The Economics of WTO Rules on Subsidies and Countervailing

Details

Author(s):
  • Alan Sykes
Publish Date:
June 1, 2003
Publication Title:
University of Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper no. 186
Format:
Working Paper
Citation(s):
  • Alan O. Stykes. The Economics of WTO Rules on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, University of Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper no. 186 (2003).

Abstract

This paper evaluates the WTO rules relating to subsidies and countervailing measures from a welfare economics perspective. It concludes that the rules relating to “nonviolation” subsidies, export subsidies and certain agricultural subsidies have sound economic justification. The rules governing domestic subsidies generally, by contrast, do little to identify or police undesirable subsidies. Further, as has been argued elsewhere, countervailing measures are economically undesirable.