapons, and policy approaches in key areas like pursuits, canines, and crowd management. For increasingly consensus practices, such as banning chokeholds, mandating intervention in another officer's misconduct, and requiring the provision of medical aid, we aimed to understand the varying degrees of implementation across departments. Our analysis explored whether some departments imposed more stringent requirements on their officers than others across all use of force issues. Additionally, we also examined whether differences in policy language across departments could provide insights into the policymaking choices facing law enforcement agencies. And, with this policymaking process in mind, we investigated whether these policy differences could help us identify use of force issues that remain debated and unresolved in policing.

While we anticipated observing policy reforms spurred by the nationwide movement and regulatory shifts, we remained mindful of the institutional and cultural resistance to change common in police agencies.[44] Criminologists, sociologists, and organizational theorists have documented the slow pace at which police organizations and their cultures embrace reforms.[45] We sought to determine whether the use of force policies themselves might shed further light on how these institutional and cultural norms continue to influence American policing practices.

Evidence from 100 U.S. Cities

METHODS

We collected and analyzed the use of force policies from the 100 largest U.S. cities through 2023, as these cities represent a significant portion of the U.S. population and tend to have more comprehensive and publicly available policies. This content analysis seeks to reveal the policy language and regulations used by law enforcement agencies after police reform efforts swept across the nation, spurred by outrage at the killing of George Floyd.[46] The study examines not just how departments have implemented consensus reforms, like chokehold bans and requirements to intervene in misconduct, but also tests our hypotheses about which force policymaking issues remain contentious across departments. Drawing from our Model Use of Force Policy project to identify significant force issues, we developed coding that reveals the tensions between officer safety and civilian rights, discretion and accountability, and traditional policing models versus reform-oriented approaches. Our analysis goes beyond commonly studied policy elements to incorporate topics that have been largely unexamined in previous empirical studies of use of force policies, such as vehicle pursuits and canine use.

DATA COLLECTION

Despite a growing interest in the regulation of policing, there have been few efforts by government regulators or researchers to assemble and make available collections of force policies.[47] Police departments have also shown a historical reluctance to share their policy manuals.[48] In response, researchers studying use of force policies have taken different tacks to obtain data. Terrill et al. sent a survey to police departments about their policies while Garrett and Stoughton gathered policies through records requests to the agencies as well as online policy manuals.[49] Campaign Zero assembled a set of policies in 2016 and Obasogie and Newman used data from this archive, one of the few collections of force policies (which we use for our comparative analysis given its coverage of 89 of our 100 cities on several key policy dimensions).[60]

Our analysis, which aims to capture the latest developments in use of force policymaking, led us to develop a database with policies collected by our research team from the 100 largest U.S. cities. While a small number of departments in our sample have been subject to DOJ investigations or consent decrees, our primary analysis examines policy trends across all 100 departments collectively rather than disaggregating by federal oversight status.

For each police department, we collected the policy manual sections and general orders relating to force. These included clearly relevant policies on firearms and de-escalation techniques, as well as regulations on situations like pursuits that frequently lead to force. Other special directives, procedure manuals, and training guidelines were generally not gathered because this study is focused on larger agencies' primary polices on the use of force. While not fully representative of all U.S. policing, this sample of 100 cities provides insights into policies affecting a significant portion of the population. Smaller departments were excluded in the study due to challenges in obtaining their policies and the potential limitations in generalizing findings from a non-random sample of these agencies.

It is worth noting that police departments appear to have heeded calls for more transparency on their policies, seen the value of making the regulations available to the public, or both.[51] By 2023, use of force policies from 91 of the 100 largest cities were available on police department websites.[52] New accountability regimes have contributed to this shift towards transparency. For instance, California, home to 15 of those cities, enacted a law effective January 1, 2020, requiring law enforcement agencies to post online all standards, policies, procedures, and training materials that would otherwise be available to the public under the state's public records law.[53]

CODING AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

This study aims to discover how police agencies have enacted recent reforms to use of force regulations and test our theories about the force issues that are contentious and unresolved. We developed twenty-two codes that cover a broad range of force concepts and topics. Certain codes were designed to capture the degree to which police departments embraced consensus reforms that emerged from the post-Floyd movement in 2020, such as chokehold bans.

Most codes, however, were crafted to probe our theories about the force issues currently under debate in American law enforcement and how these different policymaking choices might be reflected in force regulations. For instance, we asked whether a department had a "necessary" and "proportionate" force standard that surpasses the "objective reasonableness" standard set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in *Graham*. This report deliberately focuses on policies governing the use of force itself, rather than post-incident procedures like reporting or review boards, aligning with the primary scope of our Center's broader research project on use of force.

Below are the codes used in this study and an explanation of the questions we asked about each of the 100 policies.

Prohibiting chokeholds: whether the policy prohibits chokeholds, carotid restraints, and/or other breathing impairments, unless deadly force is authorized.

Intervening against excessive force or misconduct: whether the policy requires an officer to stop or prevent another officer's excessive force or misconduct.

Providing medical aid: whether the policy establishes a duty to provide medical aid whenever officers have used force.

Valuing human life: whether the policy includes language on the department valuing human life and/or aiming to minimize the use of force.

Necessary and proportionate standard: whether the policy has a necessary and proportionate standard for the use of force–as opposed to an objective reasonableness standard.

De-escalation as a first resort: whether the policy requires the use of de-escalation techniques before using force.

De-escalating unnecessary force: whether the policy requires the de-escalation of force as soon as a person's resistance decreases.

Prohibiting strikes to the head: whether the policy prohibits physical strikes to a person's head, neck, or spine, unless deadly force is authorized.

Prohibiting bodyweight on neck or back: whether the policy prohibits placing an officer's bodyweight on a person's neck, chest, or spine.

Prohibiting pepper spray against detained or passive persons: whether the policy prohibits the use of pepper spray against detained and/or passively resisting persons.

Restricting deployment of Taser: whether the policy restricts the deployment of a Taser or similar electronic control device to no longer than necessary but, in no event, longer than 3 cycles of 5 seconds.

Prohibiting baton strikes to the head: whether the policy prohibits baton strikes to the head, neck, or spine, unless deadly force is authorized.

Justifying every baton strike: whether the policy requires the justification of every baton strike.

Deadly force as a last resort: whether the policy permits the use of deadly force only as a last resort when all other options have been exhausted.

Restricting drawing of firearms: whether the policy restricts the drawing of firearms to situations where deadly force is authorized.

Prohibiting shooting fleeing persons: whether the policy prohibits shooting at a fleeing person unless the person poses an imminent threat of death or serious injury.

Justifying foot pursuits: whether the policy establishes that flight alone, by a person, is not a sufficient justification for a foot pursuit.

Restricting vehicle pursuits: whether the policy restricts the authorization of vehicle pursuits to when the person poses an imminent threat of death or serious injury.

Restricting use of canines for search and apprehension: whether the policy restricts the use of canines to a limited set of crimes and requires that the person pose an imminent threat of harm.

Prohibiting use of canines to intimidate: whether the policy prohibits the use of a canine solely to intimidate, coerce, or frighten.

Avoid crowd dispersal orders and mass arrests: whether the policy instructs officers to limit enforcement actions and arrests in crowd management settings to focus on those breaking laws and endeavors to avoid dispersal orders and/or mass arrests.

Restricting chemical force: whether the policy restricts the use of chemical force, like tear gas, to situations where its use is necessary and proportionate to an imminent threat of crowd violence or serious property damage.

Although our analysis resulted in yes/no data, the collected data sources–the use of force policies themselves–were far from uniform. Policies varied widely in structure, length, and specificity; for instance, some departments had comprehensive standalone use of force regulations, while others incorporated force policies across multiple sections of their general orders. Additionally, similar concepts were often articulated using different terminology or levels of detail across departments.

This led us to implement measures to ensure the analysis was consistent. We developed a codebook and form that contained the codes with definitions, inclusion and exclusion criteria, and example policy language. While it is possible some departments do not regularly use certain tools like canines or tasers, our research indicates this is rare among large city agencies and unlikely to significantly impact our overall findings. Using this codebook, our research team, including the authors, reviewed 11,634 pages of regulations from 100 different policies.

RESULTS

Our analysis of use of force policies from the 100 largest U.S. cities reveals both widespread adoption of certain restrictions and significant variation in other critical areas. Near-consensus reforms, such as chokehold bans, are present in most policies, albeit with slight yet meaningful variations in implementation. Standards for using force vary considerably across departments, despite many regulations still referencing the Supreme Court's objective reasonableness standard from *Graham*. Rules governing less-lethal weapons and deadly force span a spectrum from highly prescriptive to notably permissive. Additionally, our analysis shows wide disparities in policy approaches to pursuits, canine use, and crowd management–all topics closely related to use of force. The following sections detail our findings across these key areas, highlighting both areas of convergence and significant policy divergences among the police departments in the nation's largest cities. *See Figure 1*.

WIDESPREAD REFORMS: CHOKEHOLDS, INTERVENTION, MEDICAL AID, AND VALUE OF LIFE

America's larger police agencies have reached a consensus, or near-consensus, on several key force issues. Chokehold prohibitions appear in ninety-two percent (92%) of the 100 policies; duties to intervene in another officer's misconduct in ninety-three percent (93%), and duties to provide medical aid to a person in ninety-three percent (93%). Additionally, ninety-three percent (93%) of the policies explicitly express the department's value of human life and/or aim to minimize the use of force. However, while these concepts are now nearly

Figure 1

Number of Restrictive Regulations in Policies of 100 Largest U.S. Cities (out of 22)



Figure 1 Source: Stanford Center for Racial Justice analysis of use of force policies from 100 largest U.S. cities.

universal, departments often differ in their specific policy language and implementation approaches.

Chokehold restrictions vary in their stringency across departments. Many agencies, like the Chicago Police Department, allow chokeholds as a last resort "when necessary to protect against an imminent threat to life."[54] In contrast, others impose absolute bans. The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, for instance, states unequivocally that "Chokeholds are not permitted" and prohibits any action likely to restrict airflow or blood flow.[55] This absolute ban reflects Nevada's 2020 state law prohibiting chokeholds, part of a broader trend with at least 15 other states and the District of Columbia enacting similar restrictions by 2022, according to Gardener and Al-Shareffi (2022).[56]

Comparing our current data with Sinyangwe's 2015-2016 policy dataset, and using his original coding, reveals a dramatic shift in chokehold policies nationwide.[57] *See Figure 2*. Of the 89 police departments for which we have data in both periods, 62 agencies, including Las Vegas, changed their policies to restrict chokeholds. The percentage of departments restricting chokeholds surged from twenty-two percent (22%) in 2015-2016 to ninety-two percent (92%) in 2023, underscoring a significant policy evolution in response to public scrutiny and legislative action.

Policies mandating officer intervention in misconduct show some variation in scope. Most resemble the Denver Police Department's directive, requiring intervention "without regard for chain of command" whenever witnessing inappropriate force or mistreatment.[58] The Detroit Police Department takes a broader approach, extending the duty to intervene to any unethical act or policy violation.[59] Our comparative analysis shows a substantial increase in intervention policies, from twenty-nine percent (29%) of the 89 agencies in 2015-2016 to ninety-three percent (93%) in 2023, with 57 departments implementing new policies during this period.

Requirements for officers to provide medical aid are now commonplace, typically using language similar to the Dallas Police Department's mandate that "officers are responsible for rendering first aid to injured subjects."[60] The principle of valuing human life, promoted by 2016 Police Executive

Figure 2

2015/2016 and 2023 Force Regulations in Policies of 89 U.S. Cities



Figure 2 Source: Campaign Zero analysis of 2015/2016 policies, see Samuel Sinyangwe, "Examining the Role of Use of Force Policies in Ending Police Violence," (2016); Stanford Center for Racial Justice analysis of use of force policies from 100 largest U.S. cities.

Research Forum guidelines and endorsed by a group of 11 national police organizations in 2017, is expressed in various ways.[61] The Boston Police Department emphasizes respect for "the inherent life, liberty, and worth of all individuals," while San Antonio's policy explicitly prioritizes the protection of life over property and apprehension of offenders.[62] These policy statements reflect a growing emphasis on the sanctity of human life in law enforcement practices.

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES: USE OF FORCE STANDARDS AND DE-ESCALATION

The foundation of a policy agency's force regulations is a standard establishing when officers are permitted to use force. Since *Graham v. Connor*, the U.S. Supreme Court's "objectively reasonable" standard for evaluating excessive force claims under federal law has profoundly influenced these agency regulations.[63] Some policies, like that of the Irving, Texas Police Department, directly adopt the Graham standard, stating, "The U.S. Supreme Court case of **Graham v. Connor** established 'Objective Reasonableness' as the standard for all applications of force in the United States."[64] (emphasis in original)

However, force that is "objectively reasonable" may not always be necessary to resolve a situation. This distinction has led to a split among the 100 police departments studied, with forty-eight percent (48%) adopting some version of a "necessary" standard for force use where the force used must be proportional to the threat faced. *See Figure 3*. For example, the Albuquerque Police Department explicitly states it "holds Department personnel to a higher standard than that articulated in Graham v. Connor…"[65] Oakland's police department goes "beyond the Constitutional minimum" requiring that all uses of force "not only be objectively reasonable but also necessary and proportional to the situation."[66] In bold capital letters, the Cleveland Division of Police underscores that "**OFFICERS SHALL USE ONLY THE AMOUNT OF FORCE NECESSARY**

Figure 3

General and Physical Force Regulations in Policies of 100 Largest U.S. Cities



Figure 3 Source: Stanford Center for Racial Justice analysis of use of force policies from 100 largest U.S. cities.

TO ACHIEVE A LAWFUL OBJECTIVE," (emphasis in original) while Tampa's policy authorizes "only the minimum level of force necessary to control the situation."[67]

Some policies explicitly grapple with the tension between the *Graham* decision and an agency's intent to impose higher standards. The Arlington Police Department's policy acknowledges this, stating, "Oftentimes the department requires employee conduct that exceeds civil and criminal legal standards."[68] It clarifies that policy violations will only form the basis for departmental administrative sanctions, while legal violations–e.g. unconstitutional conduct under *Graham*–will be subject to civil and criminal sanctions in judicial settings.[69]

De-escalation regulations, not closely tied to federal law or precedent, are another crucial component of most force policies. Our analysis shows that seventy-nine percent (79%) of the policies require the use of de-escalation techniques before force is applied. This represents a significant increase from 2015-2016, when only thirty-one percent (31%) of the 89 departments for which we have comparative data had such requirements. By 2023, seventy-nine percent (79%) of these departments had reformed their policies to include de-escalation mandates. Additionally, fifty-six percent (56%) of the current policies require the de-escalation of force as a person's resistance decreases, while forty-four percent (44%) do not include this specific regulation.

Notably, fewer policies restrict physical force methods that have led to widely scrutinized incidents and deaths.[70] Only eighteen percent (18%) of the agencies prohibit physical strikes to a person's head, neck, or spine, unless deadly force is authorized. Similarly, just twenty-six percent (26%) ban officers from placing their bodyweight on a person's neck, chest, or spine. The New York City Police Department exemplifies this minority, with guidelines prohibiting "[s]itting, kneeling, or standing on the chest or back of a subject in a manner that compresses the diaphragm, thereby reducing the subject's ability to breathe."[71]

Figure 4

Weapons and Deadly Force Regulations in Policies of 100 Largest U.S. Cities



Figure 4 Source: Stanford Center for Racial Justice analysis of use of force policies from 100 largest U.S. cities.

CRITICAL TOOLS AND TACTICS: WEAPON USE AND DEADLY FORCE REGULATIONS

Weapon regulations constitute a significant portion of the 100 force policies analyzed. Pepper spray, a widely adopted less-lethal weapon used by an estimated 94% of U.S. departments in 2013, is consistently regulated across policies in terms of handling, decontamination procedures, and use against aggressive threats.[72] However, a notable distinction emerges in more ambiguous situations: only forty-one percent (41%) of policies restrict pepper spray against handcuffed or passively resisting individuals. *See Figure 4*.

Tasers, another common incapacitating weapon, are extensively regulated in many policies. A key point of divergence is the degree to which agencies heed medical and scientific warnings about repeated use.[73] Following a set of influential recommendations from the National Institute of Justice (2011), forty-seven percent (47%) of the policies restrict taser use to no more than 15 seconds (three standard five-second cycles). The Saint Paul Police Department exemplifies this

approach, mandating that after three cycles, the taser "will be deemed ineffective and another use-of-force option must be considered."[74]

Batons, often described as the oldest policing tool, are addressed in most policies.[75] Seventy-two percent (72%) of the policies restrict baton strikes to the head to situations where lethal force is sanctioned, reflecting a widespread acknowledgment of the significant harm batons and other impact weapons are capable of inflicting. However, only eleven percent (11%) adopt a stance similar to the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department, which maintains that "each strike with an impact weapon is a separate use of force" and requires individual justification for each blow.[76]

Deadly force authorization is a fundamental component of use of force policies. Fifty-four percent (54%) of the departments designate deadly force as a "last resort" due to its gravity and irreversible outcomes. Policy language reveals varied approaches: Milwaukee explicitly labels it a "last resort," Seattle describes it as "a measure to be employed in the most extreme circumstances," while others, like Glendale, Arizona, provide less restrictive guidelines, allowing deadly force to "overcome an attack that the [officer] reasonably believes would produce serious physical injury or death to the [officer] or another person."[77]

Firearm-specific policies reveal further variations in regulatory approaches. Only twenty-seven percent (27%) of the policies restrict officers from drawing firearms to situations where deadly force is authorized.[78] The remaining policies often allow for a broader range of circumstances. For example, the Chesapeake, Virginia Police Department permits an officer to draw their firearm when "circumstances cause the officer to reasonably believe that it may be necessary to use the weapon."[79] The policy then lists an expansive set of situations, including "building searches" and "felony vehicle stops."[80]

Ninety-three percent (93%) of agency policies specifically prohibit officers from shooting at fleeing persons unless they pose an imminent threat of death or serious injury, aligning with the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in *Tennessee v. Garner*.[81]

The remaining polices, such as Kansas City's, opt for more general deadly force guidelines, using broader language like authorizing its use to protect from what officers "reasonably believe is an immediate threat of death or serious physical harm."[82]

HIGH-RISK SCENARIOS: PURSUITS, CANINE USE, AND CROWD MANAGEMENT

Use of force policies increasingly address situations that frequently precipitate force, such as pursuits, canine deployments, and crowd management, recognizing their potential to escalate into forceful encounters. Pursuits, both on foot and in vehicles, are prime examples of such situations, and a growing number of force policies now include specific regulations aimed at shaping officers' real-time decision-making in these scenarios.

For instance, twenty percent (20%) of the policies stipulate that mere flight by a person not suspected of criminal activity is insufficient justification for initiating a foot pursuit. The Baltimore Police Department's policy demonstrates this approach, stating, "The mere act of flight alone by a person shall not serve as justification for engaging in a Foot Pursuit."[83]

Vehicle pursuits face stricter regulations, with forty-two percent (42%) of the policies restricting their authorization to situations where the fleeing person poses an imminent threat of death or serious injury to others. The New Orleans Police Department's policy illustrates this restrictive approach, permitting vehicle pursuits only when the suspect "has committed or has attempted to commit a **crime of violence**," (emphasis in original) and their escape "would pose an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or to another person."[84]

Canine deployments, which can increase the likelihood of serious force use, reveal significant variations in regulatory approaches across agencies. Only twenty-one percent (21%) of policies restrict canine use to situations involving suspects

believed to have committed specific serious crimes (such as weapon offenses or forcible felonies) and posing an imminent threat. Even fewer policies, eleven percent (11%), explicitly prohibit inappropriate uses of canines, such as the Louisville Metro Police Department's directive against "us[ing] a canine in any way to coerce or intimidate any person."[85] This lack of consensus highlights the ongoing debate about appropriate canine use in law enforcement.[86]

Crowd management presents unique challenges for use of force policies. In 2020, New Jersey's Attorney General issued a statewide policy addressing "Use of force for crowd management" which prohibits force against peaceful demonstrators while permitting it against specific individuals engaged in unlawful activity.[87] This approach, known as "differentiation" in crowd psychology studies, recognizes that crowds can contain both moderate and more antagonistic members.[88] Of the analyzed policies, thirty percent (30%) direct officers to focus enforcement actions on specific law-breaking individuals in crowd situations. Regarding more serious force, twenty-eight percent (28%) of the policies restrict the use of chemical agents like tear gas to situations where such force is necessary and proportionate to an imminent threat of crowd violence or serious property damage.

Conclusion

Reflecting on the state of police use of force policies five years after George Floyd's killing, it's evident that considerable changes have occurred. Many use of force policies have evolved, often incorporating more restrictive standards. This study is among the first to document at scale how police departments are breaking with the *Graham* standard and implementing stricter force regulations. Agencies like the Albuquerque Police Department, that a decade ago identified objective reasonableness as "the standard under which all uses of force by an officer are evaluated," now employ policies that "[hold] Department personnel to a higher standard than that articulated in Graham v. Connor…"[89] Similarly, the Metropolitan Nashville Police Department has shifted from a "reasonably necessary" force standard to one requiring force to be "necessary," while also introducing a proportionality principle that links the degree of force to the level of resistance or threat encountered.[90]

The policy shift–to embrace concepts like necessity, proportionality, and deadly force as a last resort, exceeding *Graham's* constitutional requirements–serves as evidence that reform efforts, including the post-Floyd movement, can impact police practices. Widespread adoption of explicit prohibitions on chokeholds (a force technique that could satisfy *Graham's* objective reasonableness standard depending on the circumstances) further demonstrates departments' willingness to impose more stringent constraints on officer discretion than constitutional law requires. But there remains significant variation across America's police departments–though some have adopted strict approaches to regulating force, others continue to use notably permissive force policies.

While our study focuses on policies, addressing unnecessary and unlawful force requires a multi-pronged approach. This report emphasizes that effective change demands not only well-crafted policies but also robust training, effective implementation, and capable accountability measures. Importantly, as policing scholars Kyle McLean, Seth Stoughton, and Geoffrey Alpert observe–and we concur–there is a pressing need for more research on the effectiveness of these policies in reducing loss of life and injury from police use of force.[91] This research is crucial for informing future policy decisions and reform efforts.

Large-scale research on policy effectiveness requires two key elements. First, more comprehensive data on policies across the country and sophisticated approaches for analyzing them are essential. Our study provides a foundation for this work, though future efforts will need to incorporate additional details such as the dates of policy changes and methodical tracking of these shifts over time. Moreover, a key area that deserves focus is the more than 10,000 small police departments with fewer than 30 sworn officers whose policies are not well understood and, in many cases, unavailable for public review. Understanding and analyzing these smaller agencies' policies is essential for a complete picture of use of force regulations across the nation.

Second, detailed data on use of force incidents from police agencies nationwide is necessary. While the FBI's National Use-of-Force Data Collection effort, initiated in 2019, was a step in the right direction, its limited scope and participation challenges highlight the need for more comprehensive and accessible data collection.[92] Expanding these efforts to include a broader range of force incidents, beyond those resulting in death or serious injury, is essential for facilitating more nuanced research and analysis.

Even in the absence of data and empirical research on policy effectiveness, some regulations adopted by departments show clear promise in reducing unnecessary force through their inherent mechanical and procedural constraints. For instance, policies restricting officers from drawing firearms except in situations where deadly force is authorized create an immediate physical barrier to unnecessary escalation. Similarly, regulations that permit deadly force only as a last

resort, requiring officers to exhaust all reasonable alternatives, necessarily reduce situations where lethal force might otherwise be employed prematurely. Prohibitions on using pepper spray against detained or passive individuals represent another straightforward way to prevent unnecessary force in low-risk scenarios. While research remains vital for understanding the full impact of force policies, these types of concrete operational restrictions demonstrate how carefully crafted regulations can create direct pathways to reduce unnecessary force incidents.

Beyond the question of effectiveness, the heterogeneity of use of force policies across jurisdictions makes understanding what constitutes appropriate police conduct in America inherently difficult. When neighboring cities set different rules for when and how officers may use force, the public is left without a clear or consistent standard to rely on. These policies can also be challenging to locate or are written in technical language that is difficult for community members to interpret. Better analysis and public engagement with use of force policies can enable communities to become active participants in determining how they are policed.

In conclusion, the path to meaningful police reform is complex and ongoing. This research contributes to the broader reform effort by providing a detailed snapshot of the nation's use of force policies and their evolution in the post-Floyd era. However, it also illuminates the gaps in our knowledge and the areas where further work is needed. By continuing to refine our understanding of policy effectiveness, expanding data collection efforts, and maintaining a commitment to evidence-based reform, progress can be made towards a future where encounters between police and the public involve less force, result in fewer injuries and fatalities, and better honor the trust and expectations of the communities our officers are sworn to protect and serve.

Appendix

This appendix contains the detailed coding results from our systematic analysis of use of force policies across the 100 largest U.S. cities collected through 2023. The data presented here shows the presence or absence of specific policy provisions in each department's regulations, providing the empirical foundation for our findings on policy variation and reform trends.

City/Police Department	Language valuing human life	Necessary/proportionate standard for using force	Deadly force as last resort	Requires de-escalation	De-escalating force once used	Prohibits physical strikes to head, neck, or spine	Prohibits bodyweight on person's neck, chest, or spine	Prohibits chokeholds	Flight alone does not justify foot pursuit	Restricts vehicle pursuits	Limits Taser to 3 5-second cycles	Prohibits pepper spray against passive person	Prohibits baton strikes to head, neck, or spine	Justify every baton strike	Draw firearm only when deadly force authorized	Prohibits shooting fleeing suspect unless deadly threat	Prohibits using canine to intimidate	Restricts canine searches and apprehensions	Requires officers to intervene	Requires medical aid	Limits arrests and dispersal orders in crowd situations	Limits use of tear gas to crowd violence
Albuquerque, NM	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Anaheim, CA	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Anchorage, AK	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Arlington, TX	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Atlanta, GA	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Aurora, CO	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Austin, TX	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Bakersfield, CA	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baltimore, MD	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Boise, ID	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Boston, MA	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Buffalo, NY	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Chandler, AZ	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Charlotte, NC	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Chesapeake, VA	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Chicago, IL	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Chula Vista, CA	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cincinnati, OH	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Cleveland, OH	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Colorado Springs, CO	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Columbus, OH	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Corpus Christi, TX	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Dallas, TX	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Denver, CO	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Detroit, MI	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No

City/Police Department	Language valuing human life	Necessary/proportionate standard for using force	Deadly force as last resort	Requires de-escalation	De-escalating force once used	Prohibits physical strikes to head, neck, or spine	Prohibits bodyweight on person's neck, chest, or spine	Prohibits chokeholds	Flight alone does not justify foot pursuit	Restricts vehicle pursuits	Limits Taser to 3 5-second cycles	Prohibits pepper spray against passive person	Prohibits baton strikes to head, neck, or spine	Justify every baton strike	Draw firearm only when deadly force authorized	Prohibits shooting fleeing suspect unless deadly threat	Prohibits using canine to intimidate	Restricts canine searches and apprehensions	Requires officers to intervene	Requires medical aid	Limits arrests and dispersal orders in crowd situations	Limits use of tear gas to crowd violence
Durham, NC	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
El Paso, TX	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Fort Wayne, IN	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Fort Worth, TX	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Fremont, CA	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fresno, CA	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
Garland, TX	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Gilbert, AZ	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Glendale, AZ	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Greensboro, NC	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Henderson, NV	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Honolulu, HI	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Houston, TX	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Huntsville, AL	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Indianapolis, IN	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Irvine, CA	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Irving, TX	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Jacksonville, FL	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Jersey City, NJ	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Kansas City, MO	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Laredo, TX	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Las Vegas, NV	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Lexington, KY	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Lincoln, NE	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Long Beach, CA	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes

City/Police Department	Language valuing human life	Necessary/proportionate standard for using force	Deadly force as last resort	Requires de-escalation	De-escalating force once used	Prohibits physical strikes to head, neck, or spine	Prohibits bodyweight on person's neck, chest, or spine	Prohibits chokeholds	Flight alone does not justify foot pursuit	Restricts vehicle pursuits	Limits Taser to 3 5-second cycles	Prohibits pepper spray against passive person	Prohibits baton strikes to head, neck, or spine	Justify every baton strike	Draw firearm only when deadly force authorized	Prohibits shooting fleeing suspect unless deadly threat	Prohibits using canine to intimidate	Restricts canine searches and apprehensions	Requires officers to intervene	Requires medical aid	Limits arrests and dispersal orders in crowd situations	Limits use of tear gas to crowd violence
Los Angeles, CA	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Louisville, KY	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Lubbock, TX	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Madison, WI	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Memphis, TN	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Mesa, AZ	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Miami, FL	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Milwaukee, WI	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Minneapolis, MN	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Nashville, TN	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
New Orleans, LA	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
New York City, NY	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Newark, NJ	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Norfolk, VA	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
North Las Vegas, NV	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Oakland, CA	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Oklahoma City, OK	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No
Omaha, NE	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Orlando, FL	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Philadelphia, PA	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Phoenix, AZ	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Pittsburgh, PA	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Plano, TX	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Port St. Lucie, FL	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Portland, OR	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

City/Police Department	Language valuing human life	Necessary/proportionate standard for using force	Deadly force as last resort	Requires de-escalation	De-escalating force once used	Prohibits physical strikes to head, neck, or spine	Prohibits bodyweight on person's neck, chest, or spine	Prohibits chokeholds	Flight alone does not justify foot pursuit	Restricts vehicle pursuits	Limits Taser to 3 5-second cycles	Prohibits pepper spray against passive person	Prohibits baton strikes to head, neck, or spine	Justify every baton strike	Draw firearm only when deadly force authorized	Prohibits shooting fleeing suspect unless deadly threat	Prohibits using canine to intimidate	Restricts canine searches and apprehensions	Requires officers to intervene	Requires medical aid	Limits arrests and dispersal orders in crowd situations	Limits use of tear gas to crowd violence
Raleigh, NC	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Reno, NV	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Richmond, VA	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Riverside, CA	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sacramento, CA	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
San Antonio, TX	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
San Diego, CA	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
San Francisco, CA	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
San Jose, CA	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Santa Ana, CA	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Scottsdale, AZ	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Seattle, WA	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Spokane, WA	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
St. Louis, MO	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
St. Paul, MN	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
St. Petersburg, FL	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Stockton, CA	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Tampa, FL	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Toledo, OH	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Tucson, AZ	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Tulsa, OK	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Virginia Beach, VA	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Washington, D.C.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Wichita, KS	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Winston-Salem, NC	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No

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