How Antitrust Law Can Make FRAND Commitments More Effective

Abstract

The antitrust laws can play an important role in ensuring that the rules established by standard setting organizations are effective in preventing the owners of standard-essential patents from engaging in patent holdup. We explain here that both standard-setting organizations and their members can violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act if the rules adopted are ineffective in preventing the owners of standard-essential patents from exploiting the monopoly power they gain as a result of the standard.

Details

Author(s):
Publish Date:
November 27, 2017
Format:
Working Paper
Citation(s):
  • A. Douglas Melamed & Carl Shapiro, How Antitrust Law Can Make FRAND Commitments More Effective, November 27, 2017 (available as Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 510 -- please see HERE for the SSRN.com version).
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