Wildfire risks in California have reached catastrophic proportions. Consequently, for many California families, insuring their homes against wildfire has become prohibitively expensive or outright impossible. The California state government, in an effort to address this crisis, enacted an experimental insurance regulation in late 2022, dubbed “Safer From Wildfires” (“SFW”). This Note uses law and economic theory to examine the policy, concluding that it is likely to distort the insurance market and make the problem worse, not better. SFW requires insurers, if they practice risk-based discounts at all, to provide homeowners and communities with insurance discounts for a variety of behaviors, such as fire-resistant construction and clearing flammable materials from their property. Yet this requirement creates a perverse incentive for insurers to not practice risk-pricing at all and instead to pull out completely from high-risk areas (or the state as a whole). This is in fact what has happened with several major insurance companies. As for community discounting, we are likely to observe free-rider problems, since multiple insurers operate in the same communities. SFW also requires insurers to publicly disclose their risk data and the factors on which they rely to make their coverage decisions. This requirement is less problematic: forcing insurers to publicize their superior risk data is likely to aid government and private citizens in their risk reduction efforts. SFW could be improved via the implementation of a bilateral mandate, in which insurers are required to provide wildfire insurance in high-risk areas, and homeowners are obligated to purchase it—this would mitigate the worst perverse incentive and adverse selection problems with the current policy scheme.