How Antitrust Law Can Make FRAND Commitments More Effective

Details

Author(s):
Publish Date:
November 27, 2017
Format:
Working Paper
Citation(s):
  • A. Douglas Melamed & Carl Shapiro, How Antitrust Law Can Make FRAND Commitments More Effective, November 27, 2017 (available as Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 510 -- please see HERE for the SSRN.com version).
Related Organization(s):

Abstract

The antitrust laws can play an important role in ensuring that the rules established by standard setting organizations are effective in preventing the owners of standard-essential patents from engaging in patent holdup. We explain here that both standard-setting organizations and their members can violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act if the rules adopted are ineffective in preventing the owners of standard-essential patents from exploiting the monopoly power they gain as a result of the standard.