Defects in Contracting (5816): There is a commonplace rosy picture of the virtues of exchange. Two parties get together and each agrees to exchange some assets (a tangible good, work, forbearance from doing something they are otherwise entitled to do etc.) for some assets their exchange partner controls. Each of the parties is presumptively made "better off" by the exchange. (And, in "autonomy" terms, each has acted to realize some aspect of their considered life plans.) Enforcing contracts (promises to perform in the future) is a bit more complex because by the time performance is due, it may no longer be the case that each party believes that mutual performance is in their interests (the assets they will receive are now worth less to them than those they are bound to give up; a third party values the assets they are bound to give up more highly than what the contractual partner has promised to surrender.) But enforcing contracts permits a party to reduce the risks from exposure to spot markets and reduces vulnerability to opportunistic exploitation of those who make efficient preliminary investments in performance. We recognize though that the rosy picture is not always the true picture, though we may disagree about how often exchanges prove non-beneficial and whether the legal system can respond appropriately to non-beneficial exchanges and contracts. What we will explore in this class is how political theorists, philosophers, and social scientists (above all economists and psychologists) have dealt with defective exchanges (and contracts). We will start by examining the question of what we mean when we say that an exchange makes a party "better off" and whether that judgment is "subjective" (grounded in the judgments or feelings of the parties themselves) or "objective" (grounded in the judgment of a third-party observer). We will also discuss the significant distinctions between the claims made for exchanges and those made more specifically for contracts. We will then consider a range of arguments about whether the purported benefits of exchange dissipate when one of the contractual parties merely "weakly assents" to the exchange, largely unaware of all of the terms they have agreed to by signing a long form contract, clicking to accept all the terms of an online agreement, or even merely using a particular payment mechanism to purchase a good. And, if not, should we nonetheless enforce terms that are weakly assented to? We consider how to respond to asymmetries of information: why we should or should not enforce contracts where one of the parties has poor information about the qualities of the assets they are giving up or receiving. We also examine how to deal with (widespread?) "influence" by sellers who take advantage of both buyers' emotional vulnerability and their use of heuristics that lead them to make irrational judgments (about facts, even when they are "informed") and irrational decisions (about their concrete preferences.) We discuss other forms of imprudence beyond the use of heuristics that may mislead the decision maker. For example, youth and mental illness may interfere with the contractor making decisions that advance their self-interest. Should we categorically disqualify those who are young or adjudged "mentally ill" from entering into contracts or should we distinguish situations in which their preferred choices ought to govern from those where they should be questioned? We then go on to discuss the largely political theoretical literature on duress and coercion. Choices made under duress are still choices, products of our "will," maybe even particularly wise ones. I very wisely choose to hand over my wallet to a mugger when the alternative is getting physically harmed. All choices are made under forms of constraint we often wish would not be present: I buy a basket of strawberries because the grocer is not obliged to give them to me, I may work because I cannot support myself otherwise. Are there convincing ways of thinking about when we permit someone to undo an exchange or get out of performing a contractual duty because they were inappropriately constrained, by their contracting partner or "circumstances"? We then examine issues of philosophical and psychological accounts of incommensurability and non-commodification. Are there things or situations that we cannot readily (or comfortably) compare by reference simply to which we would prefer to possess or experience? Things whose value we would diminish if we attempted to compare them? Things we should not be permitted to buy and sell though we can give them away? Finally, we spend a session on how issues of assent, misinformation, and undue constraint play out in thinking about "agreements" to engage in sexual activity. We consider both the criminal law of rape and the quasi-criminal discipline systems that schools establish to distinguish permissible from impermissible sex, as well as the educational efforts schools establish to try to distinguish between permissible sex and mutually beneficial sex. Does the rosy picture of contracting imply that all permissible agreements are mutually beneficial and does our reluctance to accept that proposition in relationship to agreements to have sex call that general proposition into question? Elements used in grading: Attendance, class participation, written assignments.