Shortly before the Covid-19 pandemic took the world by storm, inbound as well as outbound international Foreign Direct Investment movements were at an all-time high. The pandemic, however, besides significantly reducing investment net in- and outflows, also proved to be a testing time for the resilience of global supply and value chains. It also exposed the scarcity of certain critical technologies and raw materials, which prompted global economic players, most notably the European Union, to re-evaluate their economic strategy and assess how certain economic practices affect their national security. Both the European Union and the United States identified significant security risks as a result of outbound investments with respect to three critical technologies: semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and quantum. The United States responded to these economic risks in January 2025 by introducing the Final Rule on Outbound Investment, effectively establishing its own screening mechanism. Meanwhile, the European Union finds itself currently monitoring and assessing the risks of outbound investments transactions as mandated by Commission Recommendation (EU) 2025/63. Upon the conclusion of this exercise, the Union will be in a better position to debate and develop possible policy responses. Its own screening mechanism, thus, appears to be on the horizon. However, the European Union and the United States are far from being the first to consider introducing such mechanisms. In the latter half of the 20th century, Japan and China were already actively screening outbound investments based on their degree of sensitivity or effect on national security and public order. Thus, while the Union’s monitoring and risk assessment is under way, this paper aims to compare the screening mechanisms of the United States, Japan and China, and draw lessons from this comparative analysis to outline possible approaches the European Union could take, if it decides to develop its own outbound investment screening mechanism.