INTRODUCTION

One of the most significant labor law developments alongside the passage of the National Labor Relations Act itself, a quarter century earlier, the 1960 Steelworkers Trilogy promoted a process that had gained considerable impetus in the immediate post-World War II era. Arbitration—grievance or rights arbitration—had already brought with it a new corps of neutrals who were to be confronted with a wide variety of issues involving dismissals, discipline, seniority, layoffs, no-strike and management functions clauses, and much more. As Jack Stieber told the National Academy of Arbitrators (the arbitrators’ blue-ribbon organization) at its Annual Meeting 40 years ago, while interest arbitration over new
contract terms born out of the protest of the early 20th century—antedated this relatively new process, the latter soon became more prevalent in the dispute resolution arena.

The role of the law was to be a matter of debate, with early academic and arbitral differences about whether opinions should be published at all—the fear being that publication would produce an unwarranted reliance upon stare decisis. In his classic comment, Dean Harry Shulman said, “I suggest that the law stay out—but, mind you, not the lawyers.” Debate ensued in the 1950s.

And then came 1960. The labor law year of 1960 at the Supreme Court began quite differently in comparison to what was to come in June. Just a few months before the Steelworkers Trilogy the Supreme Court, addressing a duty to bargain unfair labor practice litigation, said the following:

The parties…proceed from contrary and to an extent antagonistic viewpoints and concepts of self-interest. The system has not reached the ideal of the philosophic notion that perfect understanding among people would lead to perfect agreement among them on values. The presence of economic weapons in reserve, and their actual exercise on occasion by the parties, is part and parcel of the system that the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts have recognized. [This is so notwithstanding the fact that] abstract logical analysis might find inconsistency between the command of the statute to negotiate toward an agreement in good faith and the legitimacy of the use of economic weapons, frequently having the most serious effect upon individual workers and productive enterprises…

June 20, 1960: …The U.S. Supreme Court handed down its landmark Steelworkers Trilogy decisions a half century ago. Those three decisions echoed a theme hardly inconsistent but perhaps at some tension with the language quoted above—but one consistent with the theme that the Court had propounded three years earlier in its landmark Lincoln Mills decision, i.e., that the Taft-Hartley amendments promoted judicial enforcement of the vol-

---


6 Shulman, supra note 5, at 1024.


untarily negotiated arbitration and no-strike clauses in collective bargaining agreements as the *quid pro quo* for one another.\(^9\)

*Steelworkers Trilogy* gave birth to a labor arbitration law jurisprudence\(^10\) which has been with us for a half century and which, in my view, will likely be with us when our successors are here a half century from now—though, if ironies squared over the first half century can be any guide to the future, with significant shifts both in substance and perhaps even statutory form. In those cases decided on June 20,\(^11\) it is to be recalled that the Court attempted to establish a bright line between the role of the judiciary and that of arbitrators in resolving labor arbitration disputes in those cases before the Court involving the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements. Working against the pre–*Lincoln Mills* judicial hostility to arbitration,\(^12\) the *Steelworkers Trilogy* cases all involved either motions to compel the employer to arbitrate or judicial review of arbitration awards previously rendered where the employer would not adhere to the opinion and award.

*Steelworkers Trilogy* was not front-page news. But on page 19 of the *New York Times* an unsigned article—lengthy in detail by today’s standards—said,

> In three important labor decisions today the Supreme Court laid down the policy that arbitrators should be able to do their work with little or no interference from the Federal courts.\(^13\)

How little those writers knew about the issues that awaited labor and management and ultimately the High Tribunal itself. A couple of weeks later the *Times* editorialized what many of us at that time were thinking:

---

\(^9\)Id.

\(^10\)The National Labor Relations Board had already facilitated the arbitration process through *Spielberg Mfg. Co.*, 112 NLRB 1080 (1955). Litigation was to continue about the proper accommodation between the NLRA and arbitration. See, e.g., *Olin Corp.* 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1964); Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing, 325 N.L.R.B. 176, 180–81 (1997) (Chairman Gould, concurring).

\(^11\)June 20, 1960, was the day when I began my first labor law position, while in between my second and third years at Cornell Law School, with the United Auto Workers in Detroit. I began that day after walking about a mile or so down the road from my place of residence on East Jefferson Avenue to Solidarity House, the UAW headquarters.

\(^12\)*Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.*, 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991) (finding that the purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act was “to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had existed at English common law and had been adopted by American courts, and to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts”). Such judicial hostility toward arbitration is manifested in *Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co.*, 264 U.S. 109 (1923).

One of the most important recent developments in the field of industrial relations—too little recognized by the general public—has been the enormous growth in the use of impartial arbitration to settle disputes that occur under collectively bargained agreements. Fifteen years or so ago instances were rare. Today more than 90 per cent of all labor contracts provide for arbitration, usually binding on both parties, as the final step in the processing of grievances.

But problems of enforcement have plagued the movement from the start.…

The court has held that an arbitrator’s award, based on his construction of the contract, must be enforced by the Federal court regardless of whether the judge agrees with that interpretation. The court has also held that a Federal judge cannot refuse to compel arbitration unless there is “positive assurance” that the contract explicitly exempts that matter in dispute. It is not the function of the judge, in the Supreme Court’s view, to decide which matters should be excluded if the contract calls for the submission of all grievances.

The trend of these decisions is surely sound. Arbitration has proved so conclusively to be the best way to settle contract grievances that the courts have an obligation to go as far as they can, within the bounds of correct legal reasoning, to strengthen the position of those who arbitrate.14

Ironically, this litigation took place under Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley amendments to the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) which provides that “…. suit[s] for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce…may be brought in any district courts of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.”15 The irony here is that Section 301 was enacted out of a concern articulated by the 80th Congress that unions, which had seen their demands suppressed during the wage restraint and no strike policies in effect during World War II,16 were engaging in numerous strikes, disputes, and stoppages that, in some instances, were unfaithful to their no-strike obligations in collective bargaining agreements. Suddenly the impedi-

ments to enforcing some contracts which had been regarded as “gentlemen’s agreements,” and to suing associations in the names of their members were surmounted. The challenges to Section 301 in this statute, both constitutional and statutory (the latter taking the form of the Norris-La Guardia Act of 1932 and its prohibition against injunctions in the federal courts) were not resolved until a decade later in the Court’s landmark *Lincoln Mills* decision in 1957. And then came the *Steelworkers Trilogy* in 1960.

But first let us take a few steps back. In *Lincoln Mills*, Justice Douglas’s majority opinion noted that, while the legislative history of Section 301 was “somewhat cloudy and confusing” nonetheless found a “few shafts of light that illuminate our problem.” The Court opined that Congress was interested in “promoting collective bargaining that ended with agreements not to strike. . . . Plainly the agreements to arbitrate grievance disputes is the *quid pro quo* for an agreement not to strike. Viewed in this light, the legislation does more than confer jurisdiction in the federal courts over labor organizations. It expresses a federal policy that federal courts should enforce these agreements on behalf of or against labor organizations and that industrial peace can be best obtained only in that way.” A new substantive federal labor law of contract was to be fashioned by the courts “. . . from the policy of our national labor laws.” In so doing, the Court presumably reversed the previous encounter with collective bargaining agreements where it had explicitly disclaimed reliance upon federal labor law in the discharge of a Communist party union member and in contractual litigation over what the Court characterized as “uniquely personal” rights of employees sought to be enforced by a union. In a stinging dissent, Justice Frankfurter derided the Court’s majority interpretation in Section 301 as attributing to the section “. . . . an occult content” in finding a “clear” legislative mandate to the federal courts to fashion a comprehensive body of substantive federal law. Justice Frankfurter considered this “. . . more than

---

20 *Id.* at 455.
can be fairly asked even from the alchemy of construction.”23 Significantly, for the future development of labor arbitration law, the dissent found the “...rejection, though not explicit, of the availability of the Federal Arbitration Act to enforce arbitration clauses in collective-bargaining agreements in the silent treatment given that Act by the Court’s opinion.” And because the Federal Arbitration Act “authorizes the federal courts to enforce arbitration provisions in contracts generally, but specifically denies authority to decree that remedy for ‘contracts of employment’...the Court would hardly spin such power out of the empty darkness of § 301.”24

In the wake of Lincoln Mills25 the Court soon addressed a series of questions—the first of which involved the relationship between the judiciary and arbitrators. The Steelworkers Trilogy sought to limit the role of the courts in resolving Section 301 contract issues so as to avoid Justice Frankfurter’s Cassandra-like warning that “judicial intervention is ill-suited to the special characteristics of the arbitration process and labor disputes.”26 Since the parties had bargained for the presumed superior expertise of arbitrators, where there was a broad arbitration clause providing the third party neutral with jurisdiction over a wide variety of grievances involving the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement “...only the most forceful evidence of the purpose to exclude the claim from arbitration can prevail, particularly where...the exclusion is vague and the arbitration clause is quite broad.”27 The evil to be avoided was judicial involvement in the merits through “entangle[ment]...in the construction of the substantive provisions of the labor agreement, even through the back door of interpreting the arbitration clause, when the alternative is to utilize the services of an arbitrator.”28 Because the “mature labor agreement”

24Id. at 466.
26Lincoln Mills, supra note 23, at 463.
28Id.
attempted to regulate “all aspects of the complicated relationship,”
given the compulsion to arrive at an agreement dictated some-
times by economic pressure and induced by the duty to bargain
obligations which are frequently present at the 11th hour at the
time that the contract is about to expire or has recently expired.
Said the Court through Justice Douglas, “Gaps may be left to be
filled in by reference to the practices of the particular industry
and of the various shops covered by the Agreement.” Therefore,
said the Court, “The ablest judge cannot be expected to bring the
same experience and competence to bear upon the determina-
tion of a grievance, because he cannot be similarly informed.”

One of the Steelworkers Trilogy also dealt with judicial enforce-
ment of the award once it had been rendered by the arbitrator.
Here, said the Court, the arbitrator might “look for guidance
from many sources,” but was confined to an award where it “….is
legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the collective
bargaining agreement. When the arbitrators’ words manifested
an infidelity to this obligation, courts have no choice but to refuse
enforcement of the award.”

Thus, Steelworkers Trilogy established the broad parameters. But
the ensuing half century, from Eisenhower to Obama, has brought
much change, and here I attempt to address some aspects of it
and a number of the issues which are raised by its progeny. That
said, before we discuss them seriatim it is important to note a sec-
ond irony.

The Federal Arbitration Act, which some courts have held to
be applicable to collective bargaining agreements, in the wake

---

29 Id. at 580.
30 Id. at 582.
32 Compare Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of New York, Inc. v. Soft Drink and Brewery Workers
Union Local 812, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 242 F.3d 52, 53 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[i]n cases
brought under Section 301…the FAA does not apply.”); Austin v. Owens-Brockway
Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 879 (4th Cir. 1996) (“We need not rely on the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., in this case because, in this circuit, the FAA
is not applicable to labor disputes arising from collective bargaining agreements.”); Int’l
Chem. Workers Union v. Columbian Chemicals Co., 331 F.3d 491, 494 (5th Cir. 2003)
(finding that the district court appropriately relied only on Section 301, as opposed to
the FAA, when confirming an award brought pursuant to an arbitration mandated by a
collective bargaining agreement); International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 519 v. United
Parcel Service, Inc., 335 F.3d 497, 503 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Although the Federal Arbitration
Act (‘FAA’) does not apply to collective bargaining agreements, see 9 U.S.C. § 1, federal
courts have looked to it for guidance in labor cases brought under § 301 of the Labor
Workers, Local Union No. 545 v. Hope Elec. Corp., 380 F.3d 1084, 1097 (8th Cir. 2004)
(“§ 301 provides an independent basis for federal jurisdiction to enforce labor arbitra-
of Circuit City, now clearly provides much more finality to an arbitration award than does Section 301. It is to be recalled that Steelworkers Trilogy, most particularly United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., established the proposition that courts must not interfere with the enforcement of such awards unless they betrayed the essence of the agreement. The judicial review romp through the playpen of public policy as a basis for invalidating awards had yet to come.

And here is yet another irony. In 2009, in 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, the Court decided an important case involving the collective bargaining agreement and the respective roles of arbitrators and courts under the Federal Arbitration Act, and did so without even discussing the content of the statute or its relationship to labor arbitration disputes arising under such agreements, and with no mention or reference to Justice Frankfurter’s dissent in Lincoln Mills!

Tied to this development is the fact that the Court has seemingly so restricted judicial review of labor arbitration awards under the 1925 law that the question of judicial review under public law standards in discrimination cases, for instance, remains unsettled. Workers, Local 272, 492 F.2d 1255, 1258 (1st Cir. 1974) (“In directing the parties to resubmit the issues to arbitration, we act within the scope of the Federal Arbitration Act...which, we have held, applies to collective bargaining agreements”); Tenney Eng’g, Inc. v. United Electrical Radio & Machine Workers of Am., Local 437, 207 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1953) (holding that the FAA applies to collective bargaining agreements); and Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Local 232, Int’l Union, Allied Indus. Workers of America, AFL-CIO, 36 F.3d 712, 715 (7th Cir. 1994) (“As it happens, our circuit is among the minority that has limited § 1 [of the Federal Arbitration Act] to the transportation industries and therefore applies the Arbitration Act to most collective bargaining agreements.”). Furthermore, not all circuits have decided the issue. See, e.g., Dogherra v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 679 F.2d 1293, 1297 (9th Cir. 1982) (“Neither the Supreme Court nor this court has ever held the Federal Arbitration Act applicable to arbitration of labor disputes...Because fraud is a ground for vacating an arbitral award under either the Federal Arbitration Act or the federal common law fashioned from the policy of the national labor laws under the authorization of Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, we need not decide whether the Federal Arbitration Act governs labor arbitrations.”) (citations omitted); Barrington v. Lockheed Martin, 483 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1163 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (“Judge Fawsett also determined that the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit would likely hold that the procedures of the FAA apply to an arbitration conducted pursuant to the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement to the extent that those procedures do not contradict the more specific provisions of LMRA.”) (emphasis added). On the peculiar nature of the collective bargaining agreement produced both by agreement and statute, see J.I. Case v. NLRB 321 U.S. 332 (1944).

34Enterprise Wheel Corp., supra note 31.
But it seems clear that that previous reliance upon a standard that would invalidate arbitrations where there was a manifest disregard for law cannot now stand as an independent basis for review. The major question is whether considerations akin to that standard are subsumed within Sections 10 and 11 of the Act.

That said, I propose to discuss the following: First, I discuss the problems that have arisen in motions to compel arbitration and, perhaps more important, judicial review of awards, notwithstanding what seemed to be fairly clear words in 1960—and the issues that have been raised in connection with the no-strike portion of the *quid pro quo* promoted in both *Lincoln Mills* and *Steelworkers Trilogy*. Second, I consider the relationship between the new public law of these past 50 years and the role of arbitration, in particular, the relationship between arbitration and the federal and state level antidiscrimination legislation that emerged from the civil rights revolution of the early 1960s. In this connection, I focus in particular upon the so-called external law issue in statutory arbitrations and the implications of what I view as the badly flawed analysis of the Supreme Court in *14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett*.

---

81 (2002) (employer need not specifically designate leave as FMLA leave for it to count against time which employer is required to provide).

37 Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 350 (5th Cir. 2009) (“We conclude that *Hall Street* restricts the grounds for vacatur to those set forth in § 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA or Act), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., and consequently, manifest disregard of the law is no longer an independent ground for vacating arbitration awards under the FAA.”). Judge Jolly noted that a circuit split had developed on this issue:

Four other circuits have considered this issue. The First Circuit, in dictum and with little discussion, concluded that *Hall Street* abolished manifest disregard of the law as a ground for vacatur. See *Ramos-Santiago v. United Parcel Serv.*, 524 F.3d 120, 124 n. 3 (1st Cir. 2008) (“We acknowledge the Supreme Court’s recent holding in *Hall Street Assocs.*, L.L.C. v. *Mattel* that manifest disregard of the law is not a valid ground for vacating or modifying an arbitral award in cases brought under the [FAA].” (citations omitted)).

The Sixth Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, reached the opposite conclusion by narrowly construing the holding of *Hall Street* to apply only to contractual expansions of the grounds for review. *Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, L.L.C.*, 300 Fed. Appx. 415, 418–19 (6th Cir. 2008). The Second Circuit has also held that manifest disregard survives *Hall Street*. *Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.*, 548 F.3d 85, 93–95 (2d Cir. 2008). The court, however, recognized that *Hall Street*’s holding was in direct conflict with the application of manifest disregard as a nonstatutory ground for review, but resolved the conflict by recasting manifest disregard as a shorthand for § 10(a)(4). The Supreme Court did not address this issue when it reviewed the same case. *Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.*, 559 U.S. _ (2010), 130 S. Ct. 1758, 176 L.Ed.2d 605, 78 USLW 4328 (U.S. 2010) April 27, 2010. Finally, the Ninth Circuit has concluded that *Hall Street* did not abolish manifest disregard because its case law defined manifest disregard as shorthand for § 10(a)(4). See *Comedy Club Inc. v. Improv West Assocs.*, 553 F.3d 1277, 1290 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Comedy Club II”).

Id. at 355–56. On October 5, 2009, the Supreme Court denied petitions for certiorari in *Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, L.L.C.*, 130 S. Ct. 81 (2009), and *Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Assocs.*, 130 S. Ct. 145 (2009).

38 Citigroup Global, supra note 37, at 358.

39 Pyett, supra note 35.
(hereinafter to be referred to as *Pyett*). Here I examine the relationship between the Federal Arbitration Act of 192540 and labor arbitration since, without any discussion whatsoever in what was arguably the mirror image of the Court’s refusal to discuss the FAA in *Lincoln Mills* itself, the Court presumed to resolve the issues posed by that dispute under the standards of that Act. The Supreme Court has earlier stated—this time with some slight discussion but without any rationale—that the courts should look to the 1925 law as a “source for guidance” under Section 301.41

Third, I examine the case law that has emerged as the result of a Court test of Supreme Court decisions dealing with both arbitration and the duty to bargain under the National Labor Relations Act, fueled by the policy considerations adumbrated in *Steelworkers Trilogy*. The first of these is *Wiley v. Livingston*42 in the 1960s. Great debate has now emerged at the circuit court level as to the meaning of these decisions.

Fourth, I consider the relationship between the jurisprudence of Section 301 during this past half century and of the law relating to so-called interest arbitration awards: awards in which the arbitrator is performing a legislative function by writing the contract for the parties, as opposed to the quasi-judicial function of interpreting a negotiated agreement. Do the public policy considerations enshrined in the *Steelworkers Trilogy* apply to interest arbitration cases with which, like the statutory arbitrations, the overwhelming percentage of arbitrators (including those who are part of the National Academy of Arbitrators) have little experience?43 And what role does the Federal Arbitration Act play in this arena as well? The emergence of collective bargaining in the public sector and the *de jure* consensus that the public employee right to strike cannot be recognized or tolerated has given rise to interest arbitration.44 Final offer arbitration has been incorporated into some state

---

40 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.
and the debate, if it materializes, about the Employee Free Choice Act will focus upon first contract arbitration. Here

the words of Justice Stevens, albeit uttered within the context of litigation relating to the enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement, may nonetheless have some applicability: “[a strike or a lockout]…is simply a method by which one party imposes its will upon its adversary. Such a method is the antithesis of the peaceful methods of dispute resolution envisaged by Congress when it passed the LMRA.”

Some of these arbitration disputes about whether interest arbitration can be imposed in an interest arbitration itself (a so-called “evergreen” dispute) relate to rulings of the National Labor Relations Board through its interpretation of the duty to bargain provisions contained in the statute.

The Next Stage of the Steelworkers Trilogy: Initial Review and No-Strike Pledges

In the wake of Steelworkers Trilogy beginning with the 1960s a whole host of issues came before the Court with considerable frequency. The Court held in short order that notwithstanding the fact that the conduct involved in litigation to enforce collective bargaining agreements was arguably an unfair labor practice within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board, the matter could be brought to court—in this instance by individual employees as well as the union. Suits involving the terms of a strike settlement between labor and management and not a collective bargaining agreement were enforced. Though the substantive law of labor contracts was federal, actions could be brought in state court as well as federal.

46Globe Newspaper Co. v. International Ass’n of Machinists, 648 F. Supp. 2d 193, 198 (D. Mass. 2009) (“It appears that every court to have considered [the question of whether an arbitrator has the authority to re-impose an interest arbitration provision in a new collective bargaining agreement over a party’s objection] has concluded that this type of second generation interest arbitration provision is unenforceable as contrary to public policy.”)
The Court rejected suits by individual bargaining unit members seeking to compel labor organizations to prosecute issues through the grievance–arbitration machinery to arbitration itself, absent proof that the union had failed to meet its duty of fair representation, i.e., the obligation to represent the employee and the bargaining unit fairly without hostility, discrimination or bad faith, and to handle the grievance in a “nonperfunctory” manner.51 Said the Court, “[w]e do not agree that the individual employee has an absolute right to have [a] grievance taken to arbitration…. ”52 The Court emphasized the fact that the settlement process screened out frivolous grievances which would otherwise be “costly and time-consuming” for the parties. In two subsequent decisions the Court excluded negligence as a basis for establishing a duty of fair representation violation.53 Said the Court in the 1970s, “union discretion is essential to the proper functioning of the collective bargaining system.”54 The effect of the so-called hybrid duty of fair representation/Section 301 cases was to immunize much of the parties’ relationship from judicial review—particularly where that review was sought by individual employees.

For some time it was unclear as to whether the standard of resolving all doubts in favor of arbitrability was one which meant that the judiciary or the arbitrator was to determine the question of whether the dispute was arbitrable in the first instance. Ultimately, the Supreme Court held in AT&T v. Communications Workers55 that the presumption was that the matter was for the courts and not the arbitrators—though that presumption itself could be rebutted if the collective bargaining agreement explicitly bestowed jurisdiction upon the arbitrator. But as the Federal Arbitration Act has become more prominent the story has become nuanced. The plot has thickened in a Section 301 case where the Court considered the principles contained in the FAA and reiterated the role of the Judiciary in resolving arbitrability disputes—particularly where questions as to the formation of the agreement were at issue—and here the Court appeared to abandon the above-mentioned

---

52 Id.
54 Electrical Workers (IBEW) v. Faust, 442 U.S. 42, 52 (1979), citing Vaca v. Sipes at 191–93 in limiting punitive damages for breach of the DFR.
presumption and the requirement of forceful evidence to rebut the presumption. But standards relating to judicial review of arbitration awards where one party, usually the employer, challenged the award were different. The standard, i.e., that the arbitrator was not to dispense his or her own brand of industrial justice and that the award was to manifest fidelity to the collective bargaining agreement was fairly easy to state but difficult for the courts to apply in fact. Professor Feller, who argued Steelworkers Trilogy and much of its progeny in the 1960s was focused exclusively upon Section 301 and not the FAA—and, most probably, as a result, so was Justice Douglas’s opinion. Feller said later about the holding that the arbitrator’s award must owe its “essence” to the agreement—one man’s essence had an entirely different meaning when applied by another man or woman. Judge Sutton of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit noted in 2006 that his review of challenges to arbitration awards in his circuit established that one out of four was reversed. Though undoubtedly most arbitration awards are not challenged in the courts, the odds for reversal, when doing so, are fairly good with these kinds of numbers.

The other shoe had dropped long before this story had played itself out. This was the other part of the bargain, i.e., the quid pro quo—which, it is to be recalled, was substitution of peaceful resolution through arbitration for strikes. Were injunctions available here, too? But the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 prohibiting the issuance of injunctions by federal courts against strikes

---

56 Granite Rock Co. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. ___ (2010), 188 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2897, 78 USLW 4712, 2010 WL 2518518 (U.S.) (June 24, 2010). This opinion is hardly a model of clarity since the arbitrability issue related to a no-strike clause and it may be that the Court, without articulating it, was reluctant to express the same policy where normally the employer would invoke arbitration; cf. Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, American Bakery & Confectionery Workers International AFL-CIO, 370 U.S. 228 (1962); Local Union No. 721, United Packinghouse Workers v. Needham Packing Co., 376 U.S. 247 (1964). In FAA cases involving individual contracts of employment, where the validity of the contract as a whole is at issue the arbitrator determines his or her jurisdiction—in contrast to a challenge to the arbitration clause itself. Rent-A-Center, West Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. ___ (2010), 109 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 897, 78 USLW 4643, 2010 WL 2471058 (U.S.). See particularly the scholarly and instructive dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens on behalf of Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. Id. at slip op. 1–13.


60 For insight into the historical and intellectual background of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, see Felix Frankfurter & Nathan Greene, The Labor Injunction (1930).
and picketing—itits strictures had been avoided in *Lincoln Mills* on
the ground that a decree providing for equitable relief through
a motion to compel arbitration was not “part and parcel” of the
abuses at which Norris La-Guardia was aimed—was a problem.
Strikes in violation of no-strike clauses were a closer call, notwith-
standing the legislative history of Section 301 which had been
much more concerned with strikes than arbitration. Though the
Court had appeared to speak more qualifiedly about the *quid pro
quo* a couple of years after the *Steelworkers Trilogy,* in
injunctions for
the violations of no-strike clauses presented to the Court posed
a more direct tension between Norris-La Guardia and the Taft-
Hartley amendment in the form of Section 301.

Where the Railway Labor Act of 1926 was involved the Court,
in *Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago & Indiana Railroad,* had held
that strikes called over an issue properly submitted to the
National Railroad Adjustment Board (NRAB) could be enjoined
notwithstanding the Norris-La Guardia hurdle. But in 1962 the
Court by a vote of 5–3, over Justice Brennan’s vigorous dissent,
rejected the same argument under Taft-Hartley on the ground
that it could not find that the Norris-La Guardia Act’s bar against
injunctions in labor disputes had been “impliedly repealed” by
Section 301. A majority of the Court was of the view that Sec-
tion 301 and Norris La-Guardia could not be accommodated to
one another. Eight years later the Court, speaking through Jus-
tice Brennan who had dissented in *Sinclair,* reversed that opin-
ion in *Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union* and held, this time
by 5–2 vote, that federal courts were not precluded from issuing
injunctions against strikes in violation of collective bargaining
agreements. In this case, Justice Stewart rejected the doctrine of
stare decisis quoting a concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter:
“Wisdom too often never comes, and so one ought not to reject it
merely because it comes late.”

---

61 Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, American Bakery & Confectionery Workers, 370
U.S. 254, 267, n.7 (1962); Local 721 United Packinghouse Workers v. Needham Packing
64 Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235 (1970). The case is discussed
65 Henslee v. Union Planters Bank, 335 U.S. 595, 600 (1949).
The Court’s reasoning factored in a number of considerations,\(^{66}\) not the least of which was the point that in the absence of an injunction an employer was deprived of its most effective remedy for a no-strike violation.\(^{67}\) While the *Boys Markets* opinion did not assess the effectiveness of other remedies for no-strike clause violations such as discipline and discharge, it did nonetheless focus upon the alternative of damage actions on a breach of contract theory. Said the Court,

…an award with damages after a dispute has been settled is no substitute for an immediate halt to an illegal strike. Furthermore, an action for damages prosecuted during or after a labor dispute would only tend to aggravate industrial strife and delay an early resolution of the difficulties between employer and union.\(^{68}\)

*Boys Markets* was predicated upon the order of arbitration as a condition for the injunction against the strike—in this case an arbitration of the underlying grievance which gave rise to economic pressure. But clearly the significance of the injunction remedy was to be found in the fact that it was so expeditious, in contrast to other avenues like damages and employer self-help disciplinary measures.

\(^{66}\)These considerations included: (1) an erosion of state jurisdiction through removal under Avco Corp. v. Machinists, 390 U.S. 557 (1968), thus diminishing employers’ enforcement of no-strike clauses; (2) the devastating implications if federal law deprived employers of equitable remedies in state courts; (3) the idea—in my view erroneous—that employers would not have an incentive to negotiate for arbitration/no-strike clauses; (4) the growth of labor unions in “strength” and “toward maturity” that is quite different from the “nascent” movement at the time of the Norris-LaGuardia Act; and (5) the availability of relief under the Railway Labor Act.

\(^{67}\) *Boys Markets*, supra note 64, at 248:

While it is of course true, as respondent contends, that other avenues of redress, such as an action for damages, would remain open to an aggrieved employer, an award of damages after a dispute has been settled is no substitute for an immediate halt to an illegal strike.

The Court also includes an extended quotation from an ABA report on the failings of the pre-*Boys Markets* situation:

Under existing laws, employers may maintain an action for damages resulting from a strike in breach of contract and may discipline the employees involved. In many cases, however, neither of these alternatives will be feasible. Discharge of the strikers is often inexpedient because of a lack of qualified replacements or because of the adverse effect on relationships within the plant. The damage remedy may also be unsatisfactory because the employer’s losses are often hard to calculate and because the employer may hesitate to exacerbate relations with the union by bringing a damage action. Hence, injunctive relief will often be the only effective means by which to remedy the breach of the no-strike pledge and thus effectuate federal labor policy.

*Id.* at 248, n.17.

\(^{68}\) *Id.* at 248. Subsequently the Court concluded that it would be “premature to recognize the federal common law tort [that an employer] requests…even assuming that § 301(a) authorizes us to do so.” Granite Rock Co. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. ___ (2010) at slip op. 22, 188 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2897, 78 USLW 4712, 2010 WL 2518518 (U.S.).
Thus two themes ran through *Boys Markets*, i.e., the availability of arbitrations as a substitute for industrial strife and the *quid pro quo* idea. Soon, the Court would be called upon to determine which of the two themes was dominant. (Subsequently the Court implied no-strike obligations for the purpose of an injunction from a union’s agreement to arbitrate all issues.)\(^{69}\) Then a 5–4 majority of the Court held that a federal court could not enjoin a sympathy strike pending an arbitrator’s decision of whether the strike is forbidden by the express no-strike clause contained in the collective bargaining agreement. That was *Buffalo Forge v. United Steelworkers*,\(^{70}\) where the majority stated that an underlying grievance which triggered the breach of contract strike and an order to arbitrate the grievance were a pre-requisite for an injunction. Nonetheless, in my view, Justice White’s opinion in *Buffalo Forge* was flawed in a number of critical respects—particularly his assumption that the parties had bargained for a no-strike injunction in *Boys Markets* and had not done so in *Buffalo Forge*. This just does not happen, though the parties frequently negotiate so-called “quickie” or expeditious no-strike violation procedures through which an arbitrator can issue a cease and desist award against a no-strike violation which will, if necessary, be taken to court for enforcement.\(^{71}\)

As I had advocated in my *Boys Markets* discussion, in order to avoid a Norris-La Guardia collision, the judges should not have issued an injunction without (1) a rigorous review of the no-strike clause scope and (2) consideration of whether it had been violated. This was the standard taken by Justice Stevens dissenting in *Buffalo Forge*, i.e., “The judge should not issue an injunction without convincing evidence that the strike is clearly within the no-strike clause.”\(^{72}\) Injunctions were only bargained for in an expedited no-

---


\(^{71}\) Id. at 431 (J. Stevens, dissenting).

\(^{72}\) Id. at 431–32 (J. Steven’s giving his support to a form of expedited arbitration in the context of *Boys Markets* injunctions). See also Gould, *On Labor Injunctions Pending Arbitration*, supra note 70, at 541–42:

> Whenever a *Boys Markets* injunction issues, it should be conditioned on the willingness of both parties to accede to expedited arbitration procedures. Under such procedures, the arbitrator decides in a few days or hours whether the union has breached the no-strike clause, as well as whether the employer has violated the agreement in connection with the underlying grievance that precipitated the strike. Thus, expedited arbitration limits the duration of the court’s injunction and preserves the role
strike procedure. But *Buffalo Forge* has remained good law (even though it is in truth bad law) and the Court has followed it in cases involving breach of contract stoppages over political issues.\(^7^3\) Indeed, the holding has precluded the issuance of injunctions for violations of no-strike clauses involving workplace issues where the issues are not clearly arbitrable.\(^7^4\) Notwithstanding the tone of cautious trepidation followed by the majority in *Buffalo Forge*, the circuit courts have jumped in and fashioned so-called “reverse *Boys Markets*” injunctions to enjoin management decisions involving generally a loss of jobs through plant closures, contracting out of work where the passage of time would make an arbitral remedy ineffective.\(^7^5\) Thus in these key respects, i.e., (1) the availability of injunctions for violations of no-strike clauses, express or implied, on a *Boys Markets* theory; (2) the unwillingness to extend it to issues where there is no underlying grievance which itself is susceptible to arbitration as part of *quid pro quo* for an injunction; and (3) the availability of injunctions in so-called reverse *Boys Markets* cases the law has remained stable for most of these four decades since *Boys Markets*.

To be sure, some of the reasoning in *Buffalo Forge* seemed to undercut the basis for reverse *Boys Markets* injunctions. This was so in light of two considerations that seemed important to Justice White in that case. The first is the idea that relief for violation of the no-strike clause is essential only when judicial intervention or review is bargained for, rather than the arbitral process. This was a consideration not relied upon by the Court in *Boys Markets*, not-

---


\(^7^5\) Independent Oil and Chemical Workers of Quincy, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 927 (1st Cir. 1988); American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. U.S. Postal Serv., 766 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1985); United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO v. Fort Pitt Steel Casting, Division of Conval-Penn, Inc., Division of Conval Corp., 598 F.2d 1273 (3d Cir. 1979); Lever Bros. Co. v. International Chemical Workers Union, Local 217, 554 F.2d 115 (4th Cir. 1977); Gulf Coast Indus. Workers’ Union v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 712 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1983); Aluminum Workers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO, Local Union No. 215 v. Consolidated Aluminum Corp., 696 F.2d 437, 441 (6th Cir. 1982); Local Lodge 1266, IAM v. Panoramic Corp., 668 F.2d 276, 279–83 (7th Cir. 1981); Teamsters Local 610 v. Kroger Co., 858 F.2d 415 (8th Cir. 1988); Newspaper & Periodical Drivers’ & Helpers’ Union, Local 921 v. San Francisco Newspaper Agency, 89 F.3d 629, 632 (9th Cir.1996); Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO, Local 2-286 v. Amoco Oil Co. (Salt Lake City Refinery), 885 F.2d 697 (10th Cir. 1989).
withstanding the above-noted practice of quickie or expeditious no-strike arbitration procedures where arbitrators have issued cease and desist orders against no-strike violations.

The second theme in *Buffalo Forge* was, in some respects, a logical corollary of the first, at least in sympathy strike cases: from a policy perspective courts ought not to become involved in issuing preliminary injunctions because such injunctions interfere with the arbitral process. Said *Buffalo Forge*, in response to the argument that injunctions could preserve the status quo until the question of whether the no-strike obligation had been violated was resolved in arbitration:

But this would still involve hearings, findings, and judicial interpretations of collective-bargaining contracts. It is incredible to believe that the courts would always view the facts and the contract as the arbitrator would; and it is difficult to believe that the arbitrator would not be heavily influenced or wholly preempted by judicial views of the facts and the meaning of contracts if this procedure is permitted. Injunctions against strikes, even temporary injunctions, very often permanently settle the issue; and in other contexts time and expense would be discouraging factors to the losing party in court in considering whether to relitigate the issue before the arbitrator.76

Thus the teaching of *Buffalo Forge* has a bearing upon union motions for injunctions preserving the status quo ante in the interim on the ground that the arbitration process would be frustrated until the hearing itself. The implication of Justice White’s opinion is that the parties themselves must bargain some expeditious procedure in order for the court to grant an injunction in that situation as well—the prospect of “massive preliminary injunctions” and the preemptive nature of judicial views on the arbitration process which follows would apply here as well. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit initially77 took this view in a key case remanded in the wake of *Buffalo Forge* when it stated, “an undertaking to preserve the status quo pending arbitration would be to [the employer] . . . what an undertaking not to strike would be to a union.”78 In other words, just as the Court looked

---

76 *Buffalo Forge*, *supra* note 70, at 412.
77 The court would later abandon this approach in *Newspaper & Periodical Drivers’ & Helpers’ Union, Local 921 v. San Francisco Newspaper Agency*, 89 F.3d 629, 632 (9th Cir.1996).
for a special bargained-for procedure in a Buffalo Forge sympathy strike context, the Ninth Circuit looked for the same contractual intent—to have the matter treated expeditiously when the union is seeking to restrain employer conduct—to preserve the status quo clause pending arbitration. Stated one court soon after the Ninth Circuit’s position was taken, “Granting an injunction, even for the limited purpose of this case [a reverse Boys Markets injunction to preserve the status quo ante on unilateral changes at work involving assignment, overtime and contracting out of work and changes in work schedules, wages, and conditions] ... would require some examination of the merits of the dispute between the parties...therefore, the type of injunction, requested by the Union might well contravene the policies of Buffalo Forge.”

But the weight of authority appears to be against this kind of position and to restrict Buffalo Forge, as the opinion itself states to “injunctions against strikes....”80—a conclusion perhaps partially justified by the Lincoln Mills reasoning to the effect that a collision with Norris-La Guardia could be avoided here because these cases are not “part and parcel” of the abuses at which that statute was aimed. Though, as noted, it has been said that a status quo procedure is to be implied in reverse Boys Markets actions, the key consideration is whether, due to the passage of time, the arbitral process will be frustrated because of the arbitrator’s inability to return the parties to the status quo ante.81 Said the Seventh Circuit in a case involving the union’s attempt to enforce a successorship clause against the predecessor before a new commercial relationship was consummated with a successor which would not adhere to the contractual obligations: “the implied status quo would emphasize the ‘parties’ intended forum or remedies for the resolution of contract disputes. As such, the approach is consistent with the concern expressed in Buffalo Forge that the parties be given the benefit of their bargain and that a contractually assumed arbitral remedy not be supplanted by injunctive relief.”82

The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit stated that the need for an implied status quo rule “...has as its premise what amounts to a lopsided vision of the covey of obligations arising in connection with collective bargaining pacts. Under such a view, an arbi-

80 Buffalo Forge, supra note 70, at 412.
81 Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO Local 2-286 v. Amoco Oil Co. (Salt Lake City Refinery), 885 F.2d 697 (10th Cir. 1989).
82 Panoramic Corp., supra note 78, at 282.
tration clause implicitly binds the union not to strike, but does not implicitly bind the employer to preserve the status quo... [the requirement of a status quo clause would be one in which ‘...the Court has added another story to the edifice erected by the Congress—and in the process, tilted the structure’s delicate balance. The asymmetry of this promissory rule appears to contravene, at least implicitly, the equipoise between labor and management which Congress sought to forge and which the Court elaborated in *Boys Markets*...’] The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in a fashion responsive to the concern expressed by *Buffalo Forge* about the heavy influence of judicial proceedings on the subsequent arbitration itself stressed the need to stay free of the merits enough to allow evidence developed at a court hearing to be used in subsequent grievance proceedings.84

Fittingly, the courts have fashioned preliminary injunctions pending arbitration in a variety of reverse *Boys Markets* situations. For instance, a court has found an injunction is appropriate to maintain the status quo where the liquidation and the disposition of assets would frustrate the arbitration process and make any victory by the union at the arbitration itself meaningless.85 On the other hand where reinstatement and backpay in an arbitration can be complied with the compelling circumstances for a preliminary order are unnecessary.86 This is so even though, during the interim foreclosure, unemployed workers may suffer impairment of their credit status, repossession of their property, and other monetary harm so long as these injuries do not threaten the integrity of the arbitral process.87 Thus, the great candidates for preliminary injunction have been changes that result in the physical relocation of the facilities or changes in ownership that cannot be reversed,88 whereas subcontracting that triggers a loss

---

83 Independent Oil & Chemical Workers v. Procter & Gamble, 864 F.2d 927, 931 (1st Cir. 1988).
84 Drivers, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers Teamsters Local Union No. 71 v. Akers Motor Lines, Inc., 582 F.2d 1336, 1342 (4th Cir. 1978):
   …we also disapprove that portion of the district court’s order which allows evidence developed at the court hearing to be used in subsequent grievance proceedings. The function of gathering and evaluating evidence is for the arbitrator. The parties agreed to this mechanism when they negotiated the mandatory grievance procedures. It is not for the courts to re-write the collective bargaining agreement.
85 Id. at 1341.
86 Aluminum Workers v. Consolidated Aluminum Corp., 696 F.2d 437 (6th Cir. 1982).
87 Id. at 443.
of business relationships between salespersons and customers will not suffice.89

Significantly in an era of health insurance debate, the loss of health insurance coverage has constituted irreparable harm.90 Although some courts have required a showing that the denial of health care will result in actual irreparable harm,91 and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has implied that a diminution in scope of health coverage does not constitute irreparable injury,92 in general, the courts have held that without injunctive relief in the interim the eventual award will be a "hollow formality."93

Thus, Buffalo Forge notwithstanding, labor and management both appear to be accepting or reconciled to judicial enforcement of both arbitration and no-strike clauses—a consensus, however, which does not carry over to the issue of and standards for judicial review.

The Steelworkers Trilogy and Public or External Law:
Statutory Arbitrations

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the first comprehensive antidiscrimination legislation which has fueled a wide variety of other statutes and executive orders at both the federal and state levels, was not in existence that summer of 1960 when the Steelworkers Trilogy was handed down. The tension between the role of an arbitrator who was confined to the collective bargaining agreement and public law obligations emerged in the 1960s. These matters triggered debate among arbitrators and scholars94 from the get-go—and in the context of the Academy, there broke out a debate between Robert Howlett and Bernard Meltzer.95 The challenge that the public law and employment discrimination cases

90 Whelan v. Colgan, 602 F.2d 1060 (2d Cir. 1979).
92 Local Union No. 884, United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers v. Bridgestone/Firestone, 61 F.3d 1347, 1354 (8th Cir. 1995).
pose in particular is that on the one hand arbitration is in major respects infinitely preferable to litigation. In 1984 I chaired a California State Bar Committee which proposed wrongful discharge arbitration—statutory arbitration, not as was subsequently developed, employer promulgated arbitration. Among the reasons for this proposal—and it was picked up nationally as well later in the 1980s—was that so many low income employees, disproportionately racial minorities and females, did not have the resources to go to court, but could afford the relatively inexpensive system of arbitration which can be informal and expeditious as well.

For many years it has been clear to me that low income employees are screened out of plaintiffs lawyers’ offices in both wrongful discharge and fair employment practice actions—a point made with emphasis by the Professors Blasi and Doherty in a comprehensive report highlighting the inadequacies of both litigation and administrative enforcement of employment discrimination law in California. Yet the conundrum has been that arbitration contains numerous shortcomings and institutional deficiencies as well—and they were apparent in the 1960s. Though the amicus brief of the Academy in the Pyett case indicates that the organization’s position has altered over the years, when I first spoke about this issue in law reviews, there was considerable reticence about these cases and the handling of them under public law standards. This is because, as I said in my 1969 recommendations, many of which are contained in this paper, they “...run against the grain of much of the conventional wisdom contained in the

---


national labor policy devised since the War Labor Board. . . .” 101 I emphasized that minorities and women had little involvement in the majoritarian process, let alone in the arbitration framework negotiated at the bargaining table—and that arbitrators were ill-equipped to handle such public law cases. I opined that the question was “. . . whether the leaky ship is worth patching. One might well argue that it is better to build a new ship that’s structured in the form of government labor courts more responsive to public law.” 102

The first case to come before the U.S. Supreme Court produced a far-reaching and important yet partially flawed ruling authored by Justice Powell. The case was Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. 103 Here the Court addressed the “proper relationship between federal courts and the grievance–arbitration machinery of collective bargaining agreements in the resolution and enforcement of an individual’s right to equal employment opportunities under Title VII . . . .” 104 But the Court decided the case at a time when some observers, particularly employers, contended that when a union processed an individual employee’s grievance to arbitration, the employee should be deemed to have elected a preclusive remedy 105 and could not then litigate the matter in federal court.

In the Gardner-Denver case, a black worker doing maintenance work at the company’s facility in Denver, Colorado, was discharged and the company took the position that he was producing “too many defective or unusable parts that had to be scrapped.” The petitioner filed a grievance under the collective bargaining agreement that protested the discharge and sought reinstatement without referencing racial discrimination at the first stage of the grievance–arbitration machinery. The collective bargaining agreement stated that the company could “. . . discharge [employees] for proper cause” 106 and also contained a no-discrimination clause which prohibited discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin or ancestry. The agreement also spoke of an obligation not to discharge except for “just cause” and contained a broad arbitration clause addressing the mean-

102 Id.
104 Id. at 38.
106 Gardner-Denver, supra note 103, at 39.
ing and application of the agreement and “any troubles arising in the plant.” The issue of racial discrimination was not raised until the final step before arbitration. The matter proceeded to arbitration while, simultaneously, a charge was filed alleging racial discrimination before the Colorado Civil Rights Commission and ultimately the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. At the hearing the grievant testified that his discharge was the result of racial discrimination and informed the arbitrator that he had filed the charge with the Colorado Commission because he “could not rely on the union.” The union introduced evidence about disparate treatment of the grievant. The arbitrator ruled that the grievant had been discharged for “just cause” and made no reference to the claim of racial discrimination, though he suggested that management and the union confer on whether it was possible to transfer the employee to another job. The grievant, subsequent to an EEOC determination that there was no reasonable cause to believe that the violation of Title VII had taken place, filed suit.

Speaking on behalf of a unanimous Court, Justice Powell concluded the lower courts’ determination that the grievant was bound by the arbitral decision and had no right to sue under Title VII was in error. The Court noted that Title VII “does not speak expressly” to the interplay between the federal courts and grievance–arbitration machinery. Said the Court, “There is no suggestion in the statutory scheme that a prior arbitral decision either forecloses an individual’s right to sue or divests federal courts of jurisdiction.” The Court stated that Title VII was designed to supplement rather than supplant existing law and that the individual does not “forfeit his private cause of action if he first pursues his grievance to final arbitration under the no-discrimination clause of the collective-bargaining agreement.” The relationship between the forums is “complementary”; consideration of the statutory claim by both may, in the Court’s view, promote the policy underlying each.

The Court specifically stated that the employee could not be deemed to have waived his cause of action inasmuch as there could be no “prospective waiver of an employee’s rights under Title VII.” In contrast to so-called collective rights, like the

107 Id. at 48.
108 Id. at 52, n.15.
109 Id. at 51.
waiver\textsuperscript{110} of the right to strike through a no-strike clause,\textsuperscript{111} the Court noted that Title VII stood on antimajoritarian grounds, designed, as it was, to protect the rights of minorities who had been victimized through collective and other kinds of interests engaged in by the majority. The Powell opinion stated that a waiver could only be made by an employee on a knowing and voluntary basis, that this could only arise through a voluntary settlement, and that “in no event” could a no-discrimination clause in an agreement serve as a binding waiver. Moreover, the Court noted that the arbitrator’s authority was rooted in the agreement itself and that he or she possessed no general authority to invoke laws that “conflict with the bargain between the parties….”\textsuperscript{112}

Nonetheless Justice Powell’s opinion spoke of the fact that the arbitrator’s authority could, with a no-discrimination clause in the collective agreement, be similar to or duplicative of Title VII rights. \textit{Gardner-Denver} thus concluded that, armed with a no-discrimination clause, arbitrators could function under some Title VII-like standards. Concluding that the grievance–arbitration machinery was “relatively inexpensive and expeditious” the Court noted that it could “make available the conciliatory and therapeutic processes” which could make litigation unnecessary. Thus, from the employee and employer perspective, misunderstandings or discriminatory practices might be eliminated which would otherwise invite wasteful litigation.

Finally, however, the Court, conceding that tensions between contractual and statutory objectives in machinery could be “mitigated” where the collective bargaining agreement contained provisions that were similar to Title VII, noted that arbitral expertise and specialization was in the “law of the shop, not the law of the land.”\textsuperscript{113} The “broad language” of Title VII could frequently be given meaning “only by reference to public law concepts” which


\textsuperscript{113}\textit{Id.} at 56.
were the “primary responsibility” of the judiciary, said Justice Powell.\footnote{Id. at 57.} Noting that a “substantial proportion of labor arbitrators are not lawyers,” the Court said that they possessed a “high degree of competence” in implementing public policy promoting the arbitration process itself. Nonetheless, in a much-cited footnote 21 the Court established standards under which an arbitral opinion and award could be given “great weight.” The factors which should convince the courts, said the high tribunal, were contractual provisions in the collective bargaining agreement which “conformed substantially with Title VII, the degree of procedural fairness in the arbitral forum, adequacy of the record with respect to the issue of discrimination, and the special competence of particular arbitrators.”\footnote{Id. at 60, n.21.}

Perhaps the Gardner-Denver opinion adopted a tone that was too hostile to the role that arbitration would play inasmuch as it denigrated lack of discovery (relatively unimportant in many individual cases) and a lack of expertise about public law issues. Some parties—I know of collective bargaining agreements where I arbitrated in the 1970s and 1980s—established machinery which was apparently intended to be responsive to footnote 21.\footnote{See, e.g., Weyerhauser Co. v. Int’l Woodworkers of Am., 78 LA 1109 (1982) (Gould, Arb.); Basic Vegetable Prods., Inc. v. General Teamsters, Warehousemen, & Helpers Union, Local 890, 64 LA 620 (1975) (Gould, Arb.).}

Soon the Court extended the Gardner-Denver principle to other statutory and constitutional claims.\footnote{Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, 450 U.S. 728 (1981) (Fair Labor Standards Act); McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984) (§1983 civil rights claims).} But as the 1980s and 1990s unfolded the Court began to move in a different direction when it upheld commercial agreements to arbitrate and rejected subsequent causes of action challenging arbitration’s propriety under the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925—sometimes where public law issues were involved. The commercial arbitration cases began to drive a more arbitration-friendly environment and these adjudications began to reference commercial and labor arbitration interchangeably.\footnote{See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).} As labor and commercial cases were considered under the same standards, the Steelworkers Trilogy emphasis upon
unique expertise of labor arbitrations and collective bargaining agreements began to fade.

The Court held in *Gilmer* that where an individual non–union-represented employee promised to arbitrate all disputes with an employer, the arbitration of a claim arising under age discrimination law (ADEA) could be compelled to the exclusion of litigation. The Court distinguished *Gardner-Denver* and its progeny as having been predicated upon the lack of employee agreement to arbitrate statutory claims and the lack of parties’ authorization of labor arbitrators to resolve them. Moreover, noted the Court in *Gilmer*, *Gardner-Denver* was distinguishable as a case involving a collective bargaining agreement where the employees were represented by unions, in which the potential tension between collective representation and individual statutory claims was present. But the fact that *Gilmer* itself was predicated upon an approach, albeit applicable to individual employees in the nonunion sector, at odds with some of the assumptions of *Gardner-Denver*, created the setting for another case in which the Court would address the same issues.

The first was an opinion authored by Justice Scalia in which the Court held that, for a collective bargaining agreement to produce a knowing and voluntary waiver for bargaining unit employees, it must contain a “clear and unmistakable waiver of the covered employees’ right to a judicial forum for federal claims of employment discrimination.” And yet, while suggesting that precise language in the collective agreement would produce the waiver, just a few days earlier the Court had said that a collective bargaining agreement contained “…rights in a contract workers are unlikely to read.” Thus clearly this case, the *Wright* decision, was wrong. It created the fiction that a waiver was knowing and voluntary when the talismanic language fit a particular form notwithstanding the fact that the Court had noted how unimportant the language was to the average employee. But the beat went on.

The other shoe finally dropped in *14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett*. Here the Court purported to address the question of whether a “provision in a collective bargaining agreement that clearly and

---

unmistakably requires union members to arbitrate claims arising under... [age discrimination legislation]... is enforceable.”

The case was similar to *Gardner-Denver* in some major respects, though that case involved litigation commenced in the wake of arbitral defeat for the employee and union. In both *Pyett* and *Gardner-Denver*, the collective bargaining agreement established a broad arbitration clause which the Court viewed as requiring “union members” to submit claims of employment discrimination to binding arbitration. The *Pyett* no-discrimination clause, in contrast to *Gardner-Denver*, explicitly stated that arbitrators “shall apply appropriate law in rendering decisions based upon claims of discrimination” and characterized claims subject to the grievance and arbitration procedures as the “sole and exclusive remedy of a violation.”

The union filed grievances on behalf of a number of employees which challenged their reassignments on the theory that they violated the agreement’s prohibition of discrimination on account of age and that, in any event, the reassignment violated seniority rules—and that the employer had failed to equitably rotate overtime. After the “initial” arbitration hearing the union withdrew the age discrimination grievance claims. The union apparently believed that it could not legitimately object to the reassignments as discriminatory because it had agreed to them—but continued to arbitrate the seniority and overtime issues. After the age discrimination claims were withdrawn, the affected employees filed a complaint with the EEOC and, subsequent to a no-cause letter dismissing the charge, filed suit. It was this latter proceeding that triggered a motion to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act. The lower courts concluded there had been no clear and unmistakable waiver of the right to a judicial process under the collective bargaining agreement.

Justice Thomas’s opinion for a 5–4 majority began with the assumption that unenforceability of the no-discrimination clause would mean that a “labor union could not collectively bargain for arbitration on behalf of its members”—an assumption that was both a *non sequitur* and erroneous. The arbitration of the no-discrimination issue was either a mandatory or nonmandatory

123 *Pyett*, supra note 35, at 1460.
125 *Pyett*, supra note 35, at 1463.
subject of bargaining\textsuperscript{126}— and the proper view in my opinion was that it was a mandatory subject.\textsuperscript{127} Nothing in any of the holdings including \textit{Gardner-Denver} itself would have limited or precluded bargaining on this subject whatsoever. Indeed the Court, apparently operating under the assumption that the matter could only be a mandatory subject of bargaining when the proposal was that arbitration be the final step in the process and that further litigation be precluded, so held.\textsuperscript{128} The Court stated that it would require something explicit in the antidiscrimination statute involved to find reticence or hostility on the part of Congress toward arbitration. The Court found that the arbitration clause in question was one which “clearly and unmistakably requires” arbitration—and then, in the next sentence, stated that Congress had chosen to “allow” arbitration, referencing an entirely different word and standard.

In \textit{Pyett} the Court then concluded that the arbitration in \textit{Gardner-Denver} was “not preclusive because the collective-bargaining agreement did not cover statutory claims”\textsuperscript{129}—though in \textit{Gardner-Denver} it certainly did! Antidiscrimination clauses, frequently accompanied by severability provisions which purport to sever that which is illegal from the agreement, presuppose an intent on the part of the parties to abide by the law. Beyond the fact that the Court itself had stressed the unimportance of the precise language in the collective bargaining agreement around the time that \textit{Wright} was decided, an arbitrator could replicate public law standards under broad contractual provisions which did not contain the magic words set forth, i.e., citations to particular statutes. The antidiscrimination clause which \textit{Pyett} concluded did not give the arbitrator adequate authority under \textit{Gardner-Denver}, did in fact provide such authority and, as we have seen, the Court in \textit{Gardner-Denver} fostered arbitration of employment discrimination claims under certain circumstances. Clearly footnote 21 contemplated that the courts would give “great weight” to arbitrator’s

\begin{footnotes}
\item[126] Compare \textit{Airline Pilots Ass’n Int’l v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.}, 199 F.3d 477, 486 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that a proposal for arbitration of individual statutory claims is not a mandatory subject of bargaining because the union cannot provide the employer with a statutory waiver under \textit{Gardner-Denver}), with \textit{Int’l Union of Elec., Radio, & Mach. Workers v. NLRB}, 648 F.2d 18, 25 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (finding that the elimination of discrimination is a mandatory subject of bargaining when raised by either labor or management—a decision after \textit{Gardner-Denver} that subsequently triggered the erroneous \textit{Airline Pilots} reversal).
\item[128] \textit{Pyett}, supra note 35, at 1459.
\item[129] Id. at 1467.
\end{footnotes}
decisions of employee claims dealing with the protections of Title VII and relevant and antidiscrimination law.

Justice Thomas then proceeded to dismiss the Gardner-Denver distrust of arbitration as inappropriately rooted in antimajoritarian considerations. The Court stated that in the absence of new statutory amendments, it could not adhere to the “conflict of interest concern identified” in Gardner-Denver. Thus the Court dismissed this aspect of Gardner-Denver as a “collateral attack on the NLRA.”

In one of its most remarkable passages the Pyett opinion states that a conflict of interest can be addressed through litigation initiating duty of fair representation issues. But, as the Court had correctly stated in Gardner-Denver “…a breach of the union’s duty of fair representation may prove difficult to establish….In this respect, it is noteworthy that Congress thought it necessary to afford the protections of Title VII against unions as well as employers.”

Pyett turned this point around against the grievants by stating that employees could always pursue ample avenues of antidiscrimination litigation against the unions if the arbitration was unsuccessful, ignoring the fact that the avenue that it makes available to employees is the one which demonstrates the antimajoritarian congressional philosophy which was well noted in Gardner-Denver. Meanwhile, as the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has recently held, where the union initiates a grievance under a collective bargaining agreement, union liability is not generally deemed to be within the scope of arbitral authority.

This extraordinary High Court decision is rooted in so many errors and misconceptions that it is difficult to know where to begin. Surely the Court, even as presently constituted, as well as Congress will be called upon to revisit the errors with which the opinion is strewn. In the first place, no consideration was given to the capabilities and expertise of arbitrators (although one must confess that this is a limitation which exists in Gilmer and its progeny as well). It is true that more than 80% of arbitrators have heard statutory claims—but in fact as a National Academy of Arbitrators report which produced these data notes “…while 78 percent [of arbitrators] have been required to interpret or apply Title VII, only 58 percent have received or been given training

130 Id. at 1473.
131 Gardner-Denver, supra note 103, at 58 n.19.
132 Turner v. United Steelworkers of Am., Local 812, 581 F.3d 672 (8th Cir. 2009).
that would allow a presumption of contemporary knowledge of the statute.” Lack of training and the acquisition of relevant expertise is, in the view of the Academy reporters, “... a potentially troubling lack of expertise.” Indeed, some arbitrators explicitly refuse to consider or rely upon antidiscrimination law, viewing their expertise as rooted in the law of shop as set forth in Steelworkers Trilogy. Such an arbitral approach should constitute reversible error under Pyett itself or under a more well reasoned and grounded approach which follows it in a future decision.

Moreover, as of 2000, of the National Academy of Arbitrators membership only 12 percent were women and less than 6 percent are nonwhite, a factor which is at least relevant to diversity in a multiracial society. In 2010, blacks constitute 2.82 percent, and women 18.34 percent of Academy membership. Even more ominously, organizations such as the American Arbitration Association do not appear to maintain special panels of impartial arbitrators possessing the requisite expertise and diversity who are acceptable to labor, management, and the individual grievants.

Though the National Academy of Arbitrators’ report has concluded that the lack of expertise by arbitrators in statutory cases is troubling, nonetheless it must be noted that in both Gilmer, which was the first step toward the emasculation of Gardner-Denver and in Pyett itself, the Court simply assumed arbitral expertise with a mere sleight of hand reference to it and citing no evidence whatsoever! Nonetheless, in none of these cases was a record or

---

134 Id.
136 E-mail from Eric P. Tuchman, General Counsel and Corporate Secretary, American Arbitration Association, Feb. 8, 2010 (on file with author). Mr. Tuchman’s response is based upon the fact that, in his view and of others, the clear and unmistakable language and individual access which the Court seems to require in Wright and Pyett is relatively unusual and that therefore at this point there is no demand for such provisions.
137 Pyett, supra note 35, at 1471 (citations omitted):

These misconceptions [related to arbitral competence regarding the construction of public law] have been corrected. For example, the Court has “recognized that arbitral tribunals are readily capable of handling the factual and legal complexities of antitrust claims, notwithstanding the absence of judicial instruction and supervision” and that “there is no reason to assume at the outset that arbitrators will not follow the law.” An arbitrator’s capacity to resolve complex questions of fact and law extends with equal force to discrimination claims brought under the ADEA. Moreover, the recognition that arbitration procedures are more streamlined than federal litigation is not a basis for finding the forum somehow inadequate; the relative informality of arbitration is one of the chief reasons that parties select arbitration. Parties "trad[e] the procedures
argument brought before the Court which could have supported the assumption of such expertise on this critical subject. This is in sharp contrast to the Court’s decisions in *Lincoln Mills* and especially in *Steelworkers Trilogy*, where the idea of arbitral expertise in the “law of the shop” arena was first formulated, and a two-day oral argument provided a kind of seminar in the labor arbitration process. Nothing remotely comparable to this was present in *Pyett*. 

*Gilmer* is now two decades old and wrongful discharge and fair employment arbitration has already traveled some considerable distance. 138 *Pyett*, however, is just the beginning in the organized sector and, as we have seen, the problems for individual employees are exacerbated by the tension between the exclusive bargaining representative and individual employees operating under the majoritarian statutory scheme that the Court first took note of in *Gardner-Denver*. The most remarkable aspect of the rejection of these concerns by Justice Thomas in *Pyett* is that the conflict alluded to in *Gardner-Denver* was present in the former case in its most dramatic form. Again, the union had withdrawn the grievance because it had already made an agreement. The union had agreed with the employer that younger workers could do the work in question (which was protested by older workers in the arbitration proceeding) and thus it was not able or willing to represent the employees in any way in the arbitration proceeding because its interests were diametrically opposed to theirs. Who would represent the interest of the employees in such a proceeding? On this critical point the majority opinion in *Pyett* was silent, though Justice Thomas seems to indicate that, in his view, individual employees would be able to proceed to arbitration on their own initiative. If this were not the case, the opinion would have been reasoned differently or the grant of certiorari would have been dismissed as improvidently granted. And, in truth, the Court had no developed record before it on this critical point in *Pyett*.

Again, the Court noted that avenues were open to the employees but, as *Gardner-Denver* itself noted, i.e., a duty of fair representation claim is of little value because of the considerable discretion and breadth accorded the unions in representing employees in

---

the grievance–arbitration process. The reference to the fact that employees could contend that the unions are liable under existing antidiscrimination legislation is a point on which the Court meets itself coming around the corner. For it was Congress’s mistrust of the adequacy of union representation in the workforce which led them to impose liability upon unions as well as employers. This is the point which the Gardner-Denver Court made in highlighting the inadequacy of the collective bargaining process in addressing discrimination issues. Congress itself had already made the very point which the Court refused to acknowledge!

True, 2010 is not 1974—just as 2010 is not 1960! Most unions have black, minority, and female membership (and less frequently leadership) than appears to have been the case in the immediate post–Title VII era. The fact that the minority base has grown in unions and that many of them, like the UAW, Teamsters, and the Service Employees in the private sector, are organizing such workers in union campaigns is reflected in the substantial number of cases that come before the NLRB involving references to racial issues. Employers are more likely to raise or allude to race in the election campaign now than when the Board first became concerned with this issue in the early 1960s. During my Chairmanship of the NLRB we had a number of such important cases. But the fact is that blacks and sometimes other minorities and women remain outside the top echelon of organized labor and, all too frequently, have not advanced to the higher rungs of the employment ladder. In post-racial America, as it is sometimes called, it is clear that great gains have been made since Gardner-Denver. But racial and other forms of discrimination remain pressing, as the above-referenced California report well demonstrates. Of this, Pyett seems scarcely to acknowledge.

139Pyett, supra note 35, at 1460 (“[U]nion members may bring a duty of fair representation claim against the union; a union can be subjected to direct liability under the ADEA if it discriminates on the basis of age; and union members may also file age-discrimination claims with the EEOC and the National Labor Relations Board”). Cf. Kurt L. Hanslowe, Individual Rights in Collective Labor Relations, 45 Cornell L.Q. 25 (1959)


141See, e.g., Shepherd Tissue Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. 369 (1998) (Chairman Gould, concurring) (approving a campaign handbill which included a statement by a discharged unit employee concerning a sexual harassment investigation that “black folk have been wrongly touched by whites for over 300 years” under the standards set forth by the Board in Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962)).
The most bizarre aspect of *Pyett* is the remedy sought and obtained, i.e., the granting of an employer’s motion to compel arbitration. But under the collective bargaining agreement in the case—and in this respect it is illustrative of most other such contracts—the union appears to possess exclusive control over whether the grievance can advance to arbitration under the contract. The “parties” control the arbitration process in this relationship—and the measures to enforce it—are accorded to the labor union and employer. Considerable confusion was created in *Pyett* itself by the fact that, in oral argument, the employer counsel said in response to questions by Justices Souter and Scalia (the former concerned with the fact that the Court would be confronted with “total ignorance of the contract in this case”), that the grievant would go “either through the union… or the union will turn the claim over to them and let them go by themselves.”

In the latter event, said counsel, the employer would “…pay for the arbitration, because the union in this case said we are not going to pay.”

The employer contended before the Court that the contractual language relating to grievances which could be taken to arbitration was broader in discrimination cases than in all others and that “all claims” meant that the union could not screen out these grievances. True, there are some arrangements where the parties have established special procedures allowing discrimination complaints to be taken up individually without the union, for instance the Pacific Maritime Association (PMA) and the International Longshoremen and Warehousemen Union (ILWU). But, in most collective bargaining relationships, the grievance-arbitration process is a multilayered system in which attempts to resolve the matter at lower steps of the machinery are critical and the union is selective in advancing cases to arbitration, sometimes even screening out those which are meritorious because of other considerations such as union finances. Now, under *Pyett*, where

---

143 *Id.* at 21.
the union declines to arbitrate as the agreement so provides, and the employees seek the avenue of antidiscrimination legislation open to them, the employer will head them off at the courthouse doors, contending that the matter should have been arbitrated when apparently it cannot be. Does the employer represent the employees’ interests? Hardly! In *Pyett*, the employer made the job assignment that gave rise to the grievance. Will the union dare do so? Again the answer is the same, given the fact that they have consented to the assignment. Here the individual employee is even more disfavored than in *Gilmer* in the nonunion environment because the employee is disfavored by both union and employer. What is there to arbitrate under the agreement negotiated by the union and the employer—the real parties to arbitration—and how can it be arbitrated? And what will an arbitrator think when a union is not present or sits passively while the case is presented?146

Curiously, the Court, toward the end of its opinion and almost as an afterthought states that the employees argued that the agreement would allow the union to “block” the arbitration, but then the Court adverts the argument that the union could allow the case to go forward and yet decline to participate. Justice Thomas then states that “…this question require[s] resolution of contested factual allegations…[and] was not fully briefed to this or any court and is not fairly encompassed within the question presented….”147

It might be contended that *Pyett* is an aberration and that the broad arbitration and no-discrimination clauses—at least as characterized by the employer counsel in oral argument before the Court—are atypical. Certainly, the arbitration clause seems to be fairly illustrative of the kinds of provisions which are negoti-

---


The notion that the minority or individual position will not be argued fully without the right of intervention for the grievant has special significance in the case of discrimination charges. The [court in *Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Co.*, 291 F. Supp. 199 (C.D. Cal. 1968)] recognized this factor when, refusing to bind the plaintiff to an arbitration award, it noted that the plaintiff was not represented with his own counsel at the hearing. If the discrimination charge involves the administration or negotiation of the collective bargaining agreement (in which, of course, both the union and employer are involved), it is often possible that the union’s viewpoint and interests are different from, or conflict directly with, those of the grievants.


147 *Pyett*, supra note 35, at 1474.
ated in most collective bargaining relationships. Generally unions will want to control access to the machinery since the process is privately financed and employees’ dues have already been called upon.\textsuperscript{148} Yet the \textit{Pyett} opinion generally seems to scarcely acknowledge the numerous past precedents where this has been recognized. Can a new surtax be imposed upon statutory arbitrations? Will alleged discriminates be required to pay twice for both statutory and nonstatutory arbitrations? Surely, while the individual employee in both unionized and the nonunionized context is relatively impecunious, the fact is that he who pays the piper calls the tune. It is always undesirable to have one party exclusively financing the arbitration process as employer counsel maintained was the case in \textit{Pyett},\textsuperscript{149} notwithstanding the good will and integrity of members of the National Academy of Arbitrators.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
Although each party participates in the grievance procedure, the union plays a pivotal role in the process since it assumes the responsibility of determining whether to press an employee’s claims. The employer, for its part, must rely on the union’s decision not to pursue an employee’s grievance…. Just as a nonorganized employer may accept an employee’s waiver of any challenge to his discharge as a final resolution of the matter, so should an organized employer be able to rely on a comparable waiver by the employee’s exclusive representative.…. The parties to the collective-bargaining agreement, of course, may choose not to include a grievance procedure supervised by the union, or, if they do, may choose not to make the procedure exclusive…. Most collective-bargaining agreements, however, contain exclusive grievance-arbitration procedures and give the union power to supervise the procedure.

\item[149] Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. 554, 564 (1976) (citations omitted): “Contractual remedies, at least in their final stages controlled by union and employer, are normally provided; yet the union may refuse to utilize them.” McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 291, 291 n.10 (1984) (citations omitted):
[W]hen, as is usually the case, the union has exclusive control over the “manner and extent to which an individual grievance is presented,” there is an additional reason why arbitration is an inadequate substitute for judicial proceedings. The union’s interests and those of the individual employee are not always identical or even compatible. As a result, the union may present the employee’s grievance less vigorously, or make different strategic choices, than would the employer. Thus, were an arbitration award accorded preclusive effect, an employee’s opportunity to be compensated for a constitutional deprivation might be lost merely because it was not in the union’s interest to press his claim vigorously. \textit{Amici} AFL-CIO and the United Steelworkers of America inform us that under most collective-bargaining agreements the union “controls access to the arbitrator, the strategy and tactics of how to present the case, the nature of the relief sought, and the actual presentation of the case.”

\item[149] Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 192 (1967) (citations omitted):
It can well be doubted whether the parties to collective bargaining agreements would long continue to provide for detailed grievance and arbitration procedures of the kind encouraged by L. M. R. A. § 203 (d), if their power to settle the majority of grievances short of the costlier and more time-consuming steps was limited by a rule permitting the grievant unilaterally to invoke arbitration.

\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Undoubtedly, the Court’s uncertainty about the facts in _Pyett_ is what led Justice Souter to say in dissent that the “...majority opinion may have little effect for it explicitly reserves the question whether a CBA’s waiver of a judicial forum is enforceable when the union controls access to and presentation of the employee’s claims in arbitration...”^{150} Upon remand in _Pyett_, the union argued that it controlled employee access to arbitration and that it could not and would not waive statutory claims when it refused to process the grievance. In a subsequently negotiated Agreement and Protocol, the parties agreed to a process which allowed for arbitration of grievances which the union refused to process, without resolving the collective agreement controversy.^{151}

Again, with regard to the no-discrimination clause itself, long ago I wrote that most no-discrimination clauses and the severabilit-

---

^{150}_Pyett_, supra note 35, at 1481 (J. Souter, dissenting).
^{151}See Agreement and Protocol Between SEIU 32BJ (the Union) and the Reality Advisory Board on Labor Relations, Inc. (RAB), February 17, 2010:

II. ARBITRATION

A. The undertakings described here with respect to arbitration apply to those circumstances in which the Union has declined to take an individual employee’s employment discrimination claim under the no discrimination clause of the CBA (including statutory claims) to arbitration and the employee is desirous of litigating the claim. The forum described here will be available to employers and employees who are represented by counsel and to those who are unrepresented by counsel.

B. The Union and the RAB will elicit from the American Arbitration Association a list of arbitrators who (1) are attorneys, and (2) are qualified to decide employment discrimination cases. In the event that an employee and RAB member employer seek arbitration of a discrimination claim in circumstances described in paragraph A, the list of arbitrators provided by the AAA shall be made available to the individual employee and the RAB member employer. The manner by which selection is made by the RAB member employer and the individual employee and the extent to which each shall bear responsibility for the costs of the arbitrator shall be decided between them. A person may be added to or removed from the Statutory Arbitration Panel list upon mutual agreement of the Union and the RAB. Any such arbitrations shall be conducted pursuant to the AAA national Rules for Employment Disputes and any disputes about the manner of proceeding shall be decided by the arbitrator selected.

C. The hearings in any arbitration provided for in the preceding paragraph may be held at the OCA, however, it is understood that the forum is not a forum provided for in the collective bargaining agreement.

D. The Union will not be a party to the arbitration described above and the arbitrator shall not have the authority to award relief that would require amendment of the CBA or other agreement(s) between the Union and the RAB or conflict with any provision of any CBAs or such other agreement(s). Any mediation and/or arbitration outcome shall have no precedential value with respect to the interpretation of the CBAs or other agreement(s) between the Union and the RAB.

6. The Union and the RAB agree that the provisions in this Agreement and Protocol do not resolve the dispute between them and do not advance either party’s contention as to the meaning of the CBAs, and will not make any representation to the contrary. The CBAs shall remain in full force and effect in accordance with their terms.
ity provisions under which the parties state that terms found to be unlawful will be severed from the agreement, created a presumption that the parties intended to comport themselves so as to adhere to the law. Now the Court, within weeks of the time that it had told us that workers who had not previously provided knowing and voluntary consent in Gardner-Denver and who rarely read collective bargaining agreements,\(^\text{152}\) has devised a test that made it conceivable that the waiver in Pyett was clear and unmistakable. In so doing, the Court has muddied the waters.

Another irony here lies in the fact that arbitration can play an important role in resolving employment discrimination cases. Chief Justice Roberts, during oral argument in Pyett, continuously asked why the employer would agree to an arbitration clause relating to no-discrimination matters if it could not be final and binding. What was in it for the employer, rhetorically asked Chief Justice Roberts. Just as the Supreme Court said in Carey v. Westinghouse\(^\text{153}\) prior to Pyett, the incentive to deal with these grievances responsibly will not diminish. As the Court said in Carey, the presence of third party adjudication—in that case involving jurisdictional disputes—need not possess finality and can be therapeutic in resolving strife without resort to other further litigation.\(^\text{154}\) The parties should resolve these matters through arbitration if possible. As I have previously written, it is my view that not only is it bad policy for them to remove employment discrimination cases from the grievance–arbitration machinery because of the awkwardness produced by Pyett but, if they attempt to do so in any context, labor and management would or should be liable under both antidiscrimination law and public policy.\(^\text{155}\) So many of the

---


\(^\text{153}\)Carey v. Westinghouse, 375 U.S. 261, 272 (1964) (“[T]he therapy of arbitration is brought to bear in a complicated and troubled area”).

\(^\text{154}\)Notwithstanding what the Court said in Boys Markets about the decline of an “incentive” to arbitrate without injunctive relief, the fact is in the eight years between Sinclair and Boys Markets there was no appreciable decline in the negotiation of grievance arbitration provisions. If anything, the opposite was true. Cf. William B. Gould IV, Book Review, 16 Wayne L. Rev. 384 (1969). Professor Harry Wellington was of the view that the Steelworkers Trilogy itself had “no effect” contributing to labor peace. H. Wellington, Labor and the Legal Process, 119–20, 353–54, n.62 (1968).

\(^\text{155}\)Gould, Kissing Cousins, supra note 36, at 651:

The arbitration of public law, employment discrimination, and related public-statute cases is worthy of promotion given: (1) the use of public and external law by arbitrators in both the Gilmer and Gardner-Denver contexts, promoted as it is by those opinions; (2) the inaccessibility of the courts to many employees due to the expense involved with sometimes lengthy proceedings and legal representation…. This view is consistent with the idea of resolving disputes expeditiously, informally, and with less expense. Under this logic, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit had it all wrong when in New England Health Care Employees Union v. Rhode Island Legal Services it held that
Gardner-Denver opponents seem to be consumed with the idea that employees will have numerous bites at the same apple that they ignore the fact that because of both their cost and complexity, most cases will not proceed to the courts. In fact, as Professors Stallworth and Hoyman have noted, the overwhelming number of such cases are factual and are not appealed beyond the rendering of the arbitration award whatever the rule about finality. Similarly, whether Pyett is reversed or not, antidiscrimination clauses should be held to be a mandatory subject of bargaining—the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia notwithstanding. As Carey has so well demonstrated in the context of jurisdictional strikes, the importance of arbitration lies not only, or perhaps not even primarily, in its finality but, rather, in its therapeutic value.

Arbitrators, both diverse and expert, can play a role in fashioning public law under no-discrimination clauses in collective bargaining agreements. This was so long before Gardner-Denver. However, it must be recognized that individual grievants must be direct participants and that some of the remedies, like the award of attorneys’ fees and costs in favor of victorious employees, runs against the grain and traditional culture of the arbitration process the exclusion of discrimination grievances from the collective bargaining agreement as non-arbitrable did not constitute a violation of either public policy or public law. The singling out of grievances protesting discrimination or those pending before an administrative agency or judicial agency—which is what was involved in New England Health Care—is itself discriminatory, retaliatory, and inconsistent with public policy. Moreover, by sanctioning such case segregation, the court of appeals contradicted the Supreme Court’s Goodman holding, notwithstanding Goodman’s condemnation of the same refusal to process grievances in New England Health Care where the agreement did not sanction it. Public policy favors the resolution of employment discrimination matters through arbitration and the Court of Appeals should have so held. Ultimately, I think that the judiciary will see this decision to be a flawed one and an inappropriate departure from Goodman.

See also Macklin v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 478 F.2d 979, 989 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (finding that unions have a duty “to negotiate actively for nondiscriminatory treatment”); Howard v. Int’l Molders & Allied Workers, 779 F.2d 1546, 1548 (11th Cir. 1986) (finding that a union violated 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)(3) because it did not take “every reasonable step to ensure that the employer complies with Title VII”); EEOC v. Bd. of Governors of State Colls. & Univs., 957 F.2d 424, 426 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that a collective bargaining agreement which provided that grievances could not proceed to arbitration if employee brought age discrimination claim violated the ADEA.); but see Richardson v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 532 F.3d 114, 121 (2d Cir. 2008) (allowing a collective bargaining agreement with a provision requiring employees to choose between grieving a complaint using the grievance–arbitration procedure and litigating the discrimination complaint in court). See generally Mark Berger, A Step Too Far: Pyett and the Compelled Arbitration of Statutory Claims Under Union-controlled Labor Contract Procedures, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 55 (2009).

158 Carey, supra note 153, at 272.
which provides for neither in all nonpublic law arbitration cases where only contract issues are presented. The lack of tripartite participation, I submit, is responsible for much of the confusion that has arisen in the courts subsequent to Pyett—though most of the confusion is attributable to the murkiness and ambiguity in the Pyett opinion itself.

In the first place, some courts have found that no-discrimination clauses in collective bargaining agreements do not contain clear and unmistakable waivers referencing statutes, and have sometimes suggested that parties must explicitly preclude judicial relief in the contract in order to manifest waiver. Where the employee proceeded to arbitration but declined to use a union representative and retained and paid his own counsel who worked independently, the complaint was dismissed because “...the matter was fully litigated in an arbitration hearing and the dispute was resolved...” Considering the same collective bargaining agreement involved in Pyett, one court has said that in the absence of a showing that the union precluded resort to arbitration or some form of union hostility, the complaint will be dismissed where the employee declined to pursue the arbitration. Sometimes the failure to include the no-discrimination clause in the arbitration clause itself is regarded as fatal to any attempt to claim Pyett as precedent.

In Borrero v. Ruppert Housing Co., Inc., Judge Baer in New York has held that, while the collective bargaining agreement involved in Pyett required union involvement, an employee can resort to litigation only where he “attempts to arbitrate his claims [and is]...thwarted by the Union....” In Kravar v. Triangle Services, Inc. the court explicitly held that the collective bargaining

---

159 But see Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 682 (Cal. 2000) (“The principle that an arbitration agreement may not limit statutorily imposed remedies such as punitive damages and attorney fees appears to be undisputed.”).


agreement “...operated to preclude [the plaintiff] from raising her disability-discrimination claims in any forum” because “…an individual union member does not have an unfettered right to demand arbitration of a discrimination claim” inasmuch as the union “may” demand arbitration if it finds that the claim has some merit or is “colorable.”

*Kravar* has been stayed before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals pending the outcome of an arbitration involving *Pyett* itself as to the meaning of this aspect of the collective bargaining agreement.\(^{166}\) An arbitrator will determine this issue. When the *Pyett* dispute itself has been submitted and an arbitration award has been rendered, what should be the proper judicial review of such an award? What should be the standard of review in *Pyett*-type cases? Arbitration is important in resolving such cases. Avoidance of more costly litigation is desirable. But whether it is costly and cumbersome will depend upon which judicial review avenue we take, i.e., Section 301 or the FAA. The Supreme Court in *Pyett* resolved the issue before it under the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, without any discussion of the matter. Presumably, therefore, these cases, like other cases involving alleged violations of collective bargaining agreements, can be heard under that statute as well as Section 301, the traditional forum established by both *Lincoln Mills* and *Steelworkers Trilogy*. But the issue has not been definitively resolved given the fact that *Pyett* did not even discuss the 1925 statute and thus did not render a holding on this matter.

On the subject of judicial review, the Federal Arbitration Act, hidden from the Court’s view by the parties or ignored by the Court in *Lincoln Mills* and noted, in that case, only by Justice Frankfurter, would have constituted the best avenue for most arbitrators.

The Federal Arbitration Act is superior to Section 301 of the NLRA in a number of respects. First, it contains an explicit requirement that arbitration be ordered and that a lawsuit be stayed\(^ {167}\) where the parties have entered into an arbitration agreement—and the Court has previously fashioned a pro-


\(^{167}\) 9 U.S.C.A. § 3.
arbitration policy under the 1925 law and language similar to that of the Steelworkers Trilogy itself, albeit within the commercial arbitration context. The FAA provides for interlocutory appeals and it expedites enforcement of the award inasmuch as FAA litigation is “not subject to scheduling conferences and other pretrial case-management tools…” and the 1925 Act establishes “streamlined processes for having judgment entered on, and challenging the enforcement of an award.” These applications are treated as motions rather than complaints, thus expediting the process.

But what of judicial review under the Federal Arbitration Act? Here there is good news and bad news, triggered by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hall Street Associates v. Mattel, Inc. In this non-labor FAA case, the Court established extremely narrow bases for review of arbitration awards and concluded that the standards set forth in the FAA are exclusive—albeit within the context of a decision which reviewed attempts by parties to expand the statutory grant of review set forth in the statute. Said the Court,

Sections 10 and 11, after all, address egregious departures from the parties’ agreed-upon arbitration: “corruption,” “fraud,” “evident partiality,” “misconduct,” “misbehavior,” “exceed[ing]…powers,” “evident material miscalculation,” “evident material mistake,” “award[s] upon a matter not submitted;” the only ground with any softer focus is “imperfect[ions],” and a court may correct those only if they go to “[a] matter of form not affecting the merits.” Given this emphasis on extreme arbitral conduct, the old rule of *ejusdem generis* has an implicit lesson to teach here.

---

171 *Hall Street*, supra note 36.
172 Id. at 9. The opinion goes on to spell out the lesson taught by this canon of construction:

Under that rule, when a statute sets out a series of specific items ending with a general term, that general term is confined to covering subjects comparable to the specifics it follows. Since a general term included in the text is normally so limited, then surely a statute with no textual hook for expansion cannot authorize contracting parties to supplement review for specific instances of outrageous conduct with review for just any legal error. “Fraud” and a mistake of law are not cut from the same cloth.
This is infinitely preferable to Section 301 and Enterprise Wheel, and more compatible with the spirit of that decision (if not its troublesome language which has produced so much litigation). The 25 percent reversal rate alluded to by Judge Sutton could be history—unless the Court concludes that it mistakenly assumed FAA applicability in Pyett.

But here is the next irony. In my view, the future Pyett litigation dictated either by the Court—perhaps taking back some of the more erroneous themes in its opinion—or Congress will and should mean that special and diverse panels will become available and be called upon to hear and decide these cases. If the collateral attack upon the National Labor Relations Act, to use Justice Thomas’s language, is to be avoided, a number of standards are a prerequisite to judicial review. Aggrieved employees must be at least consulted with or involved in arbitral selection. The union must be able and willing to utilize the relevant statutes expertly—and, where necessary, employees should have third-party representation. Finally, the arbitrator must actually utilize his or her expertise under the relevant statute in resolving the case. The opinion and award itself ought to be compatible with public law—in the case of Pyett, antidiscrimination law. Class-action arbitrations, to which the U.S. Supreme Court has already expressed hostility, are a vital ingredient in many antidiscrimination complaints.

---


In bilateral arbitration, parties forego the procedural rigor and appellate review of the courts in order to realize the benefits of private dispute resolution: lower costs, greater efficiency and speed, and the ability to choose expert adjudicators to resolve specialized disputes. . . . But the relative benefits of class-action arbitration are much less assured, giving reason to doubt the parties’ mutual consent to resolve disputes through class-wide arbitration. Id. at 1775.

In her persuasive dissenting opinion Justice Ginsburg said, for arbitrators to consider whether a claim should proceed on a class basis, the Court apparently demands contractual language one can read as affirmatively authorizing class arbitration. Id. at 1781 (dissenting).

However, Justice Ginsburg noted that Stolt-Nielsen’s reasoning is not necessarily applicable to many employment agreements. See, however, Jock v. Sterling Jewelers, Inc., NO. 08 CIV. 2875 (JSR), 2010 WL 2898294 (S.D.N.Y. Jul 26, 2010) (NO. 08 CIV. 2875 (JSR).

Are these standards, as a prerequisite for judicial review, compatible with the FAA? The Supreme Court of California has adopted remarkably similar standards under that state’s arbitration statute.\textsuperscript{176} Perhaps a failure to meet these prerequisites can be viewed as “evident partiality” or “misconduct.” The question of whether a manifest disregard of the law remains a basis for a challenge to an award under \textit{Hall Street} has not been definitively resolved—though it is possible that those grounds, even though they do not constitute an independent basis for review, can be seen as subsumed within the statutory language. Moreover, \textit{Hall Street} itself has said,

\begin{quote}
In holding that §§10 and 11 provide exclusive regimes for the review provided by the statute, we do not purport to say that they exclude more searching review based on authority outside the statute as well. The FAA is not the only way into court for parties wanting review of arbitration awards: they may contemplate enforcement under state statutory or common law, for example, where judicial review of different scope is arguable.\textsuperscript{177}
\end{quote}

One way or another, the due process and fairness issues under either the FAA or Section 301 will not go away. In the nonlabor arena the circuit courts have already addressed the issue.\textsuperscript{178} The \textit{Pyett} fallout in labor arbitration litigation is yet to begin.\textsuperscript{179}

\textsuperscript{176}See \textit{Armendariz}, supra note 159.

\textsuperscript{177}Hall Street, supra note 36, at 13.

\textsuperscript{178}Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 2009); Stolt-Nielsen SA v. Animalfeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2008); Ramos-Santiago v. United Parcel Service, 524 F.3d 120 (1st Cir. 2008).

\textsuperscript{179}Generally speaking, the circuit courts—the Supreme Court has not yet addressed this issue—have been receptive to compelling arbitration where the parties have negotiated neutrality provisions providing for recognition where the question is what facility is covered by the agreement. United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union v. TriMas Corp., 551 F.3d 531 (7th Cir. 2008). The same holds true for first contract arbitration. South Bay Boston Mgmt., Inc. v. Unite Here, Local 26, 587 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 2009). However, in Rite Aid of Pennsylvania, Inc. v. UFCW, Local 1776, 2010 WL 521102 (3d Cir. 2010), a 2–1 majority held that under a recognition clause union access to newly acquired facilities could not be arbitrated. A new and innovative dispute resolution approach relating to trade union organization is described in a forthcoming paper, co-authored by William B. Gould IV and Andrew Olejnik, \textit{Beyond Labor Law: Private Initiatives to Promote Employee Freedom of Association} (presented to Stanford Law School faculty, June 16, 2010), which focused upon the resolution of freedom of association issues. See generally George Raine, “Veteran Labor Lawyer Takes on New Challenge,” S.F. Chron., Jan. 26, 2008, at C1. It provides for investigations and public reports without hearings. See George A. Bermann, \textit{Administrative Delay and Its Control}, 30 Am. J. Comp. L. Supp. 473, 474 (1982). This process appears to be superior to arbitration of recognition issues. Cf. Laura J. Cooper, \textit{Privatizing Labor Law: Neutrality/Card Check Agreements and the Role of the Arbitrator}, 83 Ind. L.J. 1589 (2008).
Job Security and Entrepreneurial Concerns

One of the most important progeny of Steelworkers Trilogy is the line of authority which began to emerge in the 1960s involving the duty to arbitrate and to bargain with a union in the wake of some form of corporate reorganization. A quartet of decisions—though a trilogy are the driving force—by the Supreme Court have attempted to address these issues but have left the state of law on this 50th anniversary in considerable confusion.

The first of these cases is Wiley v. Livingston,180 which was an action by a union pursuant to Section 301 to compel arbitration under its collectively bargained agreement with the company when the company merged with another employer. In this case, authored by Justice Harlan, the Court held that “the disappearance by merger of a corporate employer which has entered into a collective bargaining agreement with a union does not automatically terminate all rights of the employees covered by the agreement and that, in appropriate circumstances, present here, the successor employer may be required to arbitrate with the union under the agreement.”181 The Court noted the central role of arbitration as it relates to national labor policy under the Steelworkers Trilogy and concluded that where “the business entity remains the same,”182 the duty to arbitrate could survive. Here the Court emphasized the fact that “negotiations will ordinarily not concern the well being of the employees…” and that objectives of national labor law dictated the balancing of the employer’s right to rearrange its business with “…some protection to the employees from a sudden change in the employment relationship.”183 The Court, however, noted that not every change in ownership of corporate structure would allow the duty to arbitrate to survive. Said the Court,

…there may be cases in which the lack of any substantial continuity of identity in the business enterprise before and after a change would make a duty to arbitrate something imposed from without, not reasonably to be found in the particular bargaining agreement and the acts of the parties involved. So too, we do not rule out the possibility that a union might abandon its right to arbitration by failing to make its claims known.184

181Id. at 549.
182Id.
183Id.
184Id. at 551.
The Court’s next crack at this issue, arising within the duty to bargain provisions of the National Labor Relations Act, moved the law in another direction. In this case, *NLRB v. Burns International Security Services*, the issue was the assertion of bargaining rights by a union where one company, Burns, providing security services replaced another, Wackenhut Corporation, which had previously provided these same services at the Lockheed Aircraft Service Company. Here, the question was whether Burns, which refused to bargain with a union representing a majority of the employees in an appropriate unit could be obliged by Board order to observe the terms of the collective bargaining agreement with Wackenhut when Burns had not voluntarily assumed it. The Court, stressing the precise facts involved here, answered the question in an opinion by Justice White in the negative. The issue here was the Board’s bargaining order which was fashioned by the agency and the Court. The Court upheld a duty to bargain with the union in the successor enterprise, finding that the employer could not entertain a good faith doubt about the majority status in light of the hiring of Wackenhut’s employees, but held that there was no obligation to adhere to the substantive terms of the collective bargaining agreement between the union and the predecessor employer. Here the Court distinguished *Wiley* and relied upon *H.K. Porter* in which it had held that the Act precluded the imposition of contractual terms even as a remedy for a statutory violation. The Court noted that it did not find *Wiley* controlling under the circumstances, notwithstanding that decision’s conclusion that a collective bargaining agreement is not an ordinary contract but rather an outline of common law in a plant or industry. The Court stressed the “limited accommodation between the legislative endorsement of freedom of contract and the judicial preference for peaceful arbitral settlement of labor disputes…” and held that the duty to bargain provisions did not oblige a successor employer to honor the predecessor collective bargaining agreement. The Court noted that *Burns* did not involve a duty to arbitrate at a Section 301 suit as was true in *Wiley*. It stressed that decision’s “narrower” holding against the backdrop of state law, under which a surviving corporation was liable for the disappearing one in a merger. The opinion went on to note that here the

---

187 *Burns*, *supra* note 185, at 286.
employers were simply competitors for the same work and there was no merger or sale of assets or dealings between the employers at all.

From a policy perspective the Court had much to say that was not present in the Wiley analysis as well:

[that]…either [the fact that] the union or the new employer are bound to the substantive terms of an old collective bargaining contract may result in serious inequities. A potential employer may be willing to take over a moribund business only if he can make changes in corporate structure, composition of the labor force, work location, task assignments, and nature of supervision. Saddling such an employer with the terms and conditions of employment contained in the old collective bargaining contract may make these changes impossible and may discourage and inhibit the transfer of capital….A union may have made concessions to a small or failing employer that it would be unwilling to make to a large or economically successful firm. The congressional policies manifest in the act is to enable the parties to negotiate for any protection either deems appropriate, but to allow the balance of bargaining advantage to be set by economic power realities. Strife is bound to occur if the concessions that must be honored do not correspond to the relative economic strength of the party.\(^\text{188}\)

But even though the Court had found that a successor employer may “ordinarily” impose new contract terms the Court said that there might be instances where it is “perfectly clear” that the new employer plans to retain all of the employees in the unit, in which event it will be appropriate to have him initially consult with the employees’ bargaining representative before he fixes terms.\(^\text{189}\) Thus the duty to bargain could arise in successorship cases even at the time that the terms of the successorship are being set, notwithstanding the fact that the collective bargaining agreement would not carry over.

The Board has held in the 1970s that, in the wake of Burns, this perfectly clear obligation to notify and bargain relates only to situations where the employer had misled employees about the wages, hours, and conditions of employment or where the employer had failed to clearly announce its intent to establish a new set of conditions prior to inviting former employees to accept employment.\(^\text{190}\) My Board held that an employer could unilaterally set wage rates that differed from those paid by his predecessor

\(^{188}\text{Id. at 288.}\)

\(^{189}\text{Id. at 294–95.}\)

\(^{190}\text{Spruce Up Corp., 209 N.L.R.B. 194 (1974), enforced without opinion, 529 F.2d 516 (4th Cir. 1975).}\)
under the collective bargaining agreement under the “perfectly clear” exception. But in a concurring opinion, I expressed the view that the Board precedent established an “[u]nduly restrictive reading of the Supreme Court’s definition of circumstances in which a successor employer must bargain about initial terms and conditions of employment.” My view was and is that the Board, by imposing the “perfectly clear” obligation to notify and bargain obligation relating to initial terms of employment only when there was deception (prior to or simultaneously with its invitation to the previous workforce to accept employment under those terms) grafted an additional requirement or impediment to effective recognition not contained in Burns itself. The Board majority eliminated those instances where employers expressed an intent to provide changed employment conditions from the obligation to bargain under the “perfectly clear” standard. I wrote in this case:

The fact is that in many, if not most, business re-arrangements, the successor employer perceives a need for change or greater flexibility in the employment relationship. This is the essential dynamic involved in the instant cases as well as countless others. To eliminate instances where employers express an intent to provide changed employment conditions from the obligation to negotiate under the “perfectly clear” standard announced in Burns would both render the holding on this point meaningless and also disregard the careful balance between competing interests articulated by the Court . . . [under extant Supreme Court authority].

My view was attacked with an argument that has arisen in a number of contexts, i.e., that it would create a disincentive for the employer to hire the old workforce. But there are already a considerable number of disincentives in place, as we see from the next important Supreme Court decision, Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Board. In this case, another case, like Wiley, involving a Section 301 action, the Court distinguished a case involving a merger from one involving a sale of assets when the initial corporate entity remains viable, held that there was no obligation to arbitrate with the successor. This meant that the union could pursue contractual obligations possessed by the predecessor, with an arbitration commenced which would explore whether

---

192 Id. at 1055.
the predecessor had breached successorship provisions in their collective bargaining agreement. The Court reasoned that, since only 9 of the predecessor’s 53 employees had been hired by the successor, the probable purpose of an arbitration between the union and Howard Johnson would have been to compel the hiring of the other workers. Such an obligation, said the Court, would be inconsistent with what had been already set forth in Burns, and an action to compel arbitration could not be required given the lack of a substantial continuity of identity in the workforce. Howard Johnson more clearly than the other cases simply opened the door for a successor employer to rid itself of any obligations by refusing to hire the predecessor’s employees. The only constraint on that is the prohibition against discrimination in hiring, something often difficult to prove.194

And finally, in the 1980s, the last of the quartet of cases emerged, Fall River Dyeing v. NLRB,195 where the successor was required to bargain with the predecessor’s union when it hired a large number of the predecessor employees after a hiatus of seven months between the initial closing. The Supreme Court enforced a Board order requiring Fall River to bargain, holding that a proper time to determine the union’s majority status is when an employer has hired a “substantial and representative complement” of the workforce.196 The balance here, notwithstanding a premature demand for recognition in advance of the hiring, was struck in favor of the union and employees.

As might be expected, the circuit courts of appeals adopted a wide variety of responses to this irreconcilable series of decisions. These cases are at odds with one another and are difficult to reconcile—and that has meant that the circuit courts have spoken with increasing frequency and inevitable disharmony in this century. Two of the most prominent in the past decade have arisen in the Third Circuit and the Second. As might be expected both decisions are split, 2–1 with strong dissenting opinions in each.

In Ameristeel Corp. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,197 the Third Circuit was confronted with the following fact pattern: Ameristeel, a successor corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of steel products, purchased the assets of Brocker Rebar

---

196 Id. at 52.
197 Ameristeel Corp. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 267 F.3d 264 (3d Cir. 2001).
manufacturing facility in York, Pennsylvania, and commenced operations there. IBT Local 430, having represented employees at the facility, had a collective bargaining agreement with Brocker. The purchase agreement between Ameristeel and Brocker contained various provisions stating that Ameristeel was not to be bound by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. This was the posture taken by Ameristeel toward the union after hiring approximately 50 employees to work at York; Ameristeel hired all but six of Local 430 members being hired. Out of this a bargaining process commenced between the parties but broke down when Ameristeel withdrew recognition because of a letter “purportedly” signed by a majority of the unionized employees in which they stated that they no longer wanted to be represented by the union. Unfair labor practice litigation commenced.

The union filed a grievance challenging unilateral changes in working conditions when the purchase agreement was consummated. Subsequently Ameristeel filed a complaint in federal district court attempting to enjoin arbitration proceedings which gave rise to the instant case. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, subsequent to the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction, stated that it was called upon to “…navigate treacherous waters of the Supreme Court’s labor law successorship doctrine which has, at times, imposed extra-contractual duties upon successor employers.”

In Ameristeel, as the dissenting opinion of Judge Becker noted, the company had hired all but six of the predecessor employees to work at the same facility doing the same job that they performed before the sale….Ameristeel also hired the predecessor[‘s] top supervisory personnel at the plant (…in contrast to Howard Johnson where the successor hired none of the predecessor’s supervisors). The York plant is situated in exactly the same location where it was before and produces the exact same product using the same inventory, the same equipment, the same physical set-up, and the same production methods…this is virtually nothing changed at the plant when Ameristeel took over except for the name on the door.

Nonetheless, the majority concluded that the mandate of Burns is that a “nonconsenting successor employer cannot be bound by the substantive terms of a CBA negotiated by its predecessor…[and this provides]…more persuasive guidance than the

---

198 Id. at 267.
199 Id. at 280.
The STEELWORKERS TRILOGY at 50

limited holding in Wiley.199a Speaking through Judge Rendell, the majority rejected the idea that Howard Johnson had in any way implicitly or explicitly modified Burns’s hostility to the imposition of a substantive collective bargaining agreement upon the new employer.

The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit came down at the other end of the spectrum. In Local 348-S, UFCW, AFL-CIO v. Meridian Management Corp.,200 Meridian successfully bid for a contract with the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey to provide engineering and janitorial services at a terminal for a three-year period. Then Meridian contracted the services out to Cristi. Local 348 represented Cristi employees who worked at JFK International Airport. Cristi amended its collective bargaining agreement to apply to Cristi employees who worked at the Port Authority terminal. Meridian then gave Cristi a notice of an attempt to terminate its subcontract janitorial services. Local 348 sought recognition with Meridian for its employees doing janitorial work at the Port Authority terminal, and sought to arbitrate with Meridian over its failure to contribute to the union’s Health and Welfare Fund. Such contributions were required under the collective bargaining agreement between the union and Cristi Cleaning Services Inc., Meridian’s predecessor.

The Second Circuit stated that the case law “...compels the conclusion that a successor employer is not automatically bound by the substantive terms of a preexisting CBA, even if that successor employer retains a majority of its predecessor’s workforce.”201 But nonetheless the court affirmed the district court judgment that Meridian was obligated to arbitrate the question of the extent to which it was bound by substantive terms. Judge Hall, writing for another 2–1 majority, examined the case law in detail and concluded that the important elements here were that Meridian had “...retained a majority of Cristi’s employees after assuming the cleaning duties previously performed by Cristi”202 and that the employees performed “substantially the same duties.” The only difference between Wiley, said the court, was that Wiley involved a merger—but the court focused upon the fact that Howard Johnson, also a merger case, had placed great stress upon substantial continuity of the identity of the workforce. The court stressed the

199aId. at 273.
201Id. at 68.
202Id. at 74.
fact that Meridian had “knowingly and voluntarily elected to carry out its obligation by hiring a subcontractor that employed workers represented by Local 348, pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement negotiated by Local 348.” Meridian had simply eliminated the middleman by entering into a direct employment relationship which involved performance of the same work and the same product for the same customer, notwithstanding the fact that there was no sale or transfer of assets. Judge Livingston in a dissent as vigorous as that employed by Judge Becker for the Third Circuit, noted the obvious—that the ruling would create (just as Howard Johnson did) a disincentive to hire a predecessor’s employees.

The virtue of the strength of these Section 301 cases from plaintiffs’ perspective in both Ameristeel and Meridian is that they involve motions to compel arbitration where Burns is not directly offended because the entire collective bargaining agreement is not necessarily assumed—only the arbitration clause itself. The court assumed that the extent of contract obligations was for the arbitrator to determine (as in Wiley) a point which Judge Livingston characterized as a “freewheeling” approach by the majority.

I think that the Second Circuit has the better part of this argument, but the basic conflict will surely come to the Supreme Court again, and its handling of other labor law cases—particularly those involving the duty to bargain in connection with managerial rearrangements where there are partial closures—does not give me much confidence about the Court’s receptiveness to my views.

**Interest Arbitration—The Last Frontier of the Arbitration Process Itself Is Interest Arbitration**

Curiously, though the New York Times editorial about Steelworkers Trilogy explicitly spoke of grievance arbitration awards and the facts of Steelworkers Trilogy did not extend beyond such, the fact is

---

203 Id. at 75.
204 Other decisions which have struggled with the tension involved in these cases are Road Sprinkler Fitters Local 669 v. Ind. Sprinkler, 10 F.3d 1563 (11th Cir. 1994); New England Mechanical v. Laborers Local Union 294, 909 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1990); Southward v. South Cent. Ready Mix Supply Corp., 7 F.3d 487 (6th Cir. 1993); Orange Place Ltd. P’ship v. National Labor Relations Board, 333 3d, 646 (6th Cir. 2003). See generally Edward Rock & Michael Wachter, Labor Law Successorship: A Corporate Law Approach, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 203 (1993).
that in the wake of the early decisions the courts have been divided on the question of the enforceability of interest arbitration awards notwithstanding the fact that interest arbitration has deep historical roots in the United States—though fostered almost as much through statute as on a voluntary basis. When the Adamson Act of 1916 in the Wilson administration was resisted, the Supreme Court, notwithstanding a different era of Commerce Clause litigation, upheld its constitutionality because “...the very absence of the scale of wages by agreement and the impediment and destruction of interstate commerce which was threatened called for the appropriate and relevant remedy, the creation of a standard by operation of law binding upon the carrier.”

Ad hoc legislation has imposed such agreements upon railroads and airlines and, subsequent to the invocation of the emergency strike provisions for longshore workers, has imposed such agreements upon them as well, through special ad hoc statute.

The system of interest arbitration has been utilized frequently in the printing and newspaper industries and, more recently in the automobile industry: in the 1970s, the steel industry negotiated the so-called Experimental Negotiating Agreement which provided for interest arbitration. And interest arbitration has spread substantially through the public sector as a substitute for

---

209 United States v. United Steelworkers, 361 U.S. 39 (1959) (holding that evidence of the strike’s effect on specific defense projects supported a judgment that the strike endangered the nation’s safety). Justice Frankfurter’s concurring opinion supplied a majority in the Steel Seizure Case, stated that the constitutional defect in President Truman’s Seizure was that he had not pursued the emergency strike avenue made open to him by Congress in Taft-Hartley. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer 343 U.S. 579, 598–601 (1952) (J. Frankfurter, concurring).
the right to strike.\textsuperscript{213} However, there is no substantial movement toward or consensus about the system on a voluntary basis. The proposed Employee Free Choice Act would provide for so-called first contract interest arbitration where the parties have difficulty resolving a collective bargaining agreement subsequent to NLRB certification.\textsuperscript{214} The California Agricultural Labor Relations Act of 1975 has been amended to provide for similar mediation–arbitration provisions, the constitutionality of which has been upheld.\textsuperscript{215} The Postal Reorganization Act of 1970 provides that interest arbitration may be invoked.\textsuperscript{216} Interest arbitration for new contracts at the expiration of a previous one or the first time around, once regarded as a “tool of the future” by one of my NLRB Chairman predecessors,\textsuperscript{217} Betty Murphy, has never materialized as such.

The legal backdrop relating to interest arbitration involves not only the Steelworkers Trilogy, Insurance Agents and its progeny, but also a decision which had issued two years earlier—\textit{NLRB v. Borg-Warner}.\textsuperscript{218} In this case the Court held that, under the duty to bargain provisions applicable to both labor and management, there are mandatory and nonmandatory (or permissive) subjects of bargaining. Both sides have the right and indeed the obligation to

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{213}] See supra, note 44. Interest arbitration awards in the public sector are judicially enforceable. See, e.g., Fire Fighters Union v. City of Vallejo, 526 P.2d 971, 975 (Cal. 1974) (upholding compulsory arbitration for fire fighters). However, public employer resistance to interest arbitration has grown in recent years. Cf. DiQuisto v. County of Santa Clara, 181 Cal. App. 4th 236; 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 93. (Court of Appeal of California, Sixth Appellate District) (2010) (the author was Expert Witness for the County of Santa Clara in this proceeding). See generally John Woolfolk, \textit{Reigning in Employee Costs: S.J. Looks to Vallejo on Pay}, San Jose Mercury News, July 4, 2010, Local News, p. 3.
\item[\textsuperscript{215}] Hess Collection Winery v. Cal. Agric. Labor Relations Bd., 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 609, 627 (Ct. App. 2006) (upholding an interest arbitration statute against a constitutional challenge because the Act has adequate standards in place to allow for judicial review).
\item[\textsuperscript{216}] Postal Reorganization Act of 1970, 39 U.S.C.A. § 1207 (a)–(d).
\item[\textsuperscript{217}] See Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n Local No. 59, 227 N.L.R.B. 520, 522 (1976). See also Sheet Metal Workers, Local 38, 231 N.L.R.B. 699, 702–03 (1977) (Member Murphy, dissenting) (“In my view, it clearly is the collective-bargaining tool of the future, and I am surprised by the unwillingness of my colleagues to find it a mandatory subject of bargaining.”); Roy Robinson Chevrolet, 228 N.L.R.B. 828, 832 (1977) (Chairman Murphy, concurring) (“With all due respect to the Fifth Circuit, I reaffirm my belief in interest arbitration as the collective-bargaining tool of the future”). Member Fanning concurred with her. See also The Columbus Printing Pressman and Assistants’ Union No. 252, Subordinate to IP & GCU (The R.W. Page Corporation), 219 NLRB 268 (1975) which contains another Chairman Murphy dissent on interest arbitration as a mandatory subject to bargaining.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
bargain to the point of impasse over mandatory subjects, but a party that insists on bargaining nonmandatory or permissive subjects to the point of impasse and conditions its execution of the collective bargaining contract upon the other party’s agreement to those nonmandatory subjects violates the refusal to bargain provisions of the statute.

Under *Borg-Warner*, *per se* violations of the duty to bargain in good faith obligation are found in such instances so as to facilitate the collective bargaining process—theoretically, at least. Labor law precludes imposition of a contract or a contract term upon the parties. But, in yet another irony, the Board and the courts—in order to vouchsafe collective bargaining—have characterized voluntarily negotiated interest arbitration as well (as its second generation variant) as nonmandatory. A party’s insistence upon adherence to such a voluntarily negotiated arrangement violates the statute. This line of authority not yet addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court is inconsistent with the idea of wide-open, robust collective bargaining promoted in *Insurance Agents*, precludes insistence upon a particular subject matter such as a dispute resolution mechanism on the ground that it is not a mandatory subject to bargaining in the view of the NLRB.

In the wake of *Steelworkers Trilogy* a number of the courts, repudiating the pre–*Lincoln Mills* rulings of the First Circuit, held that *Steelworkers Trilogy* promoted the enforcement of interest arbitration awards under Section 301. Said Judge Sobeloff for the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, “[We read] . . . the Steelworkers trilogy . . . as not only recognizing arbitration as an acceptable method of resolving labor disputes, but actively encouraging it.” Judge McCree, also relying upon the *Steelworkers Trilogy* as well as *Lincoln Mills*, for the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit soon followed suit: “The enforcement of an interest arbitration clause is within the scope and purpose of our national labor policies, and the parties here clearly contemplated the arbitration of new

---


221 Winston-Salem Printing Pressmen and Assistants’ Union, 393 F.2d 221, 226 (4th Cir. 1968).
contract terms.” How is it that interest arbitration has been discouraged?

Initially, the Board seems to have relied upon the Supreme Court post–Borg-Warner jurisprudence which emphasized the extent to which other parties had incorporated a subject matter in their own collective bargaining agreements as a factor in determining whether insistence upon it was focused upon employment conditions within the meaning of the Act. Consequently the Board, with little reasoning, concluded that interest arbitration was a nonmandatory subject over a dissent—both persuasive and yet somewhat curious—by Chairman Murphy which did not resolve the mandatory–nonmandatory dispute but rather proceeded upon the assumption that a party could insist upon a clause as a condition of the execution of the agreement where interest arbitration was part of the longstanding tradition in the industry.

Of course, grievance–arbitration machinery has long been viewed as a mandatory subject of bargaining even though it involves process and not the actual substantive conditions of employment. How can interest arbitration be distinguishable from grievance arbitration? Again, one objection to its recognition as a mandatory subject of bargaining has been that it is not as widespread throughout the country or industry as is the grievance arbitration process. Yet this perspective seems to be fundamentally inconsistent with the proposition that robust collective bargaining allows the parties to adapt their relationship spontaneously.

---

223 Mechanical Contractors Ass’n of Newburgh, 209 N.L.R.B. 1 (1973). Actually, the Board did not directly address interest arbitration in that case given its view that the dominance of the arbitration panel by labor and management representatives provided for collective bargaining under the rubric of arbitration stemmed from the Administrative Law Judge William Feldsman’s thinking. Id. at 11–15.

Numerous terms and conditions of employment have been held to be the subject of mandatory bargaining under the NLRA. See generally, C. Morris, The Developing Labor Law 772–844 (2d ed. 1983). Litton does not question that arrangements for arbitration of disputes are a term or condition of employment and a mandatory subject of bargaining. See id. at 813 (citing cases); United States Gypsum Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 112, 131 (1951).

and creatively, to meet their own needs. The courts, relying upon the *Pittsburgh Plate Glass* decision, have held that subject matter (in that case retired employees’ insurance benefits) would not be mandatory where the impact upon employment conditions of employees and employers was indirect or attenuated. Following this theme, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit stated, “An agreement on interest arbitration settles nothing of substance immediately; it lacks the required direct, significant, relationship to wages, hours or terms or conditions of employment.” But this is no different from grievance–arbitration machinery where, as the Court told us in *Steelworkers Trilogy*, the arbitrator is appointed so as to address the gaps, ambiguities, and unforeseen contingencies. Moreover, the relationship between actual conditions of employment at the time that the process is created is speculative and perhaps in some circumstances remote, the parties not knowing what will emerge from the process in a given dispute.

There is yet a third issue here which influenced the thinking of the Board in the 1970s and 1980s, i.e., “…the very procedures in controversy could always be invoked to determine their continued force and effect, with the very real prospect of a perpetual existence for the non-mandatory contract term.” It may be argued that the perpetual existence of a waiver of the right to utilize either the strike or the lockout does indeed shift the balance against what might be viewed as the implications of the *Steelworkers Trilogy* and thus truly contradict *Insurance Agents* so as to deny its philosophy of the right to use economic weaponry by the parties. Yet, the first time around it seems clear that the waiver of the right to strike is the *quid pro quo* for interest arbitration—just as that is the case in connection with the *Steelworkers Trilogy* and *Lincoln Mills* promotion of grievance–arbitration.

Moreover, it is typical to distinguish the interest arbitration terms from other benefits which will occur beyond the expiration of the existing collective bargaining agreement, such as wages and conditions of employment affecting employees hired in the future. True, the idea of continued self-perpetuation (where, once interest arbitration is negotiated, a new interest arbitrator

---

227 *NLRB v. Massachusetts Nurses Ass’n*, 557 F.2d 894, 898 (1st Cir. 1977).
229 *NLRB v. Laney & Duke Storage Warehouse Co., 369 F.2d 859, 868 (5th Cir. 1966).*
may award interest arbitration in the future) is perplexing, and the idea of a permanent waiver in perpetuity is troublesome. It may be that the law should promote the concept of a “self-terminating” interest arbitration clause.230

Concern about waiver in perpetuity obviously influenced the district court in Massachusetts in *Globe Newspaper Co. v. International Ass’n of Machinists, Local 264*231 when it concluded that the “second generation” interest arbitration was void against public policy. On balance, I think that the court was incorrect in vacating the award in *Globe*—but whether correct or not, it came to its conclusions for the wrong reasons. Again, it stressed the nonmandatory analysis which, as we have seen, stands on a shaky foundation. Hardly a mention was made of the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit which had said that “[i]f the parties elect to include in their agreement a provision governing a matter not subject to mandatory bargaining and also adopt a broad arbitration clause, nothing in [precedent] . . . labor law, or the Arbitration Act precludes arbitration of the dispute concerning the meaning or application of that provision.”232 Undoubtedly, some limitation must be placed on the prospect of a perpetual waiver. Though the matter is not free from doubt—Chairman Murphy,233 again, provided a detailed dissent, taking the position that arbitrators are not as self-aggrandizing as the Board and the courts have advertised them to be. I have always thought that arbitrators, like the late Harry Platt, were sound in their reluctance to fashion second-generation awards where one party resisted.234

---

231 *Globe*, supra note 46.
233 See supra, note 217.
234 Pacific Neo-gravure, 51 LA 14, 25 (Platt, 1968):

It would seem a fair conclusion that for an Arbitrator to order mandatory arbitration of new contract terms over the objections of either party would be, as the union states, “the equivalent of compulsory arbitration of a new contract.” In the view of many—in both labor and management—imposition of such a requirement on a non-consenting party is incompatible with our system of free collective bargaining. Nor is it unreasonable to suppose that such involuntary mandatory arbitration will adversely affect the parties bargaining relationship. . . . [T]he availability of a procedure yielding compulsory awards tends to demoralize the bargaining process. Such procedures, it is widely believed, inhibit normal bargaining by inviting unreasonable offers and demands designed to compel arbitration . . . by deterring bargainers from assuming responsibility for a settlement when they believe better terms might be arrived at through terminal arbitration.
Yet in some respects *Globe* was different. In *Globe*, the parties had consented to the arbitration which gave rise to a second-generation provision. But what was particularly important in that case and in some of the others like it was the fact that the parties were bargaining over a wide variety of issues. The union in that case—it could be the employer in another—obviously framed its position on an interest arbitration clause in light of its bargaining on other matters and the extent to which it thought it could realize its objective on the collective bargaining front *in toto*.

The court in *Globe* seemed totally unaware of this and refused to enforce an evergreen interest arbitration clause as part of the award—thus dismissing enforcement without any articulated reasoning. The fact is that one side, the union in *Globe*, may have formulated its bargaining strategy in reliance upon interest arbitration, and the employer’s belated objection and may have undercut the expectations of both parties. For the court to intervene in this manner in the collective bargaining process is the very antithesis of the way in which national labor policy is to be properly fashioned both under *Insurance Agents* and *Steelworkers Trilogy*. Moreover, equally troubling was the fact that the court, as an independent basis for concluding that the award must be set aside, held that since the subject matter was nonmandatory the incorporation of it in an award was unlawful and against public policy.

The emergence of so-called “final offer” or “baseball” arbitration in interest disputes highlight the fundamentally flawed nature of the *Globe* opinion. Whether the arbitration takes place on an item by item basis or each side putting forward a package (both more hazardous and yet relatively productive in its settlement of new contract terms in new collective bargaining sessions) if the parties are always going to be looking over their shoulder with a view toward determining how a court will characterize the subject matter in the collective bargaining process, the process is hardly furthered. In my view, it is perilous for the courts to invalidate interest arbitration clauses in arbitration awards and to interfere with arbitration awards under the public policy rubric or for some other reason.

True, the interest arbitration process is invoked rather infrequently in comparison with grievance arbitration, though clearly the emergence of interest arbitration in the public sector has begun to change this calculation. While Chairman, I expressed the view that interest arbitration should be viewed as a manda-
tory subject of bargaining under the Act in a future case.\textsuperscript{235} But as with so many other matters, I never had the chance to follow this through to its conclusion.\textsuperscript{236} The \textit{Globe} decision is illustrative of both some of the excesses of \textit{Borg-Warner}, in the form of a kind of triumphalism, which has been latched onto by courts of general jurisdiction which both lack expertise and also as a consequence disrupt the collective bargaining process. These holdings are both inconsistent with collective bargaining and arbitration and are out of touch with the Federal Arbitration Act’s promotion of arbitral finality which along with \textit{Enterprise Wheel} now serves as guidance for judicial review of arbitrations. The \textit{Globe}’s decision is just the most recent illustration of the fact that the public policy exception to the “essence” standard contained in \textit{Enterprise Wheel} has seen the courts run wild and cause more harm than help.\textsuperscript{237}

Yet, Chairman Murphy’s belief that interest arbitration is “the collective-bargaining tool of the future” notwithstanding, there remains the potential problem of self-perpetuation. Self-perpetuation over a nonconsenting party would, it seems to me, be inconsistent with federal labor policy. \textit{Globe}, it must be remembered, emerged from a fact situation where the parties had voluntarily submitted their differences to an interest arbitrator. If one party communicates at the outset—whether it is first- or second-generation arbitration—that it objects to an interest arbitration clause, it seems to me that an attack upon the award can be sustained as inconsistent with \textit{Insurance Agents} and its progeny. The prob-

\textsuperscript{235}Sheet Metal Workers Local 162 (Dwight Lang’s Enterprises), 314 N.L.R.B. 923, 926 n.12 (1994):

Chairman Gould finds that the policy favoring the peaceful settlement of disputes through arbitration expressed by the Supreme Court in the \textit{Warrior & Gulf} case in the context of grievance arbitration applies with equal force to interest arbitration. In his view, that policy also compels the conclusion that interest arbitration is a mandatory subject of bargaining on which a party may insist to impasse. He would, therefore, overrule \textit{Sheet Metal Workers Local 59 (Employers Assn.)}, 227 NLRB 520 (1976), and other cases holding that interest arbitration is a nonmandatory subject of bargaining.

\textsuperscript{236}Laidlaw Transit, Inc. 323 N.L.R.B. 867, 867 n.1 (1997):

Chairman Gould has previously expressed the view…that interest arbitration is a mandatory subject of bargaining on which a party may insist to impasse. Accordingly, he would overrule \textit{Sheet Metal Workers Local 59 (Employers Assn.)}, 227 NLRB 520 (1976), and other cases holding that interest arbitration is a nonmandatory subject of bargaining. In the absence of a current Board majority to overrule that precedent, however, Chairman Gould agrees that the judge has correctly applied it here in concluding that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(5).

lem in *Globe*, again, is that the collective bargaining process is disrupted where one party draws back at the eleventh hour or even subsequent to the commencement of negotiations. In a sense, the parties rely, just as they do in connection with timely notice for withdrawal from employer associations,\(^{238}\) upon the process which will unfold in front of them in formulating their positions at the bargaining table. The judicial review in which the court in *Globe* engaged was mischievous in its analysis and in the result it obtained.

This rule of timely withdrawal and examination of the bargaining leading up to the successor interest arbitration clause seems to be the best approach.\(^{239}\) Arbitrators properly proceed with caution into this new and relatively untested terrain. Perhaps in this way the tendency toward self-perpetuation on the part of arbitrators can be constrained.

Grievance arbitration, in contrast to interest arbitration, involves a system of dispute resolution relating to the terms and conditions of employment and, for that reason has long been regarded as a mandatory subject of bargaining. From a legal perspective, I see no reason for distinguishing between the two.

---

\(^{238}\) Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404 (1982) (an impasse in collective bargaining is not sufficient to support a finding of unusual circumstances justifying a unilateral withdrawal from a multiemployer bargaining unit); Brown v. Pro Football, Inc. 518 U.S. 231, 245 (1996):

Employers, however, are not completely free at impasse to act independently. The multiemployer bargaining unit ordinarily remains intact; individual employers cannot withdraw. *Bonanno Linen*. The duty to bargain survives; employers must stand ready to resume collective bargaining. *See, e.g.*, *Worldwide Detective Bureau*, 296 N.L.R.B. 148, 155 (1989); *Hi-Way Billboards, Inc.*, [206 N.L.R.B. 22, 23 (1973)]. And individual employers can negotiate individual interim agreements with the union only insofar as those agreements are consistent with “the duty to abide by the results of group bargaining.” *Bonanno Linen*, supra, at 416.

\(^{239}\) Cf. Local Union No. 666, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO v. Stokes Elec. Serv., Inc., 225 F.3d 415 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that an employer’s giving of notice that it desired to terminate collective bargaining agreement did not relieve it of its duty to submit to interest arbitration regarding unresolved issues concerning desire to terminate agreement even when the Regional Director of NLRB determined that the employer was relieved of its statutory duty to bargain); Sheet Metal Workers, Int’l Ass’n, Local Union No. 24 v. Architectural Metal Works, Inc., 259 F.3d 418, 422 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding that an interest-arbitration award binds a nonmember employer that had voluntarily assented to a collective bargaining agreement between a union and a multiemployer association).
Conclusion

_Steelworkers Trilogy_ remains a landmark in the development of our arbitration procedures here in the United States, promoting and facilitating the voluntary process in particular—the major contribution that the United States has made in labor-management relationships which is of some use to the world. The primary limitation in the _Trilogy_ holdings themselves relates to the third decision which also appeared in 1960, _Enterprise Wheel_, and its provision of finality to arbitration. But in fact, as we have seen, this has proved to be troublesome. In some measure, the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 may play a role in tightening up the judicial review problem. One of the many ironies here is that the Court, initially appearing to distinguish labor arbitration as special and different from its commercial counterpart, has now allowed the commercial cases to drive labor arbitration, unwarrantedly presuming an arbitral expertise in statutory claims in _Gilmer_ and _Pyett_ which is largely absent. Yet, though the Supreme Court did not address the 1925 Act notwithstanding the fact that if _Pyett_ was heard under the FAA, it would seem difficult (though not impossible) for it to draw back from a statute which for more than two decades it has said provides “guidance” to the judicial review of labor arbitration awards.240 The peculiar nature of the “mature” collective bargaining agreement with its gaps and unforeseen contingencies necessitating labor arbitration expertise seems now largely irrelevant or unnecessary given the fact that the Court speaks of commercial and labor arbitration interchangeably.241

_Boys Markets_ was the logical corollary of the _Steelworkers Trilogy_ and was rightly decided. The Court wandered off track in _Buffalo Forge_, in the teeth of Justice Stevens’s brilliant dissent on behalf of four of the justices who would have promoted the policy of industrial peace contained in both _Steelworkers Trilogy_ and _Boys Markets_ and, in the process, arbitration (albeit of no underlying grievance) itself. The Court’s rather lugubrious logic in _Buffalo_

---

The Arbitration Act does not apply to “contracts of employment of…workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce,” but the federal courts have often looked to the Act for guidance in labor arbitration cases, especially in the wake of the holding that § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act 1947, empowers the federal courts to fashion rules of federal common law to govern “suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization” under the federal labor laws.

Forge threatened to push off-track the new and important reverse Boys Markets decisions through which unions could obtain the status quo ante which in turn would preserve the arbitration process. But this did not materialize; it was Justice Holmes who said that a page of history is worth a volume of logic. Notwithstanding Buffalo Forge the lower courts—the Supreme Court has yet to address the issue—moved on promoting injunctions for both employers and unions in part, because of the concern with irreparable harm.

Just as the Court had properly accommodated the competing policies of the NLRA and Norris-La Guardia in Boys Markets, initially it did much the same in Gardner-Denver in connection with arbitration and discrimination. I would have preferred that Justice Powell had taken some of what was in the footnotes of Gardner-Denver—19 and 21 in particular—and placed it in the text and thus provided guidance for arbitrators in promoting finality. This is the one flaw in Gardner-Denver and in some respects it proved to be a vulnerable underbelly which a new Court, anxious and ambitious in its intent to reverse precedent (even though it claimed not to do so in this case) did in Pyett. With a confused and garbled record in Pyett, the Court was confused and garbled in its pronouncements for the future. Pyett will produce considerable litigation, as it has already. But, if this Court’s present composition remains, when it gets another crack at the issue of external law, the majority’s philosophical predilections promise to shut off future employment discrimination litigation unless Congress steps in and retards or eliminates the Court’s pursuit of its objective.

The brave new world of Wiley has been diminished but it is not gone completely as the Third Circuit seemed to have assumed in Ameristeel. The Second Circuit’s Meridian opinion is the better one. The issue of corporate rearrangement and job security cries out for a balanced and nuanced approach which, thus far has escaped the Court in the successorship trilogy or quartet of decisions which claim fidelity to Steelworkers Trilogy. Here also it must be said that the Court needs to clarify the ambiguities that have resulted from its decisions. My sense is that the balance will be struck for the freedom of contract note or the employers’ position which was at the heart of Burns. My sense is unless President Obama has new appointments to the Court which replace the conservative old guard which is now there a future decision will expand the holding in Burns and push to one side both Wiley and Howard Johnson.

Finally, without sufficient examination, the Board has pushed interest arbitration to one side, realizing some of the worst fears of
Borg-Warner critics, and has thereby circumscribed bargaining and the substance of future collective bargaining agreements. The fundamental distinction between grievance arbitration and interest arbitration can only be rationalized on the ground that the former is more widespread than the latter. Admittedly, this attempt to influence the contours of collective bargaining by relying upon what others have done, rather than promoting spontaneity in the parties’ own relationship, began with both American National Insurance242 (even prior to Borg-Warner) and Fibreboard.243 Coexistence of Borg-Warner with the so-called freedom of contract decisions of the Court—particularly Insurance Agents and the Court’s lockout holding in American Shipbuilding—has always dramatized the schizoid nature of the NLRA.

But now, as the Globe decision so vividly demonstrates, judicial reliance upon what was thought to be a fairly narrow public policy exception to the finality of arbitration awards244 has opened the door to harmful meddling in the collective bargaining process. I do not know whether 50 years from now interest arbitration will be an important dispute resolution tool. But the law ought not to interfere with the way in which parties may wish to proceed in this arena.

This half century, from Eisenhower to Obama, like the previous 50 years, from James Buchanan to William Howard Taft, has produced enormous change—much of which could not be fully anticipated. In 2060, when our successors are here pondering these questions, I think that we can safely say that there will be changes in the employment relationship and that the courts will be called upon to address them anew. The first two steps thus far—

242 NLRB v. American Nat’l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952) (holding that company’s insistence on broad management rights clause and refusal of grievance arbitration demand not a per se unfair labor practice and did not show a refusal to bargain in good faith).
243 Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964) (holding that an employer has to bargain collectively with the union representing its employees before contracting out work performed by union members because subcontracting is a mandatory subject of collective bargaining).
244 Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of America, Dist. 17, 531 U.S. 57, 63 (2000): We agree, in principle, that courts’ authority to invoke the public policy exception is not limited solely to instances where the arbitration award itself violates positive law. Nevertheless, the public policy exception is narrow and must satisfy the principles set forth in [W.R. Grace and Co. v. Local Union 759, Int’l Union of United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers of America, 461 U.S. 757 (1983)] and [United Paperworkers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987)]. Moreover, in a case like the one before us, where two political branches have created a detailed regulatory regime in a specific field, courts should approach with particular caution pleas to divine further public policy in that area.
Steelworkers Trilogy and Boys Markets—show that it can be done well. One cannot say the same about the third and the fourth steps, nor express much optimism about the fifth being “the bargaining tool of the future.” The challenge for the new generation in the new century is to do better and get it right by 2060—perhaps much earlier than 2060!

II. Steelworkers Trilogy: Collective Bargaining as the Foundation for Industrial Democracy and Arbitration as an Integral Part of Workplace Self-Government

W. Daniel Boone*

You have devoted your working lives to understanding and carrying out the ideals grounded in Justice Douglas’s Steelworkers Trilogy decisions. Most of my 36 years as a union lawyer have been spent serving workers and their unions as a practitioner in the labor arbitration forum. I understand intimately that grievance arbitration of collective bargaining disputes frequently falls short of what it is supposed to be, that we are all participants in a fractured and troubled labor movement, that the post–World War II labor management compact is substantially broken, and that today truly meaningful national labor law reform is more hope than expectation.

Nonetheless, I want to revisit and reflect upon “what is labor arbitration” as conceived by the Steelworkers Trilogy, and how to make it better.

Labor arbitration originated and is fundamentally grounded in collective worker action, and the collective rights of workers, through their union, to achieve the dignity and respect they deserve, together with good wages, decent pensions, and affordable health care.

*W. Daniel Boone is a partner at Weinberg, Roger & Rosenfeld in Alameda, California.