A whistleblower program by the Securities and Exchange Commission offers rewards to incentivize people to blow the whistle on securities crimes. Using structural equation modeling (SEM) with data collected from a scenario-based survey thorough Amazon Mechanical Turk, I explore whistleblowers’ decision-making process. I first note that people who value rewards tend to blow the whistle regardless of the expected severity of retaliation. I further find that: (i) people with a stronger sense of ethics blow the whistle even when severe retaliation is expected; (ii) those who are committed to their organization seem more likely to blow the whistle by using a hotline inside the company, as long as no severe retaliation is expected; (iii) in making a decision, potential whistleblowers take account of likely company or SEC reactions, company retaliation, and job change costs; (iv) while women exhibit stronger moral intensity than men and assign greater value than men to the effectiveness of company or SEC reactions, men value rewards more than women; and (v) those with whistleblowing experience (personally or through an acquaintance) assign greater value to SEC reactions and are more willing to blow the whistle to the SEC than those with no experience of whistleblowing.