After two decades of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, ratified by 44 State Parties, no study has yet fully explored how the OECD Working Group on Bribery (WGB) has pushed its members to take concrete action to fight foreign bribery and corruption. Much less on the experiences and perceptions by its participants, namely: The Secretariat of the WGB, its two Chairs, State Parties, and civil society with this monitoring mechanism. This case study aims to be the first socio-legal empirical study of the works of the WGB. Despite the lack of an initial benchmark and the lack of information on the treaty drafters’ expectations for it.

As a naming a shaming mechanism, its reach is limited. However, the OECD WGB has leveled up its tone by approaching its members harshly. This first study that evidences this harsh tone from the rich narratives from more than 40 interviews conducted with its participants, and global sentiment analysis performed on all the country reports and press releases published by the WGB. Further, this case study also suggests possible reasons for attributing this phenomenon. Namely, a flexible legal structure that has been shaped by a series of tools and organic practices that have emerged under the influence of a set of sociological factors. Here the legal culture that has developed has fulfilled the empty shell left by its creators in its early beginnings.

While this peer review mechanism is not the single answer to a world without corruption, it is undoubtedly an essential part of that solution. This research aims to continue nourishing the evolving international anti-corruption regime, by informing all stakeholders whether the methodologies devised by international organizations and States have worked in practice, and how, navigating through the narratives of its key participants. While doing so, this research also aims to contribute to the legal scholarship on peer reviews and monitoring mechanisms and a greater extent to the literature on compliance by States with international law. In parallel, this work also introduces the notion of “State performance” to complement mainstream theories assessing States’ behavior under international law.