Increasing Private Conservation through Incentive Mechanisms

Abstract

The Endangered Species Act (ESA) is the nation’s most powerful environmental law. The ESA, however, has been ineffective at achieving species conservation and recovery because the current command and control regulation imposes substantial costs on private landowners and creates perverse incentives that run contrary to the ESA’s goals. It is widely known that the primary threat to endangered species is habitat loss. With approximately three-fourths of all endangered species relying on private land for habitat, food, or breeding grounds, meaningful conservation will not be achieved without private landowners on board. Incentive mechanisms offer a promising alternative to command and control regulation and have the potential to alleviate the problems associated with the ESA. Incentive mechanisms reward private landowners for conservation and stewardship efforts that create positive externalities for the public good. This Article discusses the various incentive mechanisms that have been used in the past and proposes that more should be used in the future to increase private conservation and meet the ESA’s goals of species conservation and recovery.

Details

Publisher:
Stanford University Stanford, California
Citation(s):
  • Nathan Paulich, Increasing Private Conservation through Incentive Mechanisms, vol 3 Stanford Journal of Animal Law & Policy 106 (2010).
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