No. 43: How Innovative Is the EU’s Proposal for an Investment Court System: A Comparison between ICS and Traditional Investor-State Dispute Settlement

Details

Author(s):
  • Juan Miguel Alvarez
Publish Date:
March 25, 2020
Publication Title:
European Union (EU) Law Working Papers
Publisher:
Stanford Law School
Format:
Working Paper
Citation(s):
  • Juan Miguel Alvarez, How Innovative Is the EU’s Proposal for an Investment Court System: A Comparison between ICS and Traditional Investor-State Dispute Settlement, EU Law Working Papers No. 43, Stanford-Vienna Transatlantic Technology Law Forum (2020).
Related Organization(s):

Abstract

Prompted by the growing criticism against traditional investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), especially in the midst of the negotiations of the failed trade and commercial agreement with the United States, the European Commission of the European Union came up with a new system for the settlement of investment disputes, which promises to erase all the recurrent concerns about ISDS: the Investment Court System (ICS). For the most part, rather than absolutely innovative, the ICS merely embraces modern treaty trends developed throughout the years in the context of ISDS on subjects such as transparency, the prevention of forum shopping and frivolous claims, restrictions to the scope of the standards of treatment, among others. Yet, the ICS does introduce an innovative element, namely, the replacement of traditional ad hoc arbitral tribunals with a permanent tribunal coupled with an appeal mechanism. While these innovations certainly promise to fix some of the concerns, which ISDS has never been able to address in a satisfactory manner, such as the lack of legitimacy, predictability and consistency, it may also be the source of new challenges and issues that need to be assessed and weighed properly.