National security and international trade, and their intersections, have become critical focuses for recent administrative action. It was once rare to invoke national security as a justification for tariffs and restriction on foreign investment, but it has now become increasingly common. Courts reviewing these measures have largely defaulted to deferential approaches developed in an earlier era—one in which such actions were infrequent and rarely litigated. But in an era where assertions of national security are more common, this dogmatic jurisprudential approach lacks coherence. A new framework is needed to better guide judicial review.

This Article proposes that new framework. It identifies a distinction between two categories of justifications: Category I restraints, which seek to prevent adversaries from acquiring strategic advantages; and Category II restraints, which aim to shore up perceived weaknesses in the domestic industrial base. Category I restraints are more likely to involve classified information and fall within the President’s core foreign affairs authority, thus warranting substantial judicial deference. Category II restraints, by contrast, often resemble conventional economic regulation and rely on publicly available information, thereby falling more squarely within the judiciary’s competence to assess under established administrative law principles.

The framework introduced in this Article provides a doctrinally grounded and judicially administrable approach that allows courts to calibrate deference in national security cases. This Article thus helps to clarify the proper legal structure of this rapidly evolving area of law and provides guidance for the growing number of cases that are now making their way through the courts.